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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the problems of title to maritime territory and its resources. It 
examines the problems in the context of international law and with special reference 
to Nigeria. It is significant in that it attempts to explore ways and means of 
amicably resolving the problems of title to the maritime territory and resources that 
would otherwise have inevitably resulted in possible disintegration of Nigeria as a 
nation, if nothing is done to checkmate it. Hitherto, political solutions had been 
applied to resolve the problems which are legal problems in nature; hence the 
problems have hardly received authoritative legal analysis. Thus the thesis relies 
heavily on primary sources in examining and analyzing the problems and in 
proffering possible solutions. 
Considering the nature of the issues that are to be examined, significant 
contributions are made by the application of the principles of international law 
questions/issues to different areas of the law. These include examination of the legal 
nature of Nigeria's sovereignty over the territorial sea and its sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction in the exclusive economic zone in the context of the international law 
principles that have developed over the years and the constitutional and domestic 
law issues that the problems have generated. It also includes the problems of the 
international legal status of federating units of a federal State and the question of 
native title rights and self determination. 
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Chapter One 
I - Introduction 
1. Scope of study 
Problems of title to maritime territory and resources have existed from time 
immemorial. The problems initially started as a quest by a number of coastal States 
to expand their territorial hegemony over the adjacent maritime areas. Often, this 
was met by vehement opposition from other States favouring freer and more open 
seas. Thus, the maritime world in the periods between the 16th and the middle of 
20th Centuries witnessed a clash between States favouring free and open seas and 
those States favouring closed seas. Thus various criteria were adopted by States in 
ensuring the annexation of at least a portion of the seas adjacent to their coasts. 
Considerable success was recorded in this dimension as coastal States succeeded in 
annexing a portion of the seas adjacent to their coasts. With the annexation came 
the problem of the extent of the sea that could be closed and its juridical nature. 
Whilst the States succeeded in solving the problems of the nature of the TS through 
the Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea of 1958, the question of its breadth could 
not be resolved until the coming to force of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (hereafter referred to as UNCLOS), 1982, which provides for 12 
mile 'Territorial Sea (hereinafter referred to as TS) limit for each coastal State. 
However, within the federal coastal States, such as Australia, Canada, the United 
States, Nigeria and others, the problems of the nature of TS cannot be said to have 
been so settled. Not only that, in Nigeria problems over maritime territory and its 
resources transcend mere dispute over the TS, the ownership and control of the 
entire maritime space and its resources are equally disputed. The thesis therefore 
seeks to investigate the problems as they affect Nigeria and the possible solutions 
that may be applied by Nigeria in permanently resolving the lingering dispute. 
2. Historical development of Nigeria's coastal regions 
1 
To perfectly understand the nature of the problems as they affect Nigeria, there is 
the need to be aware of the historical development of the coastal region of Nigeria 
and the problems the development had created. Prior to colonization in Nigeria, 
there were Kingdoms and Empires that were located by the coast. The Kingdoms 
and Empires exercised as coastal frontage owners every right that any other coastal 
residents could exercise at that time. Nigeria became a colonial territory under 
Britain in 1861, through the conclusion of Treaties of cession and of protection with 
the local Chiefs and Rulers of the Kingdoms and Empires and subsequently through 
a series of diplomatic maneuvering, which later culminated in the Berlin West 
African conference of 1884-5, where Africa was partitioned among the competing 
European powers. Thus Kingdoms and Empires were constituted as colonies and 
protectorates soon after colonization. The colony of Lagos, the Southern and the 
Northern Protectorates were amalgamated to form the Nigerian State in 1914. 
By the above method, the entire coastline and the adjacent maritime territory, which 
at that time stretched from a point on the border between Nigeria and Benin 
Republic to another point on the thalweg of the Rio del Rey (but now the thalweg of 
Akwayafe River in view of the recent judgment of the ICJ in the Land and Maritime 
Boundary case between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroun vs. Nigeria: Equatorial 
Guinea intervening), 1 which divides both the Nigerian and the Cameroonian 
territories, with an approximate length of about 853 kilometres were brought under 
the control and dominion of the British Government. The coastal length can no 
longer represent the true coastal length of today's Nigeria; this is in view of the 
judgment in the above case which touches on both the land and maritime 
boundaries of Nigeria. The judgment has now awarded Bakassi Peninsula (though 
under very controversial circumstances) to Cameroun. Since Bakassi, which is also 
a local government area in Nigeria has now been formally handed over to 
Cameroun, the coastal length and the number of local government areas in Nigeria 
have been reduced very considerably. This requires the redrawing of the entire map 
of the country and an amendment to the Constitution to reflect the changes in the 
1 (2002), International Court of Justice Reports, p. 303 
2 
number of local government areas. This is in view of the rejection of the thalweg of 
Rio Del Rey River as the boundary in favour of the thalweg of Akwayafe River and 
the consequent transfer of about 33 towns and villages by Nigeria to Cameroun, 
Nigeria receiving only two villages in return. It is located on the western coast of 
Africa and is washed by the waters of the Gulf of Guinea on the Atlantic Ocean. 
Nigeria emerged as an independent sovereign nation on the 1st of October, 1960, 
following an application for membership2 made to the United Nations Organization 
and following a resolution formally admitting it into membership of the 
international community on the 7th of October 1960.3 
Prior to Nigeria's independence on 1st October, 1960, Nigeria right from the time of 
the amalgamation in 1914 up to 1951, was governed by the British as a unitary 
State. Therefore, no problems of title to the maritime territory and its resources 
arose at that time to the scale that Nigeria is currently experiencing. The problems 
started in 1951, when a federal Constitution was enacted, which divided the entire 
country into three Regional Governments namely, the Western, Eastern and 
Northern Regions with the Colony of Lagos constituted as the Federal territory.4 
Thereafter, the Regions were further subdivided into four Regions by the creation of 
the Midwestern Region out of the old Western Region.5 Thus the Western, Mid-
western and Eastern Regions, including the Colony of Lagos were the Regions and 
Colony that initially bordered the Atlantic Ocean until the military takeover of the 
reins of Nigerian Government in 1966. Following this forceful takeover, a further 
state creation exercise was undertaken, which led to the regions been subdivided 
2 Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 20, document 
N4527 in http://www.un.org/documents/galres/15/ares 15.htm. 
3 UN General Assembly Resolution 1492 (XV) of October, 1960 
4 Section 3 of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1963 (amended in 1967). 
5 Mid-Western Region (Transitional Provisions) Act, 1963; Constitution of Mid-Western Nigeria, 
1964 
3 
into twelve states.6 Nigeria as shown in the map below now consists of 36 states,7 
one Federal Capital Territory and 768 Local Government Areas.8 
Figure one: Map of Nigeria showing the current states 
N 
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Source9 
As can be seen in the above map, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Rivers, 
Ondo, Ogun and Lagos states are presently the federating units that are bordering 
the sea. The eight states will hereafter be collectively referred to as the Federating 
Coastal Units (FCU). The problems of title to the resources and maritime territory 
6 States (Creation and Transitional Provisions) Decree, 1967 and States (Creation and Transitional 
Provisions) (Amendment) Decree, 1967 
7 Nigerian Constitution, 1999, section 3 (I) 
8 Ibid, sub section (6). The number of the Local Government Areas has now reduced in view of the 
implementation of the ICJ judgment, which ordered the transfer of Bakassi Peninsula which had 
hitherto been a Local Government Area in Nigeria to Cameroon. 
9 http://www .fao .org/ag/ A G P/agpc/doc/cou nprof/nigerialn igeria. htm 
4 
of Nigeria started in earnest with the enactment of the Constitutions creating the 
above mentioned Regions. 
Furthermore, in 1956, the first discovery of petroleum in very large volume was 
made at Oloibiri in the present day Bayelsa state. 10 Thereafter, other large deposits 
of oil and gas have been found in onshore and offshore areas of the entire length of 
the coast of Nigeria. Nigeria therefore is presently the world's fifth largest oil 
producer and exporter. The revenue derived from the sale of oil and gas exploration 
and exploitation activities accounts for well over 80% of the total annual revenue 
accruable to the Nigerian Government. The revenue is shared between the Federal 
Government and all the federating units in Nigeria. Initially, all the federating units 
located along the coast, whether or not oil has been found in the adjacent sea areas 
of the units, receive more percentage from the revenue than any other federating 
units. Presently however, only the federating units regarded as oil and gas producers 
receive more in percentage than every other federating unit. By virtue of section 
162 (2) of the 1999 Constitution, the oil producing FCU, which include Akwa-lbom, 
Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, lately Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers are presently paid 
thirteen percent more than other federating units from revenue realised from oil and 
gas. Abia and Imo are oil producing federating units but they are not located by the 
sea, as such are not members of the FCU. 
It must be emphasised, that it is not all the FCU that are currently and seriously 
jostling to wrest ownership of maritime territory and its resources from the Federal 
Government. Those in the forefront of the campaign are the Niger Delta members 
of the FCU. The Niger Delta itself is made up of federating units such as, Abia, 
Akwa-lbom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers and covers an 
area of about 70, 000 square kilometres with about 560 kilometres coastal length. 
This coastal length is argued to represent about two-thirds of the total coastal length 
of Nigeria. Niger Delta is blessed with an estimated population of about 26 million 
people spread among the constituent federating units noted above. Thus out of all 
the federating units that make up the Niger Delta, only Akwa-lbom, Bayelsa, Cross 
10 Nigerian Vanguard Newspaper of gm May 2004- http://www.vanguard ngr.com. 
5 
River, Delta and Rivers states can be currently said to be in the forefront of the 
campaign to wrest control and ownership of the sea and its resources from the 
Federal Government. Furthermore, out of all the federating units that make up the 
Niger Delta, only Abia, Akwa-lbom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo 
and Rivers can be conclusively said to be oil and gas producing federating units in 
Nigeria. In Lagos and Ogun states, oil has been found in exploitable quantity but 
only the deposits in Lagos are now being worked on. 
With the enormous revenue accruing to Nigeria from oil and gas activities, it is 
normally expected that a proportion of it should be devoted to be positively 
impacted upon the people and develop their environment as is seen in other oil and 
gas producing States around the world. However, reverse is the case. Evidence 
abounds, for example, to show that the Niger Delta remains underdeveloped in 
terms of physical, social and economic development. It is an area, which has been 
ravaged by severe environmental degradation caused by pollution arising from oil 
and gas exploration and exploitation. The above coupled with the incessant gas 
flaring have combined to destroy the ecosystem and the biodiversity of the area, the 
traditional means of livelihoods, which are predominantly farming and fishing and 
have resulted in untold poverty, disease and deprivation. The oil and gas companies 
operating within the areas do not help the matter any better, they have persistently 
refused or ignored the need to apply the type of international measures and 
standards being applied elsewhere to the Niger Delta, either to reduce the incidence 
of pollution or to help in the development of infrastructure and alleviation of 
poverty of the people. 
The Niger Delta people who have been forced to live with the problems for well 
over forty years since independence in 1960 have now become frustrated and in 
their words "have decided to take their destinies in their own hands." This they are 
doing resulting to violence and unprecedented restiveness. Presently, the Nigerian 
maritime areas, especially the Niger Delta areas, are now characterised by 
unwarranted violence, and the violence is threatening the very existence of Nigeria 
as a corporate and united entity. This has led to the rule of law being replaced by 
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the rule of anarchy over the land territory and the immediate sea areas adjacent to 
Nigeria. The mode of the violence, which in most cases involve incessant blowing 
ups of oil and gas pipelines, ambushes, arsons and kidnappings/hostage takings, 
killing and maiming of oil and gas workers, policemen and soldiers posted to the 
region to secure life, property and investment all raise the question of terrorism. 
Thus, the problems of title to the resources and maritime territory have now 
assumed the dimension of an agitation to wrest total ownership and control of 
resources and the maritime territory adjacent to Nigeria from the Federal 
Government. The agitation as will be shown in chapter four and five is generally 
hinged on the concept of native right/natural prolongation, rights of self 
determination and institutionalisation of true federalism in Nigeria. 
3. Analysis of the title problems/research questions 
Maritime title problems as they currently exist in Federal coastal States, such as 
Australia, Canada, the United States of America and Nigeria can be linked to. a 
number of different but very controversial factors. First and foremost, the problems 
may be argued to have been triggered by the importance of the seas and oceans to 
most States as channels of commerce, transportation and national security. This 
informs the desire of every government of a coastal State to control its maritime 
space. The problem could also be linked to availability of natural resources of 
fisheries, hydrocarbon, gas, manganese nodules and other natural resources of the 
adjacent sea areas. The Federal Government wants to exercise power of ownership 
and control, at the same time the FCU too want to exercise power of ownership and 
control over the same maritime space and its resources. The question therefore, is 
which between the two tiers of government has the legal right to own and control 
the maritime space and its resources? 
The above problems arose as will be elaborated on in subsequent chapters from the 
facts of history, whereby before the formation of the union some states (US and 
Australia) and provinces (Canada) were either independent sovereign states (e.g. 
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Texas in the US) or were colonies or protectorates before joining the union. In 
Nigeria the entities that today make up the Nigerian State were initially independent 
Kingdoms, Empires and Emirates, but during colonialism, some of them were either 
colonies or protectorates. The question again, is whether the states as in the US and 
Australia, provinces as in Canada and colonies and protectorates as in Nigeria 
entered the federal unions at independence with their former rights over the 
adjacent TS? The States that were already sovereign, including those that were 
Kingdoms and Empires before the formation of the federal union, believed they 
came into the unions with their formal rights over the adjacent sea and as such 
should control its resources. The Federal Government however thinks differently. 
These problems were not adequately addressed by the Geneva Convention and 
UNCLOS. 
With the introduction of colonialism came also the problems of whether or not the 
transfer of rights to the colonialists could be termed state succession in international 
law, so that the colonialists assumed all the rights previously exercised by the 
Kingdoms and Empires. This question repeats itself at independence of the States. 
Furthermore, the Kingdoms and Empires in Nigeria that were formerly 
protectorates believed that the treaty of protection signed by them with the British 
did not affect their rights in the submarine areas and as such their powers of 
dominium and imperium hitherto exercised over the adjacent sea areas were 
unaffected and were not diminished in any way by the fact of treaties. 
The climax of the maritime title problems was reached in Nigeria in 2001, when the 
Supreme Court was invited by the then Attorney General of the Federation in the 
case of Attorney General of the Federation vs. Attorney General of Abia state and 
others (NO. 2) (hereafter referred to as Abia case), to determine inter alia the 
southern or seaward boundary of each of the eight federating coastal units of Akwa-
lbom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo and Rivers within the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. The court had the opportunity of resolving once and 
for all the maritime title problems in Nigeria, but the opportunity was wasted by its 
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determination that, "the seaward limit of Nigeria is the low-water mark but Nigeria 
in exercise of its sovereignty and by the custom of the international community 
exercises jurisdiction beyond that limit." 11 The determination by polarizing the 
maritime space of Nigeria to onshore and offshore for the purposes of entitlement to 
oil and gas revenue sharing by the FCU, further increased the tempo of agitation 
over ownership and control of the maritime territory and resources to a more 
dangerous dimension than ever before. It has thus raised further problems, of both 
international and domestic laws dimensions. 
3.1 International law problems emanating fromAbia case, 
The following international law problems could be elicited from the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria in Abia case: 
(a) Problem of whether or not the TS is included within Nigeria's national territory 
so that it exercises sovereignty over it. 
(b) Problem emanating from the concept of natural prolongation. Whether natural 
prolongation as used by the Geneva Convention on Continental Shelf and 
subsequently by UNCLOS to define Continental Shelf is a reference to the 
Continental Shelf of a State as an entity or only to the Continental Shelf of the 
federating units of a federal State, which are adjacent to the sea. 
(c) problem of determination of contiguity between Nigeria and its FCU 
(d) Problem of native title rights. Whether they are exclusive to the holders or not, 
and 
(e) Problem of which between the federation and the FCU possesses international 
legal personality to assume ownership and control of maritime territory and its 
resources 
3.2 Problems emanating from Nigeria's domestic laws 
11 (2002)6, Nigerian Weekly Law Reports, pp. 588-598 
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The claims of the FCU are also strengthened by the major lacunae in some of the 
domestic laws of Nigeria on the various maritime zones. The failures of the 
domestic laws are most pronounced with regards to the TS, where until now, 
Nigeria's rights and interests are a matter for speculation. This is so because, 
Section 1 (1) of the Territorial Waters Act provides that: The territorial waters of 
Nigeria shall for all purposes include every part of the open seas within thirty 
nautical miles of the coast of Nigeria (measured from low-water mark) or of the 
seaward limits of inland waters. The thirty miles have now been amended to 12 
nautical miles by the Territorial Waters Amendment Decree. As can be seen, the 
Territorial Waters Act does not specifically claim the sovereignty granted Nigeria 
over the TS by international law. It can be said without mincing of words that 
presently, there is no Nigerian domestic legislation, which specifically claims 
sovereignty granted the country by international law over the TS, the airspace above 
it and the sea-bed and the subsoil of the submarine areas. 
Thus, apart from the provisions of the Geneva Convention and the UNCLOS, 
which reserve sovereignty over the TS, the airspace above it and the sea-bed and 
subsoil for coastal States in general, the only right which it may be argued Nigeria 
has specifically claimed by its domestic laws in the TS is that of limited 
jurisdiction. The limited jurisdiction does not extend to foreigners by virtue of the 
Supreme Court pronouncements in Abia case and does not also extend to the 
airspace, the sea-bed and subsoil of the TS. As will be shown in chapter two, even 
the rights granted by UNCLOS are still disputed in Nigeria, because UNCLOS 
uses the word "state" and the federating units in Nigeria are equally referred to as 
states. 
The Territorial Waters Act is not the only Act in this category. For example, 
section 1 ( 1) of Petroleum Act and section 1 ( 1) of the Minerals and Mining Decree 
both vests ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any land on the 
State. Both laws claim the property in the TS and other areas of the maritime space, 
but not the sovereignty granted by international law over the TS itself or the 
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sovereign right over the CS. As will be expatiated in subsequent chapters, this is a 
grave omission which Nigeria must address. 
Even the Constitution of the country, which is the grundnorm of all other Nigerian 
domestic laws, does not contain provisions which are specific enough as to declare 
Nigeria's sovereignty over the territorial sea (hereinafter referred to as TS) or its 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the Continental Shelf (hereinafter referred to 
as CS) as granted by international law. Take for instance, section 44 (3) of the 
Nigeria's 1999 Constitution, which is the only provision in that Constitution on the 
ownership of maritime territory and resources provides: Notwithstanding the 
foregoing provisions of this section, the entire property in and control of all 
minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in, under or upon the territorial waters and 
the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the 
Federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the 
National Assembly. This provision like the Petroleum Act and the Minerals and 
Mining Decree mentioned above merely claim the petroleum, gas and other 
mineral resources in Nigeria's maritime space but not the actual rights granted 
Nigeria by international law over the TS the CS. This is unlike the Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act, which specifically declares Nigeria's sovereign right over the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (hereafter referred to as the EEZ). 
Furthermore, Nigeria has not enacted any legislation to claim its rights over the CS, 
as defined by Article 76(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (hereafter referred to as UNCLOS) 1982. That Article defines the CS as: "The 
continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin ... "12 
Upon it, Article 77(1) grants a coastal State sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting its natural resources. 
12 UNCLOS 1982 
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It is understood quite clearly that under international law, a coastal State need not 
claim CS rights before it can exercise them, but in a federal state with problems of 
title over the maritime territory and its resources, there is the need for a domestic 
law, which clearly proclaims the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the state over 
the adjacent CS. The failure of Nigeria's domestic laws to claim the specific rights 
granted by international law or the failure to claim the rights at all has caused 
further problems between those laws and International law. For instance, Nigeria is 
a dualist State, which means international law is looked at as being separate and 
independent from the domestic laws of Nigeria. The problem is which between the 
two legal systems is superior to the other. This problem as will be further reflected 
in subsequent chapters is compounded by international decisions, which preclude 
States from pleading domestic laws as reasons for failure to perform international 
obligations undertaken by them under specific treaties. 
Also, the maritime practice of Nigeria as exemplified by its legislative, judicial and 
executive practices indicates a remarkable lack of understanding of the basic tenets 
and principles of the law of the sea. Some of these principles, because of their 
uniqueness and novelty are not unambiguously dealt with by UNCLOS and thus 
can only be determined by examination of the practice of States. 
Another domestic law, which has created problems of title for the maritime space 
of Nigeria, is the Dichotomy Act. This Act was enacted in 2004 to cushion the 
effects and hardship caused by the decision in Abia case, but as will be shown in 
chapter six, it too suffers from numerous problems. Most especially, the Act, 
because it has the effect of changing the provision of Nigeria's Constitution on 
revenue sharing and the areas covered by the revenue sharing formula, it can only 
be legally enacted pursuant to the provisions of Section 9 (1) & (2) of the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution. That section spells out the procedure that must be followed 
in enacting laws that have the effect of changing the provision of the Constitution, 
by requiring in sub section (2) the votes of not less than two-thirds majority of all 
the members of the National Assembly and approved by resolution of the Houses 
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of Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all states. This procedure was never 
complied with before that Act was enacted. The questions are these: 
(a) Has the Dichotomy Act resolved the title problems over Nigeria's maritime 
space and resources? 
(b) What are the implications and other shortcomings of that Act? 
(c) What other methods have been adopted by the Federal Government to resolve 
the dispute? 
As a corollary to the above, the decision in Abia case has also led to increase in the 
tempo of agitation for the assertion of rights of self determination by the Niger 
Delta people and the demands for the implementation by the Nigerian Government 
of true federalism in Nigeria. True federalism has also raised the question of 
whether sovereignty in these States resides with the federation, so that it alone 
claims the international rights granted by the Geneva Convention and subsequently 
UNCLOS or whether it resides with the federating units. The argument has also 
been canvassed that sovereignty in these States are concurrent so that both the 
federation and the units are sovereign in their own rights and as such each unit has 
declared entitlement to the rights over the maritime territory adjacent to it. An 
extreme case of the problem is seen in Nigeria, whereby the FCU claim equal 
sovereignty with the federation and the right to control the resources of the 
maritime territory to the exclusion of the federation. Thus, this thesis seeks to 
address all the above problems. 
In carrying on the research, the method adopted is primarily library research, 
including Public Records Office research conducted both in Nigeria and in the 
United Kingdom. It also includes the several personal interviews conducted with 
some high ranking Nigerian officials, such as the then Attorney General of the 
Federation of Nigeria, Legal Officers and youths from the FCU. 
On the basis of the above therefore, the thesis is divided in the main into seven 
chapters. The first chapter is this introduction, it analysis the nature of the problems 
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the thesis is confronted with and how it will go about them. The second chapter 
begins by an attempt to trace the origin of maritime claims by coastal States. This is 
followed by an examination of the question of three mile TS dimension, whether 
the concept was universally adopted and if not, whether Britain the then colonial 
master of Nigeria adopted it and if it adopted it, whether it subsequently introduced 
the practice to Nigeria or not, taking into account the role of colonisation in the 
creation and development of norms of law of the sea. This chapter also attempts the 
determination of the true juridical character of the TS of Nigeria that is, whether the 
authority of Nigeria over it is that of imperium or dominium. That is whether the TS 
forms part of the national territory of Nigeria or not and the nature of governmental 
powers over it. The domestic laws and practices of Nigeria are examined in order to 
determine their conformity or otherwise with international law on the question of 
the nature of the TS. 
In doing all the above, attention will necessarily focus on examining the various 
theories, such as the Hegel, Kelsen and the property theories on the nature of TS 
and the relevant customary international laws (state practice and opinion juris) on 
the matter. It will examine what the nature of Nigeria's TS was during the pre-
colonial and colonial eras and what it has been thereafter. The aim is to determine 
through empirical evidence the basis of the claims to ownership of the sea and its 
resources by the Federal Government and the FCU, whether such claims can be 
grounded and sustained under international law and the domestic laws of Nigeria. It 
is intended to sever the TS for separate discussion from other maritime zones and to 
determine whether or not the FCU by their having been resident along the coast 
from time immemorial before the formation of the Nigerian State may have a basis 
for disputing the Federation's title over the TS. It also demonstrates that whilst the 
FCU by their having been resident by the coast from time immemorial may have a 
basis to dispute the Federation's title over the TS, the same cannot be the case with 
regards to the CS and the EEZ beyond the TS, which did not exist at that time. 
Chapter three then deals with the juridical nature of the EEZ. It attempts to 
investigate the true juridical character of the EEZ that is, whether the EEZ is a part 
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of the TS, the high seas or whether it possesses a separate legal regime of its own. 
The chapter begins by the examination of the legal evolution of the CS, which is 
inextricably linked to the EEZ and thus warranted their treatment together. It will 
examine the various postulations that were put forward by some States before the 
concept of EEZ was finally adopted and incorporated in international law. In this 
connection, a thorough investigation will be conducted to determine the unique 
characteristics of the EEZ, which differentiate it from other maritime zones. The 
aim is to demonstrate through empirical evidence that because the EEZ is different 
from both the TS and the High Seas, the authority and rights of a coastal State are 
similarly different from those it possesses over other maritime zones. By the same 
token, the chapter aims to investigate the reasons why the FCU cannot lay any valid 
claim on the EEZ and CS beyond the TS even though they have occupied the 
coastal areas before the formation of the Nigerian State. 
Further to the above, chapter four deals with the climax of the title dispute between 
the Federal Government and the FCU over the control and ownership of the sea 
areas ,adjacent to Nigeria and its resources of hydrocarbon, gas, fishery and other 
oceanic resources. It attempts to determine, which between the two tiers of the 
Nigerian government owns or should own and control the maritime territory and its 
resources. In doing this the Abia case, which the Federal Government instituted in 
order to legally resolve the controversy, will be subjected to very critical scrutiny. 
This is with a view to properly examining the decision, its ratio decidendi and the 
legal implications of the various errors, misconceptions and misapplication of 
certain concepts by the Court. This is done in order to determine the justice of the 
case and whether it has finally resolved the controversy or not. 
Chapter five on the other hand focuses on the Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of 
Dichotomy in the Application of Derivation) Act. It analysis the reasons offered by 
the President in seriously curtailing the scope of the Act. The chapter attempts to 
determine the strength and shortcomings of that Act and its capability or otherwise 
in ameliorating the harshness caused by the judgment in the Abia case, which it was 
originally intended to mitigate. Attempts will be made to answer the question 
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whether the enactment of the Dichotomy Act and other initiatives of the Federal 
Government had put an end to the title dispute between the parties? 
The concepts of true federalism and self determination which, inter alia form part 
of the real reasons or arguments why the Niger Delta people want to wrest 
ownership and control of the maritime territory and its resources from the Federal 
Government will be critically examined. This is with a view to determining whether 
the concepts can legally be relied upon to wrest control of the maritime territory and 
its resources from the Federal Government. 
To be able to proffer acceptable, enduring and proven solutions to the problems of 
maritime title in Nigeria, chapter six undertakes an in-depth comparative study of 
similar title prol:Hems in other Federal States and how the affected States succeeded 
in resolving the disputes. In this context, the practical methods adopted by the 
United States, Australia and Canada in either finally resolving the problems or at 
least abating it will be investigated. This is done with the aim of finding practical 
lessons for the resolution of similar problems by Nigeria. 
Finally, chapter seven is conclusions and recommendations. It gives a brief 
summary of the thesis by bringing out the main themes and salient legal points 
raised and discussed in the thesis. It also points out the m~n findings of the study 
and recommendations for permanent resolution of the controversy. 
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Chapter two 
The Nature of the Territorial Sea as perceived by Nigeria: The Problems of 
Law and Theory 
I. Introduction 
Determination of the question of the nature of the TS of Nigeria has more than ever 
before become of the utmost importance to the Nigerian Government as it is to most 
maritime nations the world over. The question of the nature of TS is vexed and has 
been discussed by many academic writers and jurists. The discussions centre mainly 
on whether the authority of a coastal state over the TS is imperium, dominium or 
sovereignty. 1 That is, whether the TS formed part of the national territory of the 
adjoining State or not. In the extreme case, the theories of imperium, dominium and 
sovereignty have been outrightly rejected in favour of TS being a 'bundle of 
servitudes.' Until the coming to force of the Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea, 
1958 and lately, the 1982 UNCLOS, international law, including judicial decisions 
and State practice had remained uncertain on this question. Notwithstanding the 
clarification of the juridical nature of the TS made by the Geneva Convention on 
Territorial Sea and specifically by UNCLOS, the precise nature of the TS is still 
disputed in most federal States. 
It is important to resolve the issue of the nature of the Nigerian TS, because such a 
resolution would help to correct the erroneous impression about whether or not the 
territorial boundary of Nigeria ends at low-water mark. The precise juridical basis 
of Nigeria's governmental authority depends to a very large extent on the correct 
determination of the nature of the TS adjacent to its coastline. The question whether 
Nigeria's right over the TS is that of dominium, in the sense that she possesses 
property rights or it is that of imperium in the sense of jurisdiction or sovereign 
rights has to a large extent come to depend upon proper determination of the 
juridical nature of the TS. Whether Nigeria considers itself as possessing 
1 Generally, see O'Connell, D.P., The International Law of the Sea, vol. 1, Clarendon, Oxford 
(1982), p.1- 24; 60- 82; Fulton, T.W., The Sovereignty of the Sea, Edinburgh (1911) reprinted by 
New York state library (1976), pp. 1 -25 
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sovereignty over it thereby treating the same as forming part of the national territory 
depends too on the proper determination of the nature of the TS. 
The importance of proper determination of the nature of the TS and the juridical 
basis of the Nigerian governmental powers and authority can be better appreciated 
in the light of the distribution of rights between Nigeria - a federal State and the 
federating units, especially the FCU. Proper determination of the question would 
ipso facto and ipso jure help in the determination of the question of who has title or 
should control the maritime territory adjacent to Nigeria and its resources between 
the two tiers of government. Thus, a correct determination of the legal status of this 
zone would help Nigeria determine her rights over the zone in relation with the 
rights of other coastal States. 
Closely related to the problems of nature of the TS is the controversy, which 
initially surrounded its dimension. Several criteria, such as limit of visibility, mid-
channel, range of navigation, thalweg, cannon shot rule and the three mile TS 
concept were initially adopted to describe TS dimension of a State. The practice of 
States on TS dimension is as conflicting as its nature. For instance, there were the 
proponents of three-mile TS and there were those that argued for different distances. 
With respect to Nigeria, it is important to clarify the actual dimension of the TS that 
the majority of States were prepared to concede in the 18th and 19th Centuries. 
Doing so would no doubt help in determining the farthest extent of the sea areas 
that the former Kingdoms and Empires that today make up the coastal areas of 
Nigeria were arguably able to control before colonization and after. Determination 
of the dimension of the TS during the above period would help in determining the 
dimension of sea boundary that the various Kingdoms and Empires could argue 
they brought into the union of Nigeria both in 1914 that the Kingdoms and Empires 
were amalgamated to form the State of Nigeria and after decolonization in1960. 
This part of the thesis argues that the TS, both at the time the distance was held to 
be three miles and the current twelve miles forms part of the national territory of 
Nigeria. 
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II. The Problems as Perceived by Nigeria 
Article 1 (1) & (2) and 2 of the Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone of 1958, and Article 2 (1) & (2) of UNCLOS, clearly and 
unambiguously affirm the sovereignty of the coastal State over the TS, the airspace 
above it, the sea bed and the subsoil thereof. With respect to the breadth of the TS, 
Article 3 of UNCLOS provides that: Every State has the right to establish the 
breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured 
from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention. In doing so, 
international law may be held to have resolved the problems of the dimension and 
of the dominium, imperium and sovereignty issues over the TS. It is therefore 
expected that the controversy surrounding the nature and dimension of the TS 
would have suffered a natural demise or at least have abated. However, the issue of 
the ownership of the maritime territory between the Federal Government and the 
FCU has again brought to the fore the issue of the juridical nature of the TS. It has 
also brought to the fore the issue of the dimension of the TS, because it will be 
practically impossible to determine the issue of the nature of Nigeria's TS without 
knowing the dimension of the sea upon which the acts of dominium and imperium 
were exercised, either before colonization and especially before the coming into 
force of UNCLOS in 1982. The problem has thus become a national question for 
Nigeria and problem to be resolved by Nigerian laws as interpreted and applied by 
Nigeria's courts. The ghost of the nature of TS therefore continues to haunt most 
Federal States. The problems as they affect Nigeria may be categorized as: 
(I) Judicial pronouncements, 
(II) Absence of domestic law, which declares Nigeria's interests in the TS, 
(III) General ignorance and exploitation of the masses, 
(IV) Inconsistent maritime policy formulation, 
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(V) Politicization of maritime issues, and 
(VI) Uncertainty of breadth of the TS under 1958 Geneva Convention on TS. 
1. Problems arising from judicial pronouncement 
In what appears to be a resurgence of the nature of the TS, the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria in Abia case has declared that the southern boundary of Nigeria ends at 
low-water mark and that beyond that point Nigeria only has power to exercise 
sovereign rights over the territorial waters and airspace and that they do not 
constitute an extension of the territorial boundaries of Nigeria or indeed that of the 
FCU.2 
A strict interpretation of the decision would raise the following implications: 
(a) That Nigeria does not possess sovereignty over its TS, notwithstanding 
the provisions of UNCLOS, which grants the power of sovereignty to it. The 
statement of the court equates the power of Nigeria over the TS to that of 
sovereign rights or mere jurisdictional rights, which do not even extend to 
offences committed by foreigners within the TS of Nigeria; 
(b) That Nigeria does not also possess sovereignty over the airspace above 
the TS; 
(c) That Nigeria does not possess sovereignty over the seabed, subsoil of the 
TS and the resources that lay underneath it, and 
(d) Above all, that the TS does not form part of Nigeria's national territory. 
Not only that, the judgment interpreted the word 'sea' to mean low-water mark, 
thereby equating the sea with low-water mark which is nothing but a dry land 
covered by water only at high tide. Thus by that judgment, the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria has again brought to the fore, the issue of the nature of the TS thought to 
have been long resolved. 
2. Absence of domestic laws which declare Nigeria's interests in the TS 
The second problem is the absence to date of domestic laws, which specifically and 
2 (2002) 6, NWLR, part 764, p. 660 
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unambiguously declare Nigeria's interests and rights in its TS and in other maritime 
zones adjacent to the country. This problem is a carry over from the practice during 
the colonial era, especially soon after the discovery of petroleum in the maritime 
territory of Nigeria. From that time onward, the country's interests focused more on 
the resources than the ocean itself, the subsoil and the airspace thereof. Therefore, 
most of the domestic laws relating to the maritime territory have concentrated on 
claiming the resources and not the seas themselves. 
3. General ignorance and exploitation of the masses by the elites 
The third problem is the general lack of informed knowledge about the basic 
principles of the law of the sea as they affect the TS and other maritime zones of 
Nigeria. This has led to misuse and misapplication of certain basic principles and 
concepts of the law of the sea, with the result that the minds of the ordinary coastal 
people have now become habituated to or inculcated with such ideas that the sea 
adjacent to Nigeria belongs solely to them and that it is their God-given gift, which 
they must control. This has in turn led to the formation of groups by the Niger Delta 
people that are currently championing the course of resources control. Thus in a 
statement preparatory to a proposed mass rally, the spokesman of the Ijaw Youth 
Council (IYC), Mr Peter Ajube stated: 
The proposed mass rally by the ljaw Youth Council (IYC) Worldwide is to 
further demonstrate to the entire world the impeccable desire of Ijaw people 
and the other Niger Delta ethnic nationalities to own and control their God-
given natural resources for the rapid socio-economic and infrastructural 
development as well as environmental protection ... 3 
As a consequence therefore, exploration, exploitation, navigation and other marine 
activities are now being hampered by the activities of these groups, which in most 
cases are violent. This has negative consequences on investment in the downstream 
oil and gas sectors of the Nigerian economy. It is equally antithetical to the real 
intention of UNCLOS 1982, which inter alia includes the promotion of the rule of 
3 Vanguard Nigeria Newspaper of 8th August, 2005 in 
http://www. vanguardngr .com/articles/2002/niger _del ta!nd20802005. html 
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law and peaceful uses of the world's seas and oceans and their resources by all 
nations of the world.4 It is the same lack of informed knowledge about the nature of 
the TS that has led the Supreme Court in Abia case, to describe inter alia the power 
and authority of Nigeria in relation to its TS, the subsoil below and the airspace 
above it as something akin to sovereign rights or rights of jurisdiction and to 
adjudge that the territory of Nigeria ends at low-water mark.5 
Commenting on the issue of unrest and violence in the Niger Delta areas and the 
negative consequences it has generated, Mr. Olumide Onakoya, the Managing 
Director of Mobil Oil Nigeria, observes as follows: 
"It is not that we are not interested in investing in our refineries. In fact, 
these refineries are a great national asset. But the way things are going today, 
if we put money in these refineries, we will not get return on our 
investment. ... Government must do something to ensure that it address the 
problem of unrest and hostility between oil communities and oil 
companies. ,,6 
4. Inconsistent maritime policy formulation 
The fourth problem created by the uncertainty of the nature of the TS has to do with 
formulation of marine policies by the Federal Government. Because the nature of 
rights Nigeria possesses over the TS is not clear or well understood even by the 
government, formulation of maritime policies has been inconsistent, conflicting and 
fluctuating. This explains why the Federal Government has consistently repeated 
the mistakes, such as including in its enactments a clause which makes the CS of 
Nigeria to be part of the state it is most contiguous to, even when it is clear that the 
inclusion of a similar clause in the independence and republican Constitutions had 
led in the past to misinterpretation by the people of the Niger Delta. The public 
statements of the leaders too do not help the matter. Indeed, the President and some 
Governors in their public statements still refer to the sea and its resources as 
4 See paragraph 4 of the preamble to UNCLOS, 1982 
5 Op. cit., note 2, p. 731 
6 Vanguard Newspaper of 4th June, 2005 in 
http://www. vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/business/june05/03062005 
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belonging to the FCU. 
5. Politicisation of maritime issues 
The fifth problem is the politicisation of maritime issues by the successive 
governments in Nigeria. This has led to constant review and adjustment of maritime 
policies and in the revenue paid to the FCU and in the areas of the sea covered by 
such revenues. For example, in their bid to win elections, politicians have made 
promises of either increasing the percentages payable to the FCU from revenue 
accruing from oceanic resources or that when voted to power they would look into 
the agitation of the FCU for resources control with a view to finding amicable cum 
political solutions to the problem. Politicians have also promised to develop the 
infrastructure, improve educational and health facilities. The promises were made 
by politicians who have little or no knowledge of the principles of law of the sea 
involved and in the implication of such promises. This therefore begs the question: 
Whether the problem of politicization addressed in this subsection could be 
resolved by recourse to international law or it is purely a national or domestic 
constitutional law issue? This attitude has generally imbued the minds of the 
citizens of the FCU with the impression that the generality of Nigerians 
acknowledge their ownership of the maritime territory adjacent to Nigeria, therefore, 
once in power, the FCU expect the fulfillment of the promises made by the 
politicians and where no fulfillment is forthcoming there is a general recourse to 
violence. Nigeria has consistently applied political solutions to a legal problem. 
6. Uncertainty of breadth of TS under the 1958 Geneva Convention on TS 
The sixth problem is that, the Geneva Convention of 1958 failed to specify the 
dimension or breadth of the TS, whether at three miles or at any other distance at all. 
This was because at the time of the Geneva Convention, States could not agree or 
find a compromise on the breadth of TS. Thus the three mile TS States held fast to 
their three miles TS, while those that claimed other distances, for example the 
Scandinavian States held fast to such distances. There were also the Latin American 
States who argued for a much wider TS dimension. This argument was also carried 
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as far as to whether the three miles, which so many maritime States claimed at that 
time formed part of the national territory of the adjoining State or not. 
The controversy arose as a result of the use of the word 'sovereignty' to describe 
the right a nation possesses over her TS, which word is so ambiguous that different 
meanings have at different times been read into it. This controversy was particularly 
more pronounced among federal States, which in most cases have the question of 
distribution of rights to determine between them and their federating units. In recent 
time, however, this problem has known no bounds nor is it peculiar only to the 
federal States. For example, the unfolding events in Scotland7 over the question of 
ownership of the oil deposits in the North Sea between Scotland and the rest of the 
United Kingdom now suggest that some unitary States too are not completely 
immune or exempted from the problem of determination of the nature of TS. 
Concluding on the views above, it is right to argue that UNCLOS has addressed the 
question of the nature and the dimension of the TS and that the Abia case, which 
brought the issues up again misunderstood international law on those points. 
However, UNCLOS addresses States generally without taking into consideration 
the problem of sovereignty in federal States. Similarly, Abia case is still a valid 
judgment in Nigeria and to resolve the problems will require making allusion into 
law and history as constituted in the 18th, 19th and partly 20th Centuries and as they 
affect determination of the nature and extent of the areas of sea controlled by the 
Kingdoms and Empires before the establishment of the Nigerian State and before 
UNCLOS. This calls for an examination of the development of TS as a legal 
concept before the coming into operation of the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
Territorial Sea and UNCLOS. In doing this, the concept of foreshore, which could 
be argued, served as the genesis of attempts by states at appropriating the sea areas 
adjacent to their coasts will be examined. Furthermore, mention will be made of 
·other attempts at appropriating the sea by states such as the 'range of navigation,' 
'mid-channel or thalweg,' 'limit of visibility,' 'mare liberium' and 'mare clausum.' 
7 Brown, E.D., "its Scotland's oil," vol. 2, (1978) Marine Policy, pp. 3-21 
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The 'cannon shot rule' and the 'three-mile TS' concept would cap the discussion on 
the development of the TS concept. 
On whether the authority of a coastal state over the TS is dominium, imperium, 
sovereignty or it is a 'bundle of servitudes'; we shall consider the various theories 
on the matter. We shall equally consider the practice of some states and judicial 
opinions on the subject. Finally, attempts will be made to examine the practice in 
the pre-colonial Nigeria and how the concept of TS became introduced to the legal 
system of Nigeria. We shall examine the practice of Nigeria regarding the nature of 
TS, from its independence to the present day. In doing the above, we shall carry out 
an in-depth study of the various maritime laws and judicial decisions so far 
expressed on the matter by Nigerian legislature and the judiciary. 
III. Development of TS as a Legal Concept 
1 The Foreshore- Property versus dominion8 
The foreshore is discussed in this context because it formed the immediate 
sea area upon which the sovereignty of the coastal State according to 
Digges9 was initially asserted. It is an area of the sea between the high and 
low water tide adjacent to the coast of a State and upon it the Crown had for 
a long time asserted rights and the rights were generally acknowledged by 
other maritime powers. The fact that the Crown exercised or possessed some 
measure of rights over the foreshore was not so much in controversy, as the 
nature of that right. While it is believed in some quarters that the Crown's 
right over the foreshore is proprietary in nature, others have argued that it is 
dominium. For example, Boroughs in 1633 and Selden in 1635 have both 
traced some documents, titled De superioritate maris Angliae et juris officii 
Admiralitatis in eodem to the reign of Edward II, dating as far back as 1299, 
which they argued confirmed the authority of the Crown over the foreshore 
8 Generally, see Moore, S.A., History and Law of the Foreshore and Sea Shore and the Law Relating 
Thereto, 3rd edition, (1888) p. 185; O'Connell, D.P. op. cit. vol. 1, pp. 2-9 and Gray, K.J., 
Elements of Land Law, Butterworth & Co. London (1987), pp. 32 - 33 
9 Ibid 
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areas as being proprietary in nature. 
The text of the above mentioned document was incorporated by Coke in his 
Fourth Institute in 1644 and was widely referred to in the 17th Century. From 
this time onward, other jurists such as Hale and Digges have equally made 
arguments in favour of the Crown's proprietary rights over the foreshore of 
the English seas. Thus Digges argued: 
And in this estate regall of Englande wee see that the kings of most 
auncient times have in the right of theire crowne helde the seas aboute 
this Iland so proper and entire unto them. Not only was the Crown's 
proprietary rights affirmed by jurists and the documents, there were 
also judicial decisions to the effect that 'the sea is the King's proper 
inheritance," 10 the rights were effectively presented in Ruling's 
case
11 in 1591. 
The proprietary rights were found to have been exercised over fishing and 
proclaimed in a treaty with France in 1360. In the light of the above, the 
Crown had exercised acts of a property owner by the granting of parts 
thereof both in England and in several of the Crown's overseas Colonies to 
members of the public. Example of such grants by the Crown can be found 
in Nigeria in Attorney General of Southern Nigeria vs. John Holt and 
Company (Liverpool) Ltd and others, 12(hereafter referred to as AG Southern 
Nigeria vs. John Holt Ltd). The respondents first obtained their title over 
parcels of land adjacent to the shore of Lagos from native grants. They 
subsequently obtained Crown grants in respect of the same parcels of land 
soon after the introduction of colonial rule to Lagos in 1861. At various 
dates after obtaining Crown grants the respondents carried out works on the 
foreshore in order to prevent incursions by the sea and erosion. As a result, a 
strip of land had been reclaimed below that which in 1861 had been high 
10 Royal Piscary of the Banne (1610), Dav., p. 56a 
11 Officium Domini vs. Dulinge, cited by O'Connell supra, p. 307. 
12 (1915) AC, p. 599. 
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water mark. In 1907, the Government of Lagos began the construction of a 
public road, which ran across the strip of land mentioned above. The 
respondents brought the action against the Attorney General to recover 
compensation. The court held that "the reclaimed land, not being the result of 
natural accretion, vested in the Crown as owner of the foreshore ... " 13 In 
conclusion it appears that Nigeria also followed the proprietary doctrine 
introduced by Britain. 
2 Accretion 
Since the boundary between the lands adjoining navigable rivers may be 
altered in one way or another by the forces of nature caused by the adjoining 
sea, it is necessary to examine the concept of accretion and subsequently 
avulsion in order to determine the implications of their occurrence on the 
boundary of the adjoining land. The rights and title of the Crown in the 
foreshore were in relatively rare cases affected by the concepts of accretion 
and avulsion, which operated to either add or take away depending on the 
circumstances, a portion of the Crown's territory in the foreshore. Both 
concepts apply as a matter of fairness and convenience. They are however 
different one from the other but they both occur as a result of force~ of 
nature, which alter or change the course of the boundary between the land 
and the water. 
In the case of accretion for example, if the forces of nature had the effect of 
silting up the adjoining land by a gradual and imperceptible deposition of 
alluvium, the law considers the addition as forming part of the adjoining 
land. 14 If on the other hand, gradual and imperceptible incursions and 
encroachments were made through erosion or diluvium caused by the forces 
of advancing waters of the sea on the adjoining land, the owner of the land 
loses the affected part of his land to the Crown as the owner of the foreshore. 
13 Ibid at p.600 
14 Attorney General vs. McCarthy (1911) 2 IR, 260 at 277; Port Franks Property Ltd vs. The Queen 
(1980) D.L.R. (3d) p. 28 at p.36. 
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However any changes caused by the deliberate action of the owner of the 
adjoining land have been held to fall outside the doctrine of accretion. 15 
Furthermore, apart from mere addition of a strip of land to the adjoining land, 
the process described above has the capacity of creating completely new 
islands, ownership of which may depend inter alia on the distance of the 
island to the shore. This process provided an avenue to extended maritime 
claims beyond the foreshore originally conceded to the Crown. Thus it is 
observed as follows: 
"The natural process which creates alluviums on the shore and banks, 
and deltas at the mouth of rivers, together with other processes, may 
lead to the birth of new islands. If they arise on the high seas outside 
the territorial maritime belt, they belong to no state, and may be 
acquired through occupation on the part of any state. But if they arise 
in rivers, lakes, or within the maritime belt, they are, according to the 
law of nations, considered accretions to the neighbouring Iand."16 
3. Avulsion 
Avulsion may be regarded as the opposite of accretion. It is where substantial and 
recognisable changes in boundary of land adjoining the sea or river occurred 
suddenly, either naturally or as a result of man-made changes, the boundary remains 
at the original position without any shift or alteration thereof. This implies that the 
foreshore rights of the Crown remained unaffected whenever an avulsion occurred. 
IV Development of the Breadth of TS 
This aspect of the study investigates the developments leading to the adoption of 
three-miles TS as a legal concept by the major maritime nations and whether the 
concept was introduced to Nigeria or not. This aspect is important because without 
the know ledge of the breadth of the TS in the periods, it would be difficult to 
15 Southern Theosophy Inc. vs. State of South Australia (supra), at p. 720 . 
16 Lauterpacht, H., ed. Oppenheim's International Law, vol. I, (8th ed.), Longmans, Green and Co., 
London, p. 565,§ 234F 
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determine the extent of sea areas controlled by the Kingdoms and Empires that 
today make up the coastal units of Nigeria and whether they brought the sea areas 
controlled at that time into the colonization and subsequently into the union of 
Nigeria or not. This will no doubt help in any likely recommendation that would be 
made at the end of discussions on the issues. 
1 Mare Liberum versus Mare Clausum17 
The forces of nature have both expansive and diminutive effects on the foreshore 
rights of the Crown. The expansive effect pushes the foreshore rights of the Crown 
further into the sea and where forces of nature have the effect of creating islands 
close to the shore, the Crown gains the more with its foreshore title rights extending 
from the foreshore of the mainland to that of the adjacent islands. Thus rights over 
the adjacent sea areas began to expand little by little. The above coupled with the 
claims of the Spanish over the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico and the claim 
of Portugal over the Atlantic south of Morocco and the Indian Ocean, led to the 
formulation of theories regarding the breadth of the TS. Similarly, other great 
maritime powers such as England, Venice, the Papacy and Turkey claimed the right 
to close the seas adjacent to their coasts. All the above nations sought to exclude 
foreign ships from navigating on the areas of the sea claimed by each of them hence 
the theories. 
The first in the category of theories is "mare liberum" adumbrated or written by 
Hugo Grotius in 1608. Grotius as a young Dutch scholar and a lawyer wrote mare 
liberum on a retainership basis by the Dutch East India Company. His 
preoccupation in writing mare liberum was to defend the rights of the Dutch to 
participate in the East Indian trade. 18 Thus his thesis centres mainly on the argument 
that the seas and oceans of the world are free to the whole world and as a result 
cannot be subjected to State or private ownership or appropriation. Grotius' 
17 See O'Connell D.P., vol. 1, op. cit, at pp. 1-24; Lumb RD. and Phil D., "Sovereignty and 
Jurisdiction Over Australian Waters," vol. 43 (1969), The Australian Law Journal, pp.421 -426 
18 Grotius, H., The Freedom of the Seas or the Right which belongs to the Dutch to Take Part in the 
East India Trade, (Ed. Scott, trans. Van Deman Magoffin) (Oxford University Press, 1916), ix 
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writings impacted in no small measure on the present day freedom of the high seas. 
However, a decade after Grotius, Selden, an English scholar wrote Mare Clausum 
to counter Grotius' Mare Liberum theory. The purpose of his Mare Clausum theory 
was to first and foremost defend the claims of England over the adjacent seas and 
by so doing, Selden argued that contrary to the views earlier expressed on the issue, 
the seas and oceans could in-fact be owned and appropriated by the maritime power 
whose coasts the seas adjoin. In order to drive his argument to a logical and 
acceptable conclusion, Selden had recourse to Biblical records, which is to the 
effect of the love of God in giving the earth and the seas and oceans thereof to Noah. 
It has been argued that Grotius' mare liberum overcame Selden's mare clausum and 
that it did not see the light of the day. Hence, James Brown Scott commented as 
follows: 
In this argument of books ... the Dutch Scholar has had the better of his 
English antagonist ... the Mare Liberum is still an open book, the Mare 
Clausum, is indeed a closec;l one, and as flotsam and jetsam on troubled 
waters, [Mare Liberum] rides the waves, whereas its rival, heavy and water-
logged, has gone under. 19 
This argument cannot be totally supported. This is so because it fails to reckon with 
the historical evolution of the TS, which no doubt received impetus from Selden's 
Mare Clausum. Contrary to Scott's argument therefore, claims to portions of the sea 
by States continued unabated notwithstanding Grotius' Mare Liberum theory. Thus 
Fulton observes that: 
19 Ibid 
But it is also as firmly established that all states possess sovereign rights in 
those parts of the sea which wash their shores ... There has been another 
movement in the opposite direction, by which the exclusive rights of 
maritime states in the waters immediately adjoining their coasts have come 
to be more clearly recognised and definitely incorporated in international 
law.20 
2° Fulton, T.W., The Sovereignty of the Sea, Edinburgh (1911) reprinted by New York State Library 
seconded (1976), p. 537; Colombos C.J., the International Law of the Sea (6th ed.) Longmans Green 
& Co., London (1967), pp. 91- 101 
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It can therefore be argued that while Grotius' theory impacted on the current idea 
of the freedom of the high seas, Selden's mare clausum on the other hand 
influenced the evolution of TS as a legal concept by strengthening the claims of the 
British over the adjacent sea areas. 
2 The Cannon Shot Rule versus three-mile TS limit 
Selden in his Mare Clausum did not state the specific dimension of the sea area that 
a maritime State could in-fact close neither did Grotius foreclose the possibility of 
every maritime State's entitlement over a portion of the sea adjoining its coast for 
defence and security. Thus vague criteria, such as "range of navigation," "mid-
channel or thalweg," were adopted by maritime States to define the limit of TS 
being claimed. This was followed by "limit of visibility," which Bynkershoek 
criticised, would vary according to the position of the observer, the keenness of his 
vision, the climate, and many other circumstances.21 The limit of visibility was 
closely followed, between the 17th and 18th Centuries by the "cannon shot rule," 
which is generally associated with Grotius. By that rule, the belt of sea along the 
coast which could be actually commanded and controlled by the range of artillery 
fired from the shore was regarded as the TS of the adjoining State. Beyond this 
range, the sea was high seas and was regarded as res communis that is free and 
belonging to the whole world. Thus Marshall CJ in Church vs. Hubbart stated as 
follows: "The seizure of a vessel within the range of its cannons by a foreign force 
is an invasion of that territory ... "22 
The cannon shot rule may be criticised in several ways. The first is its actual range, 
which may differ from country to country and on the type of the cannon involved. 
Secondly, by basing possession of maritime territory on force of arms, cannon shot 
rule may be taken to have foreclosed the possibility of possession of maritime 
territory by States which did not at that time possess such force of arms. It in fact 
failed to state the parameters by which such States might measure or determine the 
21 Ibid, p. 546 
22 6 US 2(Cranch) at p.234, 2 L. ed. at p. 264 
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area of sea they could close. Thirdly, cannon shot rule appeared to have more 
practicality in States that possessed it than in States that did not. Thus cannon shot 
rule failed to explain the yardstick for measuring the TS of coastal States that did 
not possess cannon. The above impression was however corrected by Gundling in 
1734, when he asserted for the first time the notion that the cannon shot rule applied 
where there was in fact no actual cannon.23 
The indeterminate nature of the cannon shot rule led to the suggestion by Galiani in 
1782 for its replacement by a more convenient and ascertainable distance. He 
suggested that the cannon shot rule be replaced by a three-mile TS limit, which 
invariably was the farthest distance that an average cannon fired from the coast 
could reach at that time. The three - mile limit became widely accepted by most 
maritime nations. This probably led Sir William Scott (later Lord Stowell) in 'The 
Anna case', a case regarded as one of the most authoritative .early expositions of the 
three - mile territorial waters rule to comment as follows; "we all know that the rule 
of law on this subject is terrae dominium finitur, ubi finitur armorum vis, " and 
since introduction of fire arms, that distance has usually been recognised to be 
about three miles from the shore."24 
3 The doctrine and practice regarding the three-mile TS 
3.1 Britain and the United States 
Britain was to the fore among the early claimers of the three-mile TS, through the 
Custom Consolidation Act of 1876, which brought to an end the Hovering Acts 
under which a certain measure of control over smugglers was exercised up to 
twelve miles from the coast. The United States adopted the three - mile rule in 1793 
by the Congress' enactment of Neutrality Act of 5th Junel794, which declared its 
neutrality in the war of the coalition between Britain and France. The enactment 
according to O'Connell was necessitated by the difficulties that attended the capture 
of a vessel within the American coasts by the belligerents. That Act granted the US 
23 O'Connell, op. cit., note I, p.321 
24 (1805) 5 C Rob 373; 165 ER 809 
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District Courts the jurisdiction to determine complaints in the cases of captures 
made within the waters of the United States or within a marine league of the 
coasts.25 
Among many incidents, two separate ones stand out to demonstrate the 
commitment of Britain and the United States to the idea of three-mile TS. The first 
of the incidents happened in 1863, when the United States Consul (Mr. Graham) at 
Cape Town, demanded the release of the Federal merchant vessel, the Sea Bride, 
which had been captured by the confederate cruiser Alabama within four miles of 
the shore, but outside the three-mile limit. He based his demand upon the doctrine 
that, since the invention of rifled cannon, territorial waters extended to at least six 
miles. The British Governor of Cape Colony declined to interfere, holding that the 
"rule of the marine league held good."26 It should be noted that Mr. Graham's 
action in trying to seek the release of the vessel was not seriously supported by his 
Government; and in the second incident in 1875 the United States joined Great 
Britain in strenuously resisting the repeated claim of Spain to a six mile zone off the 
coasts of Cuba, a claim denied again in 1880 when Spain attempted to reassert the 
claim again. 27 
3.2 Other States 
There were other states that claimed· distances, which were at variance with the 
three-mile limit. The Scandinavian States for example did not employ the cannon 
shot rule but instead claimed maritime dominium over fixed distances from the 
shore along the whole coastline, regardless of the actual presence or absence of 
shore batteries. 28 These however gradually reduced to four miles Scandinavian 
'league' by the middle of 18th Century. The French and the Russians too did not 
claim three miles TS. 
25 U.S. Statutes at Large, 384 
26 British State Papers, North America, United States (1964), LXIL, PP. 19-29; Lawrence, T.J., 
Principles of International Law, London ( 1895), p.139 
27 Wharton, F., A Digest of International Law of the United States, 3 vols., Edinburgh Review (1887) 
ff" 32 et. Seq., 327 
Churchill R.R., Lowe, A.V., The Law of the Sea, Manchester University Press 3ro ed. (1999), p. 78 
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The concerted efforts of Britain and America at ensuring the observance of the 
three-mile rule by other States, coupled with the number of other States that have 
adopted the three-mile rule must have informed Lawrence' conclusion that, "It may 
be taken for granted that, in spite of a few tentative efforts at alteration, the rule of 
the three-mile limit is part and parcel of modern international law."29 Lowe and 
Churchill on the other hand agree that the three-mile TS was never unanimously 
accepted. 30 It must be pointed out however, that the three mile TS lacked unanimity 
as argued by Lowe and Churchill, the practice too could be argued not to be 
widespread enough as to have given rise to customary international law status. The 
truth however, is that anywhere the question of development of the TS as a legal 
concept is discussed, reference will always be made to the three-mile concept. 
Furthermore, the acceptance by the learned Professors that the three mile TS was 
adhered to by most of the major maritime powers including Britain, which was at 
that time the colonial overlord of Nigeria, coupled with the fact that other States 
indeed claimed varying distances are enough to further buttress the argument that 
the low-water mark, which the Franconia case (hereafter referred to as R vs. 
Keyn), 31 Harris vs. Owners of Franconia, 32( a case which emanated from R vs. 
Keyn) and subsequently the Nigerian case of Abia case say was the limit of national 
territory is after all not the true limit of national territory. The question to be asked 
is: How does the non-unanimity of the three mile limit affect the limit of national 
territory? The answer is that it did affect it. This is made clear for example, by the 
fact that in countries such as Britain, the United States and others, where the three 
miles limit was unquestionably adopted and in the colonies and overseas territories 
where the practice was later introduced, the low-water mark adjudged by the R vs. 
Keyn and the Abia case to be the limit of national territory no doubt, can no longer 
be the limit of national territory. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid, at p. 78 
31 (1876)2 Ex. D. pp. 63-75 
32 (1877)3 C.P.D. 173 at p. 177. 
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From 1900 onward therefore, the practice of claiming three- mile territorial 
waters gained more acceptances, to the extent that those States that initially 
claimed wider distances began to abandon them in favour of the three-mile 
TS. Thus, Elihu Root commented as follows: 
These vague and unfounded claims (of the 18th, 17th and earlier 
centuries) disappeared entirely, and there was nothing of them left... 
But the new principle of freedom, when it approached the shore, it met 
with another principle, the principle of protection, not a residuum of 
the old claim ... Warships may not pass without consent into the zone, 
because they threaten. Merchant ships may pass and re pass because 
they do not threaten. "33 
The above clearly shows the process that the three-mile TS claim went through 
before it became finally accepted by a number of major maritime nations. Efforts 
made at formulating a universally acceptable territorial limit did not yield the 
desired results and hence, the inability of the 1958 Geneva Convention on 
Territorial Sea to fix a particular TS limit. It is important to note however, that 
debates leading to the 1958 Convention clearly indicate a growing desire among 
maritime nations for extended TS. The desire was necessitated, according to Ganz, 
by "economic, political and military sense, a change from the old "three mile rule" 
was long over due; "cannon shot rule" ceased to have practicality more than two 
generations ago. 34 It was only in 1982, that States through UNCLOS of that year 
were able to resolve the controversy surrounding the dimension of TS, which is 
now settled at 12 nm. Although UNCLOS provides in Article 2 for a definite 
answer to the question of nature of the TS, the true juridical nature of TS still is 
disputed in Nigeria and in some federal coastal States and can only be resolved by 
domestic laws claiming the actual rights granted States by international law. 
33 North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration, 11th Proceedings, p. 2006. 
34 Ganz, D. L., "The United Nations and the Law ofthe Sea" vol. 26 (1977) l.C.L.Q. p. 1 et. Seq., 
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V. The Juridical Nature of TS 
1 General comment 
The 1958 Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea and the 1982 UNCLOS 
categorically declare the legal status of TS by stating in clear terms that 
"sovereignty of a coastal state extends, beyond its land territory and internal 
waters ... to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the TS." Paragraph 1 of the 
Commentary of the International Law Commission on article 1 of its 1956 draft 
indicates very clearly that the rights of coastal States referred to in Article 1 of the 
Geneva Convention over the TS do not differ in nature from the right of sovereignty 
the coastal State possesses over the land territory. With the declaration in the 
Geneva Convention, it was anticipated that the controversy, which had existed for 
many centuries regarding the nature of TS, would have subsided, but the reverse is 
the case. There are those (such as La Pradelle, Salmond J.W., Hegel and others) that 
still express skepticism as to whether or not TS forms part of the territory of a 
coastal State, so that it exercises power of dominiun and imperium over it. The 
Supreme Court of Nigeria in Abia case, for example, is of the opinion that the 
territory of Nigeria ends at low-water mark and that the TS is not an extension of 
Nigeria's land territory and as a result it does not form part of Nigeria's national 
territory. The Court was of the opinion that all that international law granted 
Nigeria over the TS is power to exercise sovereignty over its seabed, subsoil and the 
airspace above it but that it does not constitute an extension of Nigeria's land 
territory.35 
The conclusion above is so fraught with legal uncertainties that the decision could 
best be described as erroneous. Firstly, the decision is erroneous because it is 
contrary to the provisions of Article 2(1) of UNCLOS, which grants sovereignty 
over the TS to coastal States. Secondly, the decision is erroneous because in 
arriving at the decision, the Supreme Court literally placed reliance on the R vs. 
Keyn case, the Submerged Lands Act case of (State of New South Wales and others 
35 Supra, pp. 730- 731. 
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vs. the Commonwealth of Australia) 36 , the Canadian case of Reference Re 
Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights 37 and the case of United States vs. 
Louisiana38 and others which, no doubt are contrary to earlier authorities, such as 
Benest vs. Pipon,39 A.G vs. Chambers40 and to later decisions of the Secretary of 
State for India vs. Chelikani Rama Rao41 and Lord Advocate vs. Wemyss,42 AG. of 
Southern Nigeria vs John Holt and company (Liverpool Ltd.).43 
Like similar controversy over the limits of TS, several writings by notable jurists, 
such as Hale M., D.P. O'Connell, Salmond J.W., Westlake J. and La Pradelle etc. 
have been made and several theories, such as La Pradelle's servitude theory, Kelsen, 
Hegel and property theory have also been propounded in-order to explain the actual 
nature of TS. The arguments focused principally on whether the authority of a 
coastal State over the three-mile TS was that of dominium so that the state 
possesses only property rights over it or whether it was imperium so that the coastal 
State possesses only the rights of jurisdiction or whether the authority was that of 
sovereignty so that the State possesses both dominium and imperium over it. On the 
other hand, others have argued that the authority of a coastal State over the TS was 
none of the above, but that it was a mere 'bundle of servitudes.' To find out the true 
nature of TS therefore, there is a need to examine some of the writings and theories, 
followed by the practice of some states on the issue. There is also a need to examine 
the various judicial decisions on the issue. 
2. TS as a 'bundle of servitudes' 
The argument that the TS is a 'bundle of servitudes' may be viewed in two different 
but related perspectives. The first is with regard to the coastal State and the second 
has to do with the right of innocent passage over the TS. 
36 (1975) 50 Australian Law Journal Reports, 218 
37 65 Dominion Law Reports (2"d edition) 353; (1967) D.L.R. 2027 
38 332 US 19; 67 US Reporter 1658 
39 ( 1829) 1 Knapp. 60; 12 E.R. 243 
40 (1854) 4 De G.M. and G. 206; 43 E.R. 486 
41 (1916) 85 UPC 222 
42 (1900) A.C. 48 
43 (1915) A.C. 599 
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2.1 Coastal State's perspective 
In order to properly explain the term 'bundle of servitudes,' there is the need to 
understand the meaning of the term. 'Bundle of servitudes' may be seen as a 
coinage derived from "international servitudes," which has been used generally to· 
describe the several restrictions of sovereignty or restrictions of territorial 
sovereignty. It is a right exercised by one State in the territory of another State, thus 
the term is heavily dependent for its exercise upon what meaning is ascribed to the 
concept of territorial sovereignty. This is so because international servitudes, by its 
character and operation had to be attached to a certain territory within a foreign 
State before it can be regarded as such. Thus it has been argued that the confederacy 
type of multilateral agreements, such as seen in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization of 17th March, 1948, the Brussels Treaty Organization of 4th of April, 
1948 and the Western European Union Treaty signed in Paris on the 23rd of October, 
1954 do not constitute foreign territory when the troops of one member State are 
stationed in the territory of another member State.44 Thus before it can constitute 
foreign restriction or right in a foreign land, the sovereignty of the Grantor over the 
territory must be proven and its consent to the grant secured through bilateral or 
multilateral agreement or according to the Right of Passage case by custom. 45 
According to V attel such restrictions or foreign rights depend to a large extent on 
the consent of the affected foreign States. Thus he stated; 
"There exists no reason why a nation, or a sovereign, if authorized by the 
laws, may not grant various privileges in their territories to another nation, ... 
When once these rights have been validly ceded, they constitute a part of the 
possessions of him who has acquired them, and ought to be respected in the 
same manner as his former possessions.46 
The totality of such rights according to V ali was necessitated by vital economic and 
44 Vali, F. A., Servitudes of International Law: a Study of rights in foreign territory (second edition) 
Stevenson & Sons, London (1958), p. 33 
45 (1960), ICJ Report, p. 4, et. Seq., 9 
46 Vattel, E., The Law of Nations, or Principles of the Law of Nature, applied to the conduct and 
affairs of nations and sovereigns, London (1714- 1767) 
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other interests, which in modem times are equally responsible for the exercise of 
similar rights by one state in the territory of another state, such as the erection of a 
free zone round the canton of Geneva or an outlet to the sea for a land-locked 
country.47 
Judging from the above, the right of innocent passage enjoyed by States over the TS 
would qualify as bundle of Servitudes. However, La Pradelle who propounded the 
theory of bundle of servitude has a contrary view of the matter. In La Pradelle' s 
view the TS did not belong to any State because it was res communis, hence any 
rights exercised by States over it constitute bundle of servitudes not to coastal States 
but to the sea which it had to bear. 48 In rejecting the idea of a coastal State's 
sovereignty, La Pradelle argued that a coastal State cannot cede its TS without 
similarly ceding the coast, and could not prohibit belligerents from engaging within 
the cannon range of TS. He also held that a coastal State could not tax a vessel in 
transits and could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over offences committed .on 
board foreign vessels or over collision that occurred within the TS.49 
Firstly, this theory can no longer hold sway having been propounded in 1898 - a 
time when the idea that the three-mile TS formed part of the national territory of a 
coastal State had gained wide acceptances by majority of coastal States. As will be 
shown later, La Pradelle's arguments that a coastal State could not cede its TS, 
without similarly ceding its coast is already overtaken by the Hay-Bunau-V arilla 
Treaty of 1903 between Panama and the United States. The argument that a coastal 
State could not prohibit belligerents from exercising over the TS has been overtaken 
by the fact that, prior to his theory, the United States Congress had enacted the 
Neutrality Act of 1794, which prohibited belligerents from engaging within the 
three-mile TS of the country. Similarly flawed, are La Pradelle's arguments that a 
coastal State could not exercise criminal jurisdiction or tax vessels in transit within 
47 Vali, F.A., op. cit. n. 35, p. 33 
48 De Lapradelle, A. G. Le Droit dell'Etat sur Ia mer territoriale, Revue Gem!rale de droit 
international public, Paris (1898), 264-268, 309- 347(1898); See also Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., 
ff' ;2 -73 and O'~onnell, op. cit., vol.l, pp. 68 -71 
0 Connell, op. ctt., vol. I, pp. 68- 71 
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the TS. It is not in all cases that a coastal State could not tax vessels or exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over offences committed within the TS. The requirement and 
enforcement of payment of ship money and salute of the British Flag by foreign 
vessels passing within the British TS have rendered the above argument baseless. 
No wonder O'Connell described it as being "technically inept. .. "50 
The questions to be asked are these: (a) is there any servitude at all on the TS. (b) If 
there is, who bears the burden? (c) What effect does the right of innocent passage 
have on the nature of the TS? The questions will be discussed under the perspective 
of innocent passage. 
2.2 The perspective of innocent passage 
Firstly, the right of innocent passage may be seen as an international servitude in 
that it is a burden which the coastal State must bear, but is generally not seen as 
such and is seen as a right of third States for specific reasons. The first is that the 
right of innocent passage like other rights in foreign lands described above existed 
formerly as customary international law right, but which by the Geneva Convention 
and UNCLOS now exists based on multilateral agreement, thus the consent of the 
coastal States may be argued to have been secured by the multilateral agreement. 
Secondly, the TS upon which the right of innocent passage is to be exercised is a 
foreign territory to third states, judging by the fact that article 2 of UNCLOS says 
that it is the same sovereignty, which a coastal State exercises over its land territory 
that extends to the TS. Therefore, vessels of another State exercising the right of 
innocent passage through the TS of another coastal State can be seen as exercising 
the same over a foreign territory. Thirdly, judging from the statement of Vattel 
above the right of innocent passage may also be argued to constitute a restriction or 
burden on the rights of the coastal States over the TS and to that extent it is an 
international servitude. Lastly, it may be argued that the same economic and 
political reasons, which informed the formation of international servitudes, also 
contributed to the granting of the right of innocent passage to States over the TS. 
50 Ibid. 
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History and tradition being, the primary reasons for the development of the concept. 
With regards to question (b), it may be argued that contrary to La Pradelle's view 
above, it is the coastal State that bears the burden of innocent passage being an 
international servitude, although it is not generally seen as such, it seen as a right of 
third States exercised for specific reasons. 
On the question of the effect of the right of innocent passage being international 
servitudes on the nature of TS, the argument could be made based on the provisions 
of Article 19(2) and 25(1) of UNCLOS, that even if the right of innocent passage 
constituted a bundle of servitudes, in practice, that fact alone has not had a major 
diminutive effect on the sovereignty granted coastal States by UNCLOS, since a 
coastal State by virtue of these provisions is empowered to suspend passages which 
are not innocent. For one thing, innocent passage is expected to be conducted as 
expeditiously as is practicable and for another, it is not the case that the vessels are 
to be stationed permanently over the TS as seen in other international servitudes, 
such as the establishment and stationing of troops on foreign soil, which operate 
more or less on a permanent basis. Even the exclusive jurisdiction granted the 
vessels of war of a foreign sovereign at peace with a coastal State and which is 
demeaning herself in a friendly manner as seen in the case of the Schooner 
Exchange vs. McFaddon51 still does not detract from the territorial sovereignty of 
the coastal State. This is so because the Grantor State in the case of military bases 
and the coastal State on whose territorial waters a foreign vessel finds itself wishes 
to exercise some measures of authority and jurisdiction, especially jurisdiction over 
criminal matters. 52 This attitude is demonstrated in the jurisdictional arrangements 
included in the Long-Range Proving Ground Treaty for the Bahamas and which 
were later extended to the United States bases in British possessions.53 Thus, the 
legislative powers of a coastal State over the TS are preserved by article 21 and it is 
51 7 Cranch (1812), p. 116 
52 Coleman vs. Tennessee (1879) 97 US 509, 24 L. Ed. 1118; Dow vs. Johnson (1880) 100, US 158, 
25 L. Ed. 632 
53 Ibid, p. 213 
41 
the coastal State alone that has the power to harness the resources of the zone. 
Furthermore, there is no similar right of over flight over the TS and submerged 
vessels are required to navigate on top the TS and also show their flags and not in 
accordance with their normal mode of navigating by way of submerging. 
3. Other theoretical approaches to nature of TS 
Amongst the various theories, three separate ones stood out to explain the juridical 
nature of the TS in connection with the Crown's ownership of it. Two of those 
theories are in support of the Crown's ownership of the TS. The first of the theories 
may be termed, 'property theory' and the purport of it is that power is the basis of 
ownership of property and that territory and property were in essence one, so that 
sovereignty and jurisdiction were really identical. According to this theory, there is 
no distinction in principle between bays, roadsteads, harbours and the marginal sea; 
they were all subjected to the authority of the coastal state in virtue of the fact of its 
exclusive power, so that they became property of the coastal sovereign from which 
he could at anytime exclude all alien shipping.54 
For the above reasons, cases that were decided by the English courts proceeded on 
the basis of Crown ownership of the TS. These cases served as authority on the 
matter before R vs. Keyn, 55 case which some people e.g. Sir Cecil Hurst 56 and 
Salmond J.57 have argued (though not conclusively) overruled the property theory 
of the TS. The right of innocent passage, which was viewed in many quarters as 
being contrary to the perceived notion of ownership of the TS by the Crown in the 
middle of 19 century, has been argued to have diminished the importance of the 
theory. The Hegelian theory of state, which came after it led to the revision of 
property theory and the question of sovereignty for which it stood. 
3.1 Hegel's Theory 
54 O'Connell, D.P., "The Federal Problem Concerning Maritime Domain in Commonwealth 
Countries," vol. l, No. 3 ( 1969- 70) Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, pp. 389 - 413 
55 Supra, n. 31 
56 (1922- 23) B.Y.I.L. p. 45 
57 Salmond J. W., "Territorial Waters," vol. 34, (1918), Law Quarterly Review, pp. 235-236 
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This theory provides a revisit of sovereignty over the TS, the ownership of which 
the property theory noted above ascribed to the Crown. By so doing, Hegelian 
theory attempts to separate sovereignty from ownership, the two concepts of which 
the earlier theory had regarded as one and the same. Therefore, instead of the theory 
to regard sovereignty as a part of ownership, the two concepts were regarded as an 
aggregation of faculties of which territory is merely the physical element of its 
exercise. The impact of this theory immediately spread to Germany and to England 
due to the fact that it was propounded at a time when Hegelian and generally 
speaking German legal influences were strong in England. However, in England the 
theory was confronted by controversies emanating first from the fact of common 
law and second from the myriad of judicial precedents which adherence to the 
earlier theory had necessitated. The fact of common law is that to its lawyers, as 
opposed to civil law lawyers, sovereignty and property are two inseparable words, 
which have had significant influence in the legal system of most common law 
countries. Hegelian theory with its sentiments in favour of TS not being part of 
national territory is therefore flawed. 58 
3.2 Kelsen's theory 
The third theory is Kelsen's theory, which has provided a corroborative support to 
the property theory. The theory was championed by the Vienna School, represented 
by Kelsen, hence the reference to it as Kelsen's theory. According to this theory, the 
TS could be regarded as forming part of the national territory of a coastal state. That 
is, a coastal state may exercise acts of sovereignty over it. However, O'Connell has 
sounded a note of warning on the usage of the word 'sovereignty' to describe the 
right or power of a state over the TS. According to him, that word conveys different 
meanings, depending on whether it is being used by common law lawyers or by a 
continental lawyer. The word sovereignty does not possess absolute connotation for 
all continental lawyers that it tends to have for common law lawyers. 59 This 
warning would seem to be unnecessary in view of the fact that UNCLOS, in 
58 O'connell, D.P.O., op. cit. n. 46, p. 394 
59 Ibid, at p. 395 
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granting sovereignty over the TS to coastal States does not distinguish between the 
common law and the civil law States and the current practice of States does not 
seem to make such distinction. Thus, like the theories earlier examined, both the 
property and Kelsen's theories found a common agreement on the proprietary rights 
of the coastal State over the adjacent TS. 
3.3 Other Jurists 
Some other writers have equally expressed opinion on the nature of the TS. Hale, in 
asserting the proprietary rights over the TS stated that: 
. The narrow sea adjoining to the coast of England is part of the waste and demesnes and 
dominions of the King of England, whether it lie within the body of any county or not. In 
this sea the King of England hath a double right, viz. a right of jurisdiction which he 
ordinarily exerciseth by his admiral, and a right of propriety or ownership.60 
In the opinion of Professor O'Connell, "after 1900 the controversy surrounding the 
juridical nature of the territorial sea waned and scarcely any author took issue with 
the notion that territorial sea is subject to sovereignty."61 
Westlake on his part, restated the Crown's proprietary rights over the seabed 
when he stated that, "within that extent the water and its bed are territorial 
and the wealth of both is the property of the territorial sovereign. 62" 
Sir Cecil Hurst, the British Foreign Office Legal Adviser who had earlier written an 
article in which he stated that 'the decision in R vs. Keyn case showed clearly that 
the territorial waters were not part of the national territory,63 wrote another article 
entitled, whose is the Bed of the Sea? Sedentary Fisheries outside the Three-Mile 
Limit, in which he analysed the status of the maritime territory situated beyond and 
within the three miles from the coast. He concluded by saying: 
60 Hale, M., Dejure Maris (1670) in Moore, S.A., History and Law of the Foreshore and Sea Shore 
and the Law Relating Thereto, 3'd ed., chapt. Iv, Stevens and Haynes, London, (1888) 
61 O'Connell, D.P., "The Juridical Nature of the Territorial Sea," vol. XLV, (1971), B.Y.I.L., p.45 at 
343 
62 Westlake, J., International Law, Part I ,Cambridge University Press, (1910), p. 188. 
63(1922- 23) B.Y.I.L. 3 p. 45 
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... so far as Great Britain at any rate is concerned, ownership of the bed 
of the sea within the three -mile limit is the survival of more extensive 
claims to the ownership of and sovereignty over the bed of the sea .... 64 
Jessup at the conclusion of his chapter dealing with "sovereignty over Territorial 
Waters" expresses the more modem views on the nature of the TS when he stated: 
It is believed that the above pages have demonstrated that the 
littoral sovereign has over territorial waters rights, powers and 
privileges which are in principle the same as those which he 
possesses on his land territories .. .It may therefore be said that 
the state is sovereign over its territorial waters.65 
The sovereignty advocated by Jessup finds international support in the 1919 Paris 
Conference on a Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation (Paris 
Convention) and in the Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago 
Convention) of 1944. Though the 1919 Paris Convention is specifically designed 
for the air space over the territory of a state, Article 1 thereof extended the 
sovereignty of a coastal state to include the TS. Article I provides: 
... For the purpose of the present convention, the territory of a 
state shall be understood as including the national territory ... and 
the territorial waters adjacent thereto. 66 
In comparison, the Chicago Convention of 1944 in its Article 2 similarly defines the 
territory of a State by stating that: For the purposes of this Convention the territory 
of a State shall be deemed to be the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto 
under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State. 
64 Ibid, p. 34-43. 
65 Jessup, P. C., The Law of the Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction, (1927); New York, 
Klaus reprint, (1970), p. 208. 
66 BFSP, vol. 112, p. 931. See also Martial, J.A., "State Control of the Air Space over the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone," vol. 30 (1952) Canadian Bar Review, p. 245. 
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The importance of Article 1 of the 1919 Paris Convention can be better appreciated 
if it is considered that prior to the adoption of the Convention itself by the initial 
thirty two nations, the emphasis on the sovereignty over the TS was then on the 
water column, but the coming into effect of this convention brought the issue of the 
airspace above the water column of the TS to the fore. Thus, in the words of 
Marston: 
Not only was the territorial sea deemed to be part of the 
national territory but it was now possible to envisage the 
marginal sea as part of a column of sovereignty extending 
upwards into the airspace ... 67 
Theoretically therefore, there is overwhelming evidence in support of coastal States 
power of dominium and imperium over the adjacent TS, its airspace, the sea-bed 
and the subsoil thereof. The next task is to explore further evidence from States 
practice. 
VI. The practice regarding the nature of TS 
1. General comment 
In this subsection, the executive, legislative and judicial practices of a few selected 
States regarding the juridical nature of the TS will be examined. These include, 
Britain, the US, India and Australia. 
2. British State Practice 
2.1 Executive and legislative measures 
In Britain the claims to sovereignty or dominium over the TS were initially 
manifested in two significant respects. In the early 17th Century for example, there 
was the requirement for the payment of tribute or ship money by foreign ships 
within what was then regarded as the British seas. In order to further concretise the 
claims to sovereignty over the TS, the British Parliament issued instructions 
67 Marston, G., "The Evolution of the Concept of Sovereignty over the Bed and Subsoil of the 
Territorial Sea," vol. XL VIII ( 1976- 7), B. Y.l.L. p. 325-6 
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requiring naval commanders to compel payment of homage to the British flag by 
the striking of the flag by foreign ships entering the British seas. A refusal to 
honour the requirement inter alia led to the first Dutch war in the middle of 17th 
Century between Britain and Sweden and the result of the war demonstrated beyond 
doubt that after all England possessed the actual dominion of the seas by reason of 
her naval power.68 The payment of ship money and the striking of the flag were 
regarded necessary for maintaining the sovereignty of the Crown over the TS. Thus, 
in the negotiations that followed, Britain consistently put forward the recognition of 
her rights to herring fishery and the striking of the flag as preconditions to the 
signing of a peace treaty. 
Consistent with the policy of extending her sovereignty to the TS, Britain enacted 
the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854, which is generally regarded as affirming the 
doctrine that the TS forms part of the territory of United Kingdom. 69 This was 
followed by another law known as the Cornwall Submarine Mines Act of 1858, 
which equally made provisions acknowledging the Crown's proprietary rights over 
the mines and minerals lying below low-water mark under the open sea adjacent to 
the county of Cornwall.70 It may be argued that the Cornwall Submarine Mines Act 
applied only to Cornwall and to the specific dispute between the Crown and the 
Duchy of Cornwall, but it must be remembered that the County of Cornwall forms 
part of the larger United Kingdom and by that enactment it may be that Parliament 
has committed itself to the proposition that the sea-bed below low-water mark of 
not only the county of Cornwall but also the entire United Kingdom is vested in the 
Crown. 
This proposition is re- affirmed in Section 7 of Crown Lands Act 1866, which 
contains similar provisions as in the Cornwall Submarine Mines Act of 1858. Again, 
Britain after the decision in R vs. Keyn enacted the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction 
Act of 1878, to correct the erroneous impression that the territory of Britain ends at 
68 Fulton, op. cit. note 20, pp. 378- 413 
69 17 & 18 Viet. C. 104, section 527 
70 Section 2 of 1858 (now repealed) 
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low-water mark, which R vs. Keyn represented. 71 The position was further 
confirmed by international documents in which Britain was a party. Example of 
such international document is the North Sea Fisheries Convention of 1882, which 
defined territorial waters as those which came within three miles, measured from 
low-water mark along the coast of each of the signatory powers.72 Thus, Britain has 
again confirmed by both executive measures and statutory provisions its dominium 
and imperium powers over the adjacent TS adjacent. 
2.2 Judicial Practice 
Ownership of maritime territory below low water mark was long before the R vs. 
Keyn case ascribed to the Crown. This view is supported by a number of judicial 
decisions long before and also after the decision in R vs. Keyn. The view became 
reinvigorated in the 18th Century, during which time several judicial decisions were 
rendered in favour of three-mile TS. At that time, the idea that three miles represent 
limit of effective gun fire from the shore was adopted by both Britain and the 
United States as the most satisfactory and effective formula, this practice for 
instance, found acceptance in The Twee Gebroeders13and in The Leda.14 In the Leda 
for example, the Admiralty Court held that the expression 'territorial limits of the 
United Kingdom' could only be interpreted to mean 'the land of the United 
Kingdom and three miles from the shore' .75 In a related development, the Privy 
Council in Benest vs. Pipon, 76 a decision which was handed down long before the R 
vs. Keyn and which rejected a claim by the lord of a manor in Jersey to be 
exclusively entitled to harvest seaweed from rocks beyond the low-water mark. 
Lord Wynford declared, "The Sea is the property of the king, and so is the land 
beneath it."77 
Similar views were also expressed in Lord Fitzhardinge vs. Purcell and Lord 
71 Ibid 
72 Hertslet, Treaties, XV, p. 795; see also Lawrence T.J., op. cit., n. 26, pp. 138- 139. 
73 (1800) 3 Ch. Rob 162 
74 ( 1856) (Swab.)Adm. 40 
75 Blunde11 vs. Catterall (1821 ), 5 B & Ald. 268; Officers of State vs. Smith ( 1846), 8 Sess. Cas. 711. 
76 ( 1829) I Knapp 60 
77 Ibid. at p. 67 
48 
Advocate vs. Wemyss. In the former case, Lord Parker (then Parker J.) decided as 
follows, 
Clearly, the bed of the sea, at any rate for some distance below low 
water mark, and the beds of tidal navigable rivers, are prima facie 
vested in the Crown, and there seems no good reason why the 
ownership thereof by the Crown should not also, subject to the rights 
of the public, be a beneficial ownership ... 78 
Whilst in the latter case, Lord Watson expressed the views as follows: "I can see no 
reason to doubt that by the law of Scotland the solum underlying the waters of the 
ocean, whether within the narrow seas or from the coast outward to the three - mile 
limit, and also the minerals beneath it are vested in the Crown."79 
The above cases received support and reinforcement in the opinion provided in 
Attorney General vs. Chambers where although the specific action involved 
ownership of a foreshore, Alderson B. advised Lord Cranworth L. C. that, excepting 
evidence of any particular usage: "the Crown is clearly in such a case, according to 
all the authorities, entitled to ... the soil of the sea itself adjoining the coast of 
England." 80 Argument may be canvassed that some of the cases mentioned above 
had references only to the foreshore and not the three- mile TS. The fact however 
remains that the question of whether the foreshore was part and parcel of national 
territory of the adjoining nation was at that point no longer in contest, because it 
was already assumed in many quarters that that part of the sea was vested in the 
Crown and what was in contest here was whether the body of water within three 
miles formed part of the domain of the Crown, therefore the only probable 
reference must be to the three- mile TS which was then the subject of controversy. 
Although Nigeria's position is discussed in paragraph V below, it may be noted in 
passing that the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act mentioned above applied by 
78 (1908)2Ch.139atp.166 
79 (1900) L.R., AC, 48 at p. 66. 
80 (1854) 4, De G.M. & G., 206; Gibson, J., "Ownership of the Sea Bed under British Territorial 
Waters," vol. 6, (1978), International Relations, p. 474 et. Seq., 479 
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virtue of Section 7 thereof to the British Empire, which at that time included 
Nigeria. 81 It applied in the case of Nigeria throughout the colonial era up to 
independence until it was repealed by Territorial Waters Decree, 1967. Though 
repealed, the new Decree as a matter of fact incorporated the most salient 
provisions of the 1878 Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act. 
The 1878 Territorial Waters Act, like the erroneous decision it was enacted to 
remedy, has been subject of intense criticisms. Salmond has argued very 
vehemently that the purport of the Act was to extend the criminal jurisdiction over 
offences committed at sea, but that the more general question as to the seaward 
limits of British territory would seem to remain as far from definite settlement as 
before. 82 He cited the reluctance of the Privy Council in the case of AG British 
Columbia vs. AG of Canada, 83 (a case which the Supreme Court of Nigeria equally 
relied on in Abia case), to express any opinion as to whether the dominion of 
Canada includes the marginal waters thereof or not to buttress his argument. 
Beautiful and well argued as Salmond's discussions may appear to be, he failed to 
explain how the Crown could by that Act confer the power of imperium upon itself 
over the TS, unless it already possessed the power of dominium over it. He also 
failed to appreciate the fact that the issue had been overtaken by more compendious 
reasons and several other judicial decisions and indeed later decisions as well, 
including Privy Council decisions, which by hierarchy of courts is the highest, and 
by the principles of English law expressed in the latin maxim of stare decisis, its 
decisions on such matters overrule any other similar decisions by any other court. 
In addition to the above, Salmond dwelled so much on the issue of marginal sea, 
which is the only area of the sea he is prepared to concede sovereignty to the coastal 
State. Little did he realise however, that the conceptual separation between marginal 
sea and TS no longer hold, because judges such as Lord Kyllachy had seen the 
difficulty involved in regarding for example the marginal sea as forming part of the 
81 Chapter 73, vol. II, LFN, 1958, p.399 
82 Op. cit., n. 57 
83 (1914) AC, p. 153 
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national territory of a coastal State and the TS thereof as not. This informs his 
holding in Lord Advocate vs. Clyde Navigation Trustees that, 
.. .Is the Crown's right in that strip of sea proprietary, like the Crown 
right in the foreshore and in land? .... I am of opinion that the former 
is the correct view, and that there is no distinction in legal character 
between the Crowns right in the foreshore in tidal and navigable rivers, 
and in the bed of the sea within three miles of the shore ....... 84 
Lord Kyllachy's dictum above received a boost in the case of Rex vs. Burt where in 
a decision which upholds the ratio decidendi of the Privy Council in Secretary of 
State for India vs. Chelikani Rama Rao, 85 the Court held on appeal, that the locus of 
seizure, approximately one and three quarter miles from the shore, is part of the 
province of New Brunswick and therefore, both as to property and jurisdiction, the 
province of New Brunswick includes the territory within which the offence was 
alleged to have been committed, and that the offence as set forth in the conviction 
was committed within the province of New Brunswick and within the body of a 
county. Baxter J. was of the opinion in that case that, it is sufficient for the 
disposition of the appeal to say that: 
As the greater includes the less, the three - mile limit was 
undoubtedly treated as part of Ne~ Brunswick ........ the contention 
that the property of the Crown does not extend below low-water mark, 
which received much support in R vs. Keyn has been set at rest so far 
as we are concerned by the judgment of the Judicial Committee in 
Secretary of State for India vs. Chelikani Rama Rao in which it is 
pointed out that R vs. Keyn, "has reference on its merits solely to the 
point of admiralty jurisdiction.86 
Another argument put forward as to why the three-mile TS should not be regarded 
84 (1891) 19 R. 174; Parry and Hopkins, "Commonwealth International Law Cases," vol. 9, (1978), 
ft 38-39. 
(1916)85 LJPC 222 
86 (1932) 5 MPR 112; Commonwealth International Law Cases, vol. 10, p 283 at 285-286. 
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as forming part of the territory it adjoins, is that the TS was subject to the right of 
public usage and also to the right of innocent passage by foreign vessels. This 
argument was canvassed by Sir Phillimore in his judgment in the R vs. Keyn. He 
stated: 
According to the modem international law, it is certainly a right 
incident to each state to refuse a passage to foreigners over its territory 
by land, whether in time of peace or war. But it does not appear to 
have the same right with respect to preventing the passage of foreign 
ships over this portion of the high seas. In the former case there is no 
jus transitus; in the latter case there is.87 
The aspect of the statement above and the criticisms that can be made on it are fully 
considered in chapter four. It is however pertinent to note that, there is a 
preponderance of opinions in favour of the three-mile TS forming part and parcel of 
the territory of a coastal state. Towards the close of the 19th Century for example, 
States that initially opposed the jurisdiction of Great Britain over its four seas 
eventually found themselves adopting it. Thus Lawrence concludes that: 
A state's territory includes the sea within .a three-mile limit of its 
shores. Along a stretch of open coast-line the dominion of the 
territorial power extends seawards to a distance of three- miles, 
measured from low -water mark. . . . Opposing views gradually· died 
out...ss 
The above therefore provide overwhelming evidence in support of coastal State's 
power of dominium and imperium over the adjacent TS. 
2.3 Commentary 
As can be seen from the theories and cases examined, whilst some of them argued 
in favour of power of imperium others argued in favour of power of dominium. A 
few of them argued that a coastal State possesses both attributes simultaneously 
87 Supra, at p. 83. 
88 Lawrence, T.J., op. cit. p.l38 (emphasis added) 
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over the TS. The question is: Can a State exercise both powers simultaneously or it 
is only one of them that it can exercise at a time? Evidence abounds to support the 
view that the conceptual separation between dorniniun and imperium which can be 
traced to Grotius no longer holds sway. This is because it has been universally 
conceded that imperium over foreign ships existed only where dominium was 
possessed. 89 It follows therefore that, a state that possesses the two attributes over 
the three - mile TS can be said to possess sovereignty over it. The critics of the 
nature of the TS have grossly misconstrued the word, 'sovereignty', that a 
clarification of its actual meaning becomes necessary. Judge Huber in the arbitral 
award in Island of Palmas' case exhaustively did this when he stated inter alia that: 
"Sovereignty in the relation between states signifies independence. Independence in 
regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of 
any other state, the functions of a state ... "90 
In line with Judge Huber's definition of sovereignty above, Article 2 of the Geneva 
Convention on Territorial Sea, 1958 and Article 2 (1) of UNCLOS, 1982 have 
provided the coastal State with the legal basis required to exercise the functions of a 
State over its TS. Article 2 of UNCLOS for instance declared that it is the same 
sovereignty which a coastal State possesses over its land territory that extends to its 
TS. 
3. United States practice 
3.1 Executive and legislative measures 
In the case of the US, the two incidents mentioned in paragraph IV, sub paragraph 
3.1 of page 26 and 27 above clearly indicate the executive measures taken with 
regards to the juridical nature of the TS. Further evidence may be found in the 
definition of the word 'territory' offered by the American Law Institute, which 
indicates that the territory of a State consists of: 
(a) the land areas 
890'Connell, op. cit., note 51, p. 304 
90 ( 1928) PCA, p. 829 at 838 - 9 
53 
(b) the internal waters and their beds 
(c) the territorial sea and its bed, and 
(d) the subsoil under, and the airspace above the territorial sea.91 
Apart from these, the Department of State in a background paper prepared by it 
prior to the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea, which while referring to 
sovereignty and TS it stated that, "it is almost universally accepted that the coastal 
State possesses sovereignty or exclusive and absolute territorial jurisdiction, in its 
territorial sea."92 Furthermore, when the United States enforced its prohibition laws 
on the British and other foreign vessels, the British Government did not frown at 
the application of the prohibition measures as according to the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, the United States had not violated international law since (1) 
foreign ships trading with a country must comply with its laws, and (2) every State 
is supreme over all persons and property within its dominions, including ships 
within its territorial waters. Furthermore, the territory of the United States as 
designated by the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of January 16, 1920 is 
held to include the established three-mile limit.93 
3.2 Judicial practice 
The US Supreme Court ruled in 1842 in Martin vs. Waddell that the original states 
acquired title to the submerged lands beneath navigable waters at independence94 
and in 1845 in Pollard vs. Hagan that subsequently admitted states enjoyed the 
same right under the equal footing doctrine.95 The Cunard vs. Mellon referred to 
above also affirms that the territory of the United States includes the established 
three-mile limit.96 All these cases demonstrate that the US treats the juridical nature 
91 The American Law Institute, "Restatement of the Law, The Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States", Jurisdiction, pt. 1, Philadelphia, (1962 draft), p. 37 
92 Whiteman M.M., ed. Digest of International Law, 837 (Department of State Publication 7825), US 
Government Printing, Washington D.C. ( 1965), p. 2. 
93 Cunard vs. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) 
94 41 US (16 Pet) 367 (1842) 
95 44 US (3 How.) 212 (1845) 
96 Supra. See also United States vs. Smiley, 27 Fed. Cas, p. 1132; Louisiana vs. Mississippi, 202 
u.s. 1, 52. 
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of its TS as that of dominium and imperium. 
4. India measures 
In India too, the Privy Council seems to have finally laid the controversies 
generated by the Franconia decision to rest in the Secretary of State for India vs. 
Chelikani Rama Rao. This case concerns a dispute between the Crown and the 
Zemindars over the ownership of islands which had arisen in the midst of the sea 
within three miles of the mainland of the province of Madras in India. The case was 
earlier tried by a District Court which found that the title to the islands in question 
originally vested in the Crown. In arriving at this decision, the District Court relied 
on the rule of English Law as enunciated in 'Law of Waters,' which is to the effect 
that islands arising out of the sea belong prima facie to the Crown. 97 It equally 
placed reliance on the case of Secretary of State for India v. Kadirikutt/8, which 
makes the above mentioned rule to be applicable in India. This decision was 
however reversed on appeal to the High Court. On further appeal to the Privy 
Council, that court dismissed the decision of the High Court and upholds that of the 
District Court. Lord Shaw, while delivering the judgment of the court in that case, 
referred to R vs. Keyn99 and stated that the doubts raised upon the proposition that 
islands rising in the sea within 3 miles from the coast of India belonged in property 
to the Crown were substantially rested on certain dicta pronounced in that case; he 
then proceeded: 
... It should not be forgotten that that case had reference on its merit 
solely to the points as to limit of admiralty jurisdiction; nothing else 
fell to be there decided ... When however, the actual question as to the 
dominion of the bed of the sea within a limited distance from our 
shores has been actually in issue, the doubts just mentioned have not 
been supported, nor has the suggestion appeared to be helpful or 
97 Coulson, H.J. and Forbes, U.A., Law Relating to Waters, Sea, Tidal and Inland and Land 
Drainage (6th edition), S. R. Hobday, London, (1952), p. 31 
98 ( 1876) 2, Ex. D. p. 63 
99 Supra 
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sound. 100 
5. Australian measures 
Webb C. J. in the Australian case of D vs. Commissioner of Taxes noted that the 
question whether or not the territory of Queensland includes the strip of water 
within a marine league of low-water mark, " It seems to me, however, that since the 
decision of the Privy Council in Secretary of State for India vs. Chelikani Rama 
Rao, it is not open to us to answer this question in the negative, no matter what 
private views we may entertain as to the strength and effect of the judgment in R. 
vs. Keyn "101 
Thus, as in the case of the English practice examined above, the practices of the 
United States, Australia and Indian have again proved conclusively that the rights of 
a coastal State over its TS is that of sovereignty. 
6. General Commentary: State of the law 
The decision in R vs. Keyn has been so much criticised and protested against in the 
strongest terms possible right from the moment it was handed down that, one finds 
it difficult to fathom why the Supreme Court in Nigeria in the year 2002 - over a 
century after the decision and in the face of such overwhelming criticisms and 
judicial decisions to the contrary still finds it convenient to rely on it to decide such 
a sensitive matter as that. No wonder the decision attracted so many criticisms and 
debates as did the R vs. Keyn case upon which the decision has been based. Many 
people have even described it as a mere political decision calculated to exploit the 
FCU of the benefits of the natural resources of the adjacent ocean space rather than 
a legal one. 
Had the Supreme Court taken the time to consider the overwhelming judicial 
opinions, statutory provisions and the opinions of publicists, which have since 
100 (1916) 43 Ind. App. 199; 85 UPC 222; (1916) 32, T.L.R. p. 652 
101 (1941) St. Qd. 218; Parry and Hopkins, op. cit., p. 38 
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rendered the correctness of R vs. Keyn decision doubtful, the court would probably 
have arrived at decisions which would be in line with such cases as Reg. vs. Dudley 
and Stephens where Lord Coleridge C. J. (who was one of the minority judges in 
the R vs. Keyn case), stated that opinion of the minority in that case had been since 
not only enacted but declared by Parliament to have been always the law102 or the 
case of Carr vs. Fracis Times and Company, where Earl of Halsbury L. C. 
referring to that judgment of the majority in the R vs. Keyn case, stated: 
"speaking of it as an authoritative judgment I cannot forbear from saying 
that, some what unusually, the legislature of this country in the very next 
session but one passed an act of parliament (41 and 42 Vic. C. 73) reversing 
that judgment - that is to say, affirming in the strongest terms that the 
decision which had been arrived at by the majority (a very narrow majority) 
in that case was one that was not the law of England ... " 103 
To come closer home, the Supreme Court in the case under review cited the case of 
AG Southern Nigeria vs. John Holt, and yet was not persuaded by the statement of 
the court to the effect that: 
" ... if the erosion had continued, their Lordships do not doubt that it would 
have been no defence against the claim of the Crown that the foreshore upon 
the line of inroad had de facto been transferred to the Crown as 'owners of 
the sea and its bed within territorial limits', and of 'foreshore' ... " 104 
Obviously, the 'territorial limit' being referred to by the Privy Council in that case 
is not the low-water mark but the three- mile territorial limit which Britain, the then 
colonial overlord of Nigeria claimed as its territorial limit. This is so because as at 
1915 when the case was decided, the idea of the 3-mile TS limit had gained so wide 
recognition and as noted earlier it was adopted by many countries including the 
major maritime powers, though it could not be said to have been unanimously 
adopted by all nations as there were other nations that claimed varying distances, 
which in some cases are in excess of three-mile. However, the fact that other 
102 (1884) 14 QBD 273 at 281 
103 (1902) AC 176 at p. 181 
104 Supra, at p. 611 
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nations claimed varying distances and not adopting low-water mark as their 
territorial limit is enough to show that the "territorial limit" the Privy Council was 
referring to in that judgment is the three-mile TS limit. 
The pertinent question that a rational mind would ask in the circumstances is 
whether the English practice as espoused above extended to her overseas colonies 
as well and by extension to Nigeria or were restricted within the domain of the 
United Kingdom. The answer to this question is yes, the practice was introduced to 
the colonies, protectorates and other overseas possessions of England. Beginning 
from the Arabian countries, such as Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (etc), one 
begins to see the introduction of the practice of regarding the three mile TS as 
forming part of the territory of the adjoining State. In the case of Abu Dhabi - a 
former British protectorate for instance, the fact of TS forming part of that country 
could be elicited from the decision of the Arbitrators in Petroleum Development Ltd 
vs. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. 105 The Arbitrators in that case decided that the TS is 
included in the concessions granted to the Petroleum Development Ltd based on the 
findings that TS forms part of the territory of Abu Dhabi. It is stated in that case 
that. .. Every State is owner and sovereign in respect of its territorial waters, their 
seabed and subsoil. .. 106 Similar holdings were made by the Arbitrators in the case 
between Petroleum Development (Qatar) Ltd vs. Ruler of Qatar. 107 Further 
evidence may also be found in the Australian and United States cases mentioned 
above. 
Furthermore, let us see the status and development of the law in the context of 
Nigeria's problems. In this context, there is the need to determine whether Britain 
introduced the three-mile TS concept to Nigeria. There is also the need to determine 
whether the three-mile TS was within the territories of the colonies and 
protectorates or not. To do this requires an in-depth examination of the traditional 
practices of the various Empires and Kingdoms that were amalgamated in 1914 to 
105 (1951)18 ILR, 144 
106 Ibid, at p.l51 - 2 
107 Ibid, p. 161 
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form the Nigerian state regarding the nature of the TS before the advent of 
colonialism. After that, it will be necessary to examine the nature of the Nigerian 
TS during the colonial era in the context of the colonial practices, orders, 
proclamations, ordinances and judicial decisions. It is also necessary to consider the 
nature of Nigeria TS after independence in order to determine whether or not there 
is a carry over of the practice introduced by Britain beyond the colonial era. 
Also, attention will be focused on examining the legal effects of the various 
cessions made to the British Government prior to colonization especially, those 
concerned with the maritime areas. That is, it will be seen whether the nature of 
practice of the local tribe's men regarding the sea bordering their towns and villages 
provides us with a clue to the correct determination of the nature of Nigerian TS. 
Subsequently, whether by such cessions the FCU, which are presently contesting 
the title to the maritime territory and resources with the Federal Government, are 
still justified to do so in-view of the aforementioned cessions. 
VII. Nature of TS of Nigeria 
1 General comment 
The nature of the Nigerian TS will be examined in this segment in the context of the 
pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial practices. 
2 The Pre-Colonial Era 
It should be noted from the outset that the controversy over the nature of Nigerian 
territorial waters began soon after independence, prior to that period there was no 
controversy as to the nature of authority exercised by the various kingdoms and 
empires that were later colonised and from amalgamation up to the time of 
federation no such controversy among the regions. Before the advent of colonial 
rule in Nigeria, there existed at various times various entities known as Emirates in 
the northern part of Nigeria, Kingdoms and Empires in the southern Nigeria with 
each of them composed of different ethnic groups. Each Emirate, Kingdom and 
Empire was independent of the other with a concomitant mode of government 
peculiar to it. History reveals for example, that Lagos was composed of ethnic 
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groups such as the Aworis, the Eguns etc. while Niger Delta was made up of groups 
such as, Kalabaris, the Effiks, Ibibios, the Urhobos, ljaws and the Itshekiris to 
mention just a few. Some of these communities border the sea and they at various 
times asserted exclusive rights over the narrow waters. They regarded themselves 
as possessing some elements of rights in the form of ownership and sovereignty 
over the waters of the sea contiguous to their various domains, a claim which still 
persists to this day. 
The claim to ownership of the maritime territory contiguous to these kingdoms and 
empires was recently re-asserted in an affidavit, deposed to by the King of Lagos in 
the Abia case that; 
From time immemorial, the indigenous people of the clans, 
villages, communities, towns, cities or local governments in 
Lagos contiguous or appurtenant to or abutting the off-shore 
waters, have claimed and exercised sovereign rights and 
dominium over, and made extensive use of the off-shore 
waters for the purpose of exercising rights of coastal frontage 
owner, fishing, navigation, transport and dredging for sand, 
domestic activities, war and ports. 108 
In 16th and 17th Centuries, it was already agreed that coastal States enjoyed "some 
rights to regulate in their own interests activities in the seas adjoining their 
coasts."109 It is doubtful, however if the various Kingdoms and Empires that today 
make up the FCU in Nigeria were aware of the existence of such rights and even if 
they did, their capacity to make such a claim might be suspect. At that time the 
various Kingdoms and Empires could not be said to be fully sovereign states 
recognized by international law. Though they were not yet full-fledge nations in the 
nature of today's state, they were independent in their own rights, because they 
were not the subjects of any other sovereign and by the fact also that they were 
108 Supra, at 723 
109 Churchill and Lowe, op cit. n. 28 at p.71 
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composed of their own territories, government and population. Like other coastal 
States and territories, the Kingdoms and the Empires derived the title and ownership 
they asserted first and foremost by their contiguity to the sea shore. Coupled with 
their native laws and customs this enabled them to exercise and regulate activities 
on the seas adjoining their coasts. An evidence of formal recognition by Britain of 
the title and ownership of the Kingdoms and Empires could be seen in a Declaration 
between the British and Kosoko, dated the 7th of February, 1863. 110 
2.1 Nature of the rights exercised before colonisation 
The rights exercised by the kingdoms and empires over the adjacent sea areas were 
manifested in the periods before colonisation in the form of: 
(a) Granting of fishing rights to both the king's subjects and his vassals; 
(b) Levying or waiving the right to levy port duties on both foreign and 
ships of vassals; 
(c) Transportation of both human and materials, such as logs of wood 
between the various parts of the kingdoms and empires; 
(d) Waging of wars with enemy kingdoms. 
(e) Granting of right to dredge for sand to both the loyal subjects or to 
vassals; 
(f) Trading within the various groups and also with other foreign nations, 
particularly the Europeans who came in search of slaves, Palm oil, Kernel, 
Gum Arabic, Rubber and other articles of trade. This resulted in the 
conclusion of various trade agreements for example between the British and 
the local rulers of the kingdoms and empires. 111 
(g) Through the execution of various treaties of cession and trade 
agreements with the European powers. 
Thus, even though the Kingdoms and Empires were not then States as noted above, 
their international legal personality and capacity to conclude international treaties 
110 See BFSP ( 1866- 1867) vol. LVII, p. 354 
111 See Agreement between King and Chiefs of Lagos and Britain of the 28 of February, 1852, in 
BSFP (1852- 1853), Vol. 42, p. 693. 
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and engaged in international trade was evident by the various treaties they 
concluded with Britain and other European countries prior to colonisation. The fact 
that they were sovereign in their own rights was also evident in the administrative 
and traditional functions which they exercised over their land and maritime 
territories. 
2.2 The extent of the sea areas controlled prior to colonisation 
The question which follows from above has to do with the extent or breadth of the 
sea the various Kingdoms and Empires exercised these acts of dominium and 
imperium. The extent of the sea areas claimed by the various Kingdoms and 
Empires is not specified either in the affidavit by the King of Lagos referred to 
above or in any written or oral documents. Similarly, the breadth of sea areas upon 
which the Kingdoms and Empires exercised the acts of dominium and imperium are 
not specified in the various treaties and agreements they entered into with the 
British prior to colonization. The idea of the three-mile TS, which at that time 
occupied the jurisprudence of international law of the sea, might not also be known 
by the various Empires and Kingdoms. An important fact is that the Kingdoms and 
Empires charged and received customs duties from European traders who made use 
of their TS. On many occasions the Kingdoms and Empires had arrested European 
traders who flouted their customs laws. This is evident from the trade Agreement 
concluded between Britain and the King of Lagos on the 28th of February, 1852, 
whereby the King and Chiefs of Lagos made an undertaken in Article I not to detain 
any trader on shore. Article VI of the same Agreement obliges the traders to pay 
respect to the King of Lagos. 112 
In the periods between 16th and 18th Centuries, the extent of the dominium and 
sovereignty the various Kingdoms and Empires claimed to have possessed and 
exercised could only be possibly explained in terms of the three miles TS. This was 
the only valid distance that the great maritime nations were prepared to recognize at 
that time. Any claim in excess of three miles would certainly not be supported or 
112 Ibid 
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recognized by Britain, which was in the forefront among the early Europeans to 
have established trading contacts with the Kingdoms and Empires. 
2.3 Traditional forms and extent of control 
In the case of the present day Niger Delta, evidence abounds that, the Efiks and 
Efiats of old Calabar controlled and exercised acts of ownership over sea areas 
extending to the present day Bakassi to the south, across the Cross River estuary to 
Tom Shot Island to the west and inland to the present day Odukpani and Akampa 
local Government Areas to the North and west. By the middle of the 19th Century, 
the British and the German missionaries and traders had started to establish trading 
centers along the coast. In exercise of the supposed authority and ownership of the 
maritime territory adjacent to Calabar Kingdom, King Ephraim IV is recorded to 
have refused on many occasions to grant permission to the Europeans to settle on 
the coast or penetrate the hinterland, because he had already established flourishing 
markets in various areas of the Cross River Basin. 113 This led for example to the 
conclusion of the agreement to regulate trade between the British supercargoes and 
the native traders of old Calabar, signed on the 19th September 1856. 114 
There is also the cession of maritime areas by the Kings; one notable example was 
the cession of Lemain Island via a Treaty signed on 14th April 1823, in favour of the 
British Government. 115 The treaties, including those with Dosunmu of Lagos and 
those with the Kings of old Calabar are assumed in many quarters to have been 
concluded based on the recognition by Britain and other powers of the control and 
the rights possessed by those Kings over the sea on which they traded and 
interacted. It may be rightly argued that there is justification in the claims of the 
various Kingdoms and Empires to the dominium and exclusive ownership of the 
maritime territory contiguous to their various domains. 
113 See Nigeria's Counter-Memorial in the case Concerning Land and Maritime Boundaries between 
Cameroun and Nigeria, Vol. I, chapters I- II, P.60 
114 Ibid, p.72 
115 Ibid, p.71 
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3 The Colonial Era 
3.1 Preliminary remarks 
The colonial era began in Nigeria with the signing of the treaty of cession, dated the 
6th of August 1861, made between King Docemo (Dosunmu) of Lagos and his 
chiefs with the British Government, whereby, the port and Island of Lagos were 
ceded to the British Government. 116 A salient part of the treaty provides that: 
They grant and confirm unto the Queen of Great Britain, her heirs and 
successors for ever, the port and island of Lagos, with all rights, profits, 
territories, and appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging, and as well 
the profits and revenue as the direct, full and absolute dominium and 
sovereignty of the said port, island and premises, with all the royalties 
thereof, freely, fully entirely and absolutely. 117 
This treaty is also well discussed in the case of AG of Southern Nigeria and others 
vs. John Holt. 118 
Thereafter, other cessions were made in favour of the British Government: For 
example, in a Declaration dated February 7, 1863, Kosoko, a former king of Lagos 
relinquished his former territory, the ownership of which according to him was 
recognised as such by the British Government. An aspect of the Declaration states 
that: "Having now left Epe, and returned to Lagos by the kind permission of Her 
Britannic Majestic Government, I lay no further claim to the ports of Palma and 
Leckie (Lekki), which consequently must revert to the Lagos Government."119 
On July 7, 1863, another Agreement was concluded between the Chiefs of Badagry 
and the British Government. Article I states in part that the Chiefs of Badagry have 
freely and willingly ceded to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, her heirs and 
successors, for ever, the town of Badagry, and all the rights and territories and 
appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging, as well as all profits and revenues, 
116 BFSP (1861- 1862) Vol. LII, P. 181-182 
117 Ibid 
118 Supra, p. 609 
119 BFSP (1866- 1867) vol. LVII p. 354 (emphasis added) 
64 
absolute dominion and sovereignty of the said town and territory of Badagry, freely, 
fully, entirely and absolutely. 120 Badagry is located by the Atlantic Ocean and 
presently a Local Government Area in Lagos state. The inclusion in the Agreement 
of all territories and appurtenances in the areas ceded, necessarily included the TS 
adjoining Badagry. 
The implication of the various cessions above is that, they confirm the international 
legal personality and the capacity of the Kings to enter into treaty relation. They 
also serve as recognition of the dominiull]. and sovereignty of the Kingdoms and 
Empires by Britain and other States that had entered into treaty relation with them. 
The other implication is that Lagos became a British Crown possession in 1861 and 
Badagry in 1863. 121 The question that may be asked at this point is: What happened 
to the other Kingdoms and Empires that were not directly ceded to the British? 
The successful annexation of Lagos as a Crown possession in 1861, served as 
impetus for similar annexations of the other Kingdoms and Empires along the coast. 
However, while the annexation of Lagos was achieved through the various cessions 
(amidst major protests in most cases) referred to; the annexation of the other 
Kingdoms and Empires along the coast was achieved by military might. Various 
military expeditions were carried out against the Kingdoms and Empires and 
because majority of them were already embroiled in internal rivalry and conflicts 
they fell very easily to the British military might The conquest was usually 
followed by the signing of a treaty of protection. Thus, the Oil River Protectorate 
was constituted on June 5, 1885, after successful military expeditions against the 
territories between the protectorate of Lagos and the western bank of the Rio del 
Rey. 122 The Benin Kingdom for example was annexed after the expedition of 
120 Ibid, pp.358 - 359 
121 Tamuno, TN., "British Colonial Administration in the Twentieth Century," in Obaro Ikime (ed) 
Groundwork of Nigerian History, Heinemann, lbadan, ( 1980) 
122 Hertslet, vol. 1, p. 123; Brownlie, I., African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia 
London and Worcester, (1979), p. 553 
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1897. 123 In 1906, through Order in Council of February 16, 1906 the Protectorate 
of Southern Nigeria was constituted, following the merging of the Lagos Colony 
with the Western Provinces and the Niger River (formerly Oil River) 
Protectorates. 124 By these methods, the entire southern Nigeria was brought under 
the British rule. The protectorate of northern Nigeria was similarly established 
through Order in Council of December 27, 1899 and included all areas formerly 
under the control of the Royal Niger Company. 125 
3.2 The administration of the territories by Britain 
On the 1st of January 1914, both the Northern and Southern (then composed of 
Lagos colony) protectorates were amalgamated to form the entity, which is now 
commonly called the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Thereafter, English laws and 
practice in the form of express enactments were introduced to Nigeria. First, the 
laws were introduced by way of Orders in Council, acting by virtue of prerogative, 
or powers conferred by the British Settlement Act, 1887. Secondly, English law was 
introduced through the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, which applied to 
protectorates, protected states and trust territories. Thirdly by colonial legislation -
through Ordinances, Acts, Proclamations by virtue of the powers granted to such 
legislature by the Crown. 126 
As far as Nigeria is concerned, the authority for the application of English laws is 
to be found in the Supreme Court Ordinance of Nigeria, 1914. In the Lagos colony, 
Ordinance 3 of 1863 made English laws applicable so far as local circumstances 
permitted, unless inconsistent with any Order in force in that colony. Similarly, the 
common law principles of equity and statutes of general application became directly 
applicable in Nigeria. 127 The importance of the application of English law in 
123 Ikime, 0., Niger Delta River: ltsekiri- Urhobo relations and the European Presence, 1884-
1936," London (1969), p.187 
124 Supra, note 103 
125 Brownlie, 1., op. Cit., n. 112, p. 165 
126 A11ott, A.N., Essays in African Law:with special reference to the Law of Ghana, London ( 1960), 
P:.4 27 Ibid, p.3; See also, Obilade, A. 0., Nigerian Legal System, Sweet & Maxwel1, London, (1979), 
p. 69 and Park, E.A.W ., The Sources of Nigerian Law African University Press, London (1963) 
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Nigeria is that, it provides us with the yardstick for examining what the nature of 
the TS bordering the southern extremity of Nigeria was during this period. It makes 
it possible for us to consider the nature of the Nigerian TS in the context of the 
various enactments cited and also in the context of the prevailing practice in 
England and in other British colonies. 
3.3 Question of three-mile TS and how it came to form part of Nigerian territory. 
It is necessary to consider the legislation relating to the boundaries of Nigeria. Two 
major sources are noteworthy in this respect. The first is through treaties and the 
second by domestic legislation. 
3.3 .1 Treaties 
Among the earliest colonial arrangements regarding boundary in Nigeria, 
two are of crucial importance. 
(i) The first is the Agreement between Britain and Germany regarding the 
Rio del Rey of 14th April, 1893. Article II of that Agreement fixed the 
Calabar sector of Nigeria boundary in 'the sea'. It provides, "from this upper 
end of Rio del Rey to the sea, that is to say, to the promontory marked West 
Huk on the above mentioned chart, the right of the Rio del Rey water way 
shall be the boundary between the Oil River Protectorate and the colony of 
the Cameroun's. 128 This does not provide a clear indication regarding the 
outer limit or extent of the coastal areas of Nigeria. 
( ii) The second is the Anglo - German Treaty of 11th March, 1913. A 
portion of it describes the boundaries of Southern Nigeria thus; 
from the centre of the navigable channel on a line joining 
Bakassi point and King Point, the boundary shall follow the 
centre of the navigable channel of the Akwayafe River as far as 
the 3 - mile limit of territorial jurisdiction ... the 3 - mile limit 
shall, regards the mouth of the estuary, be taken as a line 3 
128 Treaty Annex NC -M 27 of 14th April, 1893, No. 273, P. 147 
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nautical miles seaward of a line joining the Sandy Point and Tom 
Shot Point. 129 This has clarity in terms of dimension. 
The boundary description contained in the Anglo - German Treaty followed 
the colonies and protectorates of Nigeria into amalgamation in 1914 and 
even beyond to the adoption of a federal system of government in 1951 
through the Macpherson Constitution of that year. Further analysis of this 
treaty follows shortly. 
3.3.2 Domestic legislation 
The domestic legislation regarding the southern boundary of Nigeria was made as 
Orders in Council. About six of them are relevant. 
(i) Thus in 1899, a description of the boundary of the entire southern Nigeria was 
made by an Order in Council. The description of the boundary as given in that 
Order is the sea. 130 
(ii) Furthermore, in 1911, another Order in Council described the southern 
boundary of Nigeria as the territories of Africa which are bounded on the south by 
the Atlantic Ocean, on the west by the line of the frontier between British and 
French territories, on the north and north - east by the British protectorate of 
Northern Nigeria, on the east by the frontier between British and German 
territories. 131 
(iii) Worthy of mention is the Colony of Nigeria Boundaries Order-in-Council of 
1913; it defines the boundary of the southern extremity of Nigeria as the shore of 
the Bight of Benin. 132 
(iv) Another legislation is the Order in Council providing for the administration of 
129 Agreement between Great Britain and Germany respecting the settlement of Frontier between 
Nigeria and Cameroons from Yola to the Sea, Treaty Annex NC- M 45 of lllh March, 1913, p. 238 
-239. 
130 The Southern Nigeria Order in Council of271h December 1889, p.201 
131 Southern Nigeria Protectorate Order in Council, of 4th February 1911, p.ll2. 
132 LFN, (1958) vol. II, P.218 
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the Nigeria protectorate and Cameroon's under British mandate; this Order in 
Council like the previous ones above described the boundary of the protectorate of 
Nigeria under article 4(1) as the Atlantic Ocean. 133 
(v) In 1953, a separate Order was made for the delimitation of Lagos Township; this 
is contained in the Lagos Local Government (Delimitation of Town) Order in 
Council. The schedule to this Order gives the southern boundary of Lagos as the 
"sea." 134 
(vi) Pursuant to section 5, subsection 2 (a) of the Nigerian (Constitution) Order in 
Council, 1951, the then Governor General of Nigeria, acting in his discretion was 
allowed by proclamation, with the approval of the British Secretary of State, to 
define and from time to time vary the boundaries of any region of Nigeria. Upon 
this Order, the Governor General made a proclamation - the Northern Region, 
Western Region and Eastern Region (Definition of Boundaries) Proclamation, 1954. 
That Proclamation was published as Legal Notice No. 126 of 1954. The Order 
contains three schedules, the second defines the boundary of the Western Region 
and the third defines the boundary of the Eastern region, both give the southern 
boundary of each region as the "sea."135 
Based on the treaties and Orders in Council, there is confusion regarding the extent 
of the TS of Nigeria. This is making it difficult to ascertain the extent of the said TS. 
This is because only the Anglo-German Treaty of 11th March, 
1913 described the southern boundary in relation to the three-mile TS, the rest 
simply give the southern boundary of Nigeria as the sea. What is the sea? Where 
does the sea start? Could it be that the Anglo-German Treaty, which is an 
international treaty, defines the maritime territory of Nigeria, while the Orders-in-
Council, which are domestic laws, define the land territory of Nigeda? The 
Supreme Court of Nigeria, in the Abia case defined the word, 'sea' by reference to 
133 The Nigeria (Protectorate and Cameroons) Order in Council of 2"d August 1946, p. 573. 
134 Western Region Order in Council, No.7, Chapter 93, LFN and Lagos, 1958 
135 LFN and Lagos, 1958, pp. 686-687, (the schedules not included in the pages) 
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the Concise Oxford Dictionary. According to the Court, the Oxford Dictionary 
defines 'sea' as meaning, 
An expanse of salt water that covers most of earth's surface and 
encloses its continents and islands, the ocean, any part of this as 
opposed to dry land or fresh water, that it follows that the dry land or 
fresh water abutting the sea is not part of it. 136 
Based on this and the authority of R. vs. Keyn, which according to the court states 
that, at common law the seaward boundary of a state is the 'low-water mark and 
concludes that the boundary of the FCU in Nigeria is the low-water mark along the 
coast.' 137 The immediate implication of the imprecise nature of the various 
boundary Orders, the R vs. Keyn case and the reliance on the case by the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria in its judgment in Abia case is that, it again brought to the fore the 
question of the juridical nature and extent of the TS thought to have been long 
resolved. 
In arriving at this judgment, the Court literally placed reliance on the provisions of 
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the provisions of 
Article 5 of the UNCLOS with regards to normal and straight baselines 
measurement. In the Court's view, since the low-water mark is the normal base line 
recommended by the two Conventions as the starting point for measuring the 
breadth of the TS and by extension other maritime zones, it therefore follows that 
the low-water mark must be the boundary or the limit of the land territory as 
opposed to the maritime territory of the FCU. 138 
The reasoning of the Court in that case cannot be supported either by the ratio 
decidendi of the judgment or by any sound legal reasoning. In the first place, let us 
look at the meaning of the word 'sea'. The meaning ascribed to the word 'sea' by 
136 Op. cit., p. 728 
137 Ibid. 
138 Articles 5 and 7 of 1982 UNCLOS 
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. the Court is contrary to the meaning ascribed to it by the Oxford Dictionary quoted 
and relied upon by it, because land exposed by shifting tides is also part of the land 
territory and not the sea. It is also contrary to the legal meaning of the word 'sea', 
contained in both Stroud's Judicial Dictionary and the Dictionary of English Law 
by Earl Jowitt. For instance, Stroud's Judicial Dictionary defines the sea as: The 
Sea is either that which lies within the body of a COUNTY, or without. "The part of 
the sea which lies not within the body of a county is called the main sea, or 
ocean."
139 The Nigerian Court is thus wrong by this Stroud's definition. Similarly, 
sea is defined by Jowitt as follows: 
The main or high seas are part of the realm of England, for thereon the courts 
of Admiralty have jurisdiction, but they are not subject to the common Jaw. 
The main sea begins at the low-water mark, but between the high-water mark 
and the low-water mark, where the sea ebbs and flows the common law and 
Admiralty have divisum imperium, an alternate jurisdiction, the one upon the 
water when it is full sea, the other upon the land when it is an ebb. 140 
Taking together, it follows that, if the waters within the body of a county are also 
part of the sea, then the low-water mark cannot be the final limit of a State. It 
follows also that if the low-water mark was not the limit of England at the time in 
question, the sea mentioned in the various Boundary Orders which described the 
southern boundary of Nigeria can definitely not be the low-water mark. The 
definition of the Supreme Court of Nigeria is equally contrary to the Anglo -
German Treaty of 11th March, 1913 and the case of AG Southern Nigeria and 
another vs. John Holt, ·which both describe the southern boundary of Nigeria in 
relation to the three-mile TS. The word 'sea' as used by the various Boundary 
Orders appears to be more compatible with any part of the three miles TS 
mentioned in the 1913 Anglo - German Treaty and in the AG Southern Nigeria and 
another vs. John Holt than it is to the low-water mark, which the court ascribes to 
the word. It is also more compatible with the observation of Ohaegbu than it is to 
139 James, J.S., Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, vol. 5, London, (1974), p.2454 
140 Jowitt, E. and Walsh C., The Dictionary of English Law, vol. 2, (I- Z), Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, (1959), p.l596 
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the low-water mark. Thus Ohaegbu observes as follows: "And because the word 
"sea" was nowhere defined in the Act, it was open to construe it as the limit of the 
territorial waters, which then extended to three nautical miles seawards from the 
low-water mark". 141 
Furthermore, the court seemed to have lost sight of the meaning of the low-water 
mark as used in the conventions and had completely failed to address its mind to the 
developments before and after the decision in the R vs. Keyn. The description of the 
southern boundary of Nigeria in relation to the three mile TS accords with the 
practice of Britain and other maritime nations, which adopted the three mile as their 
territorial limits to replace the rather indeterminate cannon shot rule introduced by 
Galiani and which was dictated by the maxim, terrae dominium finitur ubi finitur 
armorum vis. 
The word 'sea' certainly encompasses the sea- bed of the TS, and even the high 
seas or any part thereof. It is therefore, erroneous for the court to have concluded on 
that basis alone, that 'the sea' means low-water mark. The word 'sea' as defined by 
that dictionary may mean any part of the sea from low-water mark seaward even to 
the high seas, but certainly it cannot be the low-water mark as adjudged by the court 
because the low-watermark is nothing more than a line along the coast which forms 
the basis for the measurement of other maritime zones. It is the lowest astronomical 
tide, which when it is high tide is covered by the waters of the sea but uncovered at 
low water tide. Thus the word sea cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria and the low-water mark, which is nothing more than land 
covered regularly by sea at high tide and left open at low tide cannot be the limit of 
Nigeria's maritime territory. It will be shown in chapter four that the R vs Keyn, 142 
case which the Nigerian Supreme Court relied on in its judgment had long been 
overtaken by events that happened before and after the decision. It may be that the 
Anglo-German treaty being an international treaty defines the international 
141 Ohaegbu, G., The Breadth of Territorial Waters in the State Practice of some African Countries, 
Bonn (1975), p. 173 
142 Supra 
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boundary of Nigeria, while the Orders-in-Council being domestic laws define the 
land boundaries of Nigeria. It follows also that the breadth of Nigerian TS during 
the period under review can only be logically explained in terms of the three-miles 
mentioned in the Anglo-German Agreement and in the case of AG Southern Nigeria 
vs. John Holt. 
3.3.3 Evidence from Colonial Officers in the context of legislation 
It will be useful to scrutinize the views held by colonial officers and other 
officials regarding the nature and extent of the TS of the former British colonies. 
In the late 1950s for example, the Colonial Office intended to extend the 
boundaries of some of its colonies, including the colony of Nigeria. A question 
was posed by the law officers as to whether the legislature of a colony or 
protectorate might, by virtue of its power to make laws for the peace, order and 
good government of the territory, enact laws governing the exploration and 
exploitation of the natural resources of the CS 'outside the TS . .143 Although the 
question was answered in the affirmative in view of the Geneva Convention of 
1958, to which Britain was then about to become a party, 144 the point of relevance 
there is the mention in that question of the word 'TS,' which presupposes that the 
TS was already included in the boundaries of the colonies which was being sought 
to include the CS thereof. 
Certain colonial enactments were made to clear the doubts that were being 
expressed in some quarters as to the competence of the local governments to make 
exclusive grant of the maritime areas below the low-water mark of the coast of the 
colonies. Most of the enactments and the discussions leading to them 
unambiguously affirm the proprietorship of the Crown over the maritime areas 
below low-water mark extending to the three mile territorial limits of the Crown's 
colonies. For example, the Foreshores and Sea Bed Ordinance of 1900 is probably 
143Marston, G., "The Incorporation of Continental Shelf Rights Into United Kingdom Law," vol. 4 
(1996), ICLQ p.l3 at 27 
144 Britain signed the Geneva Convention on Continental Shelf, 1958 on September 9, 1959 and 
ratified it on the lith May, 1964; See 499 U.N.T.S. 311 
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the first colonial enactment relating to the legal status of maritime territory outside 
the inland waters of a colony. Its enactment came as a result of an application made 
by a company in Singapore which was then part of the Crown Colony of Straits 
Settlements with respect to the grant of a lease of the maritime territory adjacent to 
the premises of the company. There arose a doubt as to the competence of the local 
government to make such grant, which was then considered to be a part of the open 
seas. Though the Colonial Office doubted whether the portion of the sea being 
referred to actually constituted an open sea, nevertheless, Wilson, a legal assistant 
in the Colonial Office wrote in response that, "in the absence of express legislation 
in the colonies I suppose the foreshore is, as elsewhere, in the Crown as well as the 
sea-bed within territorial limits, except in cases where it can be proved to have 
legally passed into the hands of private persons ... there can I imagine be no 
objection to the Crown dealing with its property."145 
The enactment of the Foreshores and Sea Bed Ordinance of 1900 opened the 
floodgates for similar legislations in the other colonies. A similar question as in the 
case of Strait Settlements arose with respect to the British Guiana and T C. Rayner, 
the then Attorney General of the colony asked the Solicitor General also of the 
colony "whether the doctrine of territorial waters gave the sovereign power over the 
waters adjacent to his dominions similar to his power over land." 146 Nunan replied 
and pointed out that: 
under Roman- Dutch law (the law of the colony at that time) the foreshore 
and the land below low- water mark was not the property of the Crown but 
was res nullius or res communis ... neither the rule of international law as to 
territorial waters nor the English Act of 1878, giving effect to it in British 
territories (which R. vs. Keyn rendered necessary, but which case at any later 
145 Marston, G., "Colonial Enactments Relating to the Legal Status of Offshore Submerged Lands," 
vol. 50 (1976) The Australian Law Journal p.402 at p. 403 
146 Cited in despatch 310 dated 30th August 1915 from the Governor to the secretary of state for the 
colonies: C.O. 111/601(unfoliated); C.O. Confidential Print West Indian No. 200 9C.0.884112) 
p.l05; Marston, G., op. cit., n. 137, at p. 406 
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date would probably have been decided differently), affect the question of 
the ownership of the soil. 147 
Nunan's comments cannot be supported in all their ramifications. First, his use of 
the words, res nullius and res communis interchangeably, as if the two mean the 
same thing cannot be justified. The two concepts refer to different legal concepts 
and cannot be used in the sense that Nunan has used them. Secondly, his reference 
to the case of R vs. Keyn to buttress his argument cannot be supported. The decision 
in R vs. Keyn case deviates from earlier and later decisions on the issue of limit of 
the territory of England and to that extent has been rejected by numerous authors 
and later decisions. In apparent disapproval of such a proposition, J. S. Risley, a 
colonial legal adviser commented thus: 
I think there is sufficient authority for the proposition {though it has 
never been strictly held by the courts) that under English law the soil 
of the sea between low-water mark and the three mile limit (including 
mines and minerals thereunder) is the property of the Crown, and can 
be granted by the Crown subject to public rights of fishing and 
navigation etc. over the locus of the grant. We have acted on this 
proposition both in the Straits and Hong Kong. 148 
The judicial authorities, which Risley complained of, began to trickle in as noted 
above from 1900 onward149• 
Other colonies that have made similar enactments include Gambia and Sierra Leone, 
though both did not directly include a clause vesting ownership on the Crown, but 
the interpretation section thereof provided that, the TS bed and subsoil and the CS 
were included in the ambit of the legislation and that the shelf was held in the right 
147 Ibid (emphasis added) 
148 Law Officer's Report of 11 Nov. 1899 and 28th March, 1900 in C.O. 111/601 (unfoliated); 
149 Lord Advocate vs. Wemyss (supra); Carr vs. Fracis Times (supra) and Secretary of State for India 
vs. Che1ikani Rama Rao (supra) etc. 
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of the colonial govemment. 150 In the case of Nigeria, attempts were made to extend 
the maritime boundary beyond the three - mile territorial waters limit to include the 
CS thereof in-order to facilitate oil exploration. Difficulties were encountered in the 
process because it was perceived that it would be against the spirit and intention of 
the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, which was about to become 
fully operational, to annex or incorporate the CS within the boundaries of Nigeria. 
The reason for this is that annexation of the CS would mean bringing it into the 
same legal status as the TS, which is obviously contrary to the provisions of article 
2(1) of the convention. The article makes it clear that a coastal state only possesses 
sovereign rights over that zone for the purposes of exploring it and exploiting its 
mineral resources. A coastal state can therefore not legally annex it. In the 
correspondence that followed, it was made clear that annexation should be out of 
the question in view of article 2(1) of the Convention, but that legislation should be 
enacted under the power of the colonial government to make law for peace, order 
and good government of the territory, which would enable it to carry out 
exploration and at the same time exploit the resources in it. 151 
Apart from the legal issue of annexation, the proposed Order also raised a 
constitutional question, in view of the extra-territorial legislative incompetence of 
the colonies, a principle which precludes the colonies from legislating on matters 
outside their national boundaries. Thus, since the CS is outside the national 
boundaries of the colonies, they could not legally legislate on it. All the above were 
however taken into consideration in the text of the Order that was eventually 
adopted. The text of the Order was then sent in the form of a circular to all the 
dependent territories with a seacoast. Having stated that further 'annexations' by 
Order-in-Council must be ruled out as inconsistent with the Convention and having 
set out the gist of the law officers' opinion the circular contained a paragraph 
redrafted by Gutteridge which provides as follows: 
150 Gambia: Mining (Mineral Oil) Act 1955; Sierra Leone: Mining (Mineral Oil) Ordinance 1958 
and Mining (Mineral Oil) (Amendment Ordinance 1960 
151 C0554/2109 (WAFI029/3/0I) 
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"It is not proposed to alter or revoke existing Orders relating to 
continental shelves, and if asked by other States how they are 
reconciled with the Convention, it would be said ... that any rights now 
exercised under these orders, or under the Submarine Areas of the 
Gulf of Paria (Annexation) Order, 1942, would be the rights 
recognized by the convention."152 
Although the various colonial Orders, extended the CS boundaries of the Colonies 
for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of the mineral resources of the 
seabed, the fact remains that the extension was based generally on the assumption 
that the TS was already within the national boundaries of the affected colonies and 
had been granted and leased on several occasions. This indeed corresponds with the 
prevailing executive opinion in the period shortly before the signing of the 1958 
Conventions that the sea bed and the subsoil thereof, at least up to the seaward limit 
of the TS of the United Kingdom were part of the Crown Estate and under the 
management of the Crown Estate Commissioners established by Crown's lands 
legislation. The Commissioners who had the statutory duty of administering the 
Crown Estate considered their jurisdiction extended at least to the seaward limit of 
the TS and acted accordingly in making grants, leases and licenses for the purpose 
of construction and mineral dredging and extraction. The Commissioners' 
contemporary view of the extent of Crown ownership is indicated in a 
memorandum on the subject of foreshore and seabed, which they issued on 7 
August 1958. A portion of the memorandum reads: 
"Not only the foreshore (excluding foreshore under the control of the 
Duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall.), but also the bed of the sea below 
the seaward limit of the foreshore and within territorial waters, and of 
every channel, creek, estuary, and of every navigable river as far up as 
the tide flows, are vested in Her Majesty ... " 153 
152 Marston G., op. cit., n. 135, at p. 27 
153 CRES58/l 020 (Foreshores 25316) 
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The executive opinion has been argued by Geoffrey Marston not to have been 
derived so much from the rule of customary international law whereby coastal 
states possess sovereignty to this limit, but from a perception of the historical 
claims of ownership by the Crown in both England and Scotland154• As far as this 
statement may be true, it must be stressed that, the rule of customary international 
law played a very significant role in reinforcing the historical claims. It is that rule 
of customary international law inter alia that afforded the historical claim of the 
Crown the legal cloak, which it seemed to have lacked initially. 
4 Post-Colonial Period 
4.1 General comments 
Discussions on post-independence practice relating to TS will be devoted to 
answering the questions listed below. The questions are necessary in order to 
determine whether the ceded and the un-ceded territories went back to the Federal 
Government of Nigeria after colonization or that those who ceded them retained 
reversionary interests in them so that the territories went back to their former 
owners. The questions are: 
(a) What is the present status of the ceded territories? In other words, whether by 
the cessions made by the kings and chiefs, the ownership and sovereignty which 
they claimed to have possessed survive after independence. 
(b )Since it is only a few islands in Lagos and in Calabar that are known to have 
been ceded, what then happened to the other islands and the TS areas adjacent 
to towns and cities which were not ceded by the Kings and Chiefs? 
(c) What has been the nature of Nigerian TS since independence? 
4.2 Status of the ceded territories 
Before Nigeria became independent in 1960, it had already become a signatory to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1958 hence the provisions were applicable to it. Thus 
before Nigeria's independence, the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone had already conferred sovereignty over the TS on coastal 
154 Ibid 
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States, 155including Nigeria. Similarly, the Geneva Convention on the Continental 
Shelf had conferred sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the CS 156on coastal States, 
including Nigeria, which is the only entity, recognised by international law as 
possessing the necessary international legal personality for the assertion of the 
rights mentioned by those Conventions. This presupposes that all the territories 
previously held by the British Government in Nigeria, which it had to relinquish as 
a consequence of Nigeria's, independence could only revert to the latter which is 
the successor state to the Crown's governmental authority in Nigeria and not to the 
FCU. The various treaties of cession do not also contain reversionary clauses to 
make the interests transferred to revert to the Kingdoms and Empires. The basic 
rule therefore, is that, colonial territory becomes independent in its entirety. 
The FCU did not possess the necessary international legal personality required to 
succeed to the ownership and control of the maritime territory, which the departing 
colonial power was relinquishing and which the convention had already vested in. 
coastal States. The legal situation generated by the departure of the colonial powers 
and the eventual independence of the former colonies has been described by the 
Australian Court in New South Wales vs. Commonwealth 157 and Bonser vs. La 
Macchia158 as having passed by virtue of the independence of Australia from Great 
Britain to the Commonwealth through the operation of international law principle of 
state succession. Thus the only competent authority that could succeed to the 
Crown's former cessions is the Nigerian state, which is the rightful successor to the 
Crown's governmental authority in Nigeria after colonisation. 
4.3 The un-ceded territory 
Not all parts of the coastal areas of Nigeria were ceded to the British at the 
inception of colonial rule. Those parts that were not ceded were forcefully brought 
under colonial rule through annexations and signing of treaties of protection with 
155 Articles 1 and 2 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 1958 
156 Article 2 of Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958 
157 (1975) 135 CLR, 337, 366 per Berwick CJ 
158 (1969) 122 CLR, 177, per Berwick CJ, and pp. 223-224 Windeyer J. 
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the various Kingdoms and Empires. Thus the surrender of the Egbado Y orubas 
brought them under the British rule after successfully seeking its protection in 1880, 
the ltsekiri kingdom in 1894 and the Benin Kingdom in 1897 after the British 
expedition against that Kingdom, to mention just a few. Both the ceded and un-
ceded maritime territories reverted to Nigeria under similar principle of state 
succession. 
4.4 Problems of lack of legislation appropriating Nigeria's sovereignty over the TS 
The conclusions in the preceding section are fraught with some legal problems as 
most of the country's laws and practices relating to the maritime zones have failed 
to assert the rights bestowed on the country by both the Geneva Convention and 
subsequently by UNCLOS. The law that went the furthest in this regard claimed 
only right of or actual acquisition of resources located both on land and in the sea 
and not sovereignty over the TS as granted by UNCLOS. Thus section 1 of the 
Minerals and Mining Decree (Act) of 1999 for example, provides as follows; 
(1) The entire property in and control of all minerals, in, under or upon any 
land in Nigeria, its contiguous continental shelf and of all rivers, streams 
and water courses throughout Nigeria, any area covered by territorial 
waters or constituency, the exclusive economic zone is and shall be 
vested in the Government of the Federation for and on behalf of the 
people of Nigeria. 
(2) All lands in which minerals have been found in commercial quantities 
shall, from the commencement of this Decree, be acquired by the 
Government of the Federation in accordance with the provisions of the 
Land Use Act and the Minister may, from time to time, with the 
approval of the Federal Executive Council, designate such lands as 
security lands. 159 
This, of course is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. Nigeria by its laws vests the 
property and power of control over mineral resources on land and sea on the 
159 Decree No. 34 of 1999 
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Federation of Nigeria, but not the powers granted by UNCLOS on the TS and other 
zones. Furthermore, subsection (2) above talks of all lands in which mineral 
resources are located; it is doubtful if all lands can be interpreted to include the sea. 
This is true, especially as the concluding clause of that subsection talks of the Land 
Use Act, which applies mainly to the land territory and not to the maritime territory 
of Nigeria. Even by using the word "acquire" is suggestive of the Federal 
Government acquiring or taking over the resources from a prior owner. It is 
therefore doubtful if "power of control" and "acquire" as used in the Decree can be 
interpreted as tantamount to power of imperium over the resources or that of 
dominium over the TS. The questions that may be asked consequent upon the above 
are these: 
(1) What is the status of a maritime territory where the coastal State has claimed 
less than that which is allowed by international law? 
(a) Is it therefore not available to the coastal State? 
(b) Is it nevertheless part of the territorial sovereignty (in the case of TS and 
internal waters) and sovereign rights (in the case of CS in accordance with 
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases) but not the EEZ (that depends on 
claim of Government)? 
(2) If (b) is correct, where do those territorial sovereignty/sovereign rights reside, 
the Federation of Nigeria or the FCU? 
With respect to question number one, it may be noted that it has been recognized 
that there is a general duty in international and customary laws for States to bring 
their internal or domestic laws into conformity with obligations under international 
law. However, this does not necessarily mean that failure to do this constitute any 
direct breach of internationallaw. 160 A breach will only necessarily occur if such a 
State fails to observe its obligations on a specific occasion. By signing and ratifying 
UNCLOS, Nigeria has demonstrated that it was acceding to the provisions. It 
follows therefore that the omission to bring the domestic ~aws into conformity with 
the provisions of UNCLOS by claiming for example sovereignty over the TS 
160 Brownlie, 1., Principles of Public International Law, (6th ed.), Oxford (2003), p.34 -35 
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cannot in any way deprive her of the benefits conferred on States by article 2 of the 
Geneva Convention and article 2 (1), (2) and (3) of UNCLOS, which reserve 
sovereignty over the TS for coastal States. This contention finds judicial support in 
the holdings of Berwick C.J. in the State of New South Wales and 5 others vs. the 
Commonwealth of Australia to the effect that: 
" ... The sovereignty and sovereign rights of which the Conventions speak 
are available to Australia as a nation state without any executive or 
legislative act on its part ... The rights of which they speak are conferred on 
the nation State, which unquestionably is Australia and not the constituent 
States whether regarded individually or collectively."161 
Furthermore, what happens to the domestic laws mentioned are mere omissions 
which could be rectified by amendments of the various laws by the Nigerian 
Parliament after the realization of the inadequacies of those laws. This presupposes 
that once those laws are amended and Nigeria claims the rights bestowed on her by 
international law, the argument in question 2 on where the sovereignty resides will 
be a thing of the past. Thus it can be rightly argued in favour of questions (1) (a) & 
(b) and 2 that the sovereignty and sovereign rights provided for by UNCLOS are all 
available to coastal States, including Nigeria and on Nigeria alone resides the 
sovereignty over its TS and as will be demonstrated in chapter four the sovereign 
rights and the jurisdiction over the CS and the EEZ. 
Therefore, where Nigeria's domestic laws claim less rights as in the case noted 
above than bestowed on her by international law, such omission could not be 
interpreted to deny Nigeria the sovereignty conferred on her by international law 
over the TS. In the absence of the domestic laws, or in the failure of them to assert 
international law rights, Nigeria can always refer and fall back on the provisions of 
international law to assert its rights over the maritime territory adjacent to its coast. 
161 ( 1976), vol. 50, A.L.J.R., p. 221 
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4.5 Nature of Nigerian TS since independence 
4.5.1 General Nature 
By the time Nigeria became independent on the 1st of October 1960, the Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and the Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf of 1958, were applicable to Nigeria. The Territorial Sea 
Convention unequivocally affirmed the sovereignty of a coastal state over the TS, 
the airspace above it, including the seabed and subsoil thereof, 162 but left the 
question of the dimension of the breadth of the TS unresolved. This coupled with 
the unilateral proclamation of the American President in 1945, which asserts the 
United States jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the subsoil and 
seabed of the CS contiguous to the United States coasts, 163 encouraged most coastal 
States, including those that already claimed the three-mile limit and those that 
claimed other distances to begin to extend their territorial claims beyond their 
former limits. 
Soon after independence, Nigeria initially claimed 12 miles TS, 164 but the twelve 
miles were .later increased to thirty miles through the enactment of the Territorial 
Waters Decree (Act) of 1967.165 The thirty- miles claim persisted until 151 January 
1998; 12 years after Nigeria acceded to and ratified166 UNCLOS, which fixed the 
current 12 miles TS. Therefore by the Territorial Waters (Amendment) Decree,167 
the 30 miles were reduced to 12 miles thereby bringing the breadth of the TS claim 
of the country in line with the provisions of UNCLOS. Interestingly however, the 
Territorial Waters Decree (Act) including the amendments thereof specifies the 
nature of the TS to be only that of jurisdiction and not the sovereignty granted by 
international law. The omission thus left the question of the nature of the TS of 
Nigeria to be entirely governed by international law, which declares the authority as 
that of sovereignty and as submitted above, the omissions do not affect the 
162 Article 2 
163 Ratiner, L., "United States Ocean Policy: An Analysis," vol. 2 ( 1970 -71), Journal of Maritime 
Law and Commerce, p.225 at 227 
164 Section 18 (l ), Interpretation Act, 1964 in Chap. 192, LFN 1990 
165 Section 1 (1), (3), (a) Chapter 428, LFN, 1990 
166 Nigeria acceded to and ratified UNCLOS on the 14th August, 1986 
167 Section 2 (a) & (b) of Decree No. 1, 1998 
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territorial sovereignty and the sovereign rights of Nigeria over the TS, the CS and 
the EEZ. 
4.5.2 Position under the Independent and Republican Constitutions 
It is reasonable to assert that from independence on 151 October 1960, up to the 
period of intervention of the military dictatorship in the government of the country 
in 1966, the TS was deemed, as forming part of the territories of the then coastal 
Regions. This assertion is informed by the provisions of the independent 
constitution of the country, which provides that "for the purposes of this section the 
continental shelf of a Region shall be deemed to be part of that Region." 168 
Furthermore, on attaining the status of a Republic in 1963, the Republican 
Constitution makes similar provisions to the above. By virtue of section 140 (6) 
thereof, the revenue derived from operations in the CS was to be paid to the Region 
to which the CS is most contiguous. 169 Thus from independence in 1960, up to the 
period of military intervention in the political terrain of Nigeria in 1966, fifty 
percent of the revenue derived from not only mining operations in the TS but from 
the entire CS was paid to the Regions the constitution considers the CS to be 
contiguous to. This is so because it is the Regions that were later subdivided to form 
the present day FCU, through a series of acts of states creation by the Government. 
Nevertheless, the Federal Government has consistently retained judicial, legislative 
and the power of control over the maritime territory within its national jurisdiction 
and its resources. 
The situation is even more compounded by the failure of the Territorial Waters 
Decree (Act) (including the Decree amending it), which is an Act adopted 
specifically on TS and some other Federal enactments relating toTS to clarify the 
true character of the Nigerian TS and the interest of the Federal Government therein. 
It is important in a Federal State like Nigeria for there to be a clear cut division 
168 Section 134 (6) of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1960 
169 The Nigerian Constitution, 1963 
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between the interests of the Federal Government and those of the FCU, especially 
with regards to the ownership of the TS, including other maritime zones, the 
resources therein and the interests of each tier of Nigerian Government in them. A 
declaration of the true juridical nature of the TS by the laws of the country would 
probably have indicated to each tier of the government in which of them ownership 
and control reside. This is necessary because even though the Geneva Conventions 
and UNCLOS both affirmed the sovereignty of a coastal State over the airspace, the 
sea-bed and subsoil of the TS, the coastal States, especially the Federal coastal 
States still need to go further than that by officially proclaiming their sovereignty 
over it in their domestic laws. 
The provisions in the Nigerian legislations regarding the TS are ambiguous and fall 
short of what obtains in other jurisdictions. This perhaps explains why despite the 
several and multidimensional approaches adopted by the Government to resolve the 
controversy between it and the FCU over the ownership of its maritime territory 
have not yielded the desired results, because a lot of loopholes have been allowed to 
exist in the domestic laws regarding the maritime territory. This has provided a 
veritable avenue for the FCU to continue unabated to challenge the basis of Federal 
Government's authority and control over the entire maritime territory of Nigeria 
and its right to explore and exploit the resources therein. For instance, Section 1 ( 1) 
of the Territorial Waters Act provides: "The territorial waters of Nigeria shall for all 
purposes include every part of the open seas within thirty nautical miles of the coast 
of Nigeria (measured from low-water mark) or of the seaward limits of inland 
waters." 170 This provision does not declare in definite terms what the nature of 
Nigeria's rights over the TS is, whether it is sovereignty or other rights. 
The provision in that section can be likened to a mere declaratory statement, which 
does not carry much legal weight or significance. Most modem maritime legislation 
of coastal States usually contains provisions on rights in respect of maritime areas, 
170 (1967), Chapter 428, LFN, 1990, as amended by the Territorial Waters (Amendment) Decree, 
1998. The 1998 amendment has shortened the breadth of Nigeria's TS to 12 nm 
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this reflects in most cases sovereignty of the coastal State in respect of the TS, and 
in archipelagic States, sovereignty in respect of archipelagic waters. This 
sovereignty is usually expressed to cover the TS, the air-space, sea-bed and the 
subsoil beneath. In countries that adopted a single maritime legislation to define 
their maritime zones, apart from specifically enumerating their maritime areas, 
which in most cases may include internal waters, TS, archipelagic waters (in 
archipelagic States), such legislation usually goes further to state the coastal State's 
rights in respect of CZ and rights in respect of the EEZ and the CS. The Nigerian 
Territorial Waters Act is lacking in most of the important areas mentioned. In fact, 
no legislation is known for example to have declared the country's interest in the 
CZ and in the rest parts of the CS beyond the EEZ. 
Based on the provisions of Section 1 (2) and 2 of that Act for example, three issues 
can be identified. The first is Nigeria's claim over the TS, the second is its 
entitlement under international law and the third is what right Nigeria has by its 
own domestic law vested on itself. Consequently, Nigeria it may be argued claims 
only the rights of jurisdiction over her TS as opposed to the sovereignty granted her 
by international law. Section 2 (1) provides that, any act or omission which-
(a) is committed within the territorial waters of Nigeria, whether by a citizen of 
Nigeria or a foreigner; and 
(b) would if committed in any part of Nigeria, constitute an offence under the 
law in force in that part shall be an offence under that law and the person who 
committed it may, subject to section 3 of this Act, be arrested, tried and 
punished for it as if he had committed it in that part of Nigeria .... 171 
There is nowhere in that Act that Nigeria specifically claimed sovereignty over its 
TS, the seabed, subsoil and the airspace above. This is contrary to the sovereignty 
granted by UNCLOS and it is a very grave omission that requires immediate 
amendment by the Nigerian Parliament. 
171 Ibid 
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The drafters of that Act must have assumed, (though very wrongly), that the mere 
mention of 'territorial waters' in the Act automatically includes the air space, sea-
bed and subsoil of the TS. This is not true, it is trite law that, though sovereignty 
over the air space, the water column of the TS and the subjacent sea-bed and subsoil 
below it gained general acceptance by the international community at about the 
same time, yet some differences exist between them. For instance, it can be argued 
that the sovereignty of the coastal State over the air space, and subsoil of the TS is 
exclusive; the same cannot be said of the water column, which is subject to the right 
of innocent passage by foreign ships. The exclusive sovereignty of a coastal State 
over the airspace above its TS, though it is not specifically provided for in 
international instrument, but may nevertheless be subject of an exception in the case 
of aircraft in distress. 
Furthermore, the process of crystallization of sovereignty over the air space above 
the TS and that of the sea-bed and subsoil is equally different. While sovereignty 
over the airspace above the TS had become accepted and incorporated in the Paris 
Conference on a Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of 1919 and in 
the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation, the same cannot be said of the 
process of crystallization of sovereignty over the sea-bed and subsoil of the TS, 
where it could not as a result of lack of consensus among States be incorporated in 
any international instrument until 1930, when it was agreed that an article be 
included in the Hague Conference text on TS stating that the territory of a coastal 
State includes also the air space above the TS, as well as the bed of the sea, and the 
subsoil. 172 On the whole, sovereignty over the airspace, sea-bed (subject to the right 
of innocent passage), and the subsoil of the TS finally became incorporated in 
international law by virtue of the provisions of Article 2 of Geneva Convention on 
the Territorial Sea, 1958 but that Convention failed to stipulate the breadth of TS 
upon which a coastal State should exercise the sovereignty. However, Article 2 (1) 
(2) and (3) of UNCLOS 1982 has now improved upon the provisions of the Geneva 
172 Churchill and Lowe, op. cit., p. 76; League of Nations Doc. C.351 (b). M. 145 (b) 1930 v, p. 
213; Rosenne, S., League of Nations Conference for the Codification of International Law, (1930) 
Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana,1975, p. 1415 
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Convention by providing for the sovereignty of the coastal States over the TS and 
the breadth thereof. 
Furthermore, the Act does not contain provisions relating to the type of baselines 
that Nigeria would adopt for the measurement of its TS, thus what constitute 
Nigeria's internal waters and the baselines for measuring her TS has become a 
matter for speculation and uncertainty. Similarly, the Act does not make reference 
to charts, geographical co-ordinates and their publication in conformity with the 
requirement of UNCLOS. 173 It is not clear how the above requirements have been 
complied with by the maritime practice of the country. 
Most federal States in apparent realisation of the consequences of any ambiguity in 
laws regarding the TS have overtly made provisions claiming sovereignty over the 
TS, the airspace above it, the seabed and the subsoil of the TS. Thus in a 
proclamation dated 27th, December, 1988, the United States in very clear and 
unambiguous language claims a 'territorial sea extending beyond the land territory 
and internal waters of the United States over which the United States exercises 
sovereignty and jurisdiction, a sovereignty and jurisdiction that extend to the 
airspace over the TS, as well as to its bed and subsoil.' 174 Similarly, in the 
preamble to the Australian Seas and Submerged Lands Act (as amended), it is 
expressly provided as follows; "Whereas a belt of sea adjacent to the coast of 
Australia, known as the TS, and the airspace over the TS and the bed and subsoil of 
the TS, are within the sovereignty of Australia."175 
Further to the above, article 2( 4) of the Russian Federation Act provides, the 
sovereignty of the Russian Federation extends to the TS, the airspace over it and 
also its sea bed and subsoil, with recognition of the right of innocent passage of 
173 See Article 16 on charts and geographical co-ordinates and Article 17 on innocent passage 
174 Territorial Sea of the United States of America, by the President of the United States of America, 
a Proclamation of 27 December, l988;http://wwww.un.org 
175 Australia; Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973, as amended by the Maritime Legislation 
Amendment Act l994.(emphasis added) 
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foreign ships through the territorial sea. 176This practice is apparently not restricted 
to federal States alone, majority of States that have assented to the two Conventions 
have had claim to sovereignty over their TS incorporated into their national laws. 
Such countries include, France, United Kingdom, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco Sierra 
Leone, Equatorial Guinea and Ghana, to mention just a few. 177 
The failure of the Territorial Sea Act and the amendment thereof to assert the 
sovereignty of Nigeria over the TS and the rights endowed in it by both the Geneva 
Convention and UNCLOS is not limited to that act alone. Nigeria's 1999 
constitution is equally deficient and lacking in provisions asserting the country's 
sovereignty over the TS and the rights over other maritime zones. Even the 
boundaries (both land and maritime) of Nigeria were va,guely described in that 
constitution. The only section of the constitution which relates to the territorial 
extent of Nigeria is section 2(2) which talks of Nigeria being a federation and 
section 3 (1) and (2). Section 3(1) merely enumerates the states of the federation by 
their names and subsection (2) states that "each state of Nigeria named in the first 
column of part 1 of the first schedule to this constitution shall consist of the area 
shown opposite thereto in the second column of that schedule."178 
A close examination of the first column of part 1 of the first schedule referred to in 
subsection (2) above merely shows the name of each state and the local 
176 Federal Act on the Internal Maritime Waters, Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of the Russian 
Federation (l) of 17th July, 1998 
177 France, Article I of Law no. 7I- I060 of I4 Dec. 197I regarding the delimitation of French 
Territorial Waters; United Kingdom, Section 7 which is the interpretation section of the Territorial 
Waters Jurisdiction Act, I878 refers to 'territorial waters as deemed by International Law to be 
within the territorial sovereignty of Her Majesty;' Tunisia, Article 4 of Act No. 73-49 delimiting 
the territorial waters of 2"d August, I973; Egypt, Article 7 of Decree Concerning the Territorial 
Waters of the Arab Republic of Egypt of I5 Jan. 1951, as amended by Presidential Decree of 17 Feb. 
1958; Morocco, Article I of Act no. 1. 73.2I1 establishing the limits of the territorial waters and the 
Exclusive Fishing Zone of Morocco, of 2 March I973; Sierra Leone, Article 2 of The Maritime 
Zones (Establishment) Decree, I996; Equatorial Guinea, Article I of Act No. 1511984 of I2 Nov. 
1984 on the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (l); 
Ghana, Section 2 subsections 1 and 2 of Maritime Zones (Delimitation) Law, I986 and India, Article 
3(1) of the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime 
Zones Act, 1976, Act No. 80 of 28 May 1976, all make provisions claiming sovereignty over their 
territorial waters 
178 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
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governments that make up that state and nothing more. The extent of the boundary 
of each local government in the FCU into the sea and the nature of governmental 
power and control over it are not stated, hence giving the impression that the 
boundary of each local government area within the FCU ends at the terminal of the 
land territory and does not include the sea area. However, in practice the Federal 
Government continues to exercise legislative, executive and other powers over 
navigation, fishing, exploration and exploitation of mineral resources. 
Furthermore, in apparent realization of the lapses in the country's maritime 
legislation, especially as it affects the juridical nature of the TS and the theory of 
governmental power and control over it, Nigeria enacted the following legislation 
in-order to rectify the anomalies. The first in the series of such legislation is the 
Minerals and Mining Decree, Section 1 (1) and (2) of which vests the entire 
property in and control of all minerals in, under or upon any land in Nigeria, its 
contiguous Continental Shelf and of all rivers, streams and water courses 
throughout Nigeria, any area covered by territorial waters or constituency, the 
Exclusive Economic Zone in the Government of the Federation for and on behalf of 
the people of Nigeria."179 The provisions in the Act quoted above are all fours with 
the provisions of sections 40 (3), 42 (3) and 44(3) of the 1979, 1989 and 1999 
Constitutions respectively. Section 44 (3) of the 1999 Constitution for instance 
provides that: 
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the entire 
property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in, 
under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial 
waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the 
Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as 
may be prescribed by the National Assembly. 
Furthermore, section 1 (1) & (2) of Offshore Oil Revenues Decree provides 
as follows: 
179 Decree No. 34 of lOth May, 1999 
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(1) Section 140 (6) of the Constitution of the Federation (which provides that the 
Continental Shelf of a state shall be deemed to be part of that state) is hereby 
repealed. 
(2) Accordingly-
(a) The ownership of and the title to the territorial waters and the Continental Shelf 
shall vest in the Federal Military Government; and 
(b) All royalties, rents and other revenues derived from or relating to the 
exploration, prospecting or searching for or the winning or working of petroleum 
(as defined in the Petroleum Decree 1969) in the territorial waters and the 
continental shelf shall accrue to the Federal Military Govemment. 180 
Another legislation with similar provisions as above is the Petroleum Act, section 1 
of which provides as follows: 
(1) The entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any lands to 
which this section applies shall be vested in the State. 
(2) This section applies to all land (including land covered by water) which-· 
(a) is in Nigeria; or 
(b) is under the territorial waters of Nigeria; or 
(c) forms part of the continental shelf. 181 
The question that readily comes to mind is whether the aforementioned provisions 
have thus cured the ambiguity inherent in the earlier enactments. 
A look at section 1 (1) & (2) (a) and (b) of Offshore Oil Revenues Decree 
mentioned above, would seem to suggest that the ambiguity or the failure noted in 
the Territorial Waters Act and other domestic laws of Nigeria mentioned above 
have thereby been cured. This Decree uses the word 'vest' and not 'sovereignty', 
which appears weightier and more in conformity with the actual right granted by 
UNCLOS than the word 'vest.' This is replica of similar omissions contained in the 
Territorial Waters Act and in the Nigerian Constitutions noted above, which both 
180 Decree No.9 of 1971 
181 Chapter 350, LFN, 1990 
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failed to claim Nigeria's sovereignty over the airspace, seabed and subsoil of the TS 
and the failure of the laws noted above to declare Nigeria's rights over the other 
maritime zones. 
Another worrisome aspect of the above enactment is the claim of ownership and 
title, which it makes with respect to the CS. Article 77 ( 1) it should be noted confers 
only sovereign rights on Nigeria and by virtue of Article 80, which makes Article 
60 applicable to the CS, Nigeria may be said also to possess the right of jurisdiction 
over the CS. It is therefore a violation of these articles to enact a law, which claims 
ownership and title over the CS. Furthermore, the word 'vest' as used in that Act is 
also suggestive of snatching something from the real owner and given to another it 
therefore does not seem to cure the doubts and anomalies in the earlier enactments. 
The basis upon which the Federal Government is vesting ownership and control of 
maritime resources on itself is equally doubtable without first declaring the 
prerequisite sovereignty over the zone. The section of the Petroleum Act cited talks 
of ownership and control of all petroleum but not the sea areas that harbour the 
petroleum; it therefore has not filled the lacunae in the Territorial Waters Act. 
4.5.3 Implications of the omissions above for the nature of the TS 
The various omissions noted above no doubt have opened up a further channel for 
the continued disputation of the maritime territory of the country and its resources 
between the FCU and the Federal Government. The omissions have also led to a 
resurgence of the controversy surrounding the juridical nature of the TS. Thus in 
Abia case, the Supreme Court of Nigeria made two outstanding statements which 
portray the unsettled nature of the juridical nature of the TS of Nigeria. The first 
statement was made by Uwais' (CJN as he then was) as follows: 
"Chief Williams [late Senior Advocate of Nigeria] has tried to show this by 
inference or implication under the provisions of the Territorial Waters Act, the Sea 
Fisheries Act and the Exclusive Economic Zone Act, all of which made reference to 
the territorial waters of Nigeria. However, with respect, none of the legislations (sic) 
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expressly defines the seaward boundary of the littoral states. This in my opinion 
cannot be inferred from the legislations (sic)."182 
In the first place the above statement is flawed because of the misconception 
relating to littoral state. Littoral State is generally used to refer to an independent 
sovereign coastal State and not a federating unit of a federation in the sense that the 
Supreme Court has used it above. Furthermore, the lapses noted explains the reason 
why the Supreme Court had to resort to the principles of international law to arrive 
at its judgment in that case- a purely domestic matter. This is not to say however 
that it is wrong to apply international law to resolve domestic matter, settled 
principles of international law can be resorted to in order to supplement and support 
domestic law in order to resolve domestic matters where the domestic law on the 
matter is unclear or uncertain and incomplete and the matter in question relates to 
international law. 183 As will be shown in chapter four, the U.S. Supreme Court 
applies international law in deciding the submerged land cases. 
Secondly, the lapses in the laws also led to the defendants' arguments in Abia case, 
that: 
'by sections 2(2), 3(1) and (2) and the first schedule to the 
constitution, Nigeria consists of the aggregate of the territories of all 
the 36 states of the Federation and the Federal capital Territory and 
that, constitutionally, therefore, Nigeria cannot have any other territory 
outside this aggregate .... 184 
182 Supra, pp. 721 -722 
183 Langan P. St. J. (ed.), Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, It" edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, (1969), p.l83- 186 and John B. and George E., (eds.), Cross Statutory Interpretation, 2nd 
edition, London, Butterworth ( 1987), p. 162 - 164. For example, international law was resorted to in 
the determination of the following cases, Jones vs. United States (1890) 137 US 202, 212; Fong Yue 
Ting vs. United States (1893) 149 US 698, 706- 711; See also, Charney, J.l., "The Delimitation of 
Lateral Seaward Boundaries between States in a Domestic Context," vol. 75, (1981), A. J. I. L., p. 28 
-68. 
184 Supra, p.647 
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The reply given to the above argument by the counsel to the Federal Government 
- a reply which the Supreme Court adopted without query is to the effect that, 'the 
seaward limit of Nigeria is the low-water mark but that Nigeria in its sovereignty 
and by the custom of the international community exercises 'jurisdiction' beyond 
that limit.' 185 The reply and the court's reliance on it cannot be supported by any 
correct legal reasoning, especially as it equates Nigeria's authority over the TS to 
that of mere jurisdiction - a jurisdiction which the court ruled that it does not extend 
to offences committed by foreigners on the TS of Nigeria. It is equally not true that 
the seaward limit of Nigeria's boundary is low-water mark. However, the reply of 
the plaintiffs' counsel and the subsequent affirmation of it by the Supreme Court 
has one importance and this is to the effect that it further buttresses our argument 
above that by the provisions of the Territorial Waters Act, the Constitutions and 
other national legislation, Nigeria has not claimed the sovereignty bestowed on 
coastal States by both the Geneva Convention and UNCLOS, but by its laws, she 
merely claims the right of jurisdiction over the TS and ownership of the natural 
resources in the seas but not the seas themselves. 
VIII. Conclusion 
In an attempt to determine the true juridical character of the TS, we began by 
examining the various stages the concept went through before the idea of three 
miles TS was muted and accepted by the major maritime powers. We argued that 
the three miles was not unanimously accepted by a number of coastal States and as 
a result it did not attain the standard of international customary law. Having 
examined the various theories and postulations about the true juridical character of 
the TS, we concluded that its character is that of dominium and imperium so that it 
forms part of the national territory of the adjoining State. We argued that the Anglo-
German Treaty of 1913 and the AG Southern states vs. John Holt 186 provide 
evidence in support of the contention that Britain introduced to Nigeria the idea of 
three miles TS. 
185 Ibid, p.647- 648 
186 Supra 
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It is concluded based on the statutes and orders in-council examined that the limits 
of Nigeria's TS before the 1982 UNCLOS, was the three-mile limit introduced by 
Britain. We argued in this respect that though the 1958 Geneva Convention and 
even UNCLOS granted sovereignty over the TS to Nigeria as a nation, but that by 
the laws in operation at that time, particularly the Territorial Waters Act, Nigeria 
did not take the benefit of that convention to assert her sovereignty over the TS. 
This it is argued is not enough to deny Nigeria of her international law rights over 
all the aforementioned maritime zones and that it is Nigeria as an entity and not the 
FCU that possesses the necessary international legal personality to claim the rights 
granted by UNCLOS over the TS and as will be shown in other chapters in all other 
maritime zones adjacent to Nigeria. A point was also made to the effect that the 
former rights exercised by the Kingdoms and Empires before colonisation were 
transferred to the British government after colonisation through the processes of 
cession and colonisation. At independence therefore, Nigeria through the process of 
state succession acquired all the former rights of the British government over the 
entire maritime areas of Nigeria. Not only that the rights also vest as customary 
international law rights regardless of: 
(a) Constitutional amendments or 
(b) Enactment of domestic legislation. 
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Chapter three 
The juridical nature of the EEZ of Nigeria: problems of law and theory 
I. Introduction 
In view of Nigeria's problems relative to maritime areas, this chapter attempts to 
trace the evolution of the EEZ as a legal concept. In doing this attention will 
necessarily focus on the extent to which the concept could be argued is an offshoot 
of the CS concept, which in itself originated from the Truman's proclamations of 
1945. The contributions and effects of the proclamations by the Latin American and 
the Arab States including the 1958 Geneva Conventions to the evolution of the EEZ 
concept will equally be a focal point in the attempts to determine the true juridical 
nature of the concept. We shall examine the various concepts that were initially put 
forward before EEZ became finally incorporated in UNCLOS 1982 as the most 
enduring and acceptable name. After this we shall carry out an in-depth 
examination of the concept itself in order to determine its actual and true juridical 
nature. There is also the need to examine how state practice and Nigerian domestic 
laws reflect the juridical nature of the EEZ. That is whether Nigeria or other States 
by their practices consider the EEZ as forming part of the High seas or the TS or 
whether they consider it as possessing a separate legal regime different from that of 
the High Seas or better still whether it is a Sui generis zone. 
A determination of the true juridical character of the EEZ is particularly important, 
especially to Nigeria in a number of ways. First, it is important because such a 
determination would help Nigeria - a federal State already embroiled in 
controversies over title to the maritime territory and its resources with its coastal 
units - to make a proper distinction between EEZ and the TS. Successful separation 
of the TS from the EEZ for treatment, would strengthen the Federal Government's 
claim over the sea areas, in that as the concept of EEZ, like the CS, did not exist 
during the pre-colonial time when there was no Nigeria in existence and the FCU 
controlled and exercised a measure of control and authority over a narrow sea area 
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adjacent to their coasts, they would have no basis to controvert Nigeria's claims 
over the EEZ and the CS. 
Secondly, since allocation of revenue to the federating units by the Federal 
Government is determined by the amount of revenue realised from the resources 
found. within the territory of a federating unit, correct determination of the juridical 
nature of the EEZ would assist the Federal Government in separating revenue 
realised from the TS from that realised from the EEZ and in the allocation thereof to 
the units. 
Thirdly, correct determination of the true juridical character of the EEZ will help 
Nigeria in separating its rights and duties over the zone from that of the waters 
overlying it and in the planning of its maritime policies in such a way that will not 
infringe upon the rights and duties of other States over the zone. 
Fourthly, examining the nature of the EEZ is important because, presently Nigeria 
does not have any legislation declaring its rights and duties over the CS. 
Examination of the nature of the EEZ will therefore expose this lapse and the urgent 
need for a domestic legislation on the CS. This in tum will help to distinguish 
between the rights over the CS and rights over other maritime zones and will help in 
strengthening the Federal Government's claim over it. 
II. Evolution of the EEZ as a legal concept 
1. General comments 
The emergence of the EEZ as a legal concept could be traced to a number of 
different factors, some of which are discussed below. 
2. Impact of Truman Proclamations of 1945 
The concept of EEZ is a recent development in the annals of international law of the 
sea and it has been described as the most outstanding and revolutionary 
transformation of the law of the sea, brought about by the developing countries in 
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the last four decades or so1• It is a concept, which has invariably received very rapid 
and general acceptance by the members of the international community; it could 
well be described as having become part and parcel of customary international law. 
It emanated in the first place ~ a reaction of some states to the unilateral 
proclamations made by the American President, Harry Truman, on September 28, 
1945. The proclamation though it was made with respect to the CS of the United 
States, it is seen by many as the planting seed of the EEZ concept.Z The Presidential 
proclamations were two in number and the first is with respect to the natural 
resources of the subsoil and the seabed of the CS, and the second has to do with 
coastal fisheries in certain areas of the high seas. The Fishery Proclamation for 
example establishes conservation zones in the high seas, contiguous to the coasts of 
the United States. Upon the zones, fishing activities were to be regulated and 
controlled solely by the United States and for its nationals or by joint agreement 
where other nationals participated.3 
. The first proclamation, which is the most important as far as this study is concerned, 
asserts United States jurisdiction and control of the natural resources of the subsoil 
and seabed of the CS contiguous to the United States coasts.4 The role it played in 
the evolution of the concept of EEZ probably led Duke Pollard to have commented 
thus: 
"By any criterion of assessment it would be difficult to deny that the claim 
advanced by President Truman on behalf of the Government of the United States in 
1 Brown, E., "Maritime Zones: A survey of claims' in New Directions in the Law of the Sea," Vol. 
III, Oceana Publications Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York (1973) 
2 Duke E. Pollard, "the Exclusive Economic Zone: The Elusive Consensus", vol. 12, No.3, (1974-
75) San Diego Law Review (SDLR), pp. 600- 623 at 605 
3 Dahmani, L., The Fisheries Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone, Dordrecht, ( 1987), p.l4 
4 Ratiner, L., "United States Oceans Policy: An Analysis," vol. 2, (1970 -71) Journal of Maritime 
Law and Commerce p.225 at 227; See also, Nelson, L.D.M., "The Patrimonial Sea" vol. 23, (1973) 
ICLQ, p. 668 at 669 
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respect of the non-living resources of the continental shelf ... was a claim to an 
economic zone of exclusive coastal state jurisdiction"5 
Most writers have been more concerned in their treatment of this topic with the 
international implications of Truman's proclamation and have thereby neglected the 
domestic aspect of it. It must be remembered that at the time the proclamation was 
issued, United States Government was already engrossed in controversies over the 
ownership and control of the maritime territory with the coastal units. There was 
also the need to provide legal underpinnings for the regulation of the petroleum 
industry which was then in dire need of regulatory authority in order to protect and 
guarantee security of investment and favourable tax treatment. 
Therefore, while it may be true that the proclamations have international 
connotations, it may well be true too that they equally possessed domestic 
connotations, if only to preempt the claims of the US coastal states, which as at that 
time were already subjudice at the US supreme court.6 If it were not the domestic 
connotation underlining the proclamation, one may be prompted to argue that the 
proclamation was unnecessary; especially at the time it was issued. This is because 
as at that time, no other nation had the technical expertise or capability or the 
machinery the like of the US to explore and exploit oceanic resources close to the 
United States coasts or the coasts of any other nation and by the doctrine of 
international law regarding the freedom of the high seas, United States had the right 
just like any other nation to exercise the freedom of the seas by exploring and 
exploiting the resources therein.7 The proclamation was therefore partly intended to 
send a warning signal to the various US coastal states about the impending action of 
the Federal Government to wrest the ownership and control of the maritime 
territory off the coasts of the United States from them. 
5 Op. cit., n. 2; See also, Friedman, W., "Selden Redividus- towards a partition of the seas", vol. 65 
( 1971 ), A.J.l.L., p. 763 and Jennings, R. Y ., "A changing law of the sea" vol. 31 ( 1972), Cambridge 
Law Journal, pp. 32 - 49 
6 U.S. Vs. State of California, United States Supreme Court Reports- Lawyers Edition 
(Annotated), 14 L. Ed. 2d; 381 US 139,14 L. ed. 2d 296 
7 Ibid, p.228 - 229 
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However, it was not immediately realized at the time the proclamation was made 
that an action by an important nation such as the United States would trigger a chain 
of reactions by other nations, both strong and weak, and small or big. This is 
particularly true of the claims made by some Latin American and other States, who 
claimed sovereignty not only over the CS but also over the waters overlaying it. 
Therefore, the Truman Proclamation was immediately followed by the Declaration 
of Mexico of 29 October 1945 and the Argentinean Proclamation made through the 
country's Presidential Decree of October 11, 1946. Argentina's Proclamation is 
particularly interesting because it contains provisions, which assert the country's 
sovereignty not only over the CS but also over the water column on top of it. 
Articles 1 and 2 of the Proclamation provide as follows; Article 1, "It is hereby 
declared that the Argentine Epicontinental Sea and continental shelf are subject to 
the sovereign power of the nation". Article 2 on the other hand provides, "For the 
purposes of free navigation, the character of the water situated in the Argentine 
Epicontinental Sea and above the Argentine continental shelf, remains unaffected 
by the present declaration". 8 
The claims of Mexico and Argentina were closely followed by similar claims made 
by Chile, and Peru, who though they possess little or no CS off their coasts, yet 
were in the forefront in making such claims. The two countries, in order to 
compensate for their natural handicap in not possessing CS and draw to themselves 
political support over their bid to control the fisheries in the waters adjacent to their 
coasts, each claimed 200 nautical miles of maritime zones. This was done by Chile 
through the Presidential Declaration Concerning Continental Shelf of June 23, 1947 
and Peru, through Presidential Decree No. 781 of August 1, 1947. Other States that 
made similar claims as above include, Costa Rica through Decree- Law of July 27, 
1948 and El Salvador through Article 7 of the Constitution of 1950. The question is 
why the 200nm claim? 
8 See Latin American Thesis in http://www.cpps-int.org/englishlnosotros/tesislatinoamericanas.htm 
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3. Reasons for the 200 nm claim by Chile, Ecuador and Peru 
A number of reasons accounted for the 200nm maritime claims. The first is based 
on the Truman Proclamation. According to these countries, since the United States 
had a unilateral right to claim the resources of the seabed adjacent to its coasts to 
the exclusion of all other countries, they too had a similar unilateral right to make 
claims consistent with their own national interests.9 
The second reason is the geographic, geologic and biologic characteristics of the 
coasts of Peru, Ecuador and Chile and the need for rational utilization of the 
resources of the adjacent sea areas, 10 particularly fisheries within 200 nm. 
Thirdly, a window of opportunity presented itself when the Allied Powers declared 
a Security Zone off Chile. This was drawn on a map, which was printed in a 
magazine. The map is about the Panama Declaration of 1939, in which Britain and 
the United States agreed to establish security and neutral zone around the American 
continent so as to prevent the re-supplying Axis ships in South American ports. 
That map showed the dimension of the security zone off the coast of Chile to be 
200 run; this has been argued to form the basis of the claim by Chile. 11 
The fourth reason is what O'Connell has traced to be the desire by Chile to protect 
natural resources. This informed the June 23 1947 Declaration made by the 
President of Chile, which was followed by other Declarations by Peru and 
Ecuador. 12 
The question then arises as to the extent that the Latin American states' claims may 
be said to be consistent with or are in conformity with Truman and the Mexican 
proclamations on which they have argued their claims, are anchored. 
9 Lecuona, D.C., "The Ecuador Fisheries Dispute," vol. 2, (1970), Journal of Maritime Law and 
Commerce, p. 91 
10 Peruano, E., "Gaceta Oficial de II Agosta 1970," translated by the author under paragraph 2 of the 
Declaration of Montevideo, vol. 2, ( 1970), Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, p. 224 
11 Stevenson, J. R. and Bernard H.O., "The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 
1974 Caracas Session", vol. 69, (1975) A.J.l.L., p.l 
12 O'Connell, D.P., the International Law of the Sea, vol. I, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1982), p. 553 
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Though the claims of these countries expressly recognized the freedom of 
navigation, their declaration of sovereignty over the epicontinental sea, went far 
beyond what was claimed by the 1945 Truman's proclamation, which provides in 
clear terms that the character as high seas of the waters above the CS and the right 
of their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way affected. 13 It may be argued 
therefore, that the claims were extravagant and thus, constituted a dangerous 
precedent capable of causing international conflict. The claims generated so many 
criticisms and protests by the international community; some queried the 
acceptability and basis of the claims by some of the States agitating for extended 
maritime jurisdiction. 
4. The influence of the Arab Declarations of 1949 
The Truman's Proclamation influenced not only the Latin American States; it also 
led to similar claims being made by certain Arab States and Emirates. Some of 
these States took advantage of the proclamation to unilaterally extend their 
individual maritime zones. 14 The focal points of the declarations were on the 
petroleum resources of the CS, upon which the States and the Emirates claim 
sovereignty. Apart from this, the proclamations also declare the jurisdictions of 
those States over the seabed and subsoil of the CS adjacent to their coasts and the 
recognition of the freedom of navigation and that of flight over the zone. The 
various declarations reflected the growing interests of coastal States in the extension 
of the adjacent sea areas, brought about, first by the Truman Proclamation and the 
widespread dissatisfaction about the existing legal regime or the lack of it. 
5 The role of Geneva Conventions of 1958 in the evolution of EEZ 
13 (1946) 40 (Supplement) A.J.I.L., p. 46 
14 Saudi Arabia for example made its own declaration on the 28th May, 1949; while Bahrain made its 
own on, 5th June, 1949; Qatar, 8th June, 1949; Abu Dhabi, lOth June, 1949; Kuwait, 12th June, 1949; 
Dubai, 14th June, 1949; Sharjah, 16th June, 1949; Ras a1 Khaimah, 17th June, 1949; Umm a1 Qaiwain, 
20th June, 1949 and Ajman on the 20th June 1949. See Dahak D., Les Etats Arabes et le Droit de Ia 
Mer, Tome 1, Casablanca, Les Editi.ons Maghrebines, (1986), p. 123 
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First and foremost, the concept of EEZ was postulated because of the unsatisfactory 
nature of some provisions of the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, which was expected inter 
alia to establish a compromise between the adherents of the classical doctrine of 
freedom of fishing on the high seas and the supporters of the more extensive 
exclusive fishing zones. The rights of the coastal states, which were sought to be 
protected by the convention, were circumscribed by a number of its articles, such as 
Articles 5, 6 and 7 etc. Particularly, the rights of the coastal States were 
circumscribed by the criteria laid down by the provisions of article 7 (2) thereof, 
hence the renewal by states of the earlier 200-mile claim. 
The 1958 conference, which was expected to provide the much-needed solution to 
the coastal state's jurisdiction over fisheries beyond TS, could not, bec~use it failed 
to make provisions for Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas. Instead, Article 6 of the Convention attempted to maintain a balance 
between the advocates of the classical doctrine of freedom of the high seas and 
those advocating a coastal state's jurisdiction by recognizing only the special 
interest of coastal States in the maintenance of productivity through the 
establishment of conservation zones and providing under article 2 of Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf for the incorporation of CS doctrine, that is, 
the exclusive right of a coastal State to the resources of the shelf. Even the 
provisions of Article 7 (1), 15 which authorizes any coastal State to maintain 
productivity through the establishment of conservation zone were circumscribed by 
the provisions of article 7(2), which imposes limitations on the unilateral measures 
adopted by the States for conservation as follows: The measures which the coastal 
State adopts under the previous paragraph shall be valid as to other States only if 
the following requirements are fulfilled: 
15 Ibid 
(a) that there is a need for urgent application of conservation 
measures in the light of the existing knowledge of the fishery; 
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(b) that the measures adopted are based on appropriate scientific 
findings; 
(c) that such measures do not discriminate in form or in fact against 
foreign fishermen. 
It is equally circumscribed by the dispute settlement procedure laid down under 
articles 9 to 12. 
The court had occasion to comment on the failure of the Fishing Convention to 
include a provision, which guarantees the right of coastal States to fisheries 
jurisdiction beyond the TS in the dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice in the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
vs. Iceland). Judge Fitzmaurice commented thus: 
clearly therefore the Convention (Geneva) reserved nothing to the coastal State by 
way of exclusive fishery rights, except in what might be called in general terms, 
sedentary fisheries. It afforded no ground for the assertion of exclusive fishery 
rights in waters outside the territorial sea, and therefore high seas. 16 This was why 
Chile, Ecuador and Peru refused to become parties to it and Iceland, Uruguay and 
Costa Rica were mere signatories to it, but never ratified it. The shortcomings of the 
1958 conventions therefore, led to a further resurgence in extended maritime claims 
by the States. 
Several factors acted as catalysts to the extended maritime claims. First and 
foremost was the decision of the international court of justice in the Anglo 
Norwegian Fisheries Case 17 , between the United Kingdom and Norway seen in 
many quarters as one of the motivating factors in the quest for maritime extension 
by majority of coastal states. That decision affirmed the Norwegian straight 
baselines practice, which had precisely the effect of subjecting large parts of the 
high seas to Norwegian sovereignty, thus violating the principle that no state may 
16 (1973), ICJ Reports, p. 27. See also, the North Sea Continental Shelf Case (1969) ICJ Reports, 
p.37 
7 (1951) I.C.J. Reports 132; See also, McDougal, M.S. and Burke, W .T., "Crisis in the Law of the 
Sea: Community Perspectives versus National Egoism," vol. 64, No.4 (1958), The Yale Law 
Journal, p.539 at 540 
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validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its own sovereignty, a method 
of straight baseline now copied by many other coastal States some of whom may 
not be able to show equally convincing evidence in support as the Norwegian 
example. 
Secondly, just as the case above acted as catalyst to extended maritime claims by 
some coastal States, so also did the so-called "Cod Wars" between Iceland and the 
United Kingdom. The first of the wars took place in 1958 and was as a result of 
Iceland's extension of its fishing limits from 4 to 12 miles claiming the extension 
was because of the special dependency of its economy on fishery resources. The 
second took place between 1972 and 1973, when Iceland extended the fishing limits 
from the previous 12 miles to 50 miles. The third, which is the latest, took place in 
1975 and concerned fishing rights and the limits of the rights between Iceland and 
the United Kingdom. This was at a time that Iceland extended its zone of control 
over fishing from 50 miles to 200 miles off its coast. After a few skirmishes 
between the two countries, an agreement was reached by which Britain agreed to 
follow Iceland's regulations establishing the 200 mile economic exclusion zone, 
and to limit the cod catch to 50,000 tons. After the lapse of this agreement, Britain 
lost its rights to fish in Icelandic waters within the 200 mile exclusion zone. 18 The 
result of the cod war as in the decision in Anglo - Norwegian Fisheries case no 
doubt serves as another catalyst in the extended maritime claims by other coastal 
States. 
The third reason is that, there was a relative increase in fishing activities as 
compared to the period shortly before 1958, due to improved technology in fishing 
vessels, which made fishing in distant waters possible. During this time too, many 
African and Asian states had emerged from colonialism as independent States and 
many of them like Nigeria for example, were already aware of the presence of 
natural resources of economic value in the ocean areas adjacent to their coasts. 
18 Kassebaum, "Ice case studies," in http://www.american.edu/ted/ice/CODW AR.htm (visited on 
09/1 0/2006) 
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There was therefore a strong desire to acquire as much ocean space as was possible 
under international law, so as to control as much of those resources as possible for 
the economic development of their respective states and for the benefit of their 
peoples, whom they argued have b~en long impoverished by reason of colonialism. 
Fourth, is motivated by desire for exclusive control over fishery and other marine 
resources by the West African States. This desire was informed by the fact that, 
most of the fishing activities, especially in the West African sub region were carried 
out by foreigners just off the coasts of the States in that region without any benefits 
whatsoever to them. As a matter of fact, some of the fishermen used very 
sophisticated fishing vessels that did not require the need to make use of port 
facilities of those States, thereby helping them avoid payment of port dues to the 
adjacent coastal States. 
Fifth, the desire for wider maritime claim by States, especially Nigeria has to do 
with security and espionage. Nigeria at this time was just emerging from a very 
bloody civil war; there was therefore the fear of espionage activities that were being 
carried out across the sea in close proximity to the shores. Nigeria therefore 
supported the idea of the EEZ that was at that time being debated by States. It was 
thought that once the proposal on EEZ jurisdiction was accepted, such propensity 
would be removed. 19 These States closed ranks with their counterparts in other parts 
of Africa to present a united and formidable claim over extended maritime space 
during the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
The sixth was the alleged secret Modus Vivendi between the United States and 
Ecuador, which was thought, had been in existence for some time, but which only 
became a matter for the public knowledge in June, 1965, served to ignite the 
resurgence of extended maritime claim by the Latin American states.Z0 The Modus 
was a secret agreement in which the US agreed to respect 12-mile Ecuadorian 
19 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, vol. I p. 139 
20 Loringe, D.C., "The United States- Peruvian 'Fisheries Dispute", vol. 23, (1971) Stanford Law 
Review P. 391-453 at 408; Nelson, L.D.M. op. cit. n. 3, p. 674 
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jurisdiction to tax foreign fishermen and an exclusive fishery jurisdiction in the 12 
mile zone. On its part Ecuador agreed to grant licenses to the US fishermen and 
refrain from seizures beyond the 12-mile limit, a move which has been interpreted 
in many quarters as a renunciation of the 200- mile limit. 
6. How States resisted the EEZ/200 nm idea 
In order to resist the 200-mile claims by the Latin American States, the United 
States and the then Soviet Union concluded a plan to organize a conference on the 
law of the sea with some specific issues slated on the agenda. The issues include, 
among other things, gaining acceptance for a 12 mile TS with an equal limit for 
fishery jurisdiction; the question ofthe freedom of transit across international water 
ways or straits and creating machinery to accommodate the "special interests" of 
coastal States in matters of conservation and fishing in the high seas beyond the 12 
mile TS. Even though the above were important the Latin American countries still 
saw the moves as suspect; hence the resurgence of the extended maritime claims, a 
claim, which spread to the newly independent States of Africa and Asia.21 
7. Latin American States contributions 
7.1 The concept of patrimonial sea as a consolidation of Latin American 
States Maritime claims 
The various Declarations by the Latin American and the Arab States were regarded 
by the majority of States as extravagant. This necessarily gave the Latin American 
States the impetus to put forward the concept of patrimonial sea to serve as a 
compromise between the norms of classical international law of the sea and the 
more far reaching maritime claims made by some coastal States. A Chilean 
diplomat, Edmundo Vergas Cerreno in a report he presented to the Inter - American 
Juridical Committee, made the first mention of the concept of patrimonial sea 
in1971. Thereafter, the concept found its first exposition on the international plane 
21 For example, two more Latin American states of Uruguay and Brazil extended through 
legislations their territorial waters to 200 nautical miles. Uruguay did this through Law 13.833 of 
Dec. 23, 1969 and Brazil through Decree- Law 1.098 Concerning the limits of the territorial sea on 
March 25, 1970. 
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when the Venezuelan delegate put it forward to the United Nations Deep Seabed 
Committee in August 1971, as a compromise proposal de lege ferenda. 22 The 
concept has been defined by Nelson "as an economic zone not more than 200 miles 
in breadth from the base line of the territorial sea (the limit of which shall not 
exceed 12 miles), where there will be freedom of navigation and overflight for the 
ships and air craft of all nations, but in that zone the coastal State will have an 
exclusive right to all resources.'m 
A substantial part of the proposal was later incorporated into the Santa Domingo 
Declaration of June 7 1972, which was adopted by 10 votes to none with 5 
abstentions. The States that adopted it are Columbia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. It was 
provided in the Declaration that "the coastal state has sovereign rights over the 
renewable and non-renewable natural resources, which are found in the waters, in 
the seabed and in the subsoil of an area adjacent to the territorial sea called the 
patrimonial sea." 24 Furthermore, the coastal state has the right to establish the 
breadth of its TS up to a limit of 12 nm. The Declaration further provides that the 
coastal state has the duty to regulate and promote the conduct of scientific research 
as well as the right to adopt necessary measures to prevent marine pollution. 
Patrimonial sea is a resource-oriented concept which if adopted would provide 
States with sovereign rights over the resources found both in the waters, the seabed 
and sub soil thereof, but it does not confer exclusive sovereignty the like of the TS 
upon a State. In that zone too, other States would have the right to lay submarine 
cables and pipelines, including also the right to conduct Marine Scientific Research 
(MSR). 
22 A/AC. 138/SR.64 , 
23 Nelson, op. cit., p. 668; see also, Venezuela's proposals (A/AC.l38/SR64); The Declaration of 
Santo Domingo, 1972: New Directions in the Law of the Sea (1973), vol. I, at p. 247 
24 New Direction on the Law of the Sea, op. cit., p. 247 
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However, while the Declaration was more specific about the breadth of TS, the 
same cannot be said of the breadth of patrimonial sea, which was decided should be 
left to an international agreement perhaps of a world wide scope, but that in all 
cases, it should not exceed 200 miles in breadth. Moreover, the lack of consensus 
among states claiming TS stricto sensu and those claiming it lato sensu, which 
characterized the earlier Declarations still presented itself as a potent factor in 
preventing the Latin American States from being able to present the concept of 
patrimonial sea as a unified regional maritime policy for adoption at the third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. This is so because; neither party 
was ready to abandon its extremism in order to adopt a compromise position, which 
would in no way have affected the basic principles of their policy. The States 
claiming TS stricto sensu, that is, Ecuador, Panama, Brazil and Peru wanted a 200 
mile TS, where passage by ships would be restricted only to innocent passage, 
while on the other hand, the States claiming TS lato sensu - the group, which 
consists of States, such as Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Uruguay, 
wanted a 200 mile TS that falls within the national sovereignty, complete and 
exclusive in nature, but upon which ships of all nations would exercise the right of 
freedom of navigation. 
A classic example of the claims in this group is provided by Uruguayan Law 
13.833 of December 23, 1969 article 1 of which expressly stated that the 
sovereignty of Uruguay extended to a zone of "territorial sea of 200 nautical miles." 
Article 2 on the other hand declared that, "vessels of any state may enjoy the right 
of innocent passage· through the territorial sea of Uruguay in a zone 12 miles wide.". 
Beyond that zone, free navigation and overflight were not affected by the provisions 
quoted above. 
These claims have far reaching effects on the notion of patrimonial sea. The claims 
of States claiming stricto sensu are clearly incompatible with the notion of 
patrimonial sea, especially as they have the legal implication of making the 200 
mile a TS and restricting the passage over it by foreign vessels to that of innocent 
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passage. It equally implies restrictions on the right of overflight by other states on 
the zone, because by international law, there is no right of overflight on the TS. 
Phillips gave the summation of such claims as tantamount to "a claim of territorial 
sovereignty. "25 Furthermore, acceptance of patrimonial sea as presented infringes 
the law of the sea as Nelson put it, "in attempting to create a zone beyond a 12 mile 
territorial sea, where a coastal state is empowered to exercise an exclusive fishery 
jurisdiction, thus violating a fundamental freedom of the high seas."26 
7.2 The Santiago Declaration of 1952 
In furtherance of their desires to extend their maritime control, Chile, Ecuador and 
Peru met in Santiago and signed a Declaration, which became known as 'Santiago 
Declaration' of August 18, 1952. The relevant aspects of the Declaration are 
perhaps articles II and V. Article II provides in part that, the Governments of Chile, 
Ecuador and Peru proclaim a standard of their international maritime policy the 
exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction each of them has over the sea that bathes the 
shores of their respective countries, to a minimum distance of 200 nautical miles. 
Furthermore, Article V provides, that this Declaration does not signify disregard for 
the necessary limitations on the exercise of sovereignty and jurisdiction established 
by international law for the sake of innocent and inoffensive passage through the 
zone indicated, for vessels of all nations. The Declaration was subsequently ratified 
by the three states and was acceded to later by Costa Rica on October 9, 1955?7 
The maritime policy contained in the Declaration was hinged by the signatories on 
ensuring for their various peoples access to necessary food supplies and to furnish 
them with means of developing their economies, as well as to ensure the 
conservation and protection of natural resources and to regulate the use thereof to 
the advantage of their countries. However, no matter how well intentioned this 
25 Phillips, T.C., "The Exclusive Economic Zone as a Concept in International Law," vol. 26 (1977) 
ICLQ, p.585- 586 
26 Nelson, op. cit., p. 667- 8 (Emphasis mine) 
27 Ibid., p. 671 
110 
policy may appear to be; it did not command the general support of the entire 
American continent until the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
7.3 The influence of the Montevideo and Lima Declarations of 1970 
The above was the position of things, when the Latin American states convoked 
two regional conferences on the law of the sea. The first was the Montevideo 
conference of 13 March 1970 and the Lima conference of August 1970. The aim of 
the Montevideo conference was to "exchange points of view and coordinating their 
position for the diplomatic defence of their respective rights." Delegates attended 
the Montevideo Conference from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. At the end of that conference, a Declaration, 
which is generally referred to as the 'Montevideo Declaration' was unanimously 
adopted. The relevant aspects of the Declaration are contained in paragraphs 2 and 
6 of the Declaration. Paragraph 2 of the Declaration provides for the recognition of 
the rights of coastal States to establish maritime limits "in accordance with their 
geographical and geological characteristics and with factors governing their rational 
utilization." Paragraph 6 on the other hand, provides that the right to adopt 
measures in areas under maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction should be exercised 
"without prejudice to freedom of navigation by ships and over flying by aircraft of 
any flag.' 
The Montevideo Declaration is important not only because it expressly made 
provision for freedom of navigation, but also because it clearly revealed the 'hidden 
agenda' of some of the conveners of the conference. This can be highlighted in the 
statement attached to the Declaration by each delegate to the conference, which 
clearly revealed the divergence of opinion held by them with regards to the 200-
mile claim and the juridical nature of the waters overlain it. In the case of Argentina, 
Chile and El Salvador for example, the statement attached to the Declaration by 
each of them indicates that the extension of sovereignty over the maritime zone 
would in no way impair the freedom of navigation by other States. That is other 
States would be allowed to exercise unimpeded high seas freedom of navigation. 
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7.4 Why freedom of navigation was allowed by Montevideo Declaration 
Three major reasons can be identified: 
(a) navigation is a time honoured privilege, as such 
(b) navigation causes no loss to anybody, and 
(c) the United States would not have allowed restriction of freedom of 
navigation for such an extent. 
However, the statement attached to the Declaration by each delegate from Brazil, 
Panama, Peru, Nicaragua and Ecuador, though it mentions freedom of navigation, it 
is clear from the wordings, that what is meant is a restricted freedom, that is 
freedom to exercise only the right of innocent passage and not the type of high seas 
freedom, which has no restriction and which is enjoyed by all nations in the high 
seas. The statement provides as follows: 
( 1) The freedom of navigation mentioned therein in paragraph 6 is the 
freedom acknowledged in the territorial sea, that is, innocent passage, as 
Brazilian legislation defines it; 
(2) The reference to over flight does not mean that the rules normally 
applied to the air space above the territorial sea should be abolished.28 
The above view is brought out very clearly in the statement attached to the 
Declaration by Peru. That statement is particularly interesting, in that, it is based 
completely on the Santiago Declaration, which states as follows: 
The delegation of Peru accepts paragraph 6 of the Declaration of Montevideo 
on the Law of the Sea with the understanding that the freedom of navigation 
mentioned is that which is acknowledged in jurisdictional seas, that is, 
innocent passage, as established in the Declaration of Santiago on the 
Maritime Zone of ( 1952); and that the reference to over flight as stated does 
not imply any derogation whatever of the rules applied to the airspace above 
28 Grarcia- Amador, F. V ., "Latin America and the Law of the Sea", ( 1972), Law of the Sea Institute 
Ocassional Paper p. 88 
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the jurisdictional sea, nor of the validity of the provisions of current 
international agreements on air navigation.29 
The attitude displayed by some of the States glaringly showed that they have other 
rights and interests than pure economic interest to protect and such attitude has far 
reaching effects in the efforts of the Latin American States to consolidate their 
positions and claims over maritime extension. 
In further efforts to consolidate their maritime policy formulation and claims to 
maritime extension, 14 Latin American states again converged in Lima in August 
1970. At the conclusion of that conference, a Declaration, which is substantially 
similar to the Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea, was adopted. As a 
result, the same reservations that attended the Montevideo Declaration were equally 
made with regards to article 3 of the Lima Declaration; it therefore appears that the 
much sought policy on the law of the sea was still a long way from being realized 
by the Latin American countries. 
8. The contributions of the African States to the development of the 
concept of the EEZ 
A Kenyan delegate, Mr. F. X. Njenga, first introduced the EEZ concept in 1971, 
during the Asia - African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) meeting in 
Colombo (Sri Lanka). Apart from the delegates from Asia and Africa, observers 
attended the meeting from Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Peru. A portion of the 
committee's report on the Law of the Sea indicates inter alia that, the Sub-
Committee, with the exception of a very few delegations, considered that at the 
present time any State would be entitled, under international law, to claim a 
territorial sea of twelve miles from the appropriate baseline and the right to 
economic exploitation of the resources in waters adjacent to the territorial sea in a 
zone, the maximum breadth of which should be subject to negotiation. 30 In the 
29 Ibid, p. 89 
30 Report of the Sub-Committee on the Law of the Sea by the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Committee, Colombo, 18-27 January, 1971 
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Colombo meeting, the Sub-Committee set up a working group to articulate the 
above position for further discussions at the thirteenth session of AALCC in 1972. 
The concept received a further boost in the resolution adopted by the council of 
OAU ministers meeting, which took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia between 15 
and 19 June 1971. 
At the 1972 meeting of AALCC therefore, the Kenyan delegate presented a well 
articulated EEZ concept to the delegations. It defines the important features of the 
proposed EEZ in terms of the rights and obligations of coastal States in particular 
and the international community in general. It stated that the underlying reason for 
the introduction of the concept is because "the present regime of the high seas 
benefits only the developed countries."31 The Organization of African Unity (OAU 
now African Union) after series of consultative meetings with member States 
adopted it and made it the principal objective to be achieved at the Law of the Sea 
conference in 1974. Within the Asian States too, the concept was widely accepted 
and endorsed at the Tokyo Legal Consultative Committee meeting of 1974. The 
resolution affirmed the permanent sovereignty of African countries over natural 
resources and the inalienable right of all countries, and of African countries in 
particular, to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources in the 
interests of their national development and that the exploitation of natural resources 
in each country should always be conducted in accordance with its national law and 
regulations. 32 
This was followed by a Declaration adopted in Mogadishu (Somalia) in June 1974 
by the council of OAU Ministers. The Declaration specifically stated that the 
African States recognize the right of each coastal State to establish an EEZ beyond 
its TS, whose limit should not exceed 200-miles measured from the baseline 
establishing its TS. The Declaration went on to state that in such zone the coastal 
State should exercise 'permanent sovereignty' over all living and mineral resources 
31 Report of the Thirteenth Session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Lagos, 18-
25 January, 1972 
32 OAU Resolution on Fisheries, OAU DOC. CM/Res. 250 (XVII) 
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and should manage the zone without undue interference with the other legitimate 
uses of the sea, namely, freedom of navigation, over flight and the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines. 33 
This Declaration has been seen by a number of commentators as a general departure 
from the rather rigid and extravagant approach of the earlier Declarations by the 
Latin American States. Many African States in response to the Declaration enacted 
legislations on EEZ, even before the concept was formally incorporated in 
international law. Thus, Nigeria claimed the 200 mile EEZ through Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act of 1978, as amended by Exclusive Economic Zone 
(Amendment) Decree 1998, Ivory Coast (Cote D'Ivoire) through Law no. 77- 929 
of 17 November, 1977, Djibouti through Law no. 52/AN'78 Concerning Territorial 
Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone, the Maritime Frontiers 
and Fishing of Djibouti of 9 January, 1979, Kenya through the Presidential 
Proclamation of February 28, 1979 and Mauritius Maritime Zone Act no. 13 of 3 
January 1977. 
The Proclamations as major departure from the Declarations did not claim 
permanent sovereignty over the resources of the zone being envisaged nor did they 
claim the same over the zone itself as indicated by the Mogadishu Declaration 
referred to above, but instead they claimed sovereign rights and jurisdiction. In the 
case of Nigeria for example, the preamble to the Exclusive Economic Zone Act 
enacted pursuant to the Mogadishu Declaration is instructive on the matter. It 
provides ... Within this Zone, and subject to universally recognized rights of other 
States (including landlocked States), Nigeria would exercise certain sovereign 
rights especially in relation to the conservation or exploitation of natural resources 
(minerals, living species etc) of the seabed, its subsoil and superjacent waters and 
the right to regulate by law the establishment of artificial structures and installations 
and marine scientific research, among other things.34 
33 OAU Doc. CM/Res. 289(XIX), contained in UN Doc. NConf. 62/33 
34 See preamble to the Exclusive Economic Zone Act, No. 28 of 1978, Chapter 116, LFN, 1990. 
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The scenario of the claims ultimately led to the graduation of EEZ to customary law 
status, which though independent from the Convention of 1982, the version of it is 
very similar to the version of EEZ that was adopted at the third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea and to a certain extent based on its model. This 
customary law status of EEZ was recognized by both the United States in a 
Presidential Proclamation of 198235 and by the ICJ in Tunisia vs. Libya case?6 The 
zone is of critical importance to coastal States, because its adoption as observed by 
Nikos Papadakis "would include within national jurisdiction almost 40 per cent of 
the total area of sea - an area in which most of the known hydrocarbons and 
commercial fisheries of the sea are found. "37 
Furthermore, the impetus received by the concept from the group of 77 and also 
from the 1977 Algiers summit meeting of the Heads of States of Non - Aligned 
Countries, paved the way for the adoption of the concept by the third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the subsequent incorporation of it in 
the UNCLOS 1982. Thus, Article 55 of UNCLOS provides a specific legal regime 
for the EEZ and defines the zone as an area beyond and adjacent to the TS, subject 
to the specific legal regime established in this part, under which the rights and 
jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights· and freedoms of other States are 
governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. The provision above raises 
the question about the juridical nature of the EEZ, that is, whether the zone is a part 
of the high seas, or whether it possesses a separate legal regime of its own. It is 
important to determine the true legal or juridical status of the EEZ, since according 
to V.F. Tsaref: 
"The juridical nature of Exclusive Economic Zone constitutes the 
legal basis which determines the relationship of rights and interests of 
35 Presidential Proclamation of lOth March 1982, Vol. 22, ILM (1983), p.461 
36 (1982), ICJ Reports, p. 18 at 38, 47-49. Similar views were expressed in the Gulf of Maine case, 
(1984) ICJ Report, 346 at 294; Rego Sanies vs. Ministere Public,74 ILR, at p. 141 and in the Libya 
vs. Malta Continental Shelf case, ( 1985) ICJ Reports, p. 13 at 32- 4 
37 Papadakis N., The International Legal Regime of Artificial Islands, A.W. International Publishing 
Co., The Netherland (1977), p. 54; Brown, E.D. op. cit., n. 1, 
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the coastal and all other states in the use of the zone."38 
What is the true juridical nature of the EEZ? That is whether the EEZ is to 
be regarded as forming part of the TS or the High Seas? 
III. The juridical nature of the EEZ 
1. General comments 
The question of the juridical nature of the EEZ emerged among all other new 
marine concepts deliberated upon at the third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea to be the most controversial concept. The controversy arose as 
Professor Scemi from Italy rightly points out, "the major matter of principle here is 
to establish whether the EEZ is the high seas, or whether it has a status different 
from that of the high seas."39 For example, in an explanation about the right of 
overflight in the EEZ, Churchill and Lowe have posed a question as follows: In this 
context, is the EEZ to be regarded as high seas or territorial sea? The learned 
Professors were of the opinion that UNCLOS "gives no direct answer."40 With due 
respect the observation by the learned Professors requires further explanation. In the 
first place, the fact that EEZ is neither the TS nor is it high seas is clearly 
discernible from the provisions of UNCLOS. Secondly, the observation did not 
address the fact that the earlier 200 miles claims by the Latin American States were 
rejected by States because the claims by implication constituted the 200 miles to be 
TS. If then 200 miles was rejected by States because of its TS implication, it is 
difficult to see how the same 200 miles EEZ will beTS. Were the nature of EEZ 
well appreciated, it would be seen that the concept applies strictly to the resources 
within the water column and apart from the right of jurisdiction which a coastal 
State possesses over artificial islands and other installations in the zone, the water 
column retains its high seas character. 
38Brown E.D. and Churchill, R.R. The Juridical Nature of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the 
Legal Regime of Navigation of Foreign Vessels Therein, UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; 
Impact and Implementation, The Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, Honolulu (1987) 
p.591 
39 Ibid p. 591 
4° Churchill R. R., and Lowe A. V., The Law of the Sea, Third ed., Manchester University Press 
(1999), p.173 
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The controversy that the concept generated among the delegates to the conference 
was so sharp and the division of opinion created by it so wide, that the provision 
which was eventually adopted turned out to be a compromise, subject to varying 
interpretations by States. To place EEZ in its correct legal perspective, there is the 
need to consider the two main schools of thought on the matter, that is, those who 
argue that the EEZ has the status of high seas and those who argue for a sui generis 
status for the zone. 
2. Does the EEZ possess the same Legal Character as the High Seas? 
Those who argued for a high seas character for the EEZ did so based on the 
traditional division of the sea areas into TS and the high seas. They argued that 
since the high seas under the 1958 Geneva Convention include "all the parts of the 
sea which were not inCluded in the TS or in the internal waters of a state"41 and that 
since ru::ticle 55 of UNCLOS defines EEZ as an area beyond and adjacent to the TS, 
EEZ could only be a part of the high seas and not a part of TS. 
Apart from the traditional division of oceans, another most hotly canvassed 
argument in support of the claim that the EEZ has the juridical status of the high 
seas is the assertion of the Secretariat of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization, which according to the proponents of the high seas status of the EEZ 
re-emphasized the juridical status of EEZ conflicts with that of the high seas. 
According to the organization: 
"For all practical and legal purposes, the status of the airspace above the EEZ 
and the regime over the EEZ is the same as over the high seas and the coastal 
states are not granted any precedence or priority. Consequently, for the 
purposes of Chicago Convention, it's Annexes and other air law instruments, 
the EEZ should be deemed to have the same legal status as the high seas and 
41 Article I Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 1958 
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any reference in these instruments to the high seas should be deemed to 
encompass the EEZ (emphasis added)."42 
The above statement is not completely correct. It is correct to the extent that the 
airspace above the EEZ is as free as the high seas but incorrect by its assumption 
that the EEZ has the same legal status with the high seas. For the fact that the 
quotation by ICAO above uses the word 'deemed,' it follows that the organization 
is not stating conclusively that the EEZ is part of the high seas, it only 'deems' it or 
assumed it in order to satisfy the purpose of the Chicago Convention, its annexes 
and other air law instruments. The statement is also inconsistent with the provisions 
of Article 58 of UNCLOS. 
In his own argument referred to by Tsarev, Dekanozov pointed out that, even with 
the divisions of the sea into CZ, CS, fisheries zone and EEZ in UNCLOS, including 
all the restrictions thereof, the character of the sea area beyond the TS still remains 
unaffected and that it is subject "to the fundamental principles of non appropriation 
and common use which constitute the contents of the concept of the high seas' 
juridical nature."43 
Furthermore, Tsarev contended that the provisions of article 58 of the UN 
Convention are in favour of the high seas status of EEZ. He argued in the first place 
that article 58 makes a vital point that in the EEZ, all States, whether coastal or 
landlocked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this convention, the 
freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea 
42 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea- Implications, if any for the application of the 
Chicago Convention, its Annexes and other international air law instruments, ICAO doc. C-
WP/7777 (1984, mimeo.), para. II. 12. Reproduced as LC/26-WP/ 5-1 (1987, mimeo.) in 3 NILOS 
YB ( 1987), 243 at p. 256. See also, Nordquist, M.H., United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, 1982 -A Commentary, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague (1995), vol. iii 
43 Dekanozov, R. V ., "On the juridical nature of the high seas and the sea-bed beyond the limits of 
the continental shelf," (1976), International Law Problems of the World Ocean today, p.93- 96. 
See also, Tsarev; V.F., "The Juridical Nature of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Legal Regime 
of Navigation of Foreign Vessels Therein, in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
Impact and Implementation: E. D. Brown and R. R. Churchill, p.592 
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related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, air 
craft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with other provisions of 
this convention. It is Tsarev's view and conceded opinion that since both the coastal 
State and other States, including landlocked States enjoy these rights in the EEZ, 
that the convention intended that the EEZ should be part and parcel of the high seas. 
Furthermore, Tsarev has also relied on Article 89 of UNCLOS to argue that the 
EEZ is part of the high seas. This article prohibits any attempt by any State, whether 
coastal or land-locked, to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty. Tsarev 
argued that, since no State can validly subject any part of the high seas to its own 
sovereignty, it follows, that in the language of article 90, every State, whether 
coastal or land-locked, has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas. He 
went further to argue that, on the EEZ all ships sail on the conditions that constitute 
the regime of navigation in the high seas and as a result, all the freedoms inherent in 
the high seas, including the well known principles of non appropriation and 
common use, are all applicable in the EEZ. 
Furthermore, the above quotation and the arguments by Tsarev and Dekanozov do 
not make clear distinction between the waters over laying the EEZ and the 
resources therein. While the water column of the EEZ, beyond the TS and the 
airspace above it may no doubt be said to retain the characteristic of the high seas, 
the same cannot be said of the living and the non-living resources of the water 
column and of the seabed and subsoil beneath it. It is as will be shown subsequently 
the failure to make this distinction that has necessitated the confusion over the legal 
nature of the zone. The EEZ, it must be understood is mainly a resource oriented 
zone, which must be distinguished from the water column and the airspace above it. 
It is equally not true that coastal States are not granted precedence or priority over 
the EEZ or to draw a conclusive high seas character, simply because other States 
have the right to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the zone. For one thing, the 
right to lay submarine cables and pipelines is a compromise based on 100 years of 
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practice. Over the EEZ, as will be shown shortly Coastal States are in fact granted 
sovereign rights over the living and the non living resources of the water column, 
seabed and subsoil and jurisdiction according to Article 60 (1) & (2) over 
installations, artificial islands and structures. The mention of right over seabed and 
subsoil of EEZ as seen in Article 56 (1) (a) of UNCLOS arises as a result of similar 
rights by the coastal State over the CS in accordance with Article 77 (1) & (2). Thus 
by the combined effects of the two provisions above, the coastal State may be said 
to possess exclusive rights over the resources of the water column, the seabed and 
subsoil of the EEZ. The high seas freedom of navigation, which no doubt applies in 
the zone is still subject to the due regard standard contained in Article 58 (3) and 
also to the coastal State's right to protect its economic resources. 
Not all rights that are exercisable by other States over the EEZ as we are made to 
believe by Tsarev. Fishery rights, establishment of artificial islands, installations 
and structures for example cannot be undertaken in the EEZ by other States, except 
with the prior authorization of the coastal State. Even where the Convention does 
not attribute a particular right or jurisdiction in the EEZ, either to the coastal or 
other States, it does not necessarily follow that other States could simply take over 
the exercise of such rights. In such a situation and especially if the non attribution 
of rights has generated a dispute, Article 59 of UNCLOS provides inter alia that 
such dispute should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all relevant 
circumstances, taking into account the respective interests involved to the parties as 
well as to the international community as a whole. This is indicative of the fact that 
the EEZ is not as argued by Tsarev a part of the high seas, but a completely new 
zone with a separate juridical status. 
It is submitted that the arguments above failed completely to take cognizance of the 
provisions in article 55 and Article 86 of UNCLOS. The two articles contain 
provisions, which if Tsarev had reckoned with them he probably would not have 
arrived at the conclusion as he did. For example Article 86 provides that, "the 
provisions of this part apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the 
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exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or the internal waters of a State, or 
the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State. This article does not entail any 
abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all states in the exclusive economic zone." 
From this provision, it is clear that the convention does not intend that the EEZ be 
subsumed in the juridical character of the high seas. It is equally clear from the 
provisions in article 55 that the EEZ is beyond but adjacent to the TS, in which case, 
it is separate from the TS and the high seas. 
Another reason why the EEZ must be regarded as having a separate juridical 
character from the high seas, is because the coastal State is empowered by 
UNCLOS to exercise a measure of control and to regulate by its domestic laws · 
activities over the high seas freedoms that are exercisable over EEZ, a coastal State 
does not possess similar right of control over freedom of the high seas beyond the 
EEZ and the CS. This is why the responsibility for the management of that part of 
the high seas is vested in the International Sea-Bed Authority in the interest of all 
mankind unlike in the EEZ where coastal States exercise sovereign and 
jurisdictional rights over the resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of the CS 
underlying the zone. Such rights cannot be exercised over the zone by other States 
except by agreement and consent of the coastal State. 
Shigeru Oda had the above in mind when he commented that, "the EEZ has made 
meaningless the traditional dualism of the territorial sea and the high seas .... the 
EEZ is a sui generis regime, and the argument as to whether it still remains a part of 
the high seas seems to be purely academic."44 
Thus, by making all the high seas freedoms contained in Articles 87-115 
exercisable by all States of the world over the EEZ, article 58 is merely reiterating 
that the EEZ is a zone which comprises or is an amalgamation of certain freedoms 
of the high seas, the TS and the CZ including the CS to make up its own separate 
44 Oda, S., "Fisheries Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea," vol. 77 ( 1983) , A.J.l.L. p. 
739 
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legal status of a sui generis kind. The exercise of sovereign rights by coastal States 
for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the EEZ 
should therefore be seen as a necessary limitation in the exercise of the freedoms of 
navigation etc. in the EEZ, just as the right of innocent passage is a necessary 
limitation on the exercise of sov~reignty of a coastal State over the TS. 
In order to substantiate the idea that there is hardly any zone of the sea, that is 
absolutely subject to the sovereignty of a coastal state, Jenning states: 
"But to think of the regime of any part of the seas simply in terms of 
sovereignty, or the absence of sovereignty, is to lose sight of some important 
legal facts of the situation. On the one hand there is the very important fact 
that the territorial sea, which is indeed by definition subject to the exclusive 
sovereignty of the littoral state, is also subject to the internationally 
established right of innocent passage. Indeed, according to the Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, even those parts of 
internal waters which result from the enclosure within straight baselines of 
"areas which previously had been considered as part of the territorial sea or 
of the high seas," are also subject to the right of innocent passage ... '.45 
In addition to that, paragraph 2 of the same article makes article 88 to 115 and other 
pertinent rules of international law applicable to the EEZ in so far as they are not 
incompatible with part V. The provisions of article 88 - 115 are high seas 
provisions and by making them directly applicable to the EEZ, it is meant to apply 
strictly to the water column of the EEZ, which has been argued to constitute high 
seas. 
3. EEZ as a Sui Generis Zone 
This school of thought argues that the EEZ is neither a part of the high seas nor is it 
that of the TS, but that it is a Sui generis zone. This proposition was spear-headed 
and formally introduced for inclusion in the convention to be adopted by Aquilar, 
who in his introductory note to the second committee stated that, "there is no doubt 
45 Jennings, op. cit., p.34 et seq., 38 
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that the EEZ, are neither the high seas, nor the TS. It is a Sui generis zone.46" One 
reason for its being a Sui generis zone is that Article 55 refers to it as being an area, 
which is beyond but at the same time adjacent to the TS, in which case it is not part 
of the TS. It is not also part of the high seas, because the zone concerns basically 
the resources of the water column only, and apart from the rights of jurisdiction 
over artificial islands, installations and structures, other high seas freedoms are 
preserved on the water column overlying the EEZ. Thus to understand the sui 
generis nature of the EEZ, it is important to note from the onset that one of the 
distinguishing elements of the zone is the fact that it encompasses two areas with 
different legal implications. That is, on the one hand we have the water column 
overlaying the EEZ and subject to different legal connotations or regime and on the 
other hand are the CS underlying the water column of the zone and made up of the 
seabed and the subsoil thereof. We also have the resources within the water column 
overlying the zone and it is with respect to the resources and to some extent the 
artificial islands, installations and structures, which a coastal State is authorized to 
establish that the zone is constituted. 
4. EEZ as Continental Shelf Regime 
There is equally the need to acknowledge that the EEZ is not a zone ab initio and 
ipso jure like the CS. The ICJ for example attested to the ab initio and ipso jure 
nature of the CS in the North Sea Continental Shelf Judgment as follows: 
the rights of the coastal state in respect of the area of continental shelf that 
constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea 
exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and 
as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is 
here an inherent right.47 • 
46Aquilar A., "Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea", vol. V, Official records, p. 
226 
47 (1969) I.C.J. Reports p.l at 22, excerpted in (1969) 63, AJ.I.L, p. 591 at 602 and (1969) 8 ILM, 
p.340 at 347 
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The immediate implication of the zone not being a zone ab initio and ipso jure is 
that the zone is optional and separate from both the high seas and the CS. Article 
77(3) of UNCLOS for instance provides that the rights of the coastal State over the 
continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any 
express proclamation. The absence of similar provisions with regards to the EEZ, 
may no doubt be interpreted to mean that before a State can be entitled to EEZ, such 
a State has to make a formal claim for it. 
Thus, a State needs not make specific claims over the CS; the right exists as an 
attribute of its sovereignty over the land territory. It is the sovereignty, which a 
coastal State possesses over the adjacent land territory that initially confers on it the 
CS rights. Like the CS, the EEZ right is recognized by customary international law 
as well as under UNCLOS. This position has also been affirmed by the ICJ in the 
Libya vs. Malta Continental shelf case. 48The result of this is that a State need not 
rely on the provisions of UNCLOS and need not be a party to it before declaring an 
EEZ.49 
Furthermore, the inclusion of the word "exclusive" is meant to refer only to the 
sovereign right of the coastal States with regards to fishery and other non-living 
resources of the water column, but not to navigation. It should also be noted that the 
TS, the high seas and even the CS regimes had existed long before the evolution of 
EEZ. It follows therefore, that EEZ as a legal concept arises independently and is 
not meant to be a part of any of the regimes enumerated above and though there is 
necessarily bound to be interaction in the exercise of rights in the zones, this arises 
because of the coexistent nature of the zones with one another. This explains the 
reason for the rather separate and elaborate but complex negotiations and 
deliberations that attended the evolution of the EEZ concept. 
48 ( 1985) ICJ Reports, p.l3 at 33 
49 Lowe, A.V., Carleton C. and Ward, C., "In the matter of East Timor's Maritime Boundaries 
Opinion", (2002), p.7 in http://www.petrotimor.com/lglop.html 
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The question that may be asked as a result of the above is whether it is possible to 
have EEZ, without the CS or vice versa. EEZ and the CS coexist with each other at 
least to the 200 miles limit of EEZ, but CS may continue beyond that limit 
depending upon the nature of the coastline of the affected State. Since the rights of 
a coastal State over its CS is argued to exist ab initio and ipso jure through 
sovereignty over the land territory, such rights could be described as inherent rights, 
the same cannot be argued in favour of EEZ, which must be claimed before a State 
could have it. Where a State has not made a claim to EEZ rights, it cannot claim it. 
It can therefore be argued that it is possible to have a CS without EEZ, but not vice 
versa. The reason for this is because part of the EEZ is CS as per Article 56 (3) of 
UNCLOS. Commenting on the possibility of existence of EEZ without the CS or 
the CS without the EEZ, the ICJ noted in the Libya vs. Malta case that, although 
there can be a CS where there is no EEZ, there cannot be an EEZ without 
corresponding CS.50 
The question may equally be asked whether a coastal State can restrict its EEZ 
rights only to the water column. The answer is no, because the EEZ and CS coexist 
with each other at least to the 200 mile limit of EEZ, the exercise of EEZ rights 
necessarily implies corresponding exercise of the CS rights. It is for the above 
reasons that the exercise of a coastal State's rights in the seabed and subsoil 
underlying the EEZ have been made contingent by article 56(3) of UNCLOS upon 
the provisions of part VI of the convention, which deals with CS issues. By making 
the provisions of the CS directly applicable to the EEZ, it is intended to reflect our 
contention above that the nature of EEZ is sui generis, comprising principles from 
the other maritime zones of the sea. Michael Morris has made similar observations 
when he pointed out that "the exclusive economic zone includes two areas partially 
merging though different in their legal regimes."51 The author was in-fact referring 
to the superjacent water of the EEZ and the CS. 
50 (1985) ICJ Reports, p. 13, 33, paragraph 34. 
51 Morris, M.A., "the Military Aspects of the Exclusive Economic Zone," vol. 3 (1982), Ocean Year 
Book, London, p.321 
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This observation is true if consideration is taken of the fact that in the 1958 Geneva 
Convention, the concept of CS became incorporated in international law of the sea 
and by Article 2, coastal States were granted sovereign rights over it and by virtue 
of Article 5 (4) right of jurisdiction over installations and devices. The sovereign 
right provided in the above article covers exploration and exploitation of the natural 
resources of the CS.52 However, Article 78(1) of UNCLOS like article 3 of Geneva 
Convention, provides that, the rights of the coastal States over the CS do not affect 
the legal status of the superjacent waters or the airspace above those waters. These 
same principles, including those provided in article 87 of UNCLOS were made 
applicable to the EEZ with slight modifications. The difference is only that on the 
superjacent waters of the CS beyond the EEZ, the coastal State does not possess the 
same legal rights it possessed over the EEZ, in the sense that on the waters of the 
EEZ, the coastal State possesses sovereign rights to the fisheries and other non-
living resources and only required to share the surplus therein with other States 
through agreements, but apart from this fisheries and non-living resources right, the 
other freedoms of the high seas apply in the EEZ. The same cannot be said of the 
CS beyond the EEZ, in which case the fishermen of all nations were free to fish 
thereon, subject only to the limitations specified under article 1 ( 1 ). 53 
As can be readily ascertained from the provisions in part V of UNCLOS, no text of 
that part spells out the status of the EEZ as a separate or sui generis. Specifically, 
article 86 excluded it from the provisions of part VII, except as are specifically 
made to apply to it; such as we have in article 58 (2), which makes the provisions of 
articles 88 to 115 applicable therein. This is different for example from what 
obtains with respect to the TS where the entire provision of Article 2 of UNCLOS 
clearly clarifies its juridical status. Likewise, in the case of the high seas, article 86 
mentioned above, clearly distinguishes it by specifically excluding all other zones 
from the effects of the provisions of Part VII of the convention. This is reinforced 
by the provisions of article 1 of Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 1958 which 
52 Article 2 of the Geneva Convention on Continental Shelf, 1958 and article 77 of UNCLOS 
53 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living of the High Seas ( 1958); See also 
the provisions of article 116 of the UNCLOS 1982 , 
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provides that, "the term 'high seas' means all parts of the sea that are not included 
in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state." The above proves 
conclusively that the EEZ is neither a part of the high seas nor is it a part of the TS. 
This conclusion receives support from the observation of Brownlie, who noted that, 
"the exclusive economic zone is not defined in the text as part of the high seas 
(article 86) and as a result is sui generis."54 
The non-conformity of the EEZ to the pattern described above also marked it out as 
being sui generis in nature. Brown noted that if the general pattern described above 
had been followed, the EEZ would have been an area of the high seas in which 
certain rights were accorded to the coastal State by way of exception to the 
fundamental principle of the freedom of the high seas. He is of the view that, the 
absence of any reference to the high seas in the definition of EEZ contained in 
article 55 of UNCLOS with particular emphasis to the words "subject to the specific 
legal regime established in this part" contained in that article, clearly indicates a 
departure from the common pattern. 55 
Arguing in favour of sui generis character for the EEZ, Churchill and Lowe, 
observe that on the basis of articles 55 and 86 of UNCLOS, the EEZ neither has the 
residual high seas character nor possesses a residual territorial sea character, which 
would have created a presumption that any activity not falling within the clearly 
defined rights of non coastal states would come under the jurisdiction of the coastal 
state. That instead, the EEZ must be regarded as a separate functional zone of a sui 
generis character situated between the territorial sea and the high seas.56 The above 
statement is true but the inclusion by the learned authors of "a presumption that 
activities not falling within clearly defined rights of non-coastal States would come 
under the jurisdiction of the coastal State" requires some explanation. Such 
activities, especially where dispute has arisen as a result of the non attribution of the 
54 Brownlie 1., Principles of Public International Law, (fifth edition), Oxford (1998), p. 206 
55 Brown, E.D., The International Law of the Sea" vol. 1, Introductory Manual, Dartmouth (1994 ), 
p6216 at 2_19 . Church til R.R. and Lowe A. V ., val. I, op. ctt, , pp.l65 - 166 
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rights to either the coastal State or non-coastal States are covered by the provisions 
of Article 59 of UNCLOS. That Article makes equity the basis of resolution of such 
dispute taking into account all relevant circumstances and the importance of the 
interest involved to the international community. This proves conclusively that the 
EEZ is a sui generis zone with specific legal regime, which includes the fisheries 
regime, the regime of navigation and the regime of living and non-living resources 
of the EEZ. 
Furthermore, more clues about the juridical character of EEZ may be found in the 
definition of Sui generis contained in Merriem Webster's Law Dictionary. Sui 
generis is defined by that Dictionary as, "constituting a class alone, unique or 
particular to it." It follows therefore that, if sui generis has been stated to be neither 
the high seas, nor TS, and the dictionary has defined it as meaning 'constituting a 
class alone and unique,' the only reasonable inference or conclusion that may be 
drawn from all the discussions above is that the EEZ constitutes a class of its own 
and unique in its juridical character, since it is not a part of the high seas nor that of 
the TS. 
The conclusions above leads to the asking of two related questions: 
( 1) How is the sui generic nature of EEZ reflected by the practice of coastal 
States, including Nigeria? 
(2) What are its implications on the distribution of the zone's rights? 
5. Nature ofEEZ as reflected by the practice of coastal States 
Evidence abounds in the practice of majority of coastal States to demonstrate that 
the EEZ is treated as a zone, which is separate and distinct from other maritime 
zones. In South Africa for example, the Maritime Zones Act of 1994 is instructive 
on the issue. After section 4 provides for the TS of South Africa, section 7 on the 
other hand makes provision, which establishes the EEZ. In order to clearly indicate 
that the EEZ is distinct from the other zones, that Act provides in section 7 that; The 
Sea beyond the territorial waters referred to in section 4, but within a distance of 
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two hundred nautical miles from the baselines, shall be the exclusive economic 
zone of the Republic. In addition to that, section 8 makes a separate provision for 
the CS, an indication again that the EEZ is distinct from the CS. Thus the 
description of EEZ as lying beyond the territorial waters and within a distance of 
two hundred miles from the baseline is meant to indicate that the EEZ is not 
regarded as a part of the TS and by the inclusion of a separate provision for the CS 
it is also meant to indicate that the EEZ is recognized to be different from it. 
In Canada, Section 4 of the Oceans Act, 1996 establishes the TS, while Section 13 
(1) declares the EEZ of Canada to consist of the sea beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea that has its inner limit the outer limit of the territorial sea of Canada 
and its outer limit: (a) the line every point of which is at a distance of 200 nautical 
miles from the nearest point of the baselines of the TS of Canada. 
Similar practice may also be found in the legislative practice of the Russian 
Federation. Thus, the Federal Act on the exclusive economic zone of the Russian 
Federation of 1998, after it provides in Article 1 ( 1) that the EEZ is a maritime zone 
which is beyond and adjacent to the TS and with a specific legal regime, that Act 
goes further in subparagraph (2) and (3) to define both the inner and outer limits of 
the EEZ, thus successfully separating it from the ambit of all other maritime zones. 
The situation is more or less the same in Ghana, 57 Sao Tome and Principe,58 Togo,59 
Tunisia60 and Guinea-Bissau61 etc. Thus by stating that the EEZ is beyond the TS, 
yet at the same time adjacent to it, and by defining both the inner and the outer 
limits of the EEZ, the Canadian and the Russian Federation legislations have clearly 
57 Maritime Zones (Delimiting) Law 1986 
58 Law No. l/98 on delimitation of the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone, 1998 
59 Ordinance No. 24 delimiting the Territorial Waters and Creating a Protected Economic Maritime 
Zone of 16 August 1977 
60 Act No. 73 - 49 delimiting the territorial waters of 2nd August, 1973, Article 1 of which 
establishes the territorial sea distinct from the exclusive economic zone established by Act No. 
50/2005 of 27 June, 2005 Concerning the Exclusive Economic Zone off the Tunisian Coasts 
61 In Guinea-Bissau, it is Articles 2 and 3 of Act No. 3/85 of May 1985, on the Maritime Boundaries 
of the State of Guinea Bissau 
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indicated that the EEZ is a separate and distinct zone. This thus demonstrates 
recognition by the large majority of coastal States of the EEZ as a separate zone and 
the fact of its recognition as a separate zone has attained the standard of 
international customary law. 
6. How do the Nigerian laws and maritime practices reflect the sui generis nature of 
the EEZ? 
Giving the arguments of some authors noted above, that the EEZ does not possess a 
separate zone, an examination of the practice of Nigeria will provide further 
relevant evidence to debunk such arguments and clear the confusion generated by 
them. For example, prior to the enactment of the EEZ Act in Nigeria, the Territorial 
Waters Act, 1978, the Sea Fisheries Act 1971 62(repealed) and the Sea Fisheries 
(Fishing) Regulations of 1972 (repealed) made pursuant to the Fisheries Act all 
reflected the traditional division of the sea areas into TS and the high seas. 
Enactment of the EEZ Act of 1978 as a separate Act from the TS Act and the 
Fisheries Act of 1992,63 which prohibits fishing without licence within the TS and 
the EEZ of Nigeria may be seen as a recognition by Nigeria of a zone, which is 
distinct from the TS and by extension the high seas. The above fact is made 
manifest by the provisions of Section 1 (1) of EEZ Act, which provides as follows: 
Subject to the other provisions of this Act, there is hereby denominated a zone to be 
known as the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as the 
Exclusive Zone) which shall be an area extending from the external limits of the 
territorial waters of Nigeria up to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the territorial waters of Nigeria is measured. 
The description of the zone 'as an area extending from the external limits of the 
territorial waters' is erroneous, because it gives the impression that the 200 miles 
EEZ is to be measured from the external limit of the TS, whereas that is not the case. 
The error is not cured by the provisions of Exclusive Economic Zone (Amendment) 
62 Chapter 404, LFN, 1990 (now repealed) 
63 Section 1 (1), 2 and 3 (1) (a), Chapter S4, No. 71, 1992 
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Decree 1998, even though the explanatory note to the amendment describes the 200 
EEZ as beginning from the baselines of the TS, this is so because the explanatory 
note has been stated not to form part of the amendment. The error arises as a result 
of the confusion by the drafters as to where the measurement of the 200 miles EEZ 
should start from since the 12 miles constitute the TS. This could also have arisen 
as a result of an attempt by them to distinguish the EEZ from the TS, upon which 
the drafters of the EEZ Act are aware of Nigeria's sovereignty. Be that as it may, 
the measurement of the 200 miles EEZ, according to Article 57 of UNCLOS 
commences from the baselines from which the breadth of the TS is measured but 
the actual rights over the Zone could be argued to commence from the external 
limits of the TS seaward to the point of 200 nm EEZ limit. In effect, the real area of 
the EEZ is 188 nm. 
7. Implications of EEZ as sui generis zone on distribution of rights 
The sui generis nature of the EEZ has some implications for the distribution of the 
zone's rights. The rights as provided in UNCLOS include sovereign rights, right of 
jurisdiction and other rights. The question will be examined in two parts: 
(a) The question of distribution of EEZ rights between a coastal State and other 
States; and 
(b) The distribution of EEZ rights within a federal coastal State. 
7.1 Distribution of EEZ rights between a coastal State and other States 
UNCLOS in recognition of the distinctive character of the EEZ makes a separate 
provision governing exercise of rights over the zone by States. Thus, Article 56 
provides as follows: 
(1) In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has; 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other 
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the 
production of energy from the water, currents and winds; 
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(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with 
regard to; 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; 
(ii) marine scientific research 
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 
The rights granted by the above provisions can be divided into three main 
categories - sovereign rights, the right of jurisdiction and other rights. The 
sovereign right is far less than actual sovereignty, which coastal States exercise over 
the TS and it is by no means exclusive as the name of the zone may seems to 
suggest, unlike in the case of CS, where the sovereign right of a coastal ·State is 
expressed by Article 77 (2) of UNCLOS to be exclusive in nature. The 
categorization of the rights as seen in the case of the TS, the CS and also the EEZ is 
further evidence of the sui generis nature of the EEZ and its implication on 
distribution of rights between the coastal States and other States. The distribution of 
the rights will be examined in turn. 
7 .1.1 Sovereign rights 
The sovereign rights conferred on Nigeria as a coastal State over the EEZ is 
contained in article 56 ( 1) of UNCLOS. The extension of the rights by that article to 
the resources of the seabed and subsoil of the EEZ is not to be interpreted as going 
contrary to the view that it is a distinct zone, but it is still sui generic in nature. The 
extension as seen in that article can be explained through the provisions of Article 
77 ( 4) of UNCLOS, which confers sovereign rights on coastal States, with respect 
to the resources of the seabed and subsoil of their CS. CS as noted earlier is a 
separate zone, notwithstanding, it coexists with the EEZ at least to the 200 miles 
limit of the EEZ. Therefore sovereign right over the resources of water column of 
the EEZ necessarily implies sovereign right over the resources of the seabed and 
subsoil of the CS. 
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By the combined provisions of Article 56 (1) and Article 77 (4) of UNCLOS, 
coastal States are empowered to exercise the sovereign rights over the resources 
within the water column of the EEZ, as well as over the resources of the seabed and 
subsoil of the CS, which in some cases may extend beyond the 200 mile EEZ. This 
notwithstanding, differences exist in the exercise of sovereign rights over both the 
CS and the EEZ. The right over the CS for example is exclusive, whereas, the right 
over the EEZ is not so exclusive. And whereas, the right over the CS affects the 
resources of the seabed and the subsoil, that of the EEZ affects both resources of the 
water column as well as the resources of the CS. In all cases however, exercise of. 
sovereign rights over the CS may not extend beyond 350 nm from the baselines 
from which the breadth of the TS is measured or shall not exceed 1 OOnm from the 
2,500 meter isobaths.64 
Thus, while a coastal States may exercise full sovereignty (subject to UNCLOS and 
customary international law) over the TS and all the resources therein to the 
exclusion of all other States, the sovereign rights granted to coastal States over the 
EEZ are subject to the qualification that under certain circumstances, other States 
could be allowed access to the resources. The coastal State is also mandated by 
Article 56 (2) to have due regard to the rights and duties of other States over the 
zone. This provision together with those of Article 58 (3) gives both the coastal 
State and maritime States reciprocal rights over the EEZ. It is also an indication that 
other States, which are neither maritime nor coastal States, equally possess some 
elements of rights in the zone. The rights of other States are more specifically 
enumerated in Article 58. That Article 58 grants all States, including land-locked 
and geographically disadvantaged States subject to the relevant provisions of the 
Convention, the freedoms referred to in Article 87, i.e. the freedom of navigation 
and of over flight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines and other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those 
associated with operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines. 
64 Article 76 (4) & (5) UNCLOS 
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In the same vein, since the sovereign right of a coastal State over the CS is 
exclusive,65 it means only the coastal State could harness the resources of that zone, 
and where other States or organizations will participate in harnessing the resources, 
this can only be done by the consent of the coastal State usually expressed by an 
agreement to that effect. Furthermore, where no attribution of right or interest has 
been made by the convention and there arises a dispute between the interests of the 
coastal State and any other State, Article 59 makes equity the basis of resolution of 
such disputes. 
It is by virtue of the above provisions that Nigeria derives the authority it is 
currently exercising over the fishery, installations, artificial islands and structures 
within the water column of the EEZ and to also explore and exploit the petroleum, 
gas and other natural resources found on the seabed and in the subsoil of the 
adjacent CS. Therefore, before the Convention became operative, Nigeria like many 
other African coastal nations enacted the EEZ Act 1978 and has thereby proclaimed 
in Section 2 (1) thereof that; "Without prejudice to the Territorial Waters Act, the 
Petroleum or the Sea Fisheries Act, sovereign and exclusive rights with respect to 
the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed, subsoil and 
superjacent waters of the exclusive economic zone shall vest in the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and such rights shall be exercised by the Federal Government 
or by such Minister or agency as the Government may from time to time designate 
in that behalf either generally or in any special case."66 
The claim to sovereign and exclusive rights as seen from the provisions above has 
been argued to be contrary to the provisions of article 56 (1) (a). The rights referred 
to in Article 56 (1) (a) are sovereign rights simpliciter and not sovereign and 
exclusive rights as contained in the provisions of the Nigerian EEZ Act. Similar 
provisions as Nigeria can be seen in Guinea Bissau. In Article 3 (2) of Act No. 3/85 
65 Article 77 (2) UNCLOS 
66 Chapter 116, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. This Act has been amended by Exclusive 
Economic Zone (Amendment) Decree, No. 42 of 1998, which significantly amended section I of the 
main Act 
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of May, 1985 on the Maritime Boundaries of the State of Guinea Bissau it is 
provided that, the State of Guinea Bissau shall have the exclusive right to explore 
and exploit the living and natural resources of the sea and the continental shelf, 
slopes and seabed within the exclusive economic zone. 
However, the reference to sovereign and exclusive right by the Nigerian EEZ Act 
can be explained in terms of the provisions of article 77(2) of UNCLOS, which, 
though it is a provision on CS but which has been made applicable to the EEZ by 
virtue of the provisions of article 56 (3). Article 77 (2) provides that, 'the rights 
referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal state does not 
explore the continental shelf or exploits its natural resources, no one may undertake 
these activities without the express consent of the coastal state.' Therefore, going by 
the assertion that the EEZ coexists or over lapped with the CS at least to the extent 
of the 200-miles of EEZ and going by the provisions of article 77(2), there is no 
doubt that the practice of Nigeria in making its right over the exploration and 
exploitation of the natural resources (especially non-living resources of petroleum 
and gas found in most cases within the CS) of the EEZ sovereign and exclusive, is 
justified. In fact, Dahmani argues on this basis that the coastal State's sovereign 
• 
rights over non-living resources (in the EEZ) are also 'exclusive' and exist ipso 
facto,67 subj.ect to the fact that it is qualified exclusiveness. 
In addition to that, the provisions of the Act may equally be explained in terms of 
the country's stance on what it perceives to be the nature of a coastal State's rights 
over the EEZ. Throughout the deliberations at UNCLOS III, Nigeria has 
consistently made it clear that it believed the right of exploitation vested on coastal 
States should be exclusive, but that in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative, it 
could confer upon other States rights of concurrent or preferential exploitation 
through bilateral or multilateral agreements. 68 This policy is reflected in the 
practice of Nigeria over its EEZ, and can be further explained by the fact that 
67 Dahmani, M., The Fisheries Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone, Dordrecht, (1987), p. 35 
68 Op. cit., n. 19, p.139 
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Nigeria does not have a separate domestic law governing its CS. Thus exclusive and 
sovereign rights as used in the Nigerian EEZ Act must be seen as a way of 
emphasizing the nation's exclusive right over the CS. 
7 .1.2 Rights of jurisdiction 
This right is specifically provided for by article 56(1) (b) of UNCLOS. It gives a 
coastal State jurisdiction over: 
(a) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; 
(b) marine scientific research; 
(c) The protection and preservation of the marine environment. 
In the real sense, the word jurisdiction carries less weight when compared with the 
sovereign rights we have referred to and the scope of its operation too becomes 
vague when used alone without such additions as 'exclusive.' As can be readily 
ascertained from the provisions of article 56 (1) (a), jurisdiction simpliciter is used 
without such suffix or prefix as 'exclusive,' this means that the jurisdiction referred 
to is highly limited, especially to installations, artificial islands and structures 
constructed on the EEZ by the coastal State. This observation is made clearer by the 
provisions of artiele 60 (1) and (2). Paragraph 1 for instance, states that the coastal 
State shall have exclusive right to construct artificial islands, marine research and 
protection of marine environment and paragraph 2, specifically provided the 
necessary qualification to the term 'jurisdiction' by stating that the coastal State 
shall have 'exclusive jurisdiction' over such artificial islands, installations and 
structures, including jurisdiction with regards to customs, fiscal, health, safety and 
immigration laws and regulation. However, the right of jurisdiction conferred on 
coastal States including Nigeria with respect to conduct of MSR in the EEZ is 
equally subject to the qualification that other States by the permission or 
authorization of the coastal State could be allowed access to carry out MSR. 
It has been alleged that the provisions of the Nigerian EEZ Act is not in conformity 
with article 56 (1) (b), specifically, section 3 subsection (3) thereof, which restricts 
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movements of vessels in and out of installations and artificial islands and which 
imposes a fine of 500.00 Nigerian Naira or twelve months' imprisonment or both 
on any ship that enters the designated areas of installations, structures and artificial 
islands without the prior consent or permission of the government has been 
identified as not conforming to the said article.69 
The other laws apart from that of Nigeria noted above, listed among the category 
not in conformity with the Convention as far as navigational rights of other States in 
the EEZ are concerned include but are not limited to, Maldives and Portugal who 
accorded to foreign shipping the right, not of freedom of navigation, but of innocent 
passage, 70 Guyana, 71 India, 72 Mauritius, 73 Pakistan 74 and Seychelles, 75 each of 
which claims the competence to designate certain areas of its EEZ for resource 
exploitation: within such areas provisions may be made for entry into and passage 
through designated area of foreign ships by the establishment of fair ways, sea lanes, 
traffic separation schemes or any other mode of ensuring freedom of navigation 
which is not prejudicial to the interests' of the coastal State concerned. 
To what extent the provisions of the Nigerian law noted above are or are not in 
conformity with the Convention or may interfere with other rights in the area and 
what remedy if any has been provided? 
By the very nature of the EEZ in encompassing areas which had formerly been part 
of the high seas, there is naturally bound to be interference one way or the other 
with other rights and freedoms in the EEZ. The rights and freedoms that are 
69 Dahmani M., op. cit., n. 66, p. 172 
70 Act No. 33177 of 28 May 1977, art.3. UN Legislative Series B/19, p. 93. Article 3 is ambiguous in 
that it provides, 'establishment of the Exclusive Economic Zone shall take into account the rules of 
International Law, namely, those concerning innocent passage and over flight.' 
71 Maritime Zones Act, 1977, section 18. UN Legislative Series B/19, p. 33 
72 Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 
1976, section 7(6). UN Legislative series Bll9, p. 47 
73 Maritime Zones' Act, 1977, section 9. 
74 Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1976, section 6 (4). UN Legislative series B/19, p. 85. 
See Generally for other states in this category in Churchill R.R. and Lowe, A. V., op. cit., n. 39, pp. 
171- 172 
75 Maritime Zone's Act, 1977, section 9, UN Legislative Series B/19 p. 102 
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immediately affected include freedom of navigation, freedom of scientific research 
and the fishing right of other States. Therefore, the fact that article 56 vests the 
coastal States with the sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources 
of the EEZ, and article 60 empowers such coastal States to construct and authorise 
and regulate the construction, operation and use of artificial islands, installations 
and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic 
purposes, naturally involves restriction in the exercise of the rights and freedoms of 
other states including land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states. 
The point must be stressed however that, having foreseen the possibility of 
interference in the exercise by coastal States of the rights herein, the convention 
provided some safeguards under Article 60. Paragraph 3 thereof provides that the 
coastal State must give due notice and permanent means of giving warning of their 
presence. Furthermore, the coastal State must also remove abandoned or disused 
artificial islands or installations and publish the depth, position and dimension of 
any such artificial islands and installations. Before establishing or constructing any 
such artificial islands or installations, the coastal State is enjoined by paragraphs 4 
and 5 to first and foremost determine their breadth in line with international 
standards and in all cases, the dimension should not exceed 500 meters around any 
such islands and installations and due notice of its existence must also be given. The 
Nigerian law is in line with this provision in that Section 4 (1) (a) of the EEZ Act 
designates only 200 meters as opposed to the 500 maximum granted by the 
provision above and by imposing penalty on the breach by foreign vessels of the 
designated area, that law still makes allowance for the defence of ignorance of the 
existence of such designated area. In which case, due publicity of the presence of 
such artificial islands, installations and structures is envisaged by the drafters of that 
law. 
Lastly, paragraph 7 prohibits the establishment of artificial islands or installations 
where such will interfere with recognized sea lanes. Further to this, and in an 
apparent attempt at forestalling delimitation problems that could occur if the 
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position of the artificial islands, installations and structures is not properly clarified, 
paragraph 8 provides that artificial islands, installations and structures, including 
the safety zones around them do not possess a status of their own neither can they 
generate a territorial sea. Since they do not posses a status of their own, it follows 
that their presence may not affect delimitation of the TS, the EEZ and the CS. This 
means that the structures, installations and the artificial islands may not (except 
with the express agreement of parties) normally be used as special circumstances to 
alter the line of delimitation between two States. 
With all the safeguards in place and with all the articles of the convention that have 
given express authorization to the coastal States to establish if they so wish, 
artificial islands, installations and structures it is difficult to see how the section of 
the Nigerian law under consideration does not conform to the convention. Even the 
imposition of a fine on the erring foreign vessels, which has been pinpointed as 
capable of interfering with navigation on the zone, is still in conformity with the 
convention. Under article 58 (3) of the convention, States are enjoined in the 
exercise of their rights and duties to have due regard to the rights and duties of the 
coastal State and to comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal 
State in accordance with the provisions of this convention and other rules of 
international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this part. This article 
empowers coastal States to' enact such laws as are necessary for the regulation and 
protection of their rights in the EEZ. Nowhere in the convention are coastal States 
specifically prohibited from imposing fines as part of the laws and regulations 
enacted by them to protect their rights on the EEZ. The imposition of fine as seen in 
the Nigerian Act above is not out of place in the process of regulating the activities 
enumerated above. 
Imposition of fine may also be subsumed under the provisions of Article 73 (1) & 
(2) of UNCLOS, which is to the effect that a coastal State in order to explore, 
exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the EEZ, is authorized to adopt 
domestic laws and regulations, including enforcement of such laws and regulations, 
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which may include arrest and detention of any erring vessel and its crew. 
Imposition of a fine on vessels entering the designated areas. without permission 
may be seen as one way of enforcing any such laws and regulations enacted by the 
coastal State and Article 73 has been explained to be "part of a group of provisions 
of the Convention (articles 61 to 73) which develop in detail the rule in Article 56 
as far as sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the living resources of the exclusive economic zone"76is concerned. 
8. How does the sui generis nature of EEZ affect distribution of the zone's rights in 
federal States? 
Discussions on distribution of EEZ rights would have been unnecessary in federal 
States, because the rights mentioned by UNCLOS have been unequivocally granted 
to States as entities with legal personalities and not to the federating units. However, 
experience in federal States, such as Nigeria, the United States, Australia, Canada, 
Pakistan and Sudan calls for an examination of the question. In most of these States, 
particularly in Nigeria the FCU, especially the coastal inhabitants, do not seem to 
attach great significance to the nature of the EEZ. Most of them make blanket 
claims, which do not distinguish between the various maritime zones. As this aspect 
will be discussed in detail in chapter four, it suffices to state here that there exist a 
number of reasons why the federating units may not be able successfully to contest 
the issue of rights over the EEZ and even the CS with the federation. 
For instance, the EEZ as well as the CS are concepts, which developed at the times 
when most of the federating units in the United States, Canada, Australia and even 
Nigeria have become members of independent sovereign States. The CS concept for 
example, became an international legal concept in 1945, through the Truman 
Proclamation of that year and its codification in the Geneva Convention of 1958. 
The EEZ on the other hand, became an international legal concept on the adoption 
of UNCLOS by States in 1982. At these times the various federating units were 
76 The M/V Saiga case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines vs. Republic of Guinea) (No. l), (1997), 
para. 66 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea decision 
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already integral parts of their respective independent sovereign States. Therefore, 
since international law governs relations between international persons, such as 
independent sovereign States and other international organizations, only the 
sovereign States and such international organizations have the capacity to claim the 
rights granted by international law. For this reason, Barwick C.J. in the New South 
Wales and others vs. the . Commonwealth of Australia commented that: "the 
sovereignty and sovereign rights of which the Conventions speak are available to 
Australia as a nation state ... "77 In so stating, his honour was reiterating the effect of 
Conventions in international law and the fact that rights mentioned only avail 
independent sovereign coastal States. The various federating units do not have such 
legal capacity. 
IV. Conclusions 
In this chapter, an in-depth examination of the processes of evolution of the concept 
of EEZ has been undertaken. The explanation is made that its evolution is 
inextricably linked to the evolution of the concept of CS, brought about by the 
Truman's proclamations of 1945. The Truman proclamations led to similar 
proclamations by the Latin American States and also by the Arab Stat~s, whose 
proclamations we argued were extravagant in that they not only claim the resources 
within the 200 miles areas as in the case of the Truman proclamations, but claimed 
actual sovereignty over the areas, thereby suppressing the freedoms of the high seas 
and replacing them in some cases with that of innocent passage. We have seen how 
the irreconcilable norms of classical international law of the sea and that of the 
more far reaching maritime claims by some States led to the inability of these States, 
especially the Latin American States to present patrimonial sea as an acceptable 
legal concept in place of the extensive TS claims made prior to the convocation of 
the third UN Conference. 
Furthermore, we explored the efforts of the African States in putting forward the 
idea of the concept of EEZ, and how the concept became widely accepted by other 
77 (1975) 50 A.L.J.R., 218 at 221 
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States to the extent that it was described by the ICJ in Libya vs. Malta78 case as 
having attained the status of customary international law even before its adoption in 
the form of a convention. We examined the various postulations and opinion juris 
on the legal nature of the EEZ and concluded based on the empirical evidence that 
have been discovered in the process that it has a Sui generis character, meaning that 
it possesses a separate and unique juridical nature different from the TS, the CS and 
also the high seas. It is argued that the confusion about the juridical character of the 
EEZ emanated from the inability or failure by those authors to distinguish between 
the resources of the water colump., which EEZ represented and the water column 
itself, which is high seas. 
Further to that, a review of State practice on the sui generis nature of the EEZ and 
how the Nigerian domestic laws reflect this character was conducted. The 
implications of the sui generis nature of EEZ for distribution of rights over the zone 
were equally examined. The rights because of the unique nature of the EEZ are not 
necessarily the same as rights over the TS, the CS and even the high seas. Similarly, 
the rights can only be exercised by independent sovereign coastal States, except 
where a federal coastal State for example quitclaims parts of its rights to its 
federating units as seen in the United States or where by constitutional agreement, a 
federal State accedes to the control of maritime areas and their resources by the 
federating units as seen in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), or where a State and its 
special areas enter into special power sharing arrangements as seen in China with 
respect to Macau and Hong Kong and the case of power sharing between the federal 
States of Canada and Australia and their coastal units. 
78 Supra, note 49. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4 The crystallisation of problems of title to Nigeria's maritime territory and its 
resources 
I - Introduction: Background perspectives 
The entire maritime space of Nigeria is well blessed with abundant living and non-
living resources in the form of fishery, hydrocarbon deposit, gas and other mineral 
resources. Several multinational and national oil and gas companies under the 
supervision and direction of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
are mining the mineral resources. The NNPC it should be noted was established in 
1977, through the merger of some departments of the Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources, and the then Nigerian National Oil Corporation. NNPC is an outfit of 
the Federal Government of Nigeria charged with the sole responsibility of the 
upstream and the downstream developments, regulation and supervision of the oil 
industry on behalf of the Nigerian Government. 
The revenue received from the sale of oil and gas alone accounts for well over 80% 
of Nigeria's wealth therefore, it provides the main stay for the nation's economy. 
The revenue accruable either from direct sale, petroleum tax or from royalties and 
rents received from the oil and gas companies operating in the maritime areas or 
from other maritime activities is collected by the Federal Government and shared 
among all the federating units and Local Governments in Nigeria in accordance 
with the percentage recommended by the provisions of the Constitution. 1 
In the period between amalgamation in 1914 to the time of federation in 1951, 
Nigeria was governed as a unitary state. At this time, the question of title to 
maritime territory and resources did not arise, because there was only one 
1 Section 162 (2) of the Nigerian Constitution, 1999 
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jurisdiction over the entire land and maritime territories. The problems started soon 
after federation in 1951 and it is between the Federal Government and the FCU. 
This chapter is devoted to examining and exploring the causes of the title problems 
over Nigeria's maritime territory. It explores the various reasons adduced by both 
the Federal Government and the FCU, with a view to determining the conformity or 
otherwise of the claims with internationa11aw. In particular, the chapter examines 
the legality or otherwise of reliance by the FCU on revenue allocation problems, 
contiguity/native title rights and natural prolongation arguments as basis of wanting 
to wrest title and ownership of maritime territory and its resources from the Federal 
Government. 
The initiatives of the Federal Government in instituting the Abia case2 to end the 
title problems are also examined. In this regard, the chapter undertakes an in-depth 
examination of the judgement and the ratio decidendi of the case, which was 
instituted by the Federal Government against the FCU at the climax of the title 
problems. This is done in order to determine the justice of the case and whether the 
decision as it presently stands is capable of putting an end to the title problems. The 
question of rights, obligations and state responsibility under international law, 
which inter alia form part of the ratio decidendi of the case, will be explored as set 
out below. 
II - The basis of the Federal Government's claim 
The basis of the controversy centres mainly on problems of title to maritime 
territory and resources of Nigeria, between the Federal Government and the FCU. 
On the one hand, the Federal Government asserts its title to the entire maritime 
territory adjacent to the coast of Nigeria and the resources that it contains, 
beginning from the baseline delimiting the TS seaward to the limit of the CS of 
Nigeria. It is the conceded view of the Federal Government that the boundary of 
each of the FCU ends at the low-water marks along the coast of the country and as a 
2 Supra 
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result the FCU have no claim whatsoever to the maritime areas seaward of the low- · 
water mark and the resources found in them. 
Hence, the Federal Government claims exclusive legislative, executive and judicial 
powers over the TS and the right to exercise any of the sovereign and jurisdictional 
rights exercisable by coastal States over the EEZ and the CS. The Federal 
Government is of the opinion that natural resources in the TS and the Federal 
Capital Territory (Abuja) are derived from the territory of the Federation and not 
from the territory of any of the FCU and that the resources of the EEZ and the CS, 
fall directly within its sovereign right and jurisdiction, by virtue of their grant to 
Nigeria by international law. In other words, the Federal Government's contention 
is that the FCU have no claim whatsoever to the maritime territory seaward of the 
baselines delineating Nigeria's TS and the resources therein. 
The government based its claims on some domestic laws, such as Territorial Waters 
Act, the Exclusive Economic Zone Act, the Minerals Act, the Petroleum Act and 
the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and on UNCLOS 
and also on some foreign cases. It suffices to state at this stage that based on our 
earlier analysis and discussions of the aforementioned domestic laws in the previous 
chapter, the Federal Government may be said not to have claimed by its domestic 
laws exactly the rights secured for her by the two Conventions, thus leaving very 
wide lacunae for the FCU to exploit. 
The identified lapses are not enough to deny Nigeria of the rights bestow on her by 
international law. The provisions in both the Geneva Convention3 and UNCLOS, 
which spell out the authority and interests in maritime areas all talk of "coastal 
State" as an entity and not the individual federating units, which do not possess the 
type of international legal personality envisaged by those provisions. Thus the title 
3 Articles I and 2 of Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea; Article 2 of Geneva Convention on 
Continental Shelf, 1958 and Article 2, 56 and 76 of UNCLOS, 1982 
146 
and interests of Nigeria in the maritime areas are preserved by international law, the 
lapses in the domestic laws notwithstanding. 
Apart from the coastal States referred to by UNCLOS, autonomous units such as in 
China with regards to Hong Kong and Macao may equally claim the benefits of 
UNCLOS, through the special arrangement known as "One country, Two Systems" 
put in place by the People's Republic of China in the two autonomous units. In this 
regard both Macao and Hong Kong are autonomous units within the People's 
Republic of China with executive, legislative and independent judicial powers, 
including that of final adjudication. Both units equally possess some elements of 
foreign affairs powers subject only to the supremacy of the Central People's 
Government's defence and foreign affairs powers. With regards to ownership of 
natural resources for example, Article 7 of the Basic Law of the Macao Special 
Administrative Region adopted by the Peoples Republic of China is instructive on 
the matter. It provides: 
The land and natural resources within Macao Special Administrative Region shall 
be State property, except for the private land recognised as such according to the 
laws in force before the establishment of the Macao Special Administrative Region. 
The Government of the Macao Special Administrative Region shall be responsible 
for their management, use and development and for their lease or grant to 
individuals or legal persons for use or development. The revenues derived there 
from shall be exclusively at the disposal of the government of the Region. Article 8 
on the other hand makes the laws, decrees, administrative regulations and other 
normative acts previously in force in Macao before the creation of the Special 
Administrative Region to continue to operate to the extent that they don't contradict 
the Basic Law.4 
4 Adopted by the Eighth National People's Congress at its First Session on 31 March, 1993; See 
·http://www .macau99 .org.mo/e_doc_fw .html. 
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Similar provisions have been enacted for the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region also adopted by the Peoples Republic of China.5 It can therefore be seen that 
even though the units mentioned above cannot be said to be independent states in 
the eye of international law, yet by the special arrangement discussed herein, they 
have been empowered by Beijing to claim the benefits of UNCLOS. The truth 
however is that there is no such arrangement as above between the Federal 
Government and the FCU and as a result the FCU cannot claim such a benefit. 
III - The basis of the claims by the FCU 
The problems of title to the maritime territory of Nigeria and its resources as far as 
the FCU are concerned are a reflection of historical problems as well as 
inaccuracies in the nation's statutory enactments regarding the living and non-living 
resources of the ocean. In 1951 for example, the Constitution 6 placed matters 
relating to living and non living resources, such as mines and mineral resources 
both on land and in the sea and fisheries including fisheries in rivers, lakes and the 
TS in the regional legislative list, thus indicating that the Regions could legislate on 
both living and non-living resources. This position changed with the coming into 
force of the 1954 constitution, 7 which placed legislative power over non-living 
resources in the exclusive legislative list, thereby removing every doubt that might 
have initially existed as to which of the two tiers of government had legislative 
powers over non-living resources. 
With regards to the living resources of both the rivers, lakes and the sea, the 1954 
Constitution was silent, that is, it neither included fisheries in the exclusive, 
concurrent or in the residuary legislative lists. The gap persisted from this time up 
to 1963, when the Republican Constitution came into force. As a result, both the 
Federal Government and the Regions considered it constitutional and expedient to 
separately enact fisheries legislation. The Federal Parliament for example enacted a 
5 Article 7 and 8 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, adopted on 4th 
April 1990 by the Seventh National People's Congress (NPC) of the Peoples Republic of China. See 
http://www .info.gov .hklbasic_law/fulltext/content020 l.htm. 
6 The Nigerian (Constitution) Order in Council 1951 
7 The Nigerian (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954 
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legislation, which according to its preamble applied only to sea fisheries within the 
territorial waters of the Federal Territory of Lagos.8 Similarly, the Western Region 
enacted its own fishery law,9 which had application only to the territorial waters of 
that region. Both the Act and Law mentioned above have now been repealed 
through the promulgation by the Federal Government of the Sea Fisheries Decree of 
1971, 10 which is a federal law that applies throughout Nigeria. The power to 
promulgate the Decree was derived by then military authorities from section 3 (I) 
of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree, 1969. This 1971 Decree 
like the 1954 Constitution referred to above, has now placed legislative power over 
fisheries in the hands of the Federal Government. The gradual abrogation by the 
Federal Government of the legislative and power of control which the Regions 
initially exercised over both living and non-living oceanic resources triggered the 
first symptoms of the dispute. 
The FCU equally raised a number of vital issues, which are discussed in tum below. 
Figure Two: A Map showing member states of the Niger Delta Areas of Nigeria 
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8 The Sea Fisheries (Lagos) Act, No. 30 of 1961; Sea Fisheries (Licensing) Regulations 1969, 
L.S.L.N. 15 of 1969 
9 Sea Fisheries Law, No 12 of 1965; Sea Fisheries (Motor Fishing Boats Licensing) Regulations, 
1967, W.S.L.N. 120of 1967 
10 Decree No. 30 of 1971. 
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Source: HAA 
1 The revenue allocation and the issue of reduction in the percentage paid to the 
FCU 
Revenue accruing from either royalties or direct sales of oil and gas products 
including the resources located on the land territory is shared between the Federal 
Government on the one hand, the federating units and the various Local 
Government areas in the country on the other. This was done in accordance with the 
formula provided, either by the commissions set up to work out acceptable 
principles of revenue allocation or by the constitutions. For instance, the following 
percentages of revenue sharing and allocation were at the time stipulated against 
each commission recommended and paid in Nigeria: 
(a) Phillipson S. Administrative and Financial Procedure under the New 
Constitution: financial Relations between the Government of Nigeria and the Native 
Administration of 1948 recommended 50 percent to the regions where resources 
were located; 35 percent to be shared among the other regions, including the region 
of origin and the remaining 15 percent to the central Government. 11 
(b) Hicks J.R and S. Phillipson Reports on the Commission on Revenue Allocation 
of 1951 recommended 50 percent to the region(s) where resources are found, 35 
percent to the other regions and 15 percent to the Central Government. 12 
(c) Chicks, A.L. Report of Fiscal Commission of 1954 recommended 100 percent 
rents and royalties to the regions where the resources were located. 13 
(d) Raisman J. and R.C. Trees Preliminary Report of the Fiscal Commission of 
1958 recommended 50 percent derivation, 30 percent to the regions and 20 percent 
to the central Govemment. 14 
(e) Binn (1964) recommended 50 percent to the region where resource is located. 
(f) Under Section 161 (1) of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 195415 all 
the proceeds from royalty received in respect of mineral resources, including 
11 Lagos: Government Printer. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Legal Notice 102 of 1954 
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petroleum was paid to the Regions where the mineral resources were extracted. In 
1959, through Nigeria (Constitution) (Amendment) Order in Council 16 of that year, 
50% of the revenue received from mineral resources, including petroleum was paid 
to the Regions from where the mineral resources were extracted from. By the 
Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council of 1960, the distribution was done in 
accordance with the provisions of section 134(1) (a) (b), thereof. It provides, there 
shall be paid by the Federation to each Region a sum equal to fifty percent of-
(a) the proceeds of any royalty received by the Federation in respect of any 
minerals extracted in that Region; and 
(b) Any mining rents derived by the Federation during that year from within 
that Region. 
By 1970, the 50% mentioned above had dropped to 45% against the FCU and in 
favour of the federation. 17 
In the following year, the Federal Government promulgated a Decree, which 
brought to an end the prerogative, which the FCU had received in the sharing of 
revenue from oil exploration activities. Consequently, by the promulgation of the 
Off-shore Oil Revenue Decree of 1971, revenue derived from oil exploration and 
exploitation activities in both the TS and the CS became exclusively reserved for 
the Federal Government. The Federal Government was not obliged by any law to 
pay any part thereof into the Distributable Pool, whereby every unit of the 
federation including the FCU could have a share. The entire revenue from those 
areas formed part of the Consolidated Revenue Fund administered solely by the 
Federal Government. The decision to abrogate the former revenue sharing 
arrangements was informed first and foremost by a desire to avoid repetition of the 
mistake of the past, whereby problems of revenue sharing contributed in no small 
measure to the collapse of the civilian administrations between independence up to 
1966 and the Nigeria civil war of 1967 to 1971. 
16 Legal Notice 59 of 1959 
17 Constitution (Distributable Pool Account), Decree No. 13 of 1970. 
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Furthermore, as at the time in question, only five of the twelve federating units in 
Nigeria were located by the sea side, it was therefore considered to be inequitable to 
regard the offshore areas as part only of these units and to also accord them with 
preferential treatment in revenue sharing to the detriment of the other federating 
units. In addition to that, during the time in question the idea that the offshore areas 
seaward of the low-water mark is a natural prolongation of the entire land mass of 
Nigeria and hence belongs to the nation as a whole had gathered enough momentum 
by the Truman Proclamation of 1945 to support claim of ownership by the 
Government. The above decision was immensely influenced by the Geneva 
Conventions of 1958. It was then thought that the offshore areas and the resources 
thereof would henceforth no longer be regarded as part of the FCU. This again 
helped in fuelling the disagreement over title to maritime territory and its resources 
between the Federal Government and the FCU. 
At a time the percentage noted above fell to as low as 1% and in 1992 either due to 
the presentation of the Ogoni Bill of Rights, which sought inter alia greater 
autonomy of the Ogoni people or through several persuasions made to the Federal 
Government, it was agreed that the 1% should be increased to 3%. It must be stated 
that the actual payment of the 3% to the FCU remains more of a theoretical issue 
than reality, this again triggered off more agitation by the Niger Delta people. By 
1999, the 3% had risen to 13% by virtue of the provisions of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution, largely due to the relentless agitation by the FCU. The current thirteen 
percent is paid to each federating unit which has natural resources located within it 
(both land and sea) in accordance with the provisions of Section 162 (2) of the 1999 
constitution. That section provides as follows: 
The President, upon the receipt of advice from the Revenue 
Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission, shall table before the 
National Assembly proposals for revenue allocation from the 
Federation Account, ... Provided, that the principle of derivation shall 
be constantly reflected in any approved formula as being not less than 
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thirteen percent of the revenue accruing to the Federation directly from 
any natural resources. 
By virtue of the above, federating units with natural resources located within either 
their land or maritime territory, particularly the FCU, receive additional thirteen 
percent shares above others without natural resources. In addition to that, the FCU 
were also entitled to share equally with other federating units from the 50%, paid 
into the Distributable Pool Account. The inconsistency noted in the various 
allocation formulas no doubt sows another seed of discord between the Federal 
Government and the FCU. The current 13%, which has been argued to have been 
increased to that percentage perfunctorily by the Federal Government is seen by the 
FCU as grossly meagre compared with the volume of revenue accruing from oil and 
gas to the coffers of the Federal Government. As a result, the FCU who had only 
managed to condone the sharing of revenue derived from the seas they consider 
belonging to them with the other federating units of the federation found it difficult 
to swallow the bitter pill of the reduction in the percentage paid to them, hence their 
agitation to take over total control of the sea and all the resources in the maritime 
areas of the country. 
2. Contiguity/native title dimensions to the dispute 
The claim of title to the sea and its resources by the FCU could also be linked to the 
CS, which the provisions of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 196018and 
the 1963 Republican Constitution of Nigeria both say shall be deemed to be part of 
the region it is most contiguous to. In this sense, only the seabed and subsoil of the 
CS was regarded as forming part of the territory of the FCU and not the water 
column thereof which is beyond the TS. Similarly, the FCU is of the opinion that 
having been living along the coastline from time immemorial, they possess a native 
title right over the sea and its resources adjoining to their coasts and that as a result, 
the Federal Government is estopped from denying a fact, which by its Constitution 
it alleged to have existed. The veracity of the claims will be examined in turn. 
18 Legal Notice 159 of 1960 
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2.1 Contiguity 
The question of contiguity arose in the first instance from the provisions of both the 
Independent and Republican Constitutions of Nigeria. In the first instance, section 
134 (6) of the 1960 Constitution, provides that, for the purposes of this section the 
continental shelf of a region shall be deemed to be part of that region. Similar 
provision as the above is equally contained in Section 140 (6) of the Republican 
Constitution of 1963. Another Act, which equally speaks of contiguity of CS, is the 
Off-shore Oil Revenues (Registration of Grants) Act. Section 1 (1) of this Act 
provides as follows; 
All registrable instruments relating to any lease, licence, permit or right 
issued or granted to any person in respect of the territorial waters and the 
Continental Shelf of Nigeria shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
in any enactment, continue to be registrable in the states of the Federation, 
respectively, which are contiguous to the said territorial waters and the 
Continental Shelf. 19 
The FCU on the basis of the provisions quoted above have consistently argued that 
the maritime territory adjacent to Nigeria and its resources belong to them and not 
to the Federal Government as claimed and that the provisions making the CS to be 
part of the Regions it is most contiguous and making leases, licences and permits to 
be registrable in states which are contiguous to the TS and CS constitute affirmation 
by the Federal Government of their claims. It is submitted that this argument cannot 
be substantiated or supported in all its ramifications. First, the sections of the 
Constitution being relied upon above are silent on the issue of ownership of the 
maritime territory. To all intents and purposes therefore, those sections merely 
'deem' the CS to be part of the regions it is most contiguous or closest to only for 
the purposes of that section of the Constitution, which is on revenue allocation and 
not for any other purposes. Secondly, the word 'deem' as used in the two 
Constitutions is not specific enough, as to be capable of being interpreted to mean 
19 Chapter 336, LFN, 1990 
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conclusive evidence by those Constitutions or by the Federal Government of 
recognition of ownership of the maritime territory and resources by the FCU. To 
deem as used in the two Constitutions is merely to assume or consider for the 
purposes of revenue allocation and sharing that the CS is part of the region to which 
it is most contiguous. 
Similarly, registration of leases, licence or permits in states contiguous to the sea 
could be interpreted as a mere administrative convenience as opposed to conclusive 
evidence of recognition of the ownership of the sea by the FCU. 
2.2 The Native title rights 
Closely related to the issue of contiguity is the question of native title rights. The 
FCU are of the opinion that as traditional occupiers and owners of the adjacent land 
areas, they as against any other federating units, authorities ·or persons are possessed 
of exclusive rights and benefits over the adjacent maritime territory and resources. 
The veracity of the argument will be examined under the following sub-headings: 
(a) sources and survival of native title rights, 
(b) the exclusivity or otherwise of the rights 
(c) the extent of native title rights. 
Arguments will be canvassed in favour of the fact that native title rights are 
traditional rights, which were not created by the common law as being presently 
portrayed, but which rights are recognised and preserved by it. In addition, the 
argument will be made that native title rights as recognised by the common law 
during the colonial era, survived that era and independence, but are not in anyway 
exclusive to the holders. Lastly, it will be established through empirical evidence 
garnered from some statutory provisions and case law, both from Nigeria and other 
common law jurisdictions that native title rights extend in a limited way to the 
maritime territory and resources as well. 
2.3 Sources and survival of native title rights 
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In the discussions on the nature of TS in chapter two, mention was made of the 
various acts of ownership exercised by the various Empires and Kingdoms along 
the Nigerian coastline before colonisation and formation of the Nigerian State. 
Recognition of such ownership in the kingdoms and empires led the Europeans, 
particularly Britain to conclude Treaties of cession with some of the Kingdoms and 
Empjres. The kingdoms and empires that were not directly ceded were forcefully 
annexed. Similar argument (apart from certain disproportionate purchases of lands 
from the native Indians and Aboriginal people) could be made in favour of the 
Native Indians of the United States, the Aborigines of Canada,20 the Maoris of New 
Zealand21 and even the Aborigines of Australia, notwithstanding that the continent 
of Australia was initially argued but inconclusively to be terra nullius or was 
sparsely populated before the advent of Britain. This contention that the continent 
of Australia was an empty continent devoid of inhabitants on settlement has been 
ably debunked by several writings and reports of the very first British residents in 
Australia. Arthur Phillip for example reported back to England after a visit that, 
"The natives were more numerous than they were supposed to be.'m Not only was 
the continent found to be heavily inhabited by the Aborigines, the Aboriginal 
people were also found to have exercised property rights.23 As a result native title 
rights have not been recognised in Australia by treaty as was the case in Canada, 
Nigeria, United States and New Zealand. Its recognition only came in 1993 through 
the Native Title Act of that year. A judicial affirmation of the rights was made for 
the first time by the High Court of Australia in its decision in Mabo (No. 2)?4 All 
these point to the fad that, the territories that today make up the Nigerian State, 
20 See for example the Royal Proclamation of I763, which was the first document that called for land 
cession negotiations between the British and the Aboriginal peoples and the Quebec Act ofl 774 in 
http://www.canadiana.org/citrnlthemes/aboriginals3 e.html (visited on 3I October, 2006) 
21 See the Treaty of Waitangi of I840 between Britain and the Native Chiefs and Tribes of New 
Zealand, Article I of which talks inter alia of cession "to Her Majesty the Queen of England 
absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of sovereignty which the said 
Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise 
or possess over their respective Territories as the sole sovereigns thereof' in 
http://www .treatyofwaitangi.govt.nz/treaty (visited on 3I st October, 2006) 
22 See letter of Phillip to Nepean, 9 July, I788, Historical Records of New South Wales, I (2):I53 
23 Banner, S., "Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and Property Law in Early Australia," vol. 23, 
(2005), Law and Historical Review p.II3 
24 (l992)I75 CLR, p.l 
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United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia were in fact not terra nullius, 
before the advent of Britain and other European countries and were indeed owned 
and controlled by the traditional occupiers. This is also an indication that native title 
rights predate the common law in these countries and are thus not created by it. 25 
The FCU in Nigeria believe that the rights as recognised by the common law 
survived colonialism and thus independence and that the rights extend to ownership 
of resources as well. 
During the colonial period and as a result of the various treaties of cession, the 
former ownership and control exercised by the kingdoms and empires in Nigeria 
passed as a matter of international law to the Crown. The same argument is also 
valid for Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.Z6 This passing of 
title notwithstanding, there is ample evidence in all these countries to show that the 
passing of ownership and control to the Crown did not extinguish native title rights 
and interests. In Nigeria for example, native title rights are seen to be preserved by 
an international treaty. This can be found in Articles XXVI and XXIX of the Anglo 
- German Agreement of March 11 1913. Article XXVI for instance provides: The 
fishing rights of the native population of the Bakassi Peninsula in the estuary of the 
Cross River shall remain as heretofore. Similarly, Article XXIX provides that where 
the boundary is formed by rivers, the populations of both banks shall have equal 
rights of navigation and fishing. 
Similarly, native title has been held in Australia not to be extinguished by the 
common law. This is in the case of Western Australia vs. Commonwealth where it 
"was held that: 
... at common law a change in sovereignty over the territory did not extinguish pre-existing 
rights and interests. The presumption was that the Crown did not intend to extinguish such 
rights and interests. As no clear and plain intention by the Crown of a general 
25 The majority of the court in Commonwealth of Australia vs. Yarmirr, held inter alia that ... native 
title rights and interests are not created by and do not derive from the common law ... (200 l) HCA, 
56, para. 48 
26 New South Wales vs. Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR, 337 at 366 and Bonser vs. La Macchia 
(1969) 122 CLR 177, at 189 
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extinguishment of native title in Western Australia could be evinced, native title survived 
colonisation ... 27 
In New Zealand, the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840 is noteworthy. After Article 1 of 
that Treaty provided for the cession of the territories of New Zealand to the Crown, 
Article 2 on the other hand: 
"Confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the 
respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries and other properties which 
they may collectively or individually possess ... "28 
Since the signing of the Treaty, native title rights have been recognised and 
preserved by a number of other laws, which include Fishing Protection Act of 1877 
(now repealed), the Sea-fisheries Act, 1894 re-enacted as Sea-Fisheries Amendment 
Act 1903 under which section 77 (2) of the Fisheries Act of 1908 first appeared. 
In acknowledging preservation of native title rights by the Treaty of Waitangi, 
Chapman J commented in R vs. Symonds as follows: 
in solemnly guaranteeing the native title and in securing what is calle~ the 
Crown's pre-emptive right, the Treaty of Waitangi, confirmed by the charter 
of the colony, does not assert, either in doctrine or practice, anything new 
and untitled. 29 
Similarly in the Te Weehi vs. Fisheries Officer, Williamson J. held on appeal that, 
"Te Weehi had been exercising a customary Maori fishing right within the meaning 
of section 88 (2) of the Fisheries Act, 1983," as a result the charge against Te 
· Weehi' was dropped. 30 Thus, Williamson J by his acceptance that the customary 
rights of the Maori, which existed before the surrender of their sovereignty to the 
Crown in the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, continue to exist until it is specifically 
altered by legislation. 
27 ILR, vol.ll2, p. 662 at 664; (1995) 128, ALR, p. l 
28 Op. cit., n. 22 
29 (1847) NZPCC, 387 at 390 
30 (1986) N.Z.A.R. 144 
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In Canada, the fact that native title rights are not extinguished by reason of 
colonialism has been given judicial affirmation in R vs. Guerin. In that case the 
court recognised that the customary rights of aboriginal people were not 
extinguished by legislation unless that legislation clearly and plainly removed the 
liberty to enjoy those rights. The court explained the pre-existing rights of the 
Indian natives as creating enforceable equitable obligation which was "not properly 
characterised as neither beneficial nor as personal usufructuary but rather as a 
unique interest which gave the Indians a legal right to occupy and possess the lands 
although the ultimate title was in the Crown.31 The summation of all the above is 
that native title rights survived colonialism and independence, notwithstanding the 
state succession that took place at independence in all the countries referred to 
above. The rights as gathered from New Zealand and Canadian cases above could 
be extinguished by legislation clearly enacted by the State for that purpose, but until 
that is done, the rights survive. 
2.4 Exclusivity of Native Title Rights 
Are native title rights exclusive to the holders or not? Evidence abounds to show 
that the common law, which recognises native title rights, recognises them as a 
form of public rights alone and not as private ones. This may be demonstrated first 
and foremost by the concept of freedom of the sea, which occupied the 
jurisprudence of international law and also finds reflection in common law, but this 
is only to the extent that the public in general have the right to fish and to navigate 
the seas. 32 Evidence of the in exclusivity of native title rights may also be found in 
the Magna Carta, which enjoined the Crown not to grant exclusive fishery rights to 
its subjects, 33 and by so doing the public right to fish was protected for future 
generations. Common law it should be noted could only recognise and protect 
existing native rights which is not repugnant or contrary to it and since exclusive 
31 (1984) 13 DLR 321; (1985) 13 DLR, 321 at 323 
32 Gammel vs. Commissioners of Woods and Forests (1859)3 Macq 419 (HL); AG of Canada vs. 
AG of Quebec (1902)1 AC 413 (PC); New South Wales vs. Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 
419,421 and423 
33 Statute 25 Edw. I, 1297 
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native title rights, especially in the maritime territory is contrary to it, exclusive 
native title rights could therefore not have been granted by it. In addition, the 
concept of innocent passage, which is an international customary law concept, 
prevented the Crown from granting private rights over the TS. 
Further evidence may also be found in various jurisdictions to demonstrate that 
native title rights are not exclusive to the holders alone. Thus in the Australian case 
of Mabo No 2 (Mabo vs. Queensland), the three islands constituting the Murray 
Islands brought an action against the state of Queensland and the Commonwealth of 
Australia seeking legal recognition and protection of traditional land rights which 
they claimed to possess in and over the Murray Islands in the Torres Straits in 
accordance with their native rights and customs. They claimed that these rights had 
existed since time immemorial, surviving the annexation of the Murray Islands to 
the state of Queensland in 1879. The plaintiffs claimed in their statement of claim 
that the defendants threatened to infringe these rights and interests by establishing a 
Council under the Land Act, 1962. By a majority of six to one, it was held inter alia 
that the Meriam people are "entitled as against the whole world to possession, 
occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of Murray Islands."34 
The above decision raises the implication that traditional rights over land territory 
may be exclusive in nature. It has to be noted however, that the decision was arrived 
at only because the 1985 Queensland Coast Island Declaratory Act (Qld.) was held 
to be discriminatory against the Meriam people, in that it extinguishes without 
compensation all traditional legal rights in or over Murray Islands which would 
otherwise have survived annexation, and it confirms all rights in or over the Murray 
Islands, which were purportedly disposed of under Crown lands legislation after 
annexation. The 1985 Act is also held by the court to be inconsistent with Article 5 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and Sections 9 and 10 of Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth.) 
enacted by the Commonwealth pursuant to the above mentioned convention and as 
34 Supra, p. 217; See also, ILR vol.ll2, p. 458 et. seq., 460 
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such could not extinguish the native title rights of the Merriam people. It is worthy 
of note also that the decision in Mabo was reaffirmed in the Western Australia vs. 
Commonwealth case. 35 
The question to be asked is whether by the above decisions, native title rights are 
truly exclusive to the holders? Secondly, whether native title rights exist over 
maritime territory and resources and whether such native title rights are also 
exclusive to the holders? 
By the decision in Mabo No.2, the first question above may be answered in the 
affirmative, that is, native title rights in relation to land territory in Australia are 
exclusive to the holders. With regards to the second question, the answer is yes 
native title rights exist in a limited way over the sea and the sea-bed. This is so, 
because subsequent upon the decisions in Mabo No. 2 case, there have been other 
decisions both in Australia and in other jurisdictions, which established the fact that 
native title rights exist over the sea and sea-bed, but that such native title rights are 
not exclusive to the holders alone. Thus in the Commonwealth of Australia vs. 
Yarmirr, the Federal Court of Australia determines that native title exists in relation 
to the sea and sea-bed within an area described in the determination, but that native 
title rights and interests "do not confer possession, occupation, use and enjoyment 
of the sea and sea-bed within the claimed area to the exclusion of all others.36 
An appeal was lodged against the decision by both the Commonwealth and the 
claimant to the Full Court of the Federal Court, 37 which reversed the decision of the 
Federal Court, but by special leave, a further appeal was made to the High Court of 
Australia. The High Court dismissed the appeal by both parties, while at the same 
time upholding the decision of the Federal Court to the effect that, "native title 
could and did exist over the sea. Native title did not however confer exclusive 
35 Supra, n. 28, pp. 662 - 664 
36 ILR (Lauterpacht and Greenwood), vol. 125 p. 321 at 322 
37 Ibid. 
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possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the sea." 38 The court after an 
exhaustive examination of precedents from both the United States and Canada 
explains further that its decision in the case is informed by "a recognition of the 
reality of the difference between the land mass and the seas and the overarching 
importance of the sea, for national defence, foreign relations, strategy, diplomacy 
and related treaty, trade and commercial considerations." 
It is not only in Australia that native rights in the offshore areas have been held not 
to be exclusive, similar holding has been made in other common law countries. In 
New Zealand for example, in the case of Waipapakura vs. Hempton, Stout J held 
that "there is no ~ttempt in the Fisheries Act, 1908, to give rights to non-Maoris not 
given to Maoris. All have the right to fish in the sea and in tidal rivers who obey the 
regulations and restrictions of the Statute ... 39 
In Canada it is in the case of Gladstone vs. R, where the question for determination 
before the Supreme Court was the interpretation of section 35 ( 1) of the Canadian 
Constitution Act of 1981. That section recognises and affirms the existing 
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada. However, the court 
refused to accept any construction of the above mentioned section, which would 
have the effect of extinguishing the ancient common law rights to fish in tidal 
waters. Specifically, the court stated, "it was surely not intended that by the 
enactment of section 35(1 ), the common law rights would be extinguished in cases 
where an aboriginal right to harvest fish commercially."40 
In the United States, common law was not the only basis of denial of exclusive 
native rights in the maritime areas as se~n in the case of Australia and Canada. 
Other bases include history, public policy and the paramount doctrine, by which the 
Federal Government's rights are held by the Supreme Court in the Tide Land cases 
to be paramount over those of the American states. Similar holdings in the United 
38 Ibid, pp. 323, 466, para. 384 
39 (1914) 33 NZLR 1065 
40 (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 648 at 679 
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States can also be found in the decisions in Shively vs. Bowlby; Te-Hit Ton vs. US; 
Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope vs. United States and the Native Village of 
Eyak vs. Trawler Diane Marie Inc. In the Shively's case for example, the Supreme 
Court of United States was of the view that: 
the Congress of the United States, in disposing of the public lands, has 
constantly acted upon the theory that those lands, whether in the interior or 
on the coast, above high water mark, may be taken up by actual occupants, in 
order to encourage settlement of the country; but that the navigable waters 
and the soils under them, whether within or above the ebb and flow of the 
tide, shall be and remain public highways: and being chiefly valuable for the 
public purposes of commerce, navigation, and fishery, shall not be granted 
41 
away ... 
Thus in Te-Hit-Ton Indians vs. US, the United States Court of Claims 
followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Shively's case in determining 
that the Alaskan Indian clan who sought to claim compensation from the 
United States Government for authorising the taking of salmon from the 
areas considered to be part of where the clan had earlier acquired and for 
closing some of the plaintiff's ancestral fishing grounds could not s~cceed. 
The Court of Claims rejected the plaintiff's claims on the basis that no such 
grant of an exclusive fishery could be presumed as it was contrary to the 
policy of the government to make such grants.42 
In the Inupiat Community case for example, the matter for determination by 
the court was a request made by the claimants for a declaration that the 
claimants possessed sovereign rights and un-extinguished aboriginal title to 
an area which lies between 3 and 65 miles off the coast of Alaska. The 
claims above were rejected at the court of first instance and on appeal to the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals it was held that, to uphold the claim "would 
be to ignore the underlying principle upon which the Supreme Court has 
41 152 us l. 
42 ( 1955) 132 F Supp. 695 
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placed reliance, that federal supremacy over the adjacent seas is an essential 
element of national sovereignty."43 Fitzgerald J observes in that case as 
follows: 
If as a matter of constitutional law, the federal government must be 
possessed of paramount rights in offshore waters, it makes no 
difference whether competing domestic claimant is a state or a tribe of 
American natives. All are subordinate to the federal government and 
neither can, under the constitution, claim rights which are at odds with 
those which are of necessity entrusted to the one external sovereign 
recognized by the constitution.44 
Lastly, in the Eyak case, the court repeated the holdings in the Inupiat 
C . 45 ommumty case. 
2.5 Extent of Native Title Rights 
Having determined that native title rights survived colonialism and independence 
and that the rights, are exclusive over land territory and in-exclusive over the 
maritime territory, the task here is to determine the contents and the spatial extent of 
the rights. The starting point according to Griffith QC is to note that native title 
rights, whether over land or maritime territories "do not have a fixed or definite 
contents. They consist according to him of "a bundle of rights, which are defined by 
the customary laws of a particular community. The content ~f that bundle of rights 
may vary from a right to hunt or to hold ceremonies or to the kind of rights which 
the Australian High Court in the Mabo No.2 case mentioned above held the Meriam 
people to possess as against the whole world. 46 That is the right of possession, 
occupation, use and enjoyment of the lands of Murray Islands. 
With regards to maritime territory, the Court in the Commonwealth of Australia vs. 
Yarmirr, gave a graphic example of the nature and components of native title rights. 
43 ( 1982) 548 F Supp 182, at 185 (District of Alaska) 
44 Ibid 
45 154 F 3d 1090 (Ninth Circuit (1998) at 1096 
46 Griffith G., "Offshore Cartography" in http://www.mlaanz.org/docs/98journal2a.html 
164 
According to that Court, native title rights include the right to travel through the 
areas, to fish and hunt in them for the various purposes stated and to visit areas of 
cultural and spiritual importance. These rights the court says are not exclusive and 
as such, "the non exclusivity necessarily involves a number of different elements: 
that anyone else might at anytime and any place within the relevant area does what 
the claimants non-exclusively did or do there." The rights have also been held in R 
vs. Sparrow41 and Mason vs. Tritton48 to extend to fishing. 
As could be observed from the cases cited above, native title rights have been held 
in Canada, the United States and New Zealand to apply in most of the cases to 
fishery and navigation. Similarly in Nigeria, the Anglo-German Treaty referred to 
above apply to right over fishery and navigation. This is so because fishing and 
navigation are rights which existed prior to colonisation in the countries above and 
as the common law could only recognise the rights that were in existence before its 
introduction in a country, fishing and navigation rights are the rights mostly 
recognised by the common law. This contention necessarily implies that as 
petroleum, gas and other oceanic mineral resources were not yet discovered in most 
of these countries, including Nigeria prior to colonisation, native title rights may not 
extend to them. 
With regards to the area of the sea covered by native title rights, the argument has 
been made earlier that Britain adopted the three-mile TS limit and that that concept 
was introduced by it to most of its colonies and protectorates. The argument was 
equally made that the three mile TS formed part of the national territory of the 
adjacent State. This been the case, it follows that the spatial limit upon which native 
title rights could be legally exercised was the three-mile TS referred to in chapter 
two. In addition, the natives like any other person could fish and navigate on the 
waters beyond the TS, but this could not be on the basis of exercise of any native 
47 (1990) l SCR 1075 
48 (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 
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rights, but that of the freedom of the high seas, which operated in the high seas 
beyond the three-mile seaTS. 
3 The natural prolongation argument 
The issue of natural prolongation forms the core of the dispute between the Federal 
Government and the FCU, particularly the Niger Delta areas. Article 76 of 
UNCLOS defines CS as follows; 
the Continental Shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a 
distance of 200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea 
is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to 
that distance." · 
Similarly, the ICJ has described CS rights in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases 
as rights, which existed ipso facto and ab initio and by virtue of sovereignty over 
the land.49 The provision above and the ICJ's description in the above mentioned 
case are being consistently confused, misconstrued and misinterpreted (sometimes 
by very eminent writers) to refer to the land territory of the FCU and the fact that 
their rights over it existed from time immemorial. Such misinterpretation has 
influenced in no small measure the current erroneous assertion of title over the 
maritime territory and its resources by the FCU. In this regard, it is pertinent to refer 
to Professor Sagay's widely reported statement that: 
"All over the world, ownership of resources belongs to the people where they 
are located. When these oil communities are located in the coastal area, their 
right of ownership extends to the outer limit of the continental shelf. The 
1958 Convention on the continental shelf, the 1960 Constitution of Nigeria, 
section 140, 1982 Convention of the law of the sea section (sic.) 76 is 
international and local authorities to support my position."50 
49 (1969) ICJ Reports, p. 3 
50 Nigerian Guardian Newspaper of 17th March, 2005, www.guardiannewsngr.cornlnews/article06 
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lkhariale after affirming the correctness of Sagay's comments on the 
judgment of the Supreme Court in Abia case observes as follows: 
"It failed to fully make use of the correct portion of the Law of the 
Seas, namely the regime of the Continental Shelf, which unequivocally 
treats the continental shelf as a natural projection of the inland territory, 
extending on a very well defined gradient, into the sea. This would 
have saved the revered justices from tortuous mental gymnastics that 
they had to go into in determining the proper connection between the 
so-called "littoral states" and all activities on their territorial waters. 51 
Lady Ime Udom, the Akwa-lbom state delegate to the political debate 
earlier mentioned has taken the argument a step further by introducing 
an element of secession of Akwa-Ibom. She argued: 
"International law acknowledges that the continental shelf is a 
natural elongation of the littoral state contiguous to it. So, you 
tell me if Akwa-lbom as a littoral state cannot claim the 
continental shelf that is the natural elongation of its own land, if 
today Akwa-Ibom decides to secede and go, will Nigeria have 
that continental shelf'. While replying to a critique, lady 
Udom has said, "He (referring to Senator Uba Ahmed) claims 
that every Jaw made in Nigeria has to be superseded by 
international law? That our constitution that is the supreme Jaw 
of the land is to be superseded by international treaties? So 
where is our sovereignty?"52 
The statements above represent gross misconception of the basic purports and tenets 
of the provisions of the 1960 Constitution and article 76 of UNCLOS cited by the 
learned Professor. In the first place, the provisions of both the Geneva Conventions 
and UNCLOS are commonly referred to and cited as articles and not sections as we 
51 Ikhariale, M., "Resource Control Judgment: Who to Blame" of IOih January, 2005 in 
http://www .dawodu.com/ikhriai ll.htm. 
52 Vanguard Newspaper of 5lh May, 2005 in 
http://www. vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/niger deltalnd304052005 .html (emphasis added). 
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are made to believe by the eminent professor. Again, the reference in both the 
Geneva Convention and article 76 of UNCLOS mentioned by Sagay is to State as 
an entity and not to communities as the learned Professor has observed. Thus Chief 
Gani Fawehinmi, rightly observed that "state here means Nation State and not a 
geographical or political division within the Nation State, like Bayelsa State. The 
Customary International Law recognises Nation States and not a geographic or 
political division within a National State ... " 53 This is not to say however that 
international law will reject any arrangements made by Nigeria or any coastal State 
whatsoever by which the coastal units are given certain specified rights over 
resources of the seas. Thus if Nigeria by special arrangements (as seen in the UAE, 
Hong Kong and Macau in China, the quitclaiming made by the United States to 
some of its coastal units) conferred certain specified rights or grants some 
concessions to the FCU over the resources of certain segments of the maritime 
space, international law would accept it as an internal arrangement, even then, it 
will always be the State to which UNCLOS addresses as having the rights and the 
obligations. The only way to give for example Hong Kong and Macau or the 
communities along the coast in Nigeria direct rights and obligations in UNCLOS is 
to give them the right to accede to it. Until such arrangements are made, the 
reference by UNCLOS will continue to be to Nigeria as an independent sovereign 
coastal State. 
Certain States like the United States, Canada and Australia have either quitclaimed 
or entered into joint ownership and management agreement of either a part of their 
seas or in the case of Canada joint management of the entire sea areas within 
Canadian national jurisdiction with their federating units, but not to the individual 
communities along the coast and this was done on the basis of different 
considerations as opposed to judicial interpretation. The judicial decisions, which 
preceded the quitclaiming in the case of United States (as would be further shown 
in chapter five) awarded ownership and control of maritime territory to the Federal 
53 Nigerian Guardian Newspaper of 18th October, 2005 in 
http://www. guardiannewsngr .com/law /article03. 
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Government just like the judgment of the Supreme Court of Nigeria awarded 
ownership and control of maritime territory adjacent to Nigeria to the Federal 
Government. This led to the criticism by Sagay and Ikhariale. 
To cap it all, no coastal State has the right of ownership or sovereignty over the CS 
beyond the TS not to talk of individual communities. The highest right a coastal 
State could exercise with regards to the CS beyond the limit of TS is that of 
sovereign right and jurisdiction .. The sovereign right in question affects the 
resources of the CS while the jurisdiction is with respect to installations and 
artificial islands but not the water column overlying it. However, with the 
emergence of the EEZ concept in 1982, coastal States can now exercise sovereign 
right over the resources of the water column and jurisdiction over installations and 
artificial islands. The exercise of the rights themselves is an attribute of sovereign 
independent coastal States and not that of the individual communities or federating 
units along the coast. The above argument equally applies to the comments of 
Ikhariale noted above. The 1960 Constitution mentioned by Sagay merely deemed 
the CS to be part of the states most contiguous to it but this is only for the purpose 
of revenue allocation and nothing more. 
Evidence abounds to support the view that the CS of a coastal State, including 
Nigeria is not a natural prolongation of the land territory of the communities 
bordering the sea alone, but that of the entire land mass of the coastal State. Apart 
from the portions of Geneva Convention and UNCLOS cited above, Truman's 
proclamation, which is often regarded as the first national claim to CS stated that 
"the Government of the United State regards the natural resources of the subsoil and 
seabed of the CS beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United 
States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control."54 
Though the proclamation itself does not specify the geographical limit of the CS 
being claimed but the press release attached to it stated that the CS was considered 
54 Proclamation No. 2667, Concerning the Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural 
Resources of the Subsoil and the Seabed of the Continental Shelf (emphasis added). Reproduced in 
the Code of Federal Regulations 1943 - 1948 Comp., 3, at p. 67 
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as extending to a water depth of 100 fathoms, which is equal to 600 feet or 200 
meters. 55 This open-ended definition of CS was adopted by the Geneva Convention 
on Continental shelf of 1958. 
The proclamation has greatly influenced the evolution of international customary 
law on the subject and it formally found its way into the corpus of international law 
in the 1958 Geneva Convention on Continental Shelf. In the light of this, Article 1 
of the 1958 Geneva Convention defines CS as the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of TS, thus employing the 
concept of adjacency rather than natural prolongation adopted by the 1982 
UNCLOS. The reference again under article 2 of the same Convention is to coastal 
State as opposed to units or communities along the coast. This no doubt is a 
reflection of the State practice, which developed as a result of the proclamation by 
which the South American States of Chile, Ecuador and Peru, which have very 
small CS in the physical sense, claimed full sovereignty over a 200 miles distance 
from their coasts. Though the claims were met by the oppositions of other States, 
nevertheless other States such as the Mid -Eastern States followed the practice by 
claiming CS rights over the seas adjacent to their coasts. A large number of the 
claims were made by the States as entities and not by the individual communities 
within those States. 
Thus, the 1958 Geneva Convention on CS has been described by the ICJ in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases as having crystallised the customary doctrine by 
which the outer limits of the Continental Shelf were defined by reference to the 
physical extension of the land mass below the adjacent sea and the depth to which it 
was possible to exploit the resources of the continental shelf. 56 The Truman 
proclamation together with similar proclamations by other States, which it inspired, 
including the North Sea Continental Shelf case mentioned above, all refer to coastal 
55 The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry Truman ( 1945) p. 353 ( 1969). See 
also, Hollick, A.L., "US Oceans Policy: The Truman Proclamation", vol. 17 ( 1976- 7), Virginia 
Journal of International Law, pp. 23 - 35. 
56 Supra, n. 50, p. 3 
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States as entities and not to the individual federating units in Federal States or to 
communities along the coast. 
Furthermore, the description of the rights as seen above by the ICJ in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases as existing "ipso facto and ab initio" 57 raises certain 
fundamental questions: What time in history does ab initio refer? Does it mean 
going back into history or does it start to count from the date of statehood? It is 
reasonable to argue that ipso facto and ab initio as used by the court can only refer 
to 1945, which is the time that the doctrine first emerged at the international plane. 
For Nigeria ab initio can only refer to 1960, because that was the date Nigeria 
became a full-fledged sovereign State that could claim rights under international 
law. Furthermore, by the doctrine of inter temporal law as enunciated in the Island 
of Palmas case,58 it is the law that existed at a particular time that governed the 
events of that time and as the concept of CS did not exist at the international plane 
until 1945, the ICJ could not be referring to a time earlier than that. This probably 
explains the reason for the decision of the arbitrator in Petroleum Development Ltd 
vs. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, to the effect that the "grant of a mineral concession in 
1939 was not to be understood as including the continental shelf," because that 
concept was not in existence as at that time.59 Again, it can be rightly argued that it 
is the entire land mass of a country that is envisaged by both the Geneva 
Convention and UNCLOS not the land mass of the individual federating units of a 
nation. It is therefore difficult for the FCU or the Niger Delta people to sustain a 
claim of title to the maritime territory and resources adjacent to Nigeria on the basis 
of the natural prolongation principle alone. 
As noted above, lady Udom's statements as a lawyer and the delegate of Akwa-
lbom state to the political debate raise the following issues: 
57 Ibid 
58 (1928) 2 U.N. Rep. 829; 4 ILR (1927 - 28) 153 
59 Supra, p. 144 at 152 
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(1) The statement equates littoral state with the federating unit of Akwa-Ibom 
state, thereby wrongly attributing to it the rights granted by international law 
to sovereign coastal States over the CS. 
(2) The statement that international law cannot supersede Nigerian laws, 
especially the Constitution, which she regards as the supreme law of Nigeria 
is partly correct and partly incorrect. 
(3) Most importantly, the statement raises the question of secession. 
With respect to item one above, the word 'littoral state' is commonly used to refer 
to sovereign independent coastal States and not to the units of a federation. It would 
be recalled that the Supreme Court in Abia casi0 used similar words throughout its 
judgment in that case to refer to the FCU. This is erroneous, the reference to coastal 
States by UNCLOS as the rightful authority to exercise the rights granted by it is 
not a reference to the units of a federation which do not possess the legal capacity 
the type envisaged by UNCLOS. Nigeria alone by reason inter alia of its status as 
an independent sovereign State under international law and by reason of the fact 
that it is a party to UNCLOS, coupled with its power over foreign affairs matters in 
the Constitution under which it's CS is categorised has the power to claim the rights 
granted by UNCLOS. It should be remembered also that the words "coastal States" 
are used by UNCLOS as a way of distinguishing between them and third States. 
The eminent lawyer must be taken on item two above not to have evinced the 
degree of concern that would indicate her awareness of the impact of international 
law on domestic legislation or demonstrated in her comments the degree of 
versatility which would indicate her appreciation of the principles of international 
law involved here. Although Nigeria may be termed a dualist State, in which case 
international law and domestic laws are regarded as separate. The question is: If 
international law and domestic laws are separate as conceived by the dualist theory, 
which between the two legal systems will be regarded as being superior to the other 
in case of a conflict between them? In the assessment of the lady lawyer, the 
60 Supra 
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Nigerian domestic law, particularly the Constitution is superior to international law. 
This may be true to the extent that Nigeria is a dualist State and to the extent that 
the debate between positivism or dualism and monist theories on the relationship 
between international and domestic laws is very controversial and difficult to 
reconcile. 
However, the lady lawyer's statement may be disputed in many respects. First and 
as will be shown subsequently, the dualist approach which she relies on is difficult 
to reconcile with the practice and the jurisprudence of the International Court and to 
a conventional law on the matter. For example, the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
has held in the Free Zone case, that "it is certain that France cannot rely on her own 
legislation to limit the scope of her international obligations."61 In the Land and 
Maritime Boundary case (Cameroun vs. Nigeria: with Equatorial Guinea 
intervening), Judge Mbaye of the ICJ made a similar observation as above, when 
Nigeria attempted to plead the non ratification by the then Supreme Military 
Council of Nigeria of the Marua Agreement of 1975, which ceded Bakassi 
Peninsula to Cameroun as a reason for avoiding that Agreement. 62 Further more, 
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties 1969, is in tandem with 
the decisions above. It provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal laws as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. The above clearly 
demonstrates that international law may be held to be superior to the domestic law 
in certain circumstances. 
Secondly, it would appear that where a State had appended its signature on an 
international document or treaty and had delivered the instrument of ratification 
thereof, where required, it becomes a matter of international conventional law for it, 
which it has to respect and observe. By doing the above Nigeria had by that singular 
action subjected itself and its activities to be bound by UNCLOS. To do otherwise 
61 PCIJ, series AlB, No. 46, at p. 167 
62 (2002), ICJ . 
173 
would not only offend against the established rule of pacta sunt servanda, but 
would impose international responsibility on Nigeria.63 
Thirdly, majority of the provisions of UNCLOS have attained the status of 
customary international law. That being the case, the Nigeria's domestic law may 
not override it. 
Fourthly, the monist theory, which is based on natural law thinking and the idea of a 
world society and which Kelsen64 argued makes international law to be superior to 
domestic law, appears to reflect a more pragmatic and practical reality of the debate 
more than the dualist approach. Thus, the constitutions of countries like Germany, 
65United States of America66 and others, the general rules of international law are 
incorporated as integral part of the constitution and express provisions made to the 
effect that such general rules of international law override and directly establish 
rights and obligations for the inhabitants of the federal territory. 
Fifthly, the eminent lawyer must be taken not to have addressed her mind to the 
provisions of the Constitution of Nigeria, which declares Nigeria's foreign policy 
objectives to include respe~t' for international law and treaty obligations.67 It thus 
appears, that Nigeria by her ratification of UNCLOS and the incorporation of the 
provisions of it in the domestic law has by that singular action acknowledged her 
subjection to be bound by the provisions thereof and cannot again plead the 
domestic laws, including the constitution for failure to perform the obligations 
imposed or claim the rights granted by it.68 
63 Article 26, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 
64 Kelsen H., Principles of International Law, 2nd edition, (1966) (Tucker edition), New York, 553 
-588 
65 Article 25 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949 as amended up to and 
including 20 December, 1993 
66 Article VI, makes all Treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the US to be the 
Supreme Law of the land 
67 Section 19 (d), Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 
68 See Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. 
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Lastly, on the issue of secession, Lady Udom could be taken to be stating what is 
obvious, by ruling that on secession of Akwa-Ibom from the federation of Nigeria 
the CS which is adjacent to it, would cease to part of Nigeria. Barwick C.J. made a 
similar comment in the State of New South Wales vs. the Commonwealth of 
Australia, that "upon a territory being given its independence of Australia and 
ceasing to be a dependent territory, the marginal seas become, by virtue of that very 
independent national status, the territorial seas of the new nation State."69 
A practical example of the situation under consideration is offered by the secession 
of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the disintegration of the former Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. At the time Eritrea was a component province of Ethiopia, the 
maritime areas were part of Ethiopia, but after Eritrea had staged a successful 
secession from it, the maritime areas ceased to be part of Ethiopia and Ethiopia has 
been rendered a landlocked State as a result. Thus if Akwa -Thorn successfully 
seceded from the Nigerian State it would no doubt go away with the segment of the 
CS adjacent to it as argued, but this is only by virtue of its newly acquired status as 
an independent and sovereign State. As long as it continues to be a unit under the 
federation of Nigeria, the sovereignty over the TS and sovereign rights over the CS 
would continue to belong to and exercised by the Nigerian State and not by Akwa-
Ibom or any other units of the federation. As would be explained when considering 
right of self determination, secession has some legal implications not foreseen by 
Lady Udom. Thus, if a segment of an independent sovereign State attempts to break 
away by the use of force or by any other means short of an agreement to that effect, 
it becomes a matter for the protection of territorial integrity and political 
independence of the parent State, which under international law the parent State 
will be entitled to defend and prevent the breaking away through all possible 
means.70 
69 (1976) 50, A.L.J .R. p.223 
70 Article 51 of the UN Charter, 1945 
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IV. Institution of the Abia case in Court 
1. Facts/judgment of the case 
The title problems over the sea and its resources in Nigeria reached a climax in 
February, 2001, when the then Attorney General of the Federation instituted an 
action against the 36 federating units (but in the main the FCU championed the 
entire course of the trial of the case because they are the ones that would be most 
affected by its outcome) at the Supreme Court, invoking the original jurisdiction of 
that court in the determination by it of the "seaward boundary of a 'littoral state' 
within the Federal Republic of Nigeria for the purpose of calculating the amount of 
revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resources 
derived from that state pursuant to the proviso to section 162 (2) of the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999." 71 
The Federal Government contended that the southern boundary of the FCU is the 
low-water mark or the seaward limit of the inland waters. Accordingly, the Federal 
Government maintained that the natural resources located within the CS of Nigeria 
are not derivable from the territory of any of the FCU. On the other hand, the FCU 
disagreed with the Federal Government's contentions and claimed that their 
respective territories e;xtend beyond the low-water mark on to the TS and even on to 
the CS and the EEZ. As mentioned earlier, the FCU in making the claims relied 
heavily on the natural prolongation principle under Article 76 (1) of UNCLOS, the 
contiguity and native title rights.72 On this basis, the FCU argued that the natural 
resources derived from both onshore and offshore are derivable from their 
respective territories and in respect thereof each of them is entitled to "not less than 
13 per cent" allocation as provided in the proviso to subsection (2) of section 162 of 
the Constitution. 
Several objections, some on points of law and some on points of facts, were raised 
71 (2002) 6 N.W.L.R., part 764, at pp. 553- 557 
72 See paragraph III, sub paras. 2 and 3 of thesis, pp.153- 165 and pp. 166- 174 
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by the defendants as to the competence of the court to entertain the suit in-view of 
the fact that the writ of summons and the statement of claim did not disclose any 
prima facie case that would warrant the attention of the court and whether it is 
proper in an action to determine the boundary of the FCU to join non FCU as 
parties. The court promptly dismissed the objections and decided inter alia that the: 
"seaward boundary of a littoral state within the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria .. .is the low water mark of the land 
surface thereof or, (if the case so requires as in the case of 
Cross River State with an archipelago of islands) the seaward 
limits of inland waters within the state."73 
In arriving at this judgment, the court practically relied on the provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions, UNCLOS and on the decisions in R vs. Keyn, Bonser vs. La 
Macchia, New South Wales & Ors. vs. The Commonwealth and on the US vs. 
Louisiana and other cases to argue that: 
"it is Nigeria as a sovereign state which can exercise 
jurisdiction and right as a coastal state over her territorial 
waters, contiguous zone, other zones in which she has a 
special interest and the high seas and will answer the claims 
of other members of the international community for, any 
breach of her obligations and responsibilities under 
international conventions ... and not her littoral states who 
have no international legal personality."74 
1.1 Comments and criticisms on the manner of handling the case 
This is a landmark decision in the history of adjudication in Nigeria, it is a decision 
that has the capacity to influence in one way or another the political, economic, 
security and national life of the country, but regrettably, the court seemed not to 
have grappled with the intertwined strands of precedent, history, political 
73 Ibid, per Ogundare J.S.C. p. 660 
74 Ibid, per Ogwuegbu J.S.C. in p. 828-829. 
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philosophy and local and international issues which make up the problem it was 
called upon to decide. The court in its judgment as seen above aptly demonstrated 
this ignorance by the numerous blunders, misconceptions and misapplications of 
certain concepts and principles of the law of the sea in the judgment. Furthermore, 
the court placed so much reliance on certain foreign cases some of which either 
through differential constitutional and historical experiences or through certain 
other occurrences could not be made directly applicable in Nigeria. Some of those 
·decisions have simply been overtaken by other events and developments in the 
countries where the decisions were rendered, yet the Nigerian Supreme Court was 
more eager in adopting them as the basis of its own decision without first 
considering those developments. 
The lawyers too, did not help the matter they (both the plaintiff and the defendant) 
demonstrated the highest level of ignorance of the basic principles of the law of the 
sea involved by their manner of presentation and of arguing the case. These 
obvious lapses on the part of the counsel had drawn the criticisms of Ikhariale, who 
observed that, "what happened was that the court was not sufficiently educated by 
the lawyers that appeared before it." In order to buttress his argument further, 
lkhariale quoted conspicuously in his paper the criticisms of Professor Sagay as 
follows: 
"Our court process in Nigeria is based on adversarial system under which the 
judge is supposed to make his decision based on the strength of the 
arguments presented by the parties ... Consequently, no matter what the 
justice of the resources control litigation was, as long as the facts presented 
were not equally matched by the rules marshalled out to the court by the 
counsels, the outcome was bound to be distasteful." 75 
While not exonerating the counsel that handled the resource control case from 
blame, Sagay's statement and the reliance placed on it by lkhariale above cannot be 
totally supported. The statement overlooks and underestimates the roles of judges in 
adjudication. It assumes that all the judges need do while adjudicating on a case is 
75 Op. cit., n. 52 
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to be 'sitting ducks', who only watch and at the end of the day base their decisions 
solely on the arguments of lawyers and nothing more. No, the judges themselves, 
especially the Supreme Court justices whose judgments not only become law once 
delivered, but is equal_ly binding and in most cases are subject to no appeal have to 
do more than that. They have to dig deep into statutes, and case laws, (both 
domestic and foreign) and where necessary in the resource control case, where they 
have little or no knowledge of the principles of the law of the sea required for a 
thorough adjudication of the matter make use of amici curiae who are experts on 
law of the sea to advice them. What the judges cannot do is to rule on matters not 
specifically pleaded by parties to a case. It will be recalled that when judges in Re 
Dominion Coal Co. and County of Cape Breton were faced with a similar situation 
of insufficiency of evidence, Currie J. undertook a personal research to compensate 
for the inadequacy of evidence in the case before him and also in order judiciously 
to determine the matter. 76 
Granted that the judges are not trained experts of the law of the sea, the case 
exposes their failure or reluctance as the case may be to undertake intensive 
research into that area of international law as is expected of judges of their calibre. 
It equally exposes their unwillingness or is it reluctance to make use of amicus curia 
as they had once done in the case between the AG of Ondo State vs. AGF and 
others. 77 The numerous legal misconceptions contained in the judgment, seriously 
threatens the reliability that anyone could place on it as a judgment, which has been 
arrived at through erudite and competence expected of Justices of the apex Court. 
No wonder the judgment has been described by a commentator as a complete 'mix 
bag'.78 
Therefore, it behoves us to attempt to highlight some of the numerous 
misconceptions contained in the judgement, with a view to correcting the erroneous 
impressions portrayed by them. The misconceptions are categorised into two. The 
76 (1963) 40, D.L.R. (2°d), p. 614 
77 (2002), vol.6, Supreme Court of Nigeria Report (part 1) 
78 Vanguard Newspaper of 22nd August, 2004 in 
www. vanguardngr .com/articles/2002/plol itics/p222082004 .htm 
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first is misunderstood international law concepts and the second is other serious 
errors. 
1.2. Misunderstood concepts of international law 
The following statements inter alia stand clearly discernible in the judgment, which 
if the judges had carried out a thorough research or had made use of amici curiae 
would not have been made at all: 
( 1 )"While it is recognised in customary international law that the sea is res 
nullius and it is therefore available for the enjoyment of all nations of the 
world, land-locked nations inclusive ... "79 
(2) "By the 1958 Convention the breadth of the territorial sea is a maximum 
of 3 miles."80 
(3) "It is to be noted that the 3 nautical miles mentioned in the case were 
later extended to 12 nautical miles by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Law of the Sea and Contiguous zone, which preceded the 1982 Convention 
on the Law of the Sea."81 
(4) "The Exclusive Economic Zone Act (Cap 116) was enacted in 1978 to 
give effect to the Treaty that preceded the 1982 Convention on the 
subject. .. "82 
(5) "All the 1958 Geneva Conventions relating to the sea are now 
superseded by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea."83 
79 Ogundare JSC, op. cit., n. 162, p. 648. 
80 Ibid, at p.651 
81 Ibid, per Uwais CJN, at p. 731 
82 Ibid, per Ogundare JSC, at p. 652 
83 Ibid, per Ogundare JSC, at P. 649. 
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Paragraph ( 1) represents a gross misconception and lack of understanding of the 
basic principles of the law of the sea. It is wrong for the court to have referred to the 
high seas as being res nullius, instead of stating that it is res communis. The two 
concepts for all intents and purposes have different meanings, connotations and 
implications. Res nullius refers to a territory without a master or owner, in which 
case it is open to acquisition by anyone who could first assert legal title by way of 
control and unchallenged occupation.84 
Res Communis, on the other hand means free and belonging to the whole world and 
as a result cannot be subject to appropriation, occupation and control by a single 
state. The term is commonly used with reference to the seabed and ocean floor 
beyond the national jurisdiction, commonly referred to as the Area, which has now 
been constituted as the common heritage of the mankind by article 136 of UNCLOS 
and by a Resolution of the General Assembly. 85 The resources of the 'area', 
including the exploration and exploitation thereof are placed under the management 
and control of a body known as the International Sea Bed Authority. The benefits 
that would accrue when exploitation of the resources of the 'area' have become 
fully operational would be utilised for the benefit of mankind.86 The initiative to 
constitute the seabed and subsoil of the high seas beyond the national jurisdiction as 
a 'common heritage of man. kind' first came from the US President in 1963, 
followed by that of the Maltese Permanent Mission to the United Nations who 
submitted the proposal to that effect to the Secretary General of the UN for 
inclusion in the agenda for the 22nd session of the General Assembly on August 18, 
1967. 
84 See Island ofPalmas case, United States vs. Netherlands, (1928) 22 AJIL 867- 912; Clipperton 
Island case, France vs. Mexico (1931 )2, U.N Rep. 1105; The Eastern Greenlands case, Denmark vs. 
Norway, PCIJ, Series AlB no. 53, p. 1913 and Land and Maritime Boundaries case, Cameroun vs. 
Nigeria (supra). 
85 General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) of December, 1970. Article 137 (1) ofUNCLOS 
· stated that no State· shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area 
or its resources etc. 
86 See Articles 133- 150 and Article 311(6) ofUNCLOS; Brown, "International Law of the Sea 
(Introductory Manual)" (supra) at pp. 445 - 447 
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Similarly, the Moon and other Celestial Bodies have been constituted by 
international law as the common heritage of the mankind. In doing this, the United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVII), adopted in 1963 set out certain 
legal principles, which include provisions that the outer space and celestial bodies 
were free for exploration and use by all states on the basis of equality and in-
accordance with international law and as a result cannot be subject of national 
appropriation in any way or means.87 In 1967, the above mentioned principles were 
further reiterated and clarified by the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. The emphasis here is that the 
exploration and the use of outer space by States must be for the benefit of all 
mankind. The Moon has also been constituted a common heritage of man kind in 
1979 by the adoption of the Moon Treaty of that year. Article XI of that Treaty 
emphasises that the Moon and its resources are the common heritage of mankind, 
and as a result cannot be the subject of national appropriation. By virtue of this 
provision, the Moon and its resources are now subject to a special regime of 
exploitation. 
It can therefore be seen that res communis and res nullius are more or less directly 
opposite and cannot be used interchangeably or in the sense that the Supreme Court 
had used it in the above-mentioned case. 
With regard to paragraphs (2) and (3), it is not true that the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone or any of the 1958 Geneva 
Conventions specified the maximum breadth of the TS, whether at three or twelve 
nm. The distance specified by Geneva Convention is not that of the TS, but of the 
·Contiguous Zone, which article 24 (2) says may not e~tend beyond twelve mile 
from the baseline from which the breadth of TS is measured. 88 It is the 1982 
UNCLOS, which fixes the maximum breadth of the TS at 12 nm.89 Prior to that 
87 See also, the General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) and General Assembly Resolution 1884 
(XVIII). 
88 Part II, Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 1958. 
89 Article 3, UNCLOS, 1982 
182 
time states were unable to agree on a precise width of TS, hence the conflicting 
claims by them. The three-mile TS happened to stand out among other TS claims as 
the one that enjoyed the acceptability of a few leading maritime States, but at the 
time of the Geneva Conventions of 1958, no agreement had been reached as to what 
the dimension of the TS should be. 
On paragraph ( 4 ), it is completely erroneous for the Supreme Court to have 
asserted that the Exclusive Economic Zone Act (a domestic Act of Nigeria) was 
enacted in 1978 to give effect to the treaty that preceded the 1982 UNCLOS. It is 
common knowledge that the only treaty that preceded the 1982 UNCLOS is the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone or the 
Geneva Convention on the CS. As a matter of fact, the concept of EEZ did not exist 
at the time of the Geneva Conventions of 1958, it is therefore chronologically 
impossible for the Exclusive Economic Zone Act to have been enacted by the 
Nigerian legislature to give effect to a treaty which did not in anyway envisage the 
concept of EEZ. 
The proposal for the adoption of EEZ was made for the first time during the 
deliberations at the third UNCLOS and this was overwhelmingly supported by 
many African and other nations to the extent that a number of them enacted 
domestic legislation to extend their maritime domains to include the 200 nm EEZ 
even before UNCLOS itself became operational.90 Nigeria is one such nation that 
enacted Exclusive Economic Zone Act before the actual convention became 
operational; this must have informed the Supreme Court's erroneous comments 
because the Act itself predates the convention. The feverish adoption by coastal 
States of the provisions of UNCLOS regarding the EEZ before its final adoption in 
1982, after Madagascar delivered the 60th ratification instrument needed to make 
90 Nigeria for example, claimed the 200-miles EEZ through the Exclusive Economic Zone Act, 1978, 
now amended by the Exclusive Economic Zone (Amendment) Decree, no. 42 of 1998; 
Ivory Coast (Cote D'Ivoire) through Law No. 77- 929 of 17m November, 1977; Djibouti through 
Law No. 52/AN/78 Concerning the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic 
Zone, the Maritime Frontiers and Fishing of Djibouti of 9m January, 1979; Kenya through the 
Presidential Proclamation of 28th February, 1979 and Mauritius Maritime Zones Act, no. 13 of 3rd 
January 1977. 
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the convention come into force prompted the ICJ in the Gulf of Maine case to 
observe as follows; 
"While the convention was not in force and a number of states have 
not ratified [it] cannot detract from the consensus reached upon large 
portions and [it] cannot invalidate the observation that certain 
provisions .... were adopted without any objection~ .. its provisions 
may be regarded as consonant with general international law on the 
question. "91 
Within three years, the ICJ held again that the "the EEZ is shown by the practice of 
States to have become a part of customary international law. "92 It emerged after the 
rejection of the various proposals put forward by the Latin American states, 
including the concept of the patrimonial sea. It may therefore be argued that the 
Exclusive Economic Zone Act enacted by the Nigerian legislature was not enacted 
to give effect to any Treaty but to give effect to a notion which was emerging in 
international law. 
As far as paragraph (5) is concerned, it is not completely true that the 1982 
UNCLOS now supersedes all the provisions of 1958 Geneva Convention relating to 
the sea. The sense in which the Supreme Court dealt with this issue is suggestive 
that the 1958 Convention had been repealed. It will be recalled that while the 
Channel Continental Shelf case was going on, France made similar argument that 
all the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea had been rendered obsolete, 
because according to it, the consensus reached at the third UN Conference on the 
Law of the Sea indicated an emergence of a new law of the sea, where the rights 
and duties of coastal States had been clearly agreed. The Court of Arbitration 
though did not pronounce directly on the issue, it however stated that there is no 
basis for the obsolescence of the Geneva Conventions.93 The Convention is thus 
not repealed as been portrayed the truth is that, to the States that have ratified the 
91 (1984) ICJ Reports, p. 249. 
92 Continental Shelf case (Libya vs. Malta) (1985) ICJ Reports, p. 13. 
93 (1979) 18, ILM, paragraphs 44, 45, and 46 of p. 387; O'Connell (supra )at p. 570 
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1982 UNCLOS, it supersedes the earlier convention for those States.94 However, to 
States that ratified only the 1958 Geneva Convention, but have not yet ratified or 
are not yet party to the 1982 UNCLOS, the provisions of 1958 Geneva Conventions 
continue to operate in those States. 95 Thus, States such as the United States of 
America, Libya, Venezuela, Peru, Israel and Turkey for one reason or another have 
not yet ratified the 1982 UNCLOS, to them therefore, especially those that have 
ratified the 1958 Geneva Convention, that convention continues to operate for them. 
1.3 Other serious errors in the case , 
The Supreme Court quoted extensively from a portion of the judgment in R vs. 
Keyn case, which is to the effect that: 
"The consensus of civilised independent states has recognised a 
maritime extension of frontier to the distance of three miles from 
low-water mark, because such a frontier or belt of water is necessary 
for the defence and security of adjacent state. It is for the attainment 
of these particular objects that dominium has been granted over this 
portion of the high seas ... "96 
In order to demonstrate that the coastal State does not possess the same 
rights it possesses over its land territory over the TS, the court proposes the 
following tests: 
( 1) That a State has the right to refuse entry or passage of foreigners over its 
territory by land, whether in time of peace or war but in the court's view, the 
State does not appear to have similar rights with respect to preventing the 
passage of foreign ships over this portion of the high seas. That is, in the TS 
there is no jus transitus but in the land territory there is. Based on this 
passage, the Supreme Court in the Nigerian case under reference concluded 
that: 
94 Article 311 (1), UNCLOS 
95 Ibid, paragraph 5. The comments above are made on the basis of the implication of the provision 
of this paragraph. 
96 Supra, pp. 81 - 82 
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"What the federation has over the territorial waters 
and airspace is the power to exercise sovereignty 
over the territorial waters and airspace and not that 
territorial sea constitutes extension of the boundary 
of Nigeria or indeed the littoral states." 97 
(2) Furthermore, in its attempt to demonstrate that Nigeria does not have full 
sovereignty over the TS, the air space above it and the sub soil beneath, the court 
made reference to the provisions of some Nigerian Statutes such as the Sea 
Fisheries Act, the Exclusive Economic Zone Act and particularly the Territorial 
Waters Act. According to the court, the Territorial Waters Act is for example 
concerned, inter alia with matters of jurisdiction in respect of offences committed 
in the territorial waters and restriction on Nigerian courts from trying persons other 
than Nigerian citizens for offences committed in territorial waters. Three issues can 
be identified from the statement of the court above: 
(a)That Nigeria does not possess full sovereignty over the TS. 
(b) That it is only the right of jurisdiction that Nigeria possesses over 
the TS and that the right of jurisdiction in question does not even 
extend to offences committed by foreigners in the TS of Nigeria. In 
other words, that the jurisdiction of the Nigerian courts does not 
extend or cover offences committed by foreigners over the TS of 
Nigeria. That is, the Nigerian courts could try only offences 
committed by Nigerians on the TS. 
(c) That the TS does not form part of either national territory or part 
of the territory of the FCU and that Nigeria does not have the right to 
prevent or restrict right of innocent passage. 
It is humbly submitted that the aspect of the court's judgment above is a legally 
impossible conclusion as far as the nature of TS is concerned. It follows therefore, 
that the Nigerian laws cited merely demonstrate the shortcomings of those laws and 
97 Supra, per Uwais C.J.N., p. 731 (emphasis added). 
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the need for their amendment to take cognisance of the current position of 
international law on the matter. The court's tests as seen above and the issues they 
have raised will be categorised as follows for criticism. 
2. Evidence of TS forming part of land territory of adjoining State 
This may be classified into statutory, opinion juris and judicial evidence. 
2.1 Statutory evidence 
It may be true for instance, that the sovereignty of coastal States over the TS is 
limited as noted by the court above, but this alone cannot be interpreted to mean 
that the TS does not form part of the land territory of the adjoining State or that the 
adjoining State does not possess full sovereignty over it. It is a recognised rule 
under the current principles of general international law as provided by Article (2) 
( 1) of UNCLOS, that the sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its land 
territory and internal waters to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the TS. This 
sovereignty according to that article extends to the airspace, the seabed and subsoil 
of the TS and must be exercised subject to UNCLOS and to other rules of 
internationallaw.98 Thus, the TS has been severally described as forming part of the 
territory, which it adjoins, thereby extending the territorial sovereignty of the 
adjacent State over land to that area of the sea.99 Therefore the Supreme Court by its 
conclusion above must be taken not to appreciate properly the current nature of 
governmental power and control that international law has conferred or bestowed 
on coastal States over the TS, the airspace above, the seabed and subsoil underneath 
it. 
2.2 Opinio juris evidence 
For example, before this position was incorporated in International Conventions, 
there existed numerous authorities most of which affirmed the inseparability of TS 
from the adjacent land territory. For instance, Welwood writing as far back as the 
98 Article 2(3) UNCLOS 
99 Article 2 ( 1 ), UNCLOS 
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year 1616 had stated that coastal waters must have the same owner as the adjacent 
land, and because such waters are so closely linked to and so incorporated into the 
land, such dominium of the adjacent land cannot be diminished by lease or 
alienation. The question of inalienability by coastal State of its TS has been 
disputed by early writers such as Bynkershoek, who was of the opinion that a 
coastal State could dispose of its TS without necessarily disposing of the land 
territory thereof. This view has however been described by Oppenheim!Lauterpacht 
in his treatise on international law where he held that, it is " ... evident that the 
territorial waters are as much inseparable appurtenances of the land as are the 
territorial subsoil and atmosphere" and that "only pieces of land together with the 
appurtenant territorial waters are alienable parts of territory."100 
Oppenheim's views have been further buttressed by the writings of Verzijl, who 
has expressed the view that not only is a state precluded from either reducing its 
breadth of TS or renouncing it entirely, at international law, but also that it is 
juridically impossible for a State to transfer part of its TS to another State without 
any accompanying land territory. 101 In other words, Verzijl takes this view in his 
realisation that "as a general rule" the territorial sea has no independent existence as 
an element of the national territory, severed from the coast which it borders."102 
In a recent article, Professor Anyangwe while referring to territorial regime stated; 
"concerning the former regime (territorial regime), all the land area of the world, 
together with the contiguous territorial sea, have been appropriated by sovereign 
States."103 By so stating, the learned Professor's statement must be taken also to 
imply or is an acknowledgment that the TS already forms part of the territory of the 
state it is contiguous to. 
100 Lauterpacht, M., Oppenheim's International Law, vol. I, (8th edition), Longmans, Green and Co., 
London and New York, (1955), p.463 et. Seq., 488 
101 Verzijl, J.H.W., International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. iii, A.W., Sijthoff Leyden, 
.( 1970), p.54, 55 
102 Ibid, at p. 55. 
103 Anyangwe, C., "African Border Disputes and their settlement by International Judicial Process," 
vol. 28, (2003) SAYIL p 29(emphasis added). 
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2.3 Judicial evidence 
Verzijl's view above is consistent with the decision in the Grisbadama Arbitration 
case, which is concerned with the determination of maritime limits between 
Norway and Sweden, Beagle Channel case104 and in the dissenting opinion of Lord 
McNair in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case. 
For example, in the Grisbadama case, the Permanent Court of Arbitration stated 
that it was: 
"In accordance with the fundamental principles of the law of 
nations, both old and new," that when territory was ceded to 
Sweden: "the radius of maritime territory constituting an 
inseparable appurtenance of this land territory must 
automatically formed part of this cession."105 
Similarly in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, Lord Arnold McNair re-
emphasized the point further by stating that: 
"To every state whose land territory is at any place washed by the 
sea, international law attaches a corresponding portion of maritime 
territory consisting of what the law calls territorial 
waters ... International law does not say to a state: 'You are entitled to 
claim territorial waters if you want them.' No maritime state can 
refuse them ... The possession of this territory is not optional. .. but 
compulsory." 106 
Is there any doctrinal reason why a coastal State cannot lease in perpetuity a body 
of water appurtenant to the land territory without the land territory being similarly 
leased? There seems to be no strict doctrinal reason why a coastal State cannot lease 
its TS in perpetuity, without necessarily leasing the adjoining land territory. The 
doctrinal reasons of "appurtenance" and of the "natural extension" of land territory 
into the sea, which have been offered as reasons why the TS cannot be leased suo 
104 HMSO, 1977; 52 ILR, p. 93. 
105 (1909), Hague Reports, p. 121 at 127 
106 (1951), ICJ Reports, p.116 at p. 160 (emphasis added). 
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moto without the adjacent land areas being also leased can be countered in view of a 
lease in perpetuity contained in the Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal 
(Hay- Bunau- Varilla Treaty) of November 18, 1903.107 Under Article II of the 
Treaty, Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation and 
control of a zone of land and land under water for the construction, maintenance, 
operation, sanitation and protection of said Canal of the width of ten miles 
extending to the distance of five miles on each side of the centre line of the route of 
the Canal to be constructed. However the proviso to this article is that the cities of 
Panama and Colon and the harbours adjacent to the said cities, which are included 
within the boundaries of the zone described in Article II, shall not be included 
within this grant. Article III on the other hand states inter alia that .... the United 
States would possess the areas granted as if it were the sovereign of the territory 
within which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the 
exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights or authority. 108 
The exclusion of the cities of Panama and Colon including the harbours thereof, 
clearly indicates that it is possible to lease TS in perpetuity without necessarily 
leasing the adjoining land territory. In Petroleum Development Ltd vs. Sheikh of 
Abu Dhabi, 109 we also see the possibility of a transfer of imperium over the TS, 
without a corresponding transfer of the dominium thereof. 
Contrary to the views of the Supreme Court of Nigeria that the TS is not an 
extension of the boundary of Nigeria, the court in Australia had an occasion to 
express a view on the matter. This was in the case of Silverdick vs. Aston, which has 
to do with the validity of the Commonwealth war precautions Act and Regulations. 
One of the grounds taken was that the Act was protanto invalid as being beyond the 
constitutional power of defence, the contention being that the power of defence did 
not extend beyond the limits of Australia. Isaac J (as he then was) dealt with the 
contention as follows: 
107 http://www. yale.edu/lawweb/avalonldiplomacy/panama/panOO l.htm 
108 Ibid. 
109 Supra, CF North Coast Atlantic Fisheries case (Britain vs. US) (1910) 4, AJIL 
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"As to the Act itself, the objection has no merit. It is absurd to limit 
the effectual defence of Australia or any country to operations on its 
own territory. Imagine the Navy confined to the three mile limit."110 
The learned Judge in so expressing himself clearly intended to convey that the 
waters within the three-mile limit were part of the territory of Australia. 
If the above examples do not emphasise the principle of inseparability enough, 
perhaps the question of the status of territorial waters off the coasts of Northern 
Ireland, which had engaged the attention of the Resident Magistrate court in 
Cushendall, Northern Ireland and later the court of Appeal would. This was initially 
in the case between Weaver vs. McNeill, 111 however the name of the case changed 
at the appeal court because of the intervention of the Director of Public Prosecution. 
The case is now known as D.P.P. of Northern Ireland vs. McNeill. 112 That case 
involved a complaint preferred against the defendants by the Chief Inspector of the 
Fisheries Conservancy Board for Northern Ireland. The charge was brought 
pursuant to section 99 (1) (a) and (b) of Fishery Act (Northern Ireland) 1966, which 
provides as follows: 
( 1) During the weekly close time; 
(a) The netting of the leader of every bag net used for catching 
salmon shall be raised and kept out the water; and 
(b) All other nets used as fixed engines for the taking of salmon or 
trout shall be wholly removed from the water. 
It was alleged that the defendants in July 1973 failed to comply with the provisions 
above. 
At the Resident Magistrate court, the trial magistrate declined jurisdiction to try the 
case on the ground inter alia that the Fisheries Act under which the complaint was 
110 (1918) 25 C.L.R. p. 506 at 517 
111 Unreported; judgment delivered on 27th June 1974. The case is fully discussed in the Article of 
Symmons C.R., 'Who Owns the territorial Waters of Northern Ireland? Vol. 27, no. l, Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly, p. 48- 66 
112 Unreported; Judgment delivered by the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal (1975). See also 
C.R.Symmons (Ibid). 
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brought is "ultra vires the power of Northern Ireland Parliament and that on the 
basis of section 1 (2) of Government of Ireland Act, 1920 which defined "Northern 
Ireland" in terms of parliamentary or electoral areas of the six counties: 
"The parliament of Northern Ireland had· not power to make laws 
except on matters exclusively relating to the portion of Ireland 
within its jurisdiction or some part thereof," and that "[a] 
parliamentary boundaries end at high water mark, the jurisdiction of 
this parliament could not extend to sea and tidal waters."113 
In other words, the Magistrate purported that the TS is not part of the territory of 
Northern Ireland. The case went on appeal on a case stated to the Court of Appeal 
of Northern Ireland and the ruling of the Resident Magistrate Court was set aside on 
the basis inter alia of inseparability principle and the principle that a statute of the 
parliament of the United Kingdom is not capable of challenge in a domestic court in 
the United Kingdom. 114 The territorial waters surrounding Northern Ireland was 
therefore adjudged to be part and parcel of it. 
3. Evidence of Exercise of criminal jurisdiction over offences committed by 
foreigners on the TS 
There are statutory and judicial practices in support of criminal jurisdiction by 
coastal States over offences committed within the TS by foreigners. 
3.1 Statutory provisions in support of exercise of criminal jurisdiction in the TS 
Contrary to the judgment in Abia case and notwithstanding the obvious limitations 
on sovereignty over the TS, international law provides circumstances under which a 
coastal State may exercise its criminal jurisdiction over offences committed by 
foreigners on the TS. These circumstances include those provided under Articles 19 
(2), 20, 21, 25 and 27(1) & (2) of UNCLOS. Article 19 (2) for instance, listed the 
activities considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of a 
113 Ibid 
114 See, Mortensen vs. Peters (1906) 8 Fraser 93 (J); Croft vs. Dunphy (1933) A.C.l56 and I.R.C. vs. 
Coli co Dealings Ltd. ( 1959) All E.R.351; (1962) A.C. I 
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coastal State. It grants the coastal State the power to prevent the passage by foreign 
vessels engaging in any of the activities mentioned in that paragraph within the TS. 
Similarly the more detailed definition of innocent passage contained in that article 
provides that passage is not innocent if the foreign ship concerned engages in wilful 
pollution or fishing or loads commodities or people contrary to the customs, fiscal 
and immigration or sanitary laws of the coastal State. 
On whether the courts in Nigeria have jurisdiction to try offences committed by 
foreigners within the TS, the Supreme Court in making such an assertion has failed 
to take cognisance of the provisions of Article 21 of UNCLOS, which gives coastal 
States the right to enact domestic laws dealing with safety of navigation, 
navigational aids, protection of cables and pipelines, conservation of the living 
resource and preservation of marine environment etc. Though the steps to enforce 
non compliance by foreign vessels with the provisions is not stated, but it would 
appear that after a coastal State has informed the offending vessel of its 
transgression and no compliance has been made after a request to do so has been 
issued by the coastal State, the coastal State can use reasonable force to ensure 
compliance by the offending vessel. 
Furthermore, the provisions of Articles 25 and 27(1) of UNCLOS give coastal 
States certain other rights over the TS, which the Nigerian Supreme Court in the 
above mentioned case did not consider. For instance article 25(1) gives a coastal 
State the right to take necessary steps within its TS to prevent passage which is not 
innocent. This according to paragraphs (2) and (3) may include taking necessary 
steps to prevent the breach of conditions of entry by ships proceeding to its internal 
water, including temporary suspension of innocent passage in specified areas of its 
TS without any discrimination among foreign ships. Article 27 on the other hand 
prohibits the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by coastal States for offences 
committed by foreigners on board foreign ships but the same article goes further in 
granting some exceptions to coastal States in paragraphs (a) to (d). In these 
193 
exceptional circumstances, a coastal State may exercise its criminal jurisdiction on 
board foreign ships if: 
(a) The consequences of the crime extend to the coastal state; 
(b) The crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of 
the territorial sea; 
(c) The assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the 
ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag state; or 
(d) Such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs or psychotropic substances. 
3.2 Judicial decisions in support of exercise of criminal jurisdiction in the 
TS 
There is evidence of arrests and conviction made on the basis of similar provisions 
as the above in Jamaica. This is Article 19 (1) (a- d) of the Geneva Convention on 
the Territorial Sea of 1958 and the case is R vs. Dankin and others. In that case a 
Jamaican Court of Appeal relying on the provisions of the above mentioned Geneva 
Convention upheld the conviction of Dankin, who with others were arrested on the 
Cayman Island right on the TS of Jamaica for possessing narcotic drugs on board 
their ships. Their argument that they were arrested in breach of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention, which according to them granted them the right of innocent passage 
did not hold sway as the court noted that there was evidence from which it could be 
inferred that the ships were engaged in illicit traffic in narcotics and were therefore 
covered by the exceptions to the principle of innocent passage provided by Article 
19( 1) (d) of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of 
1958 and the schedule 1 to the Jamaican Territorial Sea Act. 115 
There is also evidence to show that Nigeria has on several occasions exercised its 
criminal jurisdiction in apprehending and prosecuting foreign ships including their 
crew and Nigerian collaborators found to be engaging in illegal activities, such as 
bunkering, pollution, dealing with narcotics and other psychotropic substances, 
115 ILR vol. 73, p. 173 
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smuggling and poaching to mention just a few within the TS of Nigeria. Example of 
such arrests and prosecution include the arrests of 13 Russian sailors on board a 
ship- Mt African Pride, which later disappeared mysteriously from the custody of 
the Nigerian Navy and their subsequent arraignment on two counts charge of crude 
oil bunkering. 116 As this case is currently ongoing, the accused and their 
Government have never challenged the authority of the Nigerian Government for 
making the arrests or the jurisdiction of the court for trying the accused persons. 
The Russian Government through its embassy merely criticised the long detention 
without trial and bail. Bail has however been granted through the intervention of the 
Russian Government and the provision by it of the requisite bonds and assurance 
that the accused would always be available in court at subsequent adjourned dates. 
This in effect could be interpreted as recognition by both Russia and the accused of 
the sovereignty of Nigeria over the TS where the offence was committed, 
notwithstanding their being foreigners. 
Other arrests have equally been made and the three vessels involved- MtZoogu, 
Mt Tina and Mt Glory have been respectively impounded by the Nigerian Navy 
between April and August, 2003 and the foreign collaborators detained. 117 By the 
current trend on the so called war against terrorism, it would appear that Nigeria 
like any other coastal State could exercise its jurisdictional and sovereign powers to 
carry out arrest and prosecution of foreign ships and their crew members found 
engaging in acts of terrorism using the territorial waters of Nigeria as a launching 
pad. Such action wherever it is exercised would no doubt be covered by Article 27 
(b) of UNCLOS. 
Similarly, as the sovereignty of a coastal State is limited by the right of innocent 
passage in the TS, so also is its sovereignty limited over the internal waters. This is 
the case for instance where a coastal State has by virtue of Article 8 (2) of 
116 Federal Republic of Nigeria vs. Krasikov Alesey Zernakov Alexander and others, 
FHC/W228C/2004 
117 See the statement of the Commanding Officer, NNS, Delta in the Article by Amazie, E. and 
Omonobi, K., 'Oil Bunkering: Navy impounds 3 vessels', Vanguard Newspaper of 23, October, 
2004 in http://www. vanguardngr.cornlarticles/2002/nationalx/nr5231 02004.html 
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UNCLOS enclosed as internal waters by the drawing of straight baselines areas, 
which hitherto had not been considered as such; the right of innocent passage 
continues to exist notwithstanding that the area is now internal waters. It follows 
therefore, that the criminal and civil jurisdictions of the coastal State over foreign 
vessels and their crews are equally limited. However the coastal State just as in the 
ca~e of TS can exercise its criminal and civil jurisdictions over foreigners whose 
activities in this zone fall within the exceptions in Article 19 of UNCLOS. Thus the 
US Supreme Court in Wildenhus case held that a murder committed by one crew on 
another both of them being Belgians committed on board a Belgian steamship in 
dock in Jersey City ipso facto disturbed the public peace onshore and as a result the 
United States had jurisdiction.118 In Post Office vs. Estuary Radio Ltd, the English 
Court of Appeal exercised civil jurisdiction over a defendant who operated without 
a licence a wireless transmission station at a tower in the Thames estuary 
considered by the court as falling within the internal waters of the United 
Kingdom. 119 
With regards to submarines and other under water vehicles, article 20 of UNCLOS 
requires them to navigate on the surface and to show their flag. The question is 
whether UNCLOS by this provision prohibits submerged innocent passage? What 
happens for example if a submarine in exercising innocent passage across the TS of 
Nigeria fails to navigate on the surface? In the first instance, UNCLOS does not 
stricto sensu prohibit submerged innocent passage by submarines and other 
underwater vehicles in the TS, what it does is that it secures a regime for innocent 
passage. Thus if a submarine or other under water vehicles navigate submerged on 
the TS, they do not enjoy the right of innocent passage and as a result a coastal 
State may prohibit the passage, but this depends to a very large extent on the 
relationship between the coastal State and the flag State of the submarine or other 
under water vehicles. It also depends on whether such submarine or other 
underwater vehicles are naval submarine in which case immunity rights will avail 
118 20, us 1887 
119 (1967) P. No. 1216 
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them. Thus if a submarine decides to navigate submerged instead of on the surface 
of TS, the affected coastal State could take necessary measures to ensure immediate 
departure of the submarine, especially if the submarine has refused to heed the 
initial request made by the coastal State to it to leave its TS. 
4. Right of innocent passage as a limitation on exercise of full sovereignty over the 
TS 
Evidence abounds to demonstrate that contrary to the Supreme Court of Nigeria's 
decision in the case under review, the power of Nigeria over the TS like many other 
coastal States the world over, transcends mere jurisdictional power to that of 
sovereignty, limited only by the concept of innocent passage by foreign vessels. 
This limitation is an old practice of States, which only became codified in an 
international agreement in the 1958 Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone 120 and in the 1982 UNCLOS. 121 The limitation differentiates 
between sovereignty over the TS and sovereignty over the land territory, but this 
does not in any way derogate or erode the sovereign power of a coastal State. 
In arriving at the decision in Abia case, the Supreme Court relied heavily on 
statement in R vs. Keyn, which is to the effect that the right of innocent passage 
prevented coastal States from exercising full sovereignty over the TS. Regrettably 
however, this argument cannot be supported in all its ramifications. This is so 
because the land territory and the marginal sea or internal waters as the case may be 
where the sovereignty of a coastal state is incontrovertible, one way or another, are 
subject to other rights and one cannot as a result conclude that they no longer 
constitute land territory or internal waters of the adjacent state or that the state no 
longer possesses sovereignty over it. 
As a general rule, the regime of internal waters of a state is not subject to the right 
of innocent passage, except in situations provided for under Article 5 (2) of the 
120 Article 14 ( l) of Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea, 195 8 
121 Article 17, UNCLOS 
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Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea and Article 8 (2) of UNCLOS, where as a 
consequence of straight baselines delimitation, a State had enclosed within its 
internal waters areas, which hitherto was considered as forming part of the TS or 
high seas. In such a case, the right of innocent passage will continue to apply. 
Similarly, Statute on the International Regime of Maritime Ports of 1923 gives 
States, which are parties to it reciprocal rights of entry into the ports of the others 
even though the ports are located within the internal waters of the States. 122 These 
rights can equally be conferred by means of treaty relations as was the case between 
Japan and the United Kingdom in 1962, by which the vessels of their respective 
States have freedom of access to the ports, waters and places open to international 
commerce and navigation of the other. 123 
Among the member States of the European Union124 and the ECOWAS States for 
example, there is freedom of entry by the citizens of the member States to the land 
territory of another member State without a visa; this freedom has been secured in 
both cases by the agreement of member States, just as the right of innocent passage 
of foreign ships over the TS, which has existed as customary law right long before 
its codification in the Geneva Conventions and in UNCLOS. In both cases, the 
freedom of entry granted cannot in any way be interpreted to mean derogation by 
the affected States of their sovereignty over their land territories. 
There is also a right of passage known as 'exceptional rights of innocent passage'; 
this could be exercised within the internal waters of States by foreign vessels even 
though right of innocent passage does not legally exist in the internal waters of a 
State. Thus, a foreign ship in distress or where there exists force majeure could stop 
or anchor and could also enter into the nearest port even though the port is located 
within the internal waters of another State. This also extends to ships rendering 
122 Soresen, M., "Law of the Sea (International Conciliation," No. 520)," (1958), Michigan Law 
Review, p.235 
123 Brown, E.D., The International Law of the Sea, vol. I, Introductory Manual Dartmouth, England, 
(1994) p.39 
124 Articles 14(2), 61 (a) and 62 (1) (2), Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community in Nigel F., Blackstone's EC Legislation, 2002-2003, 13th Edition. 
198 
assistance and may also avail warships on similar situation. The exposition of this 
principle is contained in article 18 (2) of UNCLOS and in the decision of the Court 
in Hoff (the Rebecca case), where it is stated: 
.. Assuredly a ship floundering in distress, resulting either from the 
weather or from other causes affecting management of the vessel need 
not be in such a condition that it dashed helplessly on the shore or 
against rocks before a claim of distress can properly be invoked in its 
behalf ..... 125 
The right of innocent passage of foreign ships including ships in distress is an 
exception to the fundamental principle, which would be restrictively interpreted in 
case of doubt but they are never rights, which completely or in any way divest a 
State of the sovereignty she possesses over the TS. They are rights secured by 
agreement of States and merely demonstrate the fact that sovereignty in any given 
territory is not absolute, its exercise can be limited either by agreement of parties 
and the rules of international law, be it customary or conventional. This much was 
recognized by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the S.S. Wimbledon 
case as follows: 
"The court declined to see in the conclusion of any Treaty by which a state 
undertakes to perform or refrains from performing a particular act an 
abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any convention creating an 
obligation of this kind places a restriction upon the exercise of the sovereign 
rights of the state, in the sense that it requires them to be exercised in a 
certain way. But the right of entering into international engagements is an 
attribute of state sovereignty."126 
Equally true is the right of innocent passage through historic bays considered to be 
internal waters of the state it adjoins, thus the court in Land, Island and Maritime 
Frontier dispute after recalling that, " ... general international law does not provide 
for a single 'regime' for 'historic waters,' or 'historic bays,' but only for a particular 
125 (1929), 4 R.I.A.A. p. 444 at 447 
126 (1923) P.C.I.J. at p.42 
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regime for each of the concrete recognized cases of 'historic waters,' or 'historic 
bays,' 127 the court examined the peculiar situation of the Gulf of Fonseca, ' ... which 
is a pluri- state bay and is also an 'historic bay."128 In endorsing the opinion of the 
Central American Court of Justice that a right of innocent passage existed in the 
internal waters of the historic bay held in co- ownership by the three riparian States, 
the court reaffirmed that. .. rights of innocent passage are not inconsistent with a 
regime of historic waters. 129 
Further to the above, article 125 of UNCLOS gives to the land-locked States the 
right of transit passage through either the land territory or internal waters of another 
State for the purpose of having access or exercising the right of freedom of the high 
seas and common heritage of the mankind. This right the article says the land-
locked States can exercise through all means of transport but according to 
paragraph (2) of article 125 before such right of access could be exercised, the 
terms and modalities for its exercise must first and foremost be agreed between the 
land-locked State and the transit State. It is however doubtful if the land-locked 
States can exercise the right of over flight over the land territory, the internal and 
territorial waters of the transit State except with prior agreement or authorization, 
because by virtue of Article 1 of the Chicago Convention of 1944, the sovereignty 
of the coastal States covers the airspace above the areas, hence there is no right of 
over flight by foreign aircrafts over both internal waters and the TS except by prior 
authorization. The position is the same in the case of a strait, which was formerly 
part of the high seas, but which has been converted from its high seas status to 
internal or archipelagic waters by reason of bay closing or the drawing of straight or 
archipelagic baselines. The exercise of right of innocent passage over the TS or the 
mere fact that the ownership thereof is subject to the public right of usage by the 
citizens of a country does not preclude a State from possessing sovereignty over it. 
Above all, these rights according to article 25 (3) of UNCLOS can be temporarily 
127 (1992) ICJ Reports, p. 351 at 589 quoting from (1982) ICJ Reports, p. 74. 
128 Ibid, at 593 
129 Ibid. 
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suspended where the security of a coastal State demands a temporary suspension of 
innocent passage. This informs the various suspensions made in certain specified 
areas of the TS by Mexico, between 27 December, 2004 and 15 August, 2006. 130 
5. Nigeria exercising jurisdiction in the high seas 
Further to the above discussions, it is erroneous for the Supreme Court in the 
Nigerian case above to have included High Seas in the list of maritime zones over 
which Nigeria could exercise jurisdiction and sovereign rights. The inclusion of 
high seas as noted above portends a uniform treatment with the EEZ and the CS, 
whereas, the only jurisdictional rights Nigeria can exercise on the high seas are on 
the ships flying Nigerian flag. 131 Furthermore, Nigeria can by virtue of article 99 of 
UNCLOS exercise jurisdiction over a ship flying its flag, which is found 
transporting slaves. It can also by virtue of article 98 exercise jurisdiction over the 
ships flying its flag, which have been required to assist in an emergency. With 
respect to the offence of piracy, which is an offence that can only be committed on 
the high seas, 132 Article 100 of UNCLOS requires all States to cooperate to the 
fullest possible extent in the repression of it on the high seas or in any other place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State. By virtue of this provision therefore, Nigeria 
can exercise jurisdiction over a pirate ship on the high seas or outside its usual 
jurisdiction. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 221 of UNCLOS, Nigeria after a 
due consideration to international law, both conventional and customary may 
undertake enforcement measures against vessels, including vessels flying other 
States flags beyond its TS, which are proportionate to the actual or threatened 
damage to protect its coastline or related interests, including fishing, pollution or 
the threat thereof etc. 
Furthermore, by virtue of Article 17 paragraph (2), (3) and (4) of the UN 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
1988, Nigeria may exercise jurisdiction on vessels flying its flag, which is involved 
130 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/inocent_passages_suspension.htm 
131 Article 94, UNCLOS 
132 Ibid, Article 101 
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in drug trafficking or it may in the case of a vessel not displaying a flag or marks of 
registry but which is engaged in illicit traffic in drugs request assistance of other 
parties in suppressing its use for that purpose. Similarly by virtue of paragraph (3) 
of the same article, Nigeria may after due notification and authorization take 
appropriate measures on a vessel exercising freedom of navigation in accordance 
with international law, and flying the flag or displaying the marks of registry of 
another party, which is found trafficking in drugs and other psychotropic substances. 
Thus paragraph ( 4) of article 17 provides: In accordance with paragraph 3 or in 
accordance with treaties in force between . them or in accordance with any 
agreement or arrangement otherwise reached between those parties, the flag State 
may authorize the requesting State to inter alia: 
(c) Board the vessel; 
(d) Search the vessel; 
(e) If evidence of involvement in illicit traffic is found, take 
appropriate action with respect to the vessel, persons and cargo 
on board. 
5.1 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
Under this initiative, announced by the US President, George Bush on the 31st of 
May, 2003, participants may stop shipments of Weapons of Mass Des~uction 
(WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The goal of the 
scheme is to "create a more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach to prevent 
proliferation to or from nation States and non-state actors of proliferation concern. 
The method to achieve the goal without infringing international law which 
guarantees freedom of the high seas and of the air space above it has been stated to 
include, "inventive use of national laws, rather than an attempt to re-write existing 
international law, which prohibits stopping vessels on the high seas or grounding 
aircraft in international space." The scheme which began by initial eleven (11) 
members now has about sixty (60) States as members. 
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Under the scheme participating States and subsequently supporting States have 
committed themselves to interdicting within their airspace, internal waters, TS and 
contiguous zone ships reasonably suspected to be carrying WMD and related 
materials, especially when such shipments are meant for certain States or terrorist 
groups by the application of their national laws. 
A point of departure from the original idea of the scheme, which limited the scope 
of operation of PSI within the internal waters, TS and the contiguous zone of the 
participating States was reached when the then US under Secretary of State, John 
Bolton stated at the conclusion of the coalition's first meeting in Madrid that "there 
is broad agreement within the group that we have [the] authority to begin 
interdictions on the high seas and in international airspace." 133 The statement stirred 
controversy among the participants but in essence it clearly indicates the US 
position that PSI was not going to be restricted only to the zones mentioned above. 
The US has justified the above position on the following grounds: 
(a) When ships do not display a nation's flag, that such ships effectively 
become pirate ships that can be seized; 
(b) When the ships use a "flag of convenience" and the nation chosen gives 
United States or its allies permission, the ship can be stopped and searched; 
(c) That there is a general right of self defence given a serious belief that the 
vessels carry WMD material. 
(d) The position is equally justified based on the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540, which was unanimously adopted by the Security Council 
and which calls on States to take cooperative action to prevent trafficking in 
WMD. The PSI is seen as one of such cooperative actions authorised by the 
above mentioned Resolution. 
Items (a) and (b) above could be reasonably argued to be consistent with 
international law, except that in item (a) there must be the initial demand that the 
ship display and show its flag before any action could be taken. A look at Article 
133 Weiner, R., "Proliferation Security Initiative to Stem Flow of WMD Materiel" (2003) in 
http://cns .miis.edulpubs/week/030716.htm. 
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91(1) of UNCLOS for instance reveals that ships have the nationality of the States 
whose flag they fly. Article 92 on the other hand forbids ships from flying more 
than one flags save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international 
treaties or in UNCLOS and a ship may not change flags according to convenience. 
Therefore where a ship sails under the flags of two or more States and using them 
according to convenience, such a ship according to Article 92(2) may be assimilated 
to a ship without nationality and as such under PSI may be interdicted if it is 
suspected of carrying WMD. 
The justification here for ships may not be applicable to aircraft in the international 
airspace. There is also justification for item (d) referred to above in virtue of 
Articles 7, which recognises situations whereby some States may require assistance 
of other States in carrying out obligations under the resolution and articles 9 and 10, 
which call upon States to dialogue and cooperate on non proliferation, PSI may 
therefore be seen as a kind of such cooperation. It should also be borne in mind that 
the UN Security Resolution referred to has been passed pursuant to Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter indicating that it is a binding resolution. What may be difficult to 
justify in the circumstance is whether mere carriage of WMD by vessels or aircraft 
gives the right of self defence as claimed in (c) above in view of the multilateral 
consent. 
Presently too, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) is considering a 
review of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation, the PSI participating States and those that support it may 
seize the opportunity of the review to press for inclusion in the review clause(s), 
which authorises States to interdict vessels or aircraft reasonably susp~cted to be 
carrying WMD or other related materials in any part of the seas including in the 
airspace. This being the case Nigeria like any other State would be entitled to 
interdict any vessel or aircraft reasonably su~pected of carrying WMD or related 
material (including Government vessels, which ordinarily enjoy immunity from 
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such actions) 134 in any part of the sea once the circumstances warranting such 
stopping, boarding or arrest fall within a-d above. 
It may be argued therefore, that while it may be true that Nigeria like any other 
coastal State may exercise certain limited jurisdictions in the high seas, the 
circumstances of its exercising sovereign rights in the same zone remains to be seen. 
6. Other flaws in the case 
The case is further beset by certain fundamental shortcomings like the total absence 
of any maritime chart for the guidance of the court in the determination of the case. 
Similarly, Nigeria has not formally claimed any straight baselines; this makes the 
measurement of all other maritime zones to begin from the low-water mark. 
However, the precise location of the low-water line of Nigeria is uncertain due to 
the poor mapping of the coastline and its swampy and unstable nature, coupled with 
the ever present sand bars. More importantly, adoption of the low-water mark is not 
normally dependent upon court pronouncement, but on hydrographical conditions, 
which takes a tidal cycle of 18 Yz years to calculate. It is after the average range has 
been measured that points of low-water mark are marked on charts officially 
recognised by the coastal State. It is therefore not clear upon what geographical 
coordinates or hydrographical parameters or criteria and conditions the court had 
relied in concluding that the boundary of the FCU and consequently the boundary 
of Nigeria ends at low-water mark without any maritime chart, which would have 
been a product of calculated hydrographical conditions. It would seem from the 
provisions of Article 5 of UNCLOS that the existence of the low-water mark is 
contingent upon publication of large-scale charts officially recognised by a coastal 
State. The court's decision on this point has implications and raises the following 
questions: 
134 Articles 95 and 96 UNCLOS 
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(1) Was the court at the time of drawing up the decision relying on 
the practice of States of adopting the low-water mark as opposed to 
the high-water mark, or the mean between the two tides? 
(2) Or was it simply following the decision in R vs. Keyn case? 
(3) Could it be argued that the Article 5 obligation applies only to 
other States demanding Nigeria to produce a proper map, charts etc? 
(4) Can the Court simply stop at the point of low-water mark leaving 
the precise determination to cartographers? 
Obviously, the court could not be said to be following the practice of States on this 
issue. This is so because the practice of States in question admits to a number of 
exceptions as seen in the Anglo- Norwegian Fisheries case (U.K. vs. Norway) 135 
and also under the provisions of both the Geneva136 and UNCLOS, 137 from which 
Nigeria by the nature of its coastline may stand to benefit. Example of such 
conditions includes the presence of fringing islands on some parts of the coastline 
and the presence of a major delta, which makes that segment of Nigeria's coastline 
to be highly unstable and which entitles Nigeria to adopt a straight baselines system 
in delimiting that segment of the coastline where the conditions are present. 138 Even 
then, the adoption of a straight baselines system under the conditions described 
above would still need the low-water mark. However, wherever the straight 
baselines system has or could be drawn along the coastline, it cannot be said again 
that the territory of that State ends at the low-water mark, because at that time the 
water on the landward side of the straight baselines would have become internal 
waters of Nigeria. In the summary of maritime survey carried out by Martin Pratt 
and Clive Schofield it is emphasised that Nigeria is entitled, judging from the nature 
135Supra note 382, at p. 116 
136 Article 4 (l) 
137 Articles 5 and 7 (1), (2) 
138 Article 7 of UNCLOS enumerates the conditions a coastline should satisfy before straight 
baseline system could be adopted by a coastal State. 
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of its coastline to "delimit straight baselines in some of these areas but to date 
Nigeria has not done so." 139 The nature of the coastal areas of Nigeria above is 
depicted clearly in the map below. 
Figure Three: A Map showing the nature of the Niger Delta coast 
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The court without first considering these conditions and their limitations followed 
the decision in R vs. Keyn. Adoption of the low-water mark as a country' s baselines 
system does not depend per se on court pronouncements for its existence, but on the 
nature, geography and the configuration of the coastline of a state. Furthermore, the 
decision by a country to adopt a particular baselines system is an executive decision 
and not that of the judiciary. The judiciary can only declare any such baselines 
139 Pratt, M. , Schofield, C., "Jane's Exclusive Economic Zone," 2"d Edition (2000 -2001 ), Jane's 
Information Group, p. 198 
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system adopted by a country as either being lawful because of its consistency with 
international law or unlawful for lack of consistency with it. It cannot recommend 
that the executive adopt one system over the other. By that decision, the court has 
adopted the low-water mark to be the country's baselines system, which is a clear 
usurpation by the apex court of the functions of the executive arm of the 
Government. By the nature and configuration of the country's coastline, particularly 
in the Niger Delta areas, straight as opposed to normal baselines system which low-
water mark epitomises would have been more appropriate as the starting point for 
the measurement of Nigeria's territorial and other maritime zones. Geographical 
configuration is one of the factors that informed the decision by ICJ in the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries case. 140 
The implication is that the position taken by the court would prejudice and limit the 
position, which Nigeria could take in its future conduct of foreign affairs. The 
judgment also has the capacity to limit and restrict the country's chances of 
adopting straight baselines in case of future maritime boundary delimitation 
between Nigeria and its neighbours. However, by not adopting a straight baseline 
system Nigeria stands to gain in one particular area and this is in not increasing 
areas that would fall to the FCU in case of any extension in the areas covered by 
revenue allocation to them. This attitUde is a replica of the practice in the United 
States of America, which has refused to adopt straight baselines to delimit its 
maritime zones despite the clear need for the same considering the nature of certain 
segments of its coastline, but has preferred to adopt normal baselines in order to 
limit the areas of the TS quitclaimed to States by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. 
With regards to question three it could be argued that the Article 5 obligation to 
indicate low-water line on large scale charts officially recognised by the coastal 
State is an obligation to all coastal States that have signed and ratified UNCLOS. 
What the Supreme Court should have done in the case was to have made its 
pronouncements on the limit of the maritime territory of Nigeria to be dependent 
140 Supra, n. 224 
208 
upon Nigeria's formal adoption of a particular baseline system and publication of 
the same in a maritime chart officially recognised by it or it could have simply 
stopped at the point of low-water mark leaving the precise determination to 
cartographers. 
A maritime chart is a source of information to mariners. It depicts features such as 
the location of lighthouses, low tide elevations, mouths of rivers, roadstead, bays 
and buoys thus providing information on the safety of navigation in the areas 
covered by the chart. Furthermore, it depicts the depth of particular areas of the sea 
and any inherent dangers to shipping. It equally depicts the entire maritime space, 
the configuration and nature of the coastline both of which may enhance Nigeria's 
chances during delimitation between neighbours and the question of determination 
of the type of baseline it could adopt in case of delimitation. It is in the light of the 
above that Article 3 of Geneva Convention and Article 16( 1) and (2) of UNCLOS 
both require States to publish charts depicting their maritime areas and depositing a 
copy thereof with the Secretary General of the United Nations. The point must be 
made however that existence of the low-water mark may not depend solely on 
publication of any chart as held in the Australian case of Li Chia Hsing vs. 
Ranking, 141 but the necessity and significance of its publication by a State with 
unstable or deltaic coastline like Nigeria cannot in any way be ignored. 
7. To what extent can the Abia case be said to have finally resolved the title 
problems? 
The case, has failed to resolve the matter, first because the judgment itself has been 
based on foreign decisions from England such as, R vs. Keyn; 142 Canada such as, 
Reference Re Ownership of Off-shore Mineral Rights; 143 Australia such as, 
Submerged Lands Case (State of New South Wales and others vs. Commonwealth of 
Australia; 144 Bonser vs. La Macchia 145 and United States such as, United States vs. 
141 ILR, vol. 73, p. 173 
142 (1876) 2 Ex. D. 63 
143 65 Dominion Law Reports (2"d ed.) 353; (1967) D.L.R. 2027 
144 (1975) 50 Australian Law Journal Reports, 218 
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Louisiana. 146 There is nothing wrong for the Supreme Court to rely on foreign cases 
in order to determine judiciously the matter before it especially, where because of 
the novelty of the issues involved, there is no domestic precedent to guide the court 
in the proper determination of the case. In fact, it is almost impossible to determine 
a maritime case without having recourse to international law or foreign cases. What 
is wrong is the failure of the court to note that some of those cases are not on all 
fours with the Nigerian case and that some of them have simply been overruled by 
subsequent decisions of the court. The background of some of the cases both 
historically and constitutionally are different from what obtains in the Nigerian case 
and as a result could not serve as proper guide to the Supreme Court in determining 
the case. 
For example, in the case of R vs. Keyn, there are about four important reasons why 
that case cannot serve as a useful precedent to the Supreme Court of Nigeria in 
determining the ownership of the maritime space between the Federal Government 
and the FCU: 
The first is that, the dicta in that case which suggest that the territory of England 
ends at low-water mark were contrary to earlier authorities of (Benest vs Pipon; 147A. 
-G. vs. Chambers/48Gammell vs. Commissioner of Woods and Forests/49Gann vs. 
The Free Fishers of Whitstable/ 50 Duchess of Sutherland vs. Watson/ 51 ) and to 
later authorities (Lord Advocate vs. Trustees of the Clyde Navigation; 152 Lord 
Advocate vs. Wemyss; 153 Parker vs. Lord Advocate; 154 Lord Fitzhardinge vs. 
Purcell; 155 AG of Southern Nigeria vs. John Holt and Company (Liverpool) Ltd./56 
145 (1969) 122 C.L.R. 177 
146 332 US 19; 67 US Reporter 1658 
147 (1829) 1 Knapp. 60; 12 E.R. 243 
148 (1854) 4 De G. M. and G. 206; 43 E. R. 486 
149 (1859) 3 Macq. 419. 
150 (1865) 11 H. L. Cas. 192; 11 E. R. 1305 
151 (1868) 6 S.C. 199-
152 (1891) 19 S.C. 174 at 177 
153 (1900) A. c. 48 
154 (1904) A. C. 364 
155 (1908) 2 Ch. 139. 
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and Secretary of State for India in Council vs. Chelikani Rama Rao157). The list of 
later decisions included a decision on the same or very similar issue from Nigeria; it 
is therefore baffling to note that the Supreme Court could overlook such a decision 
in AG of Southern Nigeria vs. John Holt and Company in favour of an earlier 
decision which the later decision must be taken to have overruled. The reliance suo 
motu therefore by the Supreme Court of Nigeria on that case is tantamount to 
complete disregard of the overwhelming prec~dents on the matter. 
Secondly, Gibbs and Stephen JJ have identified another reason in the Submerged 
Lands Act Case (State of New South Wales and Others vs. the Commonwealth of 
Australia). In that case, the two judges observed that the decision was arrived at by 
a very narrow majority of 7 judges in support and 6 dissenting, an indication of how 
divided the court viewed the case and how controversial, inconsistent and unreliable 
the decision arising from it has been. 
Thirdly, the issue that fell squarely for determination in that case was not the issue 
of ownership of the seabed of the TS stricto sensu, but the extent of the criminal 
jurisdiction of the Admiralty court, which at common law did not extend beyond 
the low-water mark. Lord Shaw, who delivered the court's judgment in the case of 
Secretary of State for India vs. Chelikani Rama Rao, attested to this fact as follows: 
"It should not be forgotten that that case has reference on its 
merit solely to the point as to the limits of admiralty jurisdiction; 
nothing else fell to be decided there ... When, however, the 
actual question as to the dominion of the bed of the sea within a 
limited distance from our shores has been actually, the doubt 
just mentioned has not been supported, nor has the suggestion 
appeared to be helpful or sound."158 
156 (1915) A. c. 599. 
157 Supra, note 71 
158 Ibid, at p. 224 
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The fourth reason why the R vs. Keyn case cannot serve as a useful precedent in the 
determination of the seaward boundary of Nigeria and that of the FCU is that, 
immediately after that judgment, the Imperial Parliament, noting the erroneous 
impression created by that case enacted the Territorial Waters Act of 1878 to 
correct the erroneous impression. This Act, applied to Britain and by virtue of 
Section 7 thereof, it applied as well to her Colonies including Nigeria. 159 If 
therefore the argument was that the court of Admiralty in England did not have 
criminal jurisdiction prior toR vs. Keyn decision, that Act emphatically refuted the 
argument by stating that the criminal jurisdiction had always extended beyond the 
low-water mark. Thus, the jurisdiction of all English colonies where the 1878 Act 
applied by extension went beyond the low-water mark to at least the three-mile TS 
claimed by Britain and other maritime powers at that time. The enactment of that 
Act soon after the R vs. Keyn case was decided is indicative of the resentment with 
which the British Parliament viewed the decision and by that Act, it is reasonable to 
assume that the decision in R vs. Keyn case has been overtaken by it. It is also 
reasonable to assert that the power exercised by Her Majesty over the TS was not 
only jurisdictional power but it also included proprietary arid sovereign powers. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Nigeria relies on the case of Bonser vs. La 
Macchia, yet was not persuaded by the decision in that case, which inter alia is to 
the effect that the Australian states alone may legislate in respect of fisheries in the 
TS. 160 It is true that legislative competence is a matter distinct from the issue of 
ownership of the TS, the point is however that, the same Supreme Court which 
cited and relied on that case still went ahead to award both legislative competence 
and ownership of the TS to the Federal Government in complete disregard to the 
case it cited and relied upon. 
The United States and the Canadian cases cited and relied upon in the Nigerian case 
can be distinguished on the following grounds. In the first place, when the United 
159 Chapter 73, vol. 11, LFN (1958), p.399. The Territorial Waters Act, 1878 has now been repealed 
in Nigeria through the enactment of Territorial Waters Decree of 1967 
160 Supra, n. 234 
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States colonies became independent in 1776, the concept of TS was but a nebulous 
concept and even the CS was not yet in contemplation unlike in 1914 when the 
various colonies in Nigeria were amalgamated, a time when the concept had 
become widely accepted by the majority of maritime powers. Secondly, the concept 
of equal footing adopted by the American court in the decision is irrelevant to the 
Nigerian case. This is so because, the American Federation was established by 
agreement and the other colonies that later joined after the original states were 
admitted to the union on an equal footing basis; this is different from the 
amalgamation of the Nigerian colonies which was done without any agreement and 
it is doubtful if the concept of equal footing was ever applied to the colonies that 
were amalgamated. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the American cases ruled that the federal 
authority should have the ownership of the TS for it to protect the nation. This 
conclusion has drawn the criticisms of Gibbs J. in the Australian Submerged Lands 
Act Case (State of New South Wales and Ors vs. The Commonwealth of Australia) 
and Frankfurter J in United States vs. California, that the correctness of the 
argument is not self-evident because ownership is one thing and control and power 
is another: Ownership of the TS in a state would not hinder the control of that area 
by the Federal authority. Gibbs J continued by repeating the point made by 
Frankfurter J in the same case of United States vs. California that oil under the sea 
is no more vital to national security than uranium on land. The views of Gibbs and 
Frankfurter JJ as espoused above received a boost in the opinion of A.V. Lowe in 
his article, 161 and the criticisms of Gibbs and Frankfurter JJ became justified in 
United States by Congress' enactment of Submerged lands Act of 1953 and in 
Australia through the enactment of the Submerged Lands Act of 1967, which 
quitclaimed part of the TS to the states while still retaining the traditional and 
constitutional roles of the Federal Government in the areas granted. 
Furthermore, the reliance of that court on the Canadian case of Re Ownership of 
161 Gibbs J., "International Law and Federal Offshore lands Dispute", vol. 1, (1977), Marine Policy. 
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Offshore Mineral Rights and the Australian submerged Lands Act case (State of 
New South Wales and Others vs. the Commonwealth of Australia) cannot be 
substantiated nor could it be justified. Those cases accepted the decision in R vs. 
Keyn without deviation and to that extent cannot be relied on as an authority on the 
question of determination of the extent of the FCU' s seaward boundary or the 
territorial limit of Nigeria. This view is reinforced by the dictum of Lord Shaw who 
delivered their Lordships' judgment in Secretary of State for India vs. Chelikani 
Rama Rao. His Lordship's dictum in that case clearly indicates that the R vs. Keyn's 
case decided only the issue of the Admiral's jurisdiction and not the territorial limit 
of England as some have argued. 
To demonstrate convincingly that the dicta in R vs. Keyn 's case was only on point 
of admiralty jurisdiction simpliciter, their Lordships cited the cases of Fitzhardinge 
vs. Purcell; Lord Advocate vs. Clyde Navigation Trustees and Lord Advocate vs. 
Wemyss which all decided inter alia that the territory of the Crown extends and has 
always extended beyond the low-water mark to the limits of the three miles TS. 
With all the shortcomings of the case noted above, the question to be asked is: What 
are the implications of the judgment for Nigeria? 
V. Conclusions 
In this chapter attempts have been made to trace the genesis of the controversy 
between Nigeria and its federating coastal units over the ownership of the maritime 
territory and resources. The Federal Government on behalf of the Nigerian State has 
grounded its claim to title over the maritime territory on certain domestic laws and 
also on the provisions of UNCLOS. The domestic laws, it is discovered are 
unhelpful to the Government's claims, because of the various lacunae in the 
majority of them. Notwithstanding the identified lacunae, the Federal Government's 
title remains legally unaffected. This is because the title is protected by the 
provisions of UNCLOS, which Nigeria subscribes to and which largely governs 
maritime rights and duties of States. 
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The reasons adduced by the FCU were similarly examined. These are largely 
misconceived and contrary to international law, in that the majority of the reasons 
wrongly arrogate to the FCU the powers that UNCLOS grants to sovereign 
independent States. This notwithstanding, the argument is made that the FCU by 
reason of their having lived by and exercised some elements of control over a 
segment of the sea prior to colonisation and formation of the Nigeria State and by 
reason of the fact that they are most affected by incidents of oil and gas exploration 
and exploitation, may use that as argument to negotiate with the Federal 
Government, but there is no such basis with respect to the EEZ and the CS, which 
did not exist before colonisation and the formation of the Nigerian State. 
Furthermore, it is found out that the controversy is aggravated because of lack of 
informed knowledge of the principles of the law of the sea which led some eminent 
Nigerian writers and public figures to equate "State" as used by the Conventions 
with the coastal units in Nigeria, which are equally referred to as states. This lack of 
knowledge was equally exhibited by the Supreme Court, in its judgment in Abia 
case through the various errors noted. 
As reflected in chapter five, the harshness of the judgment has been considerably 
whittled down by the Dichotomy Act. The aspects that are not specifically covered 
by that Act, such as the decision that the territory of Nigeria ends at low-water mark 
and that it is only the power to exercise jurisdiction that Nigeria possess over the TS 
still remains a valid judgment of the Supreme Court, which binds all the courts 
below. For this and other reasons, the judgment of the court in that cas~ cannot be 
totally supported. 
215 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Developments within the Nigerian laws since the decision in Abia case 
I. Introduction 
The Abia case as noted in the preceding chapter has generated a great deal of 
controversy, some of which are legal and others political in nature. This chapter 
therefore undertakes to investigate and examine the legal developments that have 
arisen since the decision in that case. The chapter begins by the examination of the 
recently enacted Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy in the Application 
of the Principle of Derivation) Act (hereafter referred to as Dichotomy Act), which 
was enacted following recommendations by a commission set up by the Federal 
Government to study the judgment in Abia case. 
Thereafter, the chapter examines the case instituted in response to the enactment of 
the Dichotomy Act by the Governors of the 19 Northern states. 162 The extent to 
which that Act may be said to have helped in resolving the dispute and to which the 
19 Governors could go in sustaining the suit will be examined. Also investigated is 
the basis for the recent demands for resources control and the request for 
implementation of true federalism in Nigeria by the FCU. The various reasons 
adduced for the demands are examined to ascertain whether they are potent and 
cogent enough to be capable of divesting the Nigerian state of its title to the 
maritime territory and its resources conferred upon it by international law. 
Similarly explored is the international legal status of federating units of a federal 
State and wh~ther a return to the practice of what has been termed 'true federalism' 
by the advocates of the concept could be the basis of a positive right of title to 
maritime territory and resources in international law. 
Lastly, an in-depth examination of the calls by the FCU, particularly, the Niger 
Delta members of the FCU to self determination will be undertaken. This is with a 
162 19 Northern Governors and others vs. Federal Government of Nigeria and the Oil Producing 
states, Supreme Court No. 28/2004 
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view to determining whether a desire to wrest ownership and control of maritime 
territory and resources or the failure thereof were sufficient reasons for self-
determination in international law and even under the domestic laws of Nigeria. 
1. Onshore and off-shore dichotomy and its implications 
The first major development that the judgment in Abia case brought on Nigeria is 
that it polarises the Nigerian maritime territory into onshore and offshore areas for 
the purposes of revenue allocation. The onshore being the waters in the landward 
side of the low-water line, (internal waters) and the offshore being the waters 
seaward of the low-water line. This means that the resources derived from the on-
shore or internal waters and the land territory would be regarded as being derived 
within the territory of the FCU concerned and such FCU would be entitled to a 
share of thirteen percent of any revenue accruing from such resources. On the other 
hand, the resources derived from the offshore areas would be regarded as not being 
derived from the territory of any of the FCU, but derived from the Federal maritime 
territory and the revenue accruing from it belongs in totality to the Federal 
Government. That is, the thirteen percent share of the FCU would not extend to 
revenue derived from the offshore activities. 163 It is important to note that prior to 
the decision, no such dichotomy existed in the method of revenue sharing between 
the Federal Government and the FCU. The FCU received the thirteen percent from 
the revenue accruing to the country from resources mined from both the on shore · 
and the off shore areas of Nigeria's maritime space. 
The dichotomy as decided by the court would no doubt have resulted in huge 
financial losses to some of the FCU, like Akwa-lbom, Ondo, Bayelsa and Cross 
River, which possess little or no oil and gas in their onshore maritime areas, but 
only in the offshore areas which the judgment has now declared belong to the 
Federal Government. 164 A strict interpretation of the judgment and the report of the 
committee set up by the Federal Government to study the judgment and to advise it 
163 Report of the Committee on the Supreme Court judgment on the onshore and offshore suit, 
submitted on the 23rd of April, 2002, at p.4 
164 Vanguard Newspaper of 18111 February 2004, in http://www.vanguardngr.com 
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on its implications would have led to the federating units being asked to refund 
huge sums of money earlier collected individually by them from the revenue 
derived from the offshore areas to the coffers of the Federal Government. 165 A 
quick and humane intervention by the Federal Government, symbolised by the 
enactment of what is now popularly referred to as the Dichotomy Act has saved the 
FCU concerned from refunding any sums to the coffers of the Federal Government. 
2. The enactment and aftermath of Dichotomy Act 
The court's decision attracted almost unprecedented protests by the members of the 
Nigerian populace, most especially, by the members of the legal profession, the 
academia and the FCU, who have variously described the judgment as a mere 
politi.cal decision as opposed to a legal one. Therefore, instead of the judgment 
finally resolving the matter, it in fact escalated it. Sympathy and concern for the 
FCU over environmental degradation and pollution which oil exploration and 
exploitation activities have brought on their land led the Federal Government to set 
up a presidential committee charged with the responsibility of finding an amicable 
cum political solution to the uncertainty and hardship inflicted by the judgment on 
the FCU. Membership of this committee was drawn from among the major stake 
holders and after consultations with the Governors of the FCU to seek their views 
on the way forward for a political solution to the legal problem. 
The report of the committee called for immediate legislative intervention, which 
would abolish the dichotomy created by the judgment, thereby making resources 
found both from onshore and offshore as if the same were found within the territory 
of the FCU. It equally recommended as a long-term measure an amendment to the 
constitution to reflect the abolition of the dichotomy in the revenue sharing and the 
various lacunae contained in it, which the Supreme Court judgment has exposed. 
The main justification for recommending the abolition of the dichotomy in the 
application of derivative principle has been informed by the consideration that some 
165 See, "Supreme Court Ruling: How Does It Affect the States? In the 'This Day Newspaper of 
April 8, 2002. 
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compensation ought to be paid to the FCU for the adverse impact of oil exploration 
and exploitation activities on the environment as well as the economic activities of 
the FCU. 
In what may be termed partial response to the recommendations of the Presidential 
Committee, the Federal Government sent a Bill to the National Assembly which 
sought inter alia to define the extent of the seaward boundary from which the FCU 
could rightfully expect to benefit from the Federation Account on the basis of the 
13% Derivation Principle. The Bill defines this zone to be 200 meters water 
isobaths, which in effect coincides with the Country's 24 nm Contiguous Zone in 
the Niger Delta areas and less than that limit in places like Lagos and Ogun states. 
However, the National Assembly amended this provision by inserting in its stead a 
provision which defined the applicable zone for the purpose of derivation to the full 
extent of Nigeria's EEZ and CS; this in effect corresponds with the 
recommendation of the Presidential Committee. The National Assembly's 
amendment of the Bill led to the refusal by the President to assent the Bill. The 
President gave among other reasons for his refusal to append his signature to the 
Bill as amended to tum it to law as including the following: 
(1) That the Bill as amended equates the sovereignty of the (FCU) (in 
respect of revenue derivation) with that of the Federal Republic and this 
is to the disadvantage of other non oil producing federating units of the 
Republic. 
(2) Nigeria is technologically ill-equipped to undertake an accurate and 
scientific demarcation of its seaward boundaries extending to the 
Continental Shelf, which in some segments of the coast extends up to 
350 nm, let alone doing so among the FCU. 
(3) That even if it was capable of doing so, such an accurate demarcation 
would involve a probable encroachment on the equally legitimate 
claims 
conflict. 
of our maritime neighbours - a possible cause of armed 
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( 4) That a state (FCU) may cause war with a sovereign country on the basis 
of its interest in revenue derivable from the Continental Shelf. 
(5) A basic precondition for any claim to maritime sovereignty is that the 
claimant must be able not only to police, but effectively to defend the 
territory it claims. 
(6) Most of the offshore exploration of crude oil in which Nigeria is 
currently involved is carried on within 24 nautical miles of the country's 
shores. For reasons both of limited funding and the absence, as of today, 
of any technology capable of mining in such distances from the shore, 
the situation will remain unchanged for some time to come. Thus the 
littoral states (FCU) do not stand to gain any increased revenue in the 
immediate future merely by a legal extension of the zone from which 
they may derive income. 
(7) Control of territorial waters carries with it the responsibility of 
monitoring the environmental impact of economic exploitation of such 
territory, and imposing appropriate penalties on those who infringe our 
environmental laws, far away from our shores. Nigeria does not now 
have, and is unlikely to have in the long term, the capability to assess 
such impact effectively. 
(8) Nigeria under President Obasanjo, has signed an agreement with the 
maritime and neighbouring republic of Sao Tome, setting up a Joint 
Development Zone on the EEZ between the two countries. It is likely 
that a similar agreement will be signed with other countries. The 
amendment which the National Assembly adopted in the Bill will render 
such a peaceful approach to the matter academic, and limit the country 
to the option of war, in defence of the 'rights' of relatively small number 
of littoral states (FCU), and to the detriment of the non-littoral states. 
(9) But the most dangerous implication of the Bill which the National 
Assembly passed is the implied right which it confers on a small number 
of littoral states (FCU) to engage unilaterally in foreign policy making, 
through presumably direct negotiations with foreign powers and 
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companies- a prerogative which our Constitution reserves exclusively to 
the Federal Government; for the right to make such a claim of derivation 
logically carries along with it the right of negotiation over it. 
3. Comments and criticisms on the President's views 
Objective examination of the above reasons reveals that while some may be cogent, 
the majority of them cannot be supported in all ramifications. In the first place, the 
majority of the reasons enumerated began on the assumption that the insertion by 
the National Assembly of a clause extending the share of the FCU from onshore 
revenue to the revenue derivable from mining of resources of the entire EEZ and 
CS is tantamount to quitclaiming or cession of the zones themselves to the FCU. 
This is completely erroneous; the purport of the insertion by the National Assembly 
to the Bill is simply to extend the 13% share of the FCU in the revenue accruing to 
the Federation Account from activities in the maritime areas to cover revenue 
derivable from offshore mining and other economic activities. Were that clause 
retained and approved by the President, it would have returned oil revenue sharing 
to the status quo that is, covering revenue derived from both onshore and off-shore 
as it existed in the independence and republican Constitutions of Nigeria. This in 
effect would not warrant the FCU engaging in any foreign negotiations or adopting 
foreign policy, which would be contrary to that adopted by the Federal Government. 
The Federal Government could control the activities of the FCU as it did during the 
time revenue sharing by the regions covered resources from both onshore and off-
shore - a time when the FCU did not engage in any foreign affairs whatsoever with 
any country over areas covered by the percentage of revenue paid to them. The 
Federal Government does all the negotiations, enters into all mining agreements, 
grants all oil exploration and exploitation licences, police its marine environment 
and monitors environmental impacts of oil exploration and production, which the 
FCU are at the receiving end of such impacts and above all adopts all maritime and 
foreign policies it may deem necessary. All the FCU are entitled to do is to demand 
for their share of 13% from whatever revenue accruing to the Federal Government 
221 
from oil and gas exploration and exploitation covering both onshore and offshore 
maritime areas. 
As a corollary to the above, the extension envisaged by the National Assembly 
would not in any way affect Nigeria's claims or the claims of other States in the 
case of maritime delimitation and therefore cannot drag Nigeria to war with any of 
its proximate neighbours. This is so because the extension that was envisaged by 
the National Assembly would only help the FCU to share from the revenue that 
would accrue to Nigeria from every part of the sea that falls under Nigeria's 
national jurisdiction either as a result of maritime delimitation or from any joint 
development agreement into which Nigeria may enter. The insertion by the 
National Assembly would not in any way affect the agreements which the Federal 
Government has signed or is proposing to sign with any neighbouring country; it 
may only affect for example the 60% share of the Federal Government from the 
revenue accruing to the Joint Development Zone Authority (JDZA) put in place by 
Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe166 or to the share of Nigeria in the revenue that 
would accrue to it in the case of full implementation of the Unitisation Agreement 
between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. 167 
By the same token, it is difficult to fathom how the insertion in the Bill that the 
share of the FCU should extend both to the EEZ and the CS would equate the 
sovereignty of the FCU with that of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the matter of 
revenue sharing. Sovereignty is an international law concept which has to do with 
the normal compliments of State rights, the typical case of legal competence or in 
the language of Brownlie, "the legal shorthand for legal personality of a certain 
kind, that of statehood," 168 this as discussed above appertains to a State as an entity 
166 Article 3( I), Agreement between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of 
Sao Tome e Principe on the Joint Development of Petroleum and other Resources, in respect of 
Areas of the Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone of the two States 
167 Article 6, Treaty between the Federal R<;;public of Nigeria and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea 
Concerning their Maritime Boundary of 23 day of September, 2000 and Article I of the Protocol 
on Implementation of Article 6(2) of the Treaty between The Federal Republic of Nigeria and the 
Republic of Equatorial Guinea Concerning their Maritime Boundary. 
168 Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, (Sixth ed.), Oxford (2003), p.l06 
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and not to the component units. More importantly the FCU, do not seem to have 
any other sovereignty outside the sovereignty conferred by international law on 
Nigeria as a nation - a legal personality over the airspace, the seabed and subsoil of 
the TS of Nigeria and sovereign and jurisdictional rights over the EEZ and CS. 
Furthermore, it is doubtful if the ability to police and defend maritime areas is 
presently a precondition for a claim to maritime sovereignty. This used to be the 
case during the cannon shot rule mentioned earlier, but which has since been 
discarded and taken over by the contiguity and natural prolongation criteria. Claim 
to either sovereignty, sovereign rights or jurisdiction as the case may be over 
maritime areas arises in the first instance by the contiguity of a nation to the sea, 
whether or not that nation has the capacity to police and defend the maritime areas 
it claims. With respect to TS for example, Lord Arnold McNair in the Anglo -
Norwegian Fisheries case has observed that the possession of territorial sea by a 
State "is not optional.. .but compulsory," 169 in which case it does not depend on the 
ability ofthat State to police and defend it. Furthermore, by virtue of Article 77 (3) 
of UNCLOS for example, the CS rights automatically attach to every coastal State 
and do not depend upon any claim or proclamation nor do they depend on the 
ability of a State to police and defend it. It is the natural appurtenance of the land 
territory to the sea that confers in the first place the sovereignty which a country 
possesses over the TS and the sovereign rights and jurisdiction which it ordinarily 
exercises over the EEZ and the CS. This explains the reason for the comments of 
ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf case that; 
The principle of the 'just and equitable share' if found, contradicted the most 
fundamental of all the rules of law relating to the Continental Shelf, namely, 
that the rights of the coastal state in respect of the Continental Shelf that 
constitute a natural prolongation of the land territory into and under the sea 
exist ipso facto and ab initio by virtue of sovereignty over the land ... 170 
169 Supra 
170 ( 1969), ICJ Reports at p.22 
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It therefore follows that if the rights of a coastal state over the CS exist ipso facto 
and ab initio, are not optional but compulsory, the same rights cannot necessarily 
depend on its ability to police and defend it before it can possess it. 
Item 6 above is completely indefensible as it overlooks the developments regarding 
the recent discoveries in Agbami, Bonga and the Erha fields, which are off-shore oil 
and gas fields. The Agbami oil field, for instance, which lies in block Oil 
Prospecting Licence (OPL) 216 and which is reputed to rank among the largest 
single discoveries in deep water in the West Africa sub-region is about 200 km off-
shore. In the case of Bonga oil field it is in Oil Prospecting Licence (OPL) 212 and 
it is about 120 km off-shore, while Erha oil and gas fields, which lies about 1,200 
meters of water on oil block 209 are located about 100 miles southeast of Lagos. 
Efforts at producing from Agbami and Bonga oil fields have reached the stage in 
which the Production Sharing Contract (PSC) had been concluded, with the Federal 
Government through the NNPC awarded the largest share. It is expected that by the 
year 2008 production from Agbami field for example would start with the initial 
200,000 barrel per day. Presently, construction of the Floating Production, Storage 
and Offloading (FPSO) Vessel preparatory to the start of oil and gas exploitation at 
the Agbami Field has already begun and calls to reduce this long term gestation 
period in deep water oil and gas exploration and production, which according to the 
Group Managing Director of NNPC is engendered by high technology equipment, 
facilities and highly trained manpower needed is being made. 171 With regards to 
Erha field, ESSO Exploration - a unit of Exxon Mobil Corporation has recently 
announced commencement of production from the deepwater oil and gas field with 
the capacity of daily production of 210,000 barrels per day. The Erha North oil field, 
another offshore oil field has just been discovered by Shell Exploration and 
Production Company (SNEPCO) and when operational, the Erha North will 
171 See Kupolokun, F., "Kupolokun canvasses review of gestation period in deep water oil 
exploration" in Guardian Newspaper of 23rd March, 2005 in 
http://www .guardiannewsngr .com/business/ article03. 
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produce an average of 40,000 barrels of oil per day. 172 
When the call materialises, the 2008 gestation period may be further reduced. This 
again tears to shreds the argument by the President that the area of the sea in which 
Nigeria is currently capable of carrying out oil and gas exploitation is within 24 nm 
of the country's shore. Similarly, the argument by the President that the oil 
producing members of the FCU do not stand to gain any increase of revenue in the 
immediate future merely by a legal extension of the zone from which they may 
derive income has also been jettisoned. The statement has been overtaken by the 
fact that as of today there is in existence technology that is capable of mining in 
very deep waters and that the question of lack of funds raised by the President is 
also jettisoned by the example of Agbami Floating Production Storage and Off-
loading and the Bonga Oil Field, which are nearing completion stage. 173 There is no 
doubt that such a legal extension of the zone would guarantee unto the FCU a 
substantial share in the amount that would accrue to the Federal Government from 
the over 1.1 billion US Dollars Agbami Floating Production Storage and Off-
loading (FSPO) and the share that would accrue from the 50% NNPC share in the 
Production Sharing Contract with regard to Bonga oil field. The same is true with 
regards to the Erha and Erha North oil and gas fields. 
While it may be true to assert that Nigeria is technologically ill-equipped to carry 
out delimitation of its seaward maritime boundaries, the same cannot be said of its 
financial capability to employ the services of companies that are well equipped with 
the necessary technology to carry out the delimitation of Nigeria's seaward 
boundary. This was done in the case of maritime delimitation between Nigeria and 
Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome e Principe and Cameroon pursuant to the ICJ 
judgment in the case between Cameroon and Nigeria with Equatorial Guinea 
intervening. As a matter of fact, the National Boundary Commission, on behalf of 
172 Vanguard Nigerian Newspaper of 9th May, 2006 in 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/business/may06/b09052006.ht. 
173 Dr Ojo, (Chairman House Committee on Petroleum Resources)'s comments "Nigeria unhappy 
about Agbami-Bonga projects" in Vanguard Newspaper of Wednesday, 9th of March, 2005; 
http://www. vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/nationalx/nr l 09032005 .html. 
225 
the Federal Government had already begun negotiations on the delimitation of the 
country's CS and the maritime boundary with Benin Republic. 
Furthermore, while it may be true that the Bill as amended by the National 
Assembly would necessarily involve maritime boundary delimitation between the 
FCU to determine the amount of revenue realised from the areas appertaining to 
each of them, this in effect does not warrant its rejection by the Federal Government. 
This is due to the fact that proper implementation of the 200 metres water isobaths, 
which the Federal Government eventually adopted would equally warrant such 
maritime delimitations in order to determine amount of revenue derivable from oil 
wells found within the areas that appertain to each of them, this therefore brings to 
nought the argument that Nigeria is technologically ill-equipped to carry out the 
delimitation or that it would require maritime delimitation between the FCU. At any 
rate, the Federal Government can opt to retain expression of the power to delimit or 
not to delimit its maritime boundaries. 
The Federal Government has now abolished the dichotomy through the 
enactment of an Act of Parliament, section 1 of which provides as follows; 
As from the commencement of this Act, the 200 meter water depth isobaths 
contiguous to a state of the Federation shall be deemed to be a part of that state 
for the purposes of computing the Revenue accruing to the Federation Account 
from the state pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999 or any other enactment. 174 
The questions that have cropped up as a result of the enactment include: 
(a) To what extent has the enactment of this Act gone in bringing an end to 
the dispute between the Federal Government and the FCU over the 
ownership of the Nigerian maritime territory and its resources? 
(b) If it has not, what shortcomings militated against its success? 
(c) Has the enactment of that Act rendered the Supreme Court judgment in 
174 Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy in the Application of Principle of Derivation) 
Act, No. 24 of 2004 
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that case invalid/nugatory? 
4. To what extent can the Dichotomy Act be said to have resolved the dispute? 
The answer to this question is no. Just as the previous steps taken by the Federal 
Government to checkmate the controversy between it and the FCU over the 
ownership of maritime territory have failed to yield the desired results, 175 so also is 
the Dichotomy Act. That Act has not and may not in anyway settle or abate the 
dispute; in fact, it has been described by one of the major actors in the controversy-
Governor of Delta State, James lbori as: 
A palliative grudgingly granted the oil producing states in order to 
temporarily arrest the trend towards violent revolt by the 
masses ... we in Delta State will never abandon the struggle for 
resource control because our losses are far too enormous to be 
forgotten ... 176 
His statement was complemented by that of the Chairman of the Senate Committee 
on Niger Delta, Senator John Brambaifa, who sees that Act, as a good thing in the 
right direction but that it is not the best. From the way his statement on that Act was 
framed, it is not difficult to ascertain or fathom the underlying motive or the 
direction and the line of his thoughts. Referring to the Act, he stated: 
"It is not the best if you consider the agitation for total control as 
demanded by the resource control proponents. But in any struggle, 
there is no way that you struggle for self-determination in one form 
or the other that you will attain all that you want at one goal. The 
sensible person will prefer to struggle, get something out of the 
struggle first and continue with the struggle later until he eventually 
175 Two major steps were discernible in this respect, the first is the establishment of Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) to replace the ailing Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development 
Commission 
176 See lbori, J., "Ibori restates call for resource control" in the Guardian Newspaper of 22nd April 
2004- http://www. Guardiannewsngr.com/news/article 16 
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gets what he wants."177 
Such statements coming from the mouths of very powerful individuals who wield 
tremendous political, economic and other influences in the politics, economics and 
other areas of national life of Nigeria and of the Niger Delta areas in particular 
would seem to suggest clearly that the Act has not ended the controversy. It merely, 
though not conclusively addresses the issue of dichotomy in the revenue sharing 
formula, which is but the tip of an iceberg considering the plethora of demands of 
the FCU. 
In other words, the abolition of dichotomy in the sharing of revenue by the 
Dichotomy Act is seen by the FCU as merely a step forward in their agitation for 
the taking of total control of the maritime territory and the resources therein and not 
an end in itself. 
4.1 Shortcomings of the Act 
With regards to (b) above, the Dichotomy Act has not resolved title problems 
because of the following shortcomings: 
(a) it does not for instance address the key question of ownership of 
the maritime territory or the control of the resources therein and 
the issue of the seaward limit of the boundary of each of the FCU, 
which the Supreme Court awarded both the TS and the CS 
thereof to the Federal Government. 
(b) the enactment of the Act itself is not without procedural 
irregularities. 
(c) the Act does not address the fears of ethnic minority being 
expressed by some segments of the Niger Delta, such as the 
Ogonis, and has failed to make a proper distinction between what 
177 See Brambaifa, J., "Problem of Sea Piracy," Vanguard Newspaper of gth May, 2004 in 
http://www. vanguardngr.com 
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has been termed the "true or core Niger Delta areas" and the "not 
true Niger Delta area," which are key issues in the agitation for 
resources control but which have often been forgotten or 
neglected in most of the efforts at finding lasting and amicable 
solutions to the dispute. 
(d) the Act is equally silent about the degradation of the Niger Delta 
environment due to pollution from oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation. 
(e) the provisions of the Act are not encompassing enough to make 
the resources of the entire CS to be subject to the principle of 
derivation. 
May be if it had done so, it would have been placatory enough to end or at least 
abate the controversy. This contention is made manifest by the provisions of 
section 1 of that Act. In other words, the share of the FCU is limited by that Act 
only to revenue accruing from the resources mined within the 200-metre water 
isobaths. There is no question about the fact that the CS of Nigeria extends in the 
relevant parts far beyond the 200-meter water isobaths being granted by the Federal 
Government. The depth of 200-metres been referred to varies from country to 
country depending on the nature of the coastline itself. Even within Nigeria as can 
be observed from the map below, the depth of 200-meters varies considerably, with 
most of the FCU in the Niger Delta areas having their 200-meters water isobaths 
extending well beyond the 24 nm Contiguous zone, but in Cross River, Lagos and 
Ogun areas, the 200 meters water depth scarcely extend to that limit. This would 
result in inequity in the application of that Act. 
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Figure Four: A map showing the 200 metre water isobaths. 
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As hinted above, the enactment of the Act itself is procedurally wrong, in that it was 
enacted without the pre-requisite constitutional amendment and its enactment has 
the legal implication of changing the provisions of an existing Constitution on the 
matter of revenue sharing. This is so because the problem of dichotomy in oil 
revenue sharing has all along remained a constitutional question; therefore, 
enactment of legislation in the form of the Dichotomy Act to change the provisions 
of the Constitution on that issue is unconstitutional. In Nigeria an Act of Parliament 
cannot ordinarily change the provisions of the Constitution; that can only be done 
through constitutional amendment in line with the provisions of section 9 of the 
Constitution, which stipulates the procedure to be followed. According to Section 9 
(I), the National Assembly may ... alter any of the provisions of this Constitution. 
Sub section (2) of that section on the other hand specifically enumerates procedure 
to be followed in making the alteration mentioned by section 9( I). It states: 
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An Act of National Assembly for the alteration of this 
Constitution ... shall not be passed in either House of the National 
Assembly unless the proposal is supported by the votes of not less than 
two-thirds majority of all the members of that House and approved by 
resolution of the Houses of Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all 
the states. 178 
The above procedure was not complied with in the process of enacting the 
Dichotomy Act for the following reasons: 
(f) there was no proposal to amend the constitution, 
(g) no resolution by the two-thirds majority or any resolution of the 
Houses of Assembly of all the federating units at all before the 
Act was passed. 
(h) the enactment of the Dichotomy Act itself was done pursuant to 
the recommendation of the committee referred to above, which 
suggested it as a temporary measure pending permanent solution 
which requires constitutional amendments. The recommendation 
of the committee can be likened to putting the cart before the 
horse in that it puts the enactment of the Dichotomy Act first 
before constitutional amendment, which should legally precede 
it. The Constitution was thus not amended before the Act was 
passed and even thereafter the Constitution is yet to be amended 
to give constitutional validity to the Dichotomy Act. 
The irregularities according to Professor Ben Nwabueze (SAN) could "re-open a 
fresh controversy because the constitutional validity of the Act can be challenged in 
court." 179 The irregularities have indeed re-open another round of controversy, in 
that, the 19 Governors from Northern Nigeria and three of their counterparts from 
the South West have now instituted a case at the Supreme Court to challenge the 
178 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
179 See Prof. Nwabueze, B., "Offshore/Onshore oil law illegal" in The Guardian Newspaper of 20th 
February 2004- http://www .guardiannewsngr.cornlnews/article 10. 
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constitutionality or otherwise of the extension of the revenue sharing by the FCU to 
200 meter water isobaths. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the Act itself 
amounted to "legislative judgment" in that it has by implication ceded that part of 
the Nigerian coastline and TS contrary to the provisions of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution, the Territorial Waters Act and the Exclusive Economic Zone Act, to 
the Niger Delta members of the FCU. 
Specifically, the plaintiffs claim inter alia: 
(a) Whether in view of the provisions of Sections 16 and 44 (3) of the 1999 
Constitution, the provisions of Territorial Waters Act, the Exclusive 
Economic Zone Act it was not ultra vires the powers of the Federal 
Government to make and implement the Allocation of Revenue Act of 
2004? 
(b) Whether having regards to the provisions of Sections 4, 16, 44(3), 162 and 
315 of the 1999 Constitution the Allocation of Revenue Act is not 
unconstitutional, null and void? 
(c) Whether in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abia case, the 
Dichotomy Act is not a legislative judgment thereby making it null and void 
and without any effect?180 
The Plaintiffs' argument that by deeming the 200 meter water isobaths to be part of 
the FCU for the purpose of calculating the amount of revenue that accrue to them 
amounted to cession of that part of Nigerian maritime space to the FCU cannot be 
supported in its entirety. Cession is a mode of acquisition of title to territory, which 
connotes a permanent transfer of sovereignty over a particular territory usually by 
agreement in the form of a treaty between the grantor (usually a sovereign) and the 
grantee. It is obvious from the provisions of section 1 of the Dichotomy Act quoted 
above, which uses the word 'deemed' to describe the 200 metre water isobaths 
which the Federal Government intends the revenue sharing to cover, that it is not 
180 Vanguard Newspaper of 22"d August; see also The 19 Northern Governors vs. Federal 
Government of Nigeria and the Oil Producing states, Supreme Court Suit No. 28 /2004 
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the intention of that Act to cede or quitclaim the affected areas to the FCU, but to 
merely deem it as part of the FCU only for the purpose of revenue sharing. No 
doubt that for all other purposes, the areas in question would not be regarded or be 
deemed to be part of the FCU. It would be recalled that the 1960 and 1963 
Nigerian Constitutions, referred to in the previous chapter used similar word to 
describe the areas covered by the 50% paid to the Regions that the Constitution 
deemed the CS to be most contiguous. The court has now dismissed the case 
without properly marshalling all the issues, including the issues in a - c above and 
the constitutionality or otherwise of the Dichotomy Ac. 181 Thus the Dichotomy Act 
is still a valid exercise of the National Assembly of Nigeria. 
4.2 Has the Dichotomy Act rendered Abia case invalid/nugatory? 
No, it has not the Act has merely extended the areas of the sea covered by the 
revenue entitlement of the FCU from the low-water mark that Abia case pegged it, 
but it has not changed the territorial boundary or the seaward limit of Nigeria's 
national territory, which Abia case decided is the low-water mark. The Act has not 
also changed the power to exercise act of ownership and control of the maritime 
territory and its resources, which the Abia case places on the Federal Government. 
Thus, the judgment like the Act enacted pursuant to it is still a valid judgment in 
Nigeria. 
II - Intensification in the Demands for Resource Control 
The FCU who have all along resented the idea of sharing revenue accruing from 
such resources on-shore and offshore and have regarded the practice as an un-
welcomed imposition by the Federal Government is now to face a reduction in the 
areas covered by the percentage hitherto paid to them. The decision in Abia case is 
thus seen as an injustice to the Niger Delta people, who bears all the brunt of oil and 
gas exploration and exploitation. The Dichotomy Act too is seen by the majority of 
Niger Delta people as not doing enough to remedy the perceived injustice in Abia 
case. The result is a general increase in the tempo of agitation for resources control 
181 Ibid 
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by the Niger Delta people. The agitation itself is taking the form of an 
unprecedented restiveness and violence in the Niger Delta areas of Nigeria. 
To mention only the very recent incidents, MEND, on the 11th January, 2006, 
kidnapped four foreign oil workers, including one American, one Briton, one 
Bulgarian and a Honduran and held them captive for nineteen days! The same 
MEND on the 15th of January, 2006, invaded the Benisede flow station belonging to 
SPDC, burnt two staff quarters, blew up the oil flow station with dynamite and shot 
dead 14 soldiers with several other people injured. On the 18th of February, 2006, 
MEND forcefully took as hostages, 9 foreign oil and gas workers, which included 
three Americans, one Briton, one Filipino, two Thais and two Egyptians. A bomb 
explosion occurred at the Bori Camp Army barracks in Portharcourt on Wednesday 
the 19th of April, 2006 followed within one week by a similar bomb explosion in 
Warri, Delta state, leaving several people dead and several others injured. On the 
lOth of May, 2006, an American was shot dead in his car on his way to work by yet 
unidentified gunmen, while on the 11th of May, 2006, three foreign oil and gas 
workers were abducted from their car and were not released until the following day. 
Lately too, eight foreign oil and gas expatriates, 6 Britons, one Canadian and one 
American were kidnapped by the Iduwini Volunteer Force (IVF) on the 2"d of June, 
2006, two of whom were later released on the 4th of the same month. Similarly, 
militant youths shot dead a Naval Commander, four ratings and two civilians on the 
7th of June, 2006, at the Cawthrone Channel River in Port Harcourt182 and on the 
12th of July, 2006, the same militant youths attacked a vessel, which was carrying 
some supplies to an oil company at Okerenkoko in Warri, killing one Naval Officer 
and three ratings with several others wounded. 183 Not relenting, MEND on the 20th 
of January, 2007 attacked and hijacked a cargo ship and taken hostage the 24 
foreigners onboard the ship. 184 
182 Guardian Newspaper of 14th July, 2006 in http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/news/articleOI 
183 Ibid 
184 Vanguard Nigerian Newspaper of 21 '1 January, 2007 in 
http://www. vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/cover/january07/21 012007 /f321 012007 .ht 
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Thus, production of oil and gas in the Niger Delta Areas of Nigeria is now 
characterised by incessant ambushing, kidnappings, arsons, bombings and killings 
of oil and gas and allied workers, blockading of offices and production sites with its 
attendant restriction of movements, blowing up of oil pipelines and the shutting up 
of oil flow stations 185 to mention just a few. Furthermore, oil bunkering, which has 
resulted and is still resulting in major losses of oil revenue by the oil and gas 
companies and consequently the Federal Government, is argued to be the 
handiwork of the youth of Niger Delta and in some instances with their foreign 
collaborators. 186 It has been argued that the militant groups derive the money used 
in the purchase of arms and ammunitions from oil bunkering. Thus, normal protests, 
which ordinarily were meant to be peaceful, soon turned violent by the hijacking of 
the same by the militant youths. 
In addition to the activities of the militant youth noted above, major policies of the 
government and of the oil companies operating in the region regarding the maritime 
areas including exploration, production and sale of oil and gas are often violently 
challenged and disrupted by the Niger Delta youth. The most recent examples 
include the plans by the Federal Government to build a petroleum refinery in Ondo 
state and the recent plan by the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) to 
relocate its operational base from Warri in Delta state to Portharcourt in Rivers state. 
In June, 2006, the Ijaw Youth Liberty Movement threatened to carry out fresh 
hostage taking if the case instituted by the Delta state government against the 
chairman of Foundation for Transparency in Africa was not withdrawn within a 
185 The shutting down of the oil facilities of SPDC by five communities in River state on Tuesday, 
the 16th of August, 2005 to mention just a few. Chevron Oil Company on the other hand shut its 
Idama and Robertkiri flow stations in Rivers state because of threats of attack by the militant I jaw 
youths and was only able to reopen with the presence of heavily armed soldiers, see vanguard 
Nigerian Newspaper of 26th September, 2005 in 
http://www. v anguardngr .com/articles/2002/cover/september05/26092005/f4 26092005. 
186 It is alleged by Shell that 21.9 million barrels per day is lost to oil bunkering. This revelation 
corroborates the Federal Governrtlent's estimation of about 276 billion Naira so far lost by Nigeria; 
See Vanguard of Nigeria Newspaper of 9th March, 2005 in 
http://www. vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/niger delta/nd309032005.html and Vanguard Nigerian 
Newspaper of 24th August, 2005 in vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/niger_delta/ndl24082005.html. 
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deadline given by the group. 187 The state of insecurity generated by all the above 
has led to the recent. threats by SPDC to withdraw from further operations in 
Nigeria 188and the mass relocation of oil and gas workers to Lagos. The killings and 
hostage takings seem to have defied all known solutions and they go on unabated. 
1. The basis of the agitation for resources control 
The agitation is generally hinged on the following criteria: 
(a) Through demand for implementation of true federalism in Nigeria 
(b) Through agitation for self determination 
2. Demand for implementation of true federalism 
The demand for implementation of true federalism, which hitherto had been a subtle 
and non-violent affair has now assumed a dimension of national significance by the 
nature of violence and restiveness noted above and has found a common and 
uniform expression in the agenda submitted by all the states constituting the FCU, 
for the national political reform conference, put in place by the Federal Government. 
A commentator has for example, regarded recognition of "fiscal federalism" and 
"regional control of resources" as the only solution in the resolution of restiveness 
in the Niger Delta area ... anything short of these solutions would be an exercise in 
futility. 189 Professor Sagay in his weekly column argued that "without true 
federalism Nigeria shall know no peace."190 The seriousness with which the Niger 
Delta people view the issue of true federalism and resources control can be further 
elicited from the invocation of the spirit of their gods on any of their delegates to 
the conference that compromised these principles. 191 
187 Vanguard Newspaper of 4th June, 2006 in 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/cover/june06/f404062006.html 
188 See Guardian Newspaper of 12th June, 2004 in http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/news/articlell. 
189 Ewherido, p., Deputy Speaker, in Vanguard Newspaper of, Wednesday, 9th of March, 2005; 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/southwest/sw408032005.html 
190 See Vanguard Newspaper of 31st December, 2004, pg 28. 
191 Vanguard Newspaper of 26th February, 2005 in 
http;//www. vanguardngr .com/articles/2002/national x/nr226022005 .html. 
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Thus, the agenda of the South West, the South East and the South-South 
geopolitical zones (the zones in which the FCU rightly belong) were unanimous in 
their demands for implementation of true federalism in Nigeria. According to them 
a return to true federalism would guarantee unto each of them not only the right to 
mine the land based resources found within their territories, but also the right to 
explore and exploit the resources of the ocean contiguous to their land territories. 192 
However, the position of the South West geopolitical zone as expressed in its 
agendum for the Conference could be distinguished in one significant respect from 
that of the South-South and the South East geo-political zones as far as true 
federalism and resource control issues are concerned. In the true federalism being 
advocated by the South West, the ocean space beyond the TS would be a matter for 
international law. Thus it is stated that, "how far a country exercises jurisdiction 
into the sea is a matter of international law and not even constitutional law. 
Therefore, by ancillary reasoning, resources which are outside territorial waters can 
only be a matter for the centre." Accordingly, the South West geopolitical zone 
expects that in a true federalism it advocates, "The Federal Government shall 
continue to control company taxation on extractive and non-extractive industries. 
This means that while the zones will keep the royalties, the Federal Government 
will keep the petroleum tax ... " 193 
Leaving for later a critique on this argument, it may be noted that the South East on 
its part did not advocate resource control per se, but called for the re-structuring of 
Nigeria to six zones, where it expects other zones "to be persuaded by concessions 
being made to them on revenue allocation and the pegging of the derivation 
principle to a level that ensures adequate funding of the zones of the North, the 
Middle Belt, etc." Top on the agenda of the South-South geopolitical zone on the 
other hand is resource control and true federalism. Unlike the South West and South 
192 See Alaieyeseigha, D., "abolition of Petroleum and Land Use Acts" in Guardian Newspaper of 
Nigeria of 22nd March, 2004; http://www .guardiannewsngr.com. 
193 Vanguard Newspaper, February 19, 2005, at pp 3-6 
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East zones, the South-South geopolitical zone has made no distinction in its 
clamour for return to true federalism and resource control between the resources on-
shore and offshore of Nigeria maritime territory or between TS and CS. All it wants 
is the control of all resources in the entire maritime territory adjacent to the Niger 
Delta areas. Unfortunately, the conference ended abruptly without resolving the 
thorny issue of resources control and the question of true federalism. The agitation 
therefore still rages on unabated. 
2.1 Federalismllnternationallegal personality and resources control 
This aspect of the outcome of both the Supreme Court judgment in Abia case and 
the Dichotomy Act will be examined by an attempt to answer the following 
questions: 
(a)What is true federalism and what is its relationship with international 
legal personality? Do the federating units possess international personality, 
the like of the federation? 
(b )Does true federalism exist in reality? And; 
(c)lf it does exist, would a return to true federalism as advocated by the 
Niger Delta people guarantee to them the right to take over the sovereignty 
confer on Nigeria as a nation over the TS and her sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction over the EEZ and the CS? 
2.2 True Federalism and the question of international legal personality 
This will be examined in the following order: 
(a)Nigeria's understanding of true of federalism 
(b) the relationship between federalism and international legal personality 
2.3 Nigeria's understanding of true federalism 
In Nigeria, true federalism has been frequently associated with regional autonomy 
and the control of resources by the regions in which such resources are found. That 
is an autonomy whereby the federating units possess equal sovereignty with the 
federation and become independent from it. A type of autonomy that guarantees 
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each region the power to establish a regional police force and separate parliament 
and control all resources both on land and at the sea. Thus Pa Enahoro in a paper 
titled, "Reformed Federalism," the elder statesman dealt exhaustively with what he 
regards. as true federalism for Nigeria. He states that: 
we believe that the nationalities of Nigeria are entitled, as their inalienable 
right, to enjoy a meaningful individualism within the Nigerian family and 
that the generality of our people are entitled, as of right, to an abundant life 
for which nature's generous endowments of human talent and material 
resources more than qualify them ... "194 
To buttress and drive his arguments home, the elder statesman quoted extensively 
some articles of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
particularly the preamble, which talks of "nations," "nationalities and peoples of 
Ethiopia," article 3, which talks of Ethiopian flag and which allows each member 
state to have its own separate flag and article 3, which talks of recognition of all 
Ethiopian languages and the authorisation allowing the member states of the 
federation to determine their respective languages. More importantly, the elder 
statesman quoted from article 39 of the same Constitution, which guarantees the 
rights of the individual nations and nationalities of Ethiopia to self determination up 
to secession, unrestricted right to establish and administer itself and which shall 
include the right to establish government institutions within the territory it 
inhabits. 195 The elder statesman did not mince words in canvassing and advocating 
similar provisions in the true federalism he wants for Nigeria. 
True federalism is understood in the context described above by several prominent 
Nigerians. In the view of former Governor Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa state for 
example: 
194 Pa Enahoro "Reformed Federalism" presented at Shell Hall, Muson Centre, Onikan Lagos, 
Nigeria on the 6th October, 2005 and reforted by Vanguard Newspaper of Nigeria under title 
"Nigeria's False Federalism" on the 11 and 121h October, 2005 in 
http://www. vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/politics/october05/121 02005/p 112102005 .html. 
195 See the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 
http://www .africa. upenn.edu/homet/ethiopian_constitution.html. 
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"We need to see federalism in action rather than being a mere phrase to 
describe our lopsided union. I believe that if the states are allowed under 
clear federal principles to harness the resources within their territories and to 
nurture their individual economies according to their peculiar strength, our 
nation will then be truly bound by freedom, peace and unity." 196 
In the debate about the nature of the political conference, a commentator observes 
as follows: "It does not matter whether it is sovereign or not we should look beyond 
the name and think of the need." He further argues that to us, "it is .. .inevitable a 
debate about the nature of the Nigerian federal system. It is about what should be 
the degree of power that should be enjoyed by the constituent units, the states or 
ethnic nationalities."197 This question is a very important and controversial question 
as far as Nigeria and this thesis are concerned. With regards to Nigeria, a 
determination of what true federalism represents is important because according to 
Senator Tokunbo Afikuyomi, "the future and destiny of Nigeria are tied to it."198 As 
if to re-emphasise the statement of Professor Sagay above, the Speaker of Delta 
state House of Assembly - Honourable Pius Ewherido thinks that there will be no 
solution to the restiveness in the Niger Delta Areas "except government gives 
recognition for physical federalism and regional control of resources."199 Thus the 
future destiny of Nigeria as a nation and the question of restiveness and control of 
maritime territory and resources are all regarded as sine qua non to Nigeria's 
returning to true federalism. 
With regards to this thesis, the question is important in that correct determination of 
what true federalism is all about would assist in the determination of the legal status 
of the federating units within a federal system of government, in particular the FCU. 
196 Vanguard of Nigeria Newspaper of 13th May, 2004 in 
http://www. vanguardngr .cornlarticles/2002/politics/p313052004.html 
197 Sam E., (not the Governor ofEbonyi state) in Vanguard Newspaper of22 February, 2005 in 
http://www. vanguardngr.cornlarticles/2002/politics/p222022005 .html 
198 Vanguard of Nigeria Newspaper of 15th February, 2005 in 
http://www. vanguardngr.corn!articles/2002/nationalx/nr3150022005 .html 
199 Vanguard of Nigeria Newspaper of 8th March, 2005 in 
http://www. vanguardngr .cornlarticles/2002/south west/s w40803 2005 .html 
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It will equally help in the determination of whether or not it is the Federal 
Government as opposed to the FCU that possesses the necessary international legal 
personality to assume ownership of oceanic resources as granted by international 
law. This importance thus underscores the need for a thorough examination of what 
true federalism is if it indeed exists. 
2.4 The relationship between federalism and international personality 
It may be argued that the regional autonomy or true federalism (apart from the 
extreme approach of some Niger Delta Groups noted below) is meant to be 
exercised in the context of an internal autonomy of the federating units within the 
Nigerian federation. There is a problem however when the true federalism is 
understood to include autonomy of the units over the maritime areas and resources. 
The problem is this, UNCLOS (article 2 (1)) talks of sovereignty of a coastal State 
extending beyond its land territory to the TS and a coastal State (articles 56(1) (a) & 
(b) and 77) as possessing sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the EEZ and the CS. 
This being the case, the question then arises; which between the federating units 
and the federation possesses the sovereignty mentioned by UNCLOS and which 
between the two tiers of government should possess the necessary international 
legal personality to assume the obligations created by it? 
Professor Sagay had occasion to address the issue of true federalism in the context 
of international personality. In a recent article, the learned professor tries hard to 
rake up evidence in support of a contention that a Governor of a federating unit 
(Bayelsa state) under a federal system is entitled to sovereign immunity in the same 
capacity as the president of the federation itself. In doing so, he concludes that both 
the federating units and the federation itself possess equal sovereignty and equal 
international legal personality. In other words, that "a federation's sovereignty is 
split between the federal State and the federating units."200 In reaching the above 
conclusion, Professor Sagay quoted extensively the definition of federalism offered 
200 Vanguard of Nigeria Newspaper of October 14, 2005 in 
http://www. vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/politics/october05/141 02005/p4141 02005 .html 
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by Professor Nwabueze and Whiteman's Digest of International law. Quoting 
Professor Nwabueze, Sagay says: 
Federalism may be described as an arrangement whereby powers within 
multi-national country are shared between a federal or central authority, and 
a number of regionalized governments ... In a federation, each government 
enjoys autonomy, a separate existence and independence of the control of 
any other government. Each government exists, not as an appendage of other 
government. .... Thus, the central government on the one hand and the State 
governments on the other hand are autonomous in their respective spheres.201 
At the international plane, Professor Sagay's conclusion receives support in the first 
place from the definition of federalism offered by Whiteman's Digest of 
International Law, which the learned Professor quotes very extensively and which 
is similar in many respects to that of Professor Nwabueze on the issue that the 
federation's sovereignty is split between the federating units with each of them 
possessing equal sovereignty and independence.Z02 
In the same vein, the split sovereignty spoken of by Professor Sagay is akin in many 
respects to what the writers on American Federalism in the periods between 1787 
and 1788 described as divided sovereignty. 203 This idea of divided sovereignty, 
which De Tocqueville propagated and which was put in correct legal perspective by 
the German jurist - Waitz is to the effect that, when states, which hitherto were 
sovereign and independent in their own right come together and by an agreement 
form a federal state, they thus individually gave up a part of their sovereignty to the 
central authority, whilst retaining the parts not given away. According to this 
postulation, though sovereignty is divided, it is not as a matter of fact qualitatively 
affected but quantitatively; the sovereignty is no longer a complete sovereignty as it 
201 Vanguard of Nigeria Newspaper of 14th October, 2005 in 
http://www. vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/politics/october05/141 02005/p4141 02005, p. 4 
202 Ibid. 
203 Lodge, H.C., The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States: being a 
collection of essays written in support of the Constitution, 1787, ed. H. Cabot Lodge, 1886. See also, 
Bernier, 1., International Aspects of Federalism, London (1973), p.l8. 
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used to be before the entry into the union agreement. The result according to Waitz 
is that both the central authority and the federating States were sovereign and 
independent in the spheres retained by each of them. 204 
Oppenheim, who himself is a supporter of divisible sovereignty, had taken the 
matter a bit further than Waitz, because while Waitz did not specifically say that the 
federating units possess international personality, Oppenheim categorically stated 
they do. After examining the situation with the German Empire after the peace of 
Westphalia and the establishment of the United States of America and Switzerland 
as federal states, the learned author was able to distinguish between what he terms 
partially and fully sovereign states. According to him partially sovereign states, 
such as the member states of a federation as in the case of Germany, USA and 
Switzerland and protected states and all states which are under suzerainty are 
international persons and subjects of international law. Accordingly he stated: 
They cannot be full, perfect, and normal subjects of international law there is 
no doubt. But it is inaccurate to maintain that they have no international 
position whatever. Once it is appreciated that is not so much the possession 
of sovereignty which determines the possession of international personality 
but rather the possession of rights, duties and powers in international law, it 
is apparent that a state which possesses some, but not all, of those rights, 
duties and powers is nevertheless an international person.205 
The divisible sovereignty highlighted above best describes the type of federation by 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which was first formed into a federation by the 
coming together of the nine Emirates on February 25th, 1968. Hitherto the Emirates 
were British protected States who regained their independence in 1971,206 but who 
later came together to form a federation, first through a treaty but later replaced by a 
204 Waitz, 1., Grundzuge der Politik, Kiel, (1862), pp. 43-45. See also, Bernier, (ibid). 
205 Jennings R. and Watts, A., Oppenheim's International Law, ninth edition, Harlow: Longman, 
(1992), p. 123 
206 AI-Muslemani A.A., "The Legal Aspect of the Gulf Cooperation Council," PhD thesis, 
University of London, (1989), pp. 48- 52. 
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Constitution, No. 1 of 1996. Concerning natural resources, Article 23 of the United 
Arab Emirate Constitutional Amendment No. 1 of 1996, places the natural 
resources and wealth in each Emirate as the public property of that Emirate.207 This 
thus constitutes the first and probably the only known case of federating units' 
absolute control of maritime resources. 
3. The Concept of Indivisible Sovereignty in federal States 
Contrary to the views expressed above, some writers have argued that sovereignty 
in federal States is indivisible and can only reside with either the federating units or 
the central authority depending upon whether the union itself was established by 
Treaty or whether after the Treaty of Union, the union decided to replace the Treaty 
by a Constitutional act. Accordingly the proponents of the view (of which Calhoun 
and Von Seydel are notable),208 are of the opinion that as long as the Treaty of the 
union still subsists, the individual federating unit still retains its sovereignty. They 
argued further that sovereignty is however transferred to the central authority when 
the federating units decided to replace the Treaty establishing the union with a 
Constitution. In other words that both the federating units and the federation cannot 
possess sovereignty simultaneously, it either belongs to one or it belongs to the 
other. 
4. The concept of concurrent sovereignty in Federal States 
Another postulation put forward especially by Nawiasky for the explanation of the 
relationship of federal States and their federating units is that sovereignty is 
concurrent between them. This according to him is because a federation being a 
conglomeration of states, sovereignty necessarily rests on all of them concurrently, 
without any of them being subordinated one to the other. Thus, when the 
competence of any of the federating units is modified one way or another by the 
207 http;//wwwhelplinelaw .com/law/uae/constitution/constitutionO l.php 
208 Calhoun, "A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States, in The Works of 
John C. Calhoun," ed. R. C. Cralle, Charrleston and New York, Appleton ( 1851 - 81 ), pp. Ill -
406: Seydel, V., Der Bundesstaatsbegriff, en ZeitschriftjU die gesammte Staatswissenschaft, 28, 
(1872), 185-256 
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federal authorities, Nawiaski209 argues it is not a violation of their sovereignty since 
according to him the federation itself must be taken as acting in accordance with the 
will of the federating units. With respect to international personality, Nawiaski 
looks on it as a matter purely of competence and that once the central authority has 
been charged with the exclusive responsibility to conduct foreign affairs on behalf 
of the federating units, the central authority it is that must enjoy international 
personality but when the federating units retain for themselves certain aspects of 
international competence, to that extent, the federating units should be regarded as 
subjects of internationallaw.210 
5. The Views of the International Law Commission 
The divergence of opinions seen in the above discussions is a reflection of the 
controversial nature of the relationship between the federation and its component 
units. The various attempts made by the International Law Commission to resolve 
the divergence, ended up in producing conflicting reports. Thus in a report on the 
subject prepared by Lauterpacht in 1953, it was reasoned that treaties concluded by 
member states of a federation are treaties in the meaning of international law. 211 
This means units of a federation which conclude an international treaty are to be 
regarded as international legal persons. In 1958, another report prepared by 
Fitzmaurice contained a different view. It stated that in so far as the component 
units of a federation are empowered or authorised under the Constitution of the 
federation to negotiate or enter into treaties with foreign nations, even if it is in their 
own name, they do so as agents for the federation, which alone possessing 
international personality, is necessarily the entity that becomes bound by the treaty 
and responsible for carrying it out.212 A further opinion was expressed in the 1962 
edition of the International Law Commission report, which was edited by Waldock. 
In that edition, the view was expressed that if the constitution of a federation 
confers upon its federating units the power to enter into agreements directly with 
209 Nawiasski, H., Der Bundesstaat als Rechtsbegriff, Ttibingen, (1920). 
210 Ibid, p.49; See in particular, Bernier, op. cit., note 284, p.22. 
211 Yearbook of International Law Commission (1953), vol. ii, p.139 
212 Yearbook of International Law Commission, (19580, vol. ii, p. 24 
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foreign nations, the federating units in that circumstance are exercising the power in 
the capacity only as an organ of the federation. 213 
6. Criticisms against the views 
First and foremost, the statement by the South West to the effect that "how far a 
country exercises jurisdiction into the sea is a matter of international law and not 
even constitutional law: is partly correct and partly incorrect. It is correct to the 
extent that the maritime areas and the activities thereon are generally governed by 
international law, but incorrect, because international law empowers coastal States 
to enact domestic laws to claim the rights endowed them by it and to regulate 
marine activities within their areas of sovereignty, sovereign right or jurisdiction. 
Therefore, domestic laws operate alongside international law on the sea areas 
within the national jurisdiction. The position of the South West mentioned above 
reflects a more pragmatic and realistic argument on the matter. This is reasonable 
considering the argument that the TS formed part of national territory of a coastal 
State. It assumes (though not conclusively) for example that TS being part of the 
national territory, a return to true federalism would enable the FCU to have control 
over the resources of the TS, while the CS beyond the TS being a matter for 
international law, only the centre, that is the Federal Government could take control 
of that area on behalf of the entire Nigerian State. 
Furthermore, while Professor Sagay' s views on true federalism and divisible 
sovereignty may be correct with respect to federal States, which specifically share 
foreign affairs matters with their federating units, it is not completely true with 
respect to Nigeria and some other federal States where foreign affairs matters are in 
the exclusive competence of the federal authority. In such States where foreign 
affairs matters are reserved exclusively for the central authority and the constituent 
units charged with only certain domestic responsibilities, it cannot be plausibly said 
that the federating units possess any element of international personality or can be 
regarded ~s subjects of international law. This is so for example in the case of 
213 Yearbook oflntemational Law Commission (1962), vol. ii, p. 36 
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Nigeria, where after foreign affairs powers have been exclusively reserved for the 
central government, what is usually left is domestic matters, which to all intents 
and purposes would not qualify the units for international personality or make them 
subjects of international law. 
Furthermore, the rights, duties and powers, which could qualify federating units for 
international personality as proposed by Oppenheim are in reality usually vested in 
the central government by the constitution. The fact that sovereignty is not divided 
' 
in the case of the federation of Nigeria is made manifest by the provisions of 
Section 2(1) of the 1999, Nigerian Constitution, which is to the effect that "Nigeria 
is one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign State ... " It is also on the basis of the 
above contention that Governor Alarnieyeseigha of Bayelsa state of Nigeria was 
refused state immunity by the High Court in England in R (on the application of 
Diepreye Solomon Peter Alamieyeseigha vs. Crown Prosecution Service).214 This is 
made manifest in the judgment of the court, which basically relies on the certificate 
issued by the Secretary of State, to the effect that: 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a State for the purposes of Part 1 of the 
Act. Bayelsa state is a constituent territory of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
a federal State for the purposes of Part 1 of the Act. Chief Alamieyeseigha is 
the Governor and Chief Executive of Bayelsa state and is not to be regarded 
for the purposes of Part 1 of the Act as Head of State of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria.215 
Furthermore, accepting the views of Professor Sagay would be tantamount to 
accepting that the federating units for instance and the Nigerian federal State have 
equal sovereignty, equal international legal personality and that none between the 
two tiers of government is subordinate one to the other. If Sagay's proposition were 
to be accepted, the FCU, it appears would have justification for attempting to wrest 
ownership of the maritime territory from the federation, whereas in reality this is 
214 (2005) EWHC 2704 (Admin) 
215 Ibid. 
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not the case. The conclusion is thus fraught with some legal uncertainty as to which 
of the two equal sovereigns should be recognised by the international community as 
capable of representing Nigeria internationally and which between the two of them 
should possess the necessary legal capacity to assume ownership and control of the 
maritime territory and its resources. It is trite law that a State would not be 
permitted by the other members of the international community to present two faces 
to them, a federal State is either represented by its central authority or it is 
represented by the federating units. 216 Accepting the above views would also be 
tantamount to accepting one side of an argument to the neglect of others, which 
sometimes may be overwhelming and probably more credible and compendious. 
This is so because the learned Professor in holding the views as he did clearly 
disregards the opinions of other writers and the practice of States on the matter. 
Calhoun and Von Seydel's indivisible sovereignty, though it best describes 
Nigeria's type of federation as can be seen in the provisions of section 2(1) of 1999 
Nigerian Constitution, the views can be criticised in various ways. In the first place, 
by assuming that all federal States came into been through treaty obligations is 
preposterous and overlooks the situation of some federal states that came into being 
without any formal treaty obligation, but through colonial impositions, some of 
which were later ratified by constitutional acts. Nigeria is an example of such States. 
Secondly, it is preposterous for the learned authors to have assumed that every state 
that enters a federal union was a sovereign State before entering the union. 
Experience has shown in Australia, United States, Canada and Nigeria, that some of 
the federating units were mere colonial appendages before becoming members of 
the unions. In Nigeria for example all the regions that were joined together to form 
the federation of Nigeria were either former protectorates or former colonies. 
Nigeria started as a unitary state, but later transmuted to a federation in 1951. 
Consequently, the present federating units were not independent sovereign states 
before the formation of the Nigerian federal union and thus did not bring any 
216 See Laskin, B., "Some International Legal Aspects of Federalism; the Experience of Canada" in 
Federalism and the New Nations of Africa, Currie edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
(1964 ), p.391. 
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sovereignty into the union. Thus Calhoun and Seydel's views have been generally 
discountenanced by several other authors and those who did not discountenance the 
views like Zorn, Borel and Le Fur are generally of the view that sovereignty in 
federal States rests on the central authority rather than on the individual federating 
units. 
The concurrent sovereignty it has been argued was accepted, by the then USSR to 
the extent that the Academy of Sciences of the country wrote a book, where it is 
stated the Soviet Union is a sovereign State but that "this state of affairs does not 
reduce or quantitatively affect the sovereignty and independence of each Union 
Republic". 217 However, apart from the case of the UAE above, it is wrong to 
generalise that all member states of a federation were full-fledged States before the 
formation of a federal union. More importantly, some of the views examined were 
expressed over a century ago and to that extent have been overtaken by state 
practice. 
7. Practice of Federal States regarding the legal status of federating units 
Theory as well as opinion juris have failed to resolve finally the question of the 
legal status of federating units of a federation. In international law, when a search 
for a solution to an international legal question cannot be found both in theory and 
in opinion juris, attention is normally turned to the practice of States which is 
another source of international law for a possible solution. Therefore, in our search 
for the correct legal status of the units of a federation vis-a-vis the federation, 
attention will necessarily tum to the practice of federal States in general. This is 
seen below at three levels: 
(a) Judicial practice 
(b) Constitutional practice 
(c) Foreign affairs practice 
217 International Law, an undated publication of the Academy of Sciences of USSR, p. 91; See for a 
more detailed explanation on the issue in Soviet Yearbook of International Law (1963), pp. l 05 -8 
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7.1 Judicial practice 
From the judicial point of view and contrary to the views expressed by some of the 
theories examined above, sovereignty in federal States is generally regarded as 
appertaining to the federation as opposed to the various units that make up the 
federation and thus it is the federation as opposed to the units that possesses 
international personality. 
7.1.1 United States 
In the United States for example, a number of Supreme Court decisions have made 
similar declarations. The court asserted in United States vs. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corporation - a case which has to do with the question of the foreign affairs powers 
of the United States that: As a member of the family of nations, the right and power 
of the United States in that field are equal to the right and power of the other 
members of the international family. Otherwise, the United States is not completely 
sovereign.218 Also, the same court in New York vs. United States held that 'the states 
on entering the union surrendered some of their sovereignty' ?19 The court has also 
held in Mackenzie vs. Hare that as a Government, the United States is invested with 
all the attributes of sovereignty' ?20 
7.1.2 India 
In India a similar view as above has been held with respect to the federal State of 
India. This is in the case of D. D. Cement Co. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax. In 
that case, certain rulers entered into a treaty of union, whereby they agreed to form 
a union to be known as the Patiala and East Punjab States Union. In a disagreement 
that followed thereafter, the court held that the treaty was a treaty in the 
international sense of the term and as a result would not be enforceable in a 
domestic court. Specifically, the court was of the opinion that: 
The agreement embodies the terms on which the rulers agreed and decided to 
unite or federate and bring into existence a new International Persona (sic). 
218 299 US (1936), p. 304 at 318. 
219 326 US (1946), p. 572 at 594. 
220 239 US (1915), p. 299 at 311. 
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This is one of the circumstances under which a State personality breaks or 
ceases to exist and the results in such a case are not materially different from 
those which flow when a sovereign State cedes to or is subjugated by another 
sovereign State.221 
7 .1.3 Nigeria 
In Nigeria, the Supreme Court in Abia case has this to say with regards to 
the status of the Nigerian state vis-a-vis the federating units: 
... Nigeria as a sovereign State is a member of the international 
community. The littoral defendant States, not being sovereign, are not, 
either individually or collectively. In exercise of its sovereignty, 
Nigeria from time to time enters into treaties - both bilateral and 
multilateral. The conduct of external affairs is on the exclusive 
legislative list. The power to conduct such affairs is, therefore, in the 
Government of the Federation to the exclusion of any other political 
component unit in the Federation. 222 
It is obvious therefore that sovereignty in federal states rests on the State as entity 
and not on the individual federating units. 
7.2 Constitutional practice 
It is not only in judicial practice that the federation as opposed to the units is agreed 
to possess international legal personality and sovereignty; the view is supported by 
the Constitution of a number of federal States. 
7.2.1 Germany 
In Germany, Article 32(1) of the German Basic Law223 is instructive on the matter. 
It provides that the foreign relations of Germany shall be conducted by the 
Federation and where the Lander have power to legislate, they may according to 
221 (1955), All Indian Report (Pepsu), 3; See also, (1955), vol. 49, A.J.I.L., p. 573 
222 Supra, p. 589 
223 1949 as amended on 20th December, 1993 
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paragraph (3) of Article 32 conclude Treaties with other States but they must first 
and foremost obtain the consent of the Federal Government. Further provisions with 
respect to foreign affairs powers of Germany can be seen in Article 59(1 ), which 
empowers the Federal President to represent the country internationally and Article 
73(1), which vests in the Federal Government the exclusive legislative powers over 
foreign affairs matters. 
7 .2.2 Switzerland 
In Switzerland, it is Article 8 of the Constitution; it empowers the Swiss State with 
"the sole right to declare war and conclude peace, and to make alliances and treaties, 
particularly customs and commercial treaties with foreign States. By virtue of 
Article 9 thereof, the Cantons are empowered to enter into treaty relations with 
foreign states with respect to matters of public economy, frontier relations and 
police. It may be argued that the two Articles above confer concurrent foreign 
affairs powers on both the federation and the Cantons but a look at the provisions of 
Article 18 thereof suggests that before any Canton could conduct any foreign 
relations it has to go through the Federal Council. This is akin to the German 
provisions which require the consent of the Federal Government before a Lander 
could enter into foreign treaty relation. 
7 .2.3 United States 
The case with the United States is similar in many respects to the position in 
Germany and Switzerland. In this regard, Article 1, section 10, clause 1 of the 
Constitution makes clear that the constituent states of the Union are forbidden from 
entering into any treaty, alliance or confederation. However, as in Germany, clause 
3 of Article 1 stated that no state shall, without the consent of Congress ... enter into 
any Agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power. Article II, 
section 1 on the ot~?-er hand gives the President the power to enter into treaty 
relations on behalf of the United States, while Article VI makes all such treaties 
under the authority of the country the supreme law of the land. The Articles 
mentioned have been held by the Supreme Court in U.S. vs. Arjona to indicate that 
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responsibility for foreign affairs in the United States is vested solely in the federal 
government. 224 
7 .2.4 Nigeria 
With respect to Nigeria, the following matters are contained in the Exclusive 
Legislative List: Defence (item 17), Diplomatic, Consular and trade representation 
(item 20), External Affairs (item 26), Implementation of treaties relating to matters 
on the exclusive legislative list (item 31) and mines and minerals, including oil 
fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas (item 39).225 As can be seen, 
the above are matters connected either directly or indirectly with foreign affairs, 
their presence therefore in the exclusive legislative list, connotes absence of similar 
powers in the federating units?26 Going by the provisions of Section 12 (2), the 
National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part thereof with 
respect to matters not included in the Exclusive Legislative List for the purpose of 
implementing a treaty. In addition to that, Section 4 (4) (a) gives the National 
Assembly the power to legislate on any matter contained in the Concurrent 
legislative List and if any law enacted by the House of Assembly of a state is 
inconsistent with the laws enacted by the National Assembly, such state laws to the 
extent of their inconsistency shall be null and void.227 
The practice whereby the units of the federation are empowered subject only to the 
consent of the federation to enter into treaty relation with foreign countries has been 
argued to confer concurrent sovereignty on the units and thus international 
personality. This argument may be debunked on many grounds. First, the provisions 
requiring the consent of the Federal Government before the units could enter into 
treaty relations with foreign States should be seen as a subordination of the units 
concerned to the authority of the federation, who may withhold the consent in 
particular cases. Evidence of such subordination is also seen in the provisions 
224 120 US 479 (1887. See also U.S. vs. Curtis Wright Export Corporation 299 U.S. 304(1936). 
225 Second Schedule, Part 1, 1999 Nigerian Constitution. 
226 Section 4(2) &(3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution excludes the Federating Units from 
le,rislating on matters contained in the Exclusive Legislative List 
22 Ibid, subsection (5) 
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making the laws of the units which are contrary to the laws of the federation to be 
null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 228 
7.3 Foreign Affairs practice 
Furthermore, the Foreign Secretaries or Foreign Affairs Ministers as the case may 
be are usually appointed by the Federal Government and they carry out the foreign 
or external affairs of the respective States. The federating units in most cases do not 
possess equivalent power, a single foreign secretary or minister represents the entire 
State internationally. Furthermore, apart from the isolated cases seen in the former 
USSR, whereby units such as Byelorussia (now Belarus) and Ukraine became 
original members of the UN in 1945, it is only the central government that is 
usually recognised by the members of the international community as possessing 
this power. Though the isolated cases referred to above might have been done to 
enhance and widen the political representation of the then USSR in the UN, the 
action had legal connotation, in that it gave the two units international personality 
and made them subjects of international law. That practice has now changed with 
the disintegration of the USSR and Byelorussia and Ukraine each becoming an 
independent sovereign state of its own. In practice therefore, it is the federation as 
opposed to the units that is usually saddled with the responsibility for foreign affairs. 
The statement is equally true with regards to Canada where the situation with 
Quebec has led to competition over foreign affairs matters. 
8. Does one True kind of Federalism exist in reality? 
Federalism as practised differs from State to State. In America, which is commonly 
regarded as an epitome of true federalism, the constituent states' foreign affairs 
powers are subject to the consent of the Federation, whereas in the former Soviet 
Union, the member states' foreign affairs powers appeared to be unrestricted. In 
America the constituent states do not control oceanic resources, except the 
resources within the one marine league granted the Atlantic and Pacific states and 
the three marine leagues granted the states along the Gulf of Mexico. The grants 
228 See for example Article 31 of German Basic Law 
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notwithstanding, the United States still maintains its sovereignty over parts of the 
TS granted to the states. In some Federal States, such as the UAE, it may be argued 
that the constituent units are not completely divested of foreign affairs powers. Thus 
it would appear that though federalism is a system of governance, which best 
addresses diversity and interests of the minority in any given federal State; it may 
be an illusion to speak of true federalism. 
The International Conference on Federalism, which took place in Brussels, Belgium 
on the 25th of March, 2005 was confronted with the4 question of true federalism. 
The Prime Minister of Belgium, Guy Verhofstadt had this to say on the matter: 
One fit-all" federal model does not exist. Each situation requires a tailor 
made approach, adapted to the needs of a particular cultural, historic and 
demographic environment. Changing a state's system is a gradual complex 
process, which implies giving and taking in a spirit of compromise and 
sometimes highly technical solutions.229 
The Nigerian former President, Chief Obasanjo, in his paper entitled, "How to 
Strengthen Federal Institutions" reiterated the fact that there is no true federalism. 
He stated: 
It is my hope that some of the issues raised about reality and practice of 
federalism in Nigeria will be useful to this conference as we collectively 
strive for the most transparent, inclusive, tolerant, participatory and 
democratic political arrangement that can best guarantee democracy around 
the world. 230 
It may therefore be right to conclude on this aspect with the observations of Dr Alex 
Ekweme, the Second Republic Vice President of Nigeria as follows: 
"There is no one formula of what is federalism or true federalism, as 
Nigerians like to say. There isn't a true one or a false one. Each country has 
to adopt or adapt the federal principles according to its own peculiarities .. .I 
229 Obiawu, "Reconciling contending issues in Nigeria's quest for true federalism," Guardian 
Newspaper, 14th march, 2005 in http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/policy_politics/articleOl 
230 Ibid. 
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do not think there is any other country in the world with about 350 ethnic 
nationalities, 140 million people with three large ethnic nationalities; others 
not so large, and some very small. These are attributes peculiar to Nigeria. 
Therefore, our federalism must take into consideration the peculiarities of 
Nigeria's landscape and be tailored to optimise the benefits to the masses."231 
In reality therefore, there is no one-fit-all federalism each federal State attempts to 
formulate its own federalism the way that suits its own peculiarities. 
9. Could a return to true Federalism grant a positive right of control of maritime 
territory and resources on the FCU? 
While a return to the type of federalism being advocated by the FCU may, (going 
by the position of Nigerian Constitution on revenue sharing) warrant the treatment 
of resources of the TS as being located within the territories of the FCU and hence 
the extension of their shares to the revenue accruing from those resources. It is 
however doubtful, if this would have any visible impact on the question of 
ownership and control of the TS itself and in the revenue and the sovereign right 
and jurisdiction, which Nigeria possesses over the EEZ and the CS. This is so 
because the most basic feature of a federal state is that authority over internal affairs 
is divided by the constitution between the federal authorities and the member states 
of the federation, while foreign affairs are normally handled by the Federal 
Government. Both the previous and current Nigerian Constitutions contain 
provisions delineating the spheres of influence or jurisdiction of the respective 
governments of Nigeria. For instance, fishing and fisheries other than fishing and 
fisheries in rivers, lakes, water-ways, ponds and other inland waters within Nigeria 
fall within the exclusive legislative list of the Federal Government. Similarly, 
maritime shipping and navigation, mines and minerals including oil fields, oil 
mining, geological surveys and natural gas232 all fall within the exclusive legislative 
competence of the Federal Government. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Section 4 (2) of the Nigerian Constitution, 1999; See also Items 29, 36 and 39 of Part 1, Second 
Schedule of the Constitution, which contains matters falling within the exclusive legislative 
competence of the Government of Nigeria 
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Furthermore, the maritime territory of a coastal State is governed to a large extent 
by international law. Similarly a coastal State is granted the right to legislate on 
certain specified matters. But because the rights of a coastal State over the various 
maritime zones derive primarily from international law, coupled with the fact that 
such rights in the majority of cases involve the interplay of other States and the 
security of their individual States, maritime territory apart from the isolated case of 
the UAE has generally been regarded by most States as falling within foreign affairs. 
In Nigeria as in most other federal States, external affairs fall within the exclusive 
competence of the Federal Government. Ownership in the FCU of the maritime 
territory would no doubt entail engagement by the FCU in foreign relations such as 
entering into Treaty relations with foreign States in case of maritime negotiation 
and delimitation, international navigation, resource exploration and exploitation. 
These activities presently fall within foreign matters, which are the exclusive 
preserve of the Federal government. 233 
Furthermore, it is doubtful if a return to true federalism as advocated with 
concomitant amendments to the nation's constitution would lead to transfer of the 
entire federation's interests and authority over the maritime territory and resources 
to the FCU. This is so because as long as Nigeria remains a federal State; return to 
true federalism would have little impact on the international law provisions which 
vest sovereignty over the TS and sovereign rights and jurisdiction on a State as an 
entity. As long as Nigeria remains one nation, it would be a Herculean or near 
impossible task to negotiate a constitution which would completely divest the other 
federating units not being part of FCU of their interests in the maritime territory and 
resources. 
Already, the federating units from the north have opposed the type of true 
federalism that would warrant control of maritime resources by the FCU. In their 
agenda to the National Conference mentioned earlier, delegates from the north had 
maintained that the derivation principle and other variables embodied in section 162 
233 Item 31 of Part 1, second schedule of the 1999 Constitution 
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(2) of the 1999 Constitution which are to be taken into account by the National 
Assembly in the formulation of a law to regulate revenue allocation, should not be 
tampered with. Secondly, it is their considered opinion that argument for resource 
control is untenable because according to them, "resources from other parts of 
Nigeria were used to make the initial investment at the exploration state which 
ultimately led to the discovery of oil and subsequent exploitation in these areas. 
Third and most important, that "such argument ignores the universal practice by 
which it is the nation State and not the component units which exercises absolute 
control over natural resources."234 It has also been held that the other federating 
units from the north are poised to adopting a similar position.Z35 Thus the debate on 
this issue at the conference became so intractable that the conference ended without 
adopting a particular stance on resource control and true federalism. It is therefore 
difficult to see how a return to what has been termed true federalism as advocated 
by the FCU would give them their dream of total control of the resources of the 
maritime territory of Nigeria. 
III - Agitation and the right of Self determination 
In recent times, the agitation by the FCU has transcended mere calls for true 
federalism to calls for self determination. The agitation is gradually assuming an 
alarming proportion with disruptions of economic activities, (especially oil 
exploration and exploitation) of the Niger Delta areas by the various interest groups 
that have now emerged and which are championing the course of self determination 
of the Niger Delta people. The agitation for self determination in Nigeria is not 
limited to the Niger Delta people; among the Igbo people in the Eastern part of 
Nigeria, the Movement for the Actualisation of a Sovereign State of Biafra 
(MASSOB) has consistently claimed the right to self determination for the Igbo 
people. The agitation by MASSOB, (which has been regarded in many quarters as a 
resurgence of events that plunged Nigeria into the civil war of 1967 to 1970) 
recently led to a public declaration by its members of the independence and 
234 Vanguard Newspaper of Friday, 18th of March, 2005 in 
http://www .vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/l8032005/f318032005 
235 Ibid. 
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sovereignty of the lgbo people from the Federal Republic of Nigeria with 
headquarters in Aha. However, while the reason for the agitation by MASSOB 
centres basically on supposed marginalisation of the Igbo as a people in the scheme 
of things in Nigeria, the agitation by the Niger Delta people has to do mainly with 
the ownership and control of the maritime territory and its resources. 
The activities of MASSOB have influenced in no small measure the current 
agitation by the Niger Delta people, because some of the federating units that make 
up the lgboland are equally oil producing states and as a result partake in the 
clamour for control of the maritime territory and its resources. The question that 
needs be examined in this context is the extent to which the Niger Delta people 
including their Igbo component can avail themselves of the rights to self 
determination either under international law which governs the principle or whether 
such rights are contemplated by the domestic laws of Nigeria. 
The interest groups within the FCU; particularly in the Niger Delta area could be 
divided into four with each of them possessing its individual aims and objectives. 
On this basis it will be easier to explain that while some of the groups are in favour 
of external self determination of the Niger Delta areas outside of the framework of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria, others are not so interested. 
The first among the interest groups is the group of politicians and government 
officials, some of whom have occupied or are still occupying or are jostling to 
occupy exalted governmental positions at either the federal or state levels. This 
group to which the South-South Peoples Assembly may be categorised does not 
favour disintegration of the Nigerian state per se and if they did, they have been 
passive about it and would rather prefer that the Niger Delta continues to remain an 
integral part of the Nigerian state where they would continue to have the 
opportunity of aspiring to any level in the government of the country. To continue 
to play a key role in the scheme of things and as far as their interests are continued 
to be protected, they would favour one Nigeria. Members of this group span all 
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cadres of politicians and other government officials (both past and present). This 
group worked very hard to ensure that the South-South geopolitical zone produced 
the next president of Nigeria, in the April, 2007 general elections, but succeeded 
only in producing the Vice President. 
The second group comprises the indigenous non governmental organisations 
(NGOS). This group consists of activists and critics whose main concern as in the 
first group is not the disintegration of the Nigerian State per se, but require a 
'negotiated agreement' for the continued existence of Niger Delta (FCU) in Nigeria, 
whereby the people of that region would have a 'fair deal' of whatever benefits are 
derivable from that region. This explains the reason for the unflinching support the 
group has lent to the calls for the convocation of Sovereign National Conference by 
the Government of Nigeria. Being composed of active and restive youths, this 
group has been in the forefront in showing its anger, disenchantment and 
resentment about the attitude of the oil companies operating in the Niger Delta areas 
and in the sensitisation of the people of that region and the international community 
and the powers that be at the federal level to the devastation of their rivers and , 
farmlands by the multinational oil and gas companies, who according to the group, 
usually spend money in order to get into a community for oil drilling but leave after 
the exhaustion of the oil in that area without any visible developmental impact in 
the community. 236 The group has complained bitterly too about what they 
considered the seeming insensitivity of the government to the pollution of the Niger 
Delta environment through oil exploration and exploitation. The group comprises 
the !jaws both at home and abroad and recently have embarked upon international 
protests to draw the attention for example of the British Prime Minister, the Foreign 
Affairs Secretary, the British Parliament, the European Union, the Secretary 
General of the Commonwealth and the Representative of the United Nations in the 
United Kingdom to what has been termed economic exploitation and ecological 
236 See the Vanguard Newspaper's exclusive interview with the leader of !jaw Youths (the Egbesu) 
in the issue of 8th May 2004 in www.vanguard ngr.com 
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warfare on the Ijaws and other Niger Delta nationalities.237 It is their desire that the 
Federal Government should show more concern for their plight and also curb its 
military excesses by restricting it from what has been termed incessant killings of 
Ijaws openly, secretly and extra-judicially.238 Also, that the Multinational Oil and 
Gas Companies should use the type of international standards they have applied and 
are still applying in other advanced petroleum producing countries to control the 
pollution and other degradation of their environment. 
The third group includes those who do not want the FCU to continue to remain in 
Nigeria. The Ijaw Republican Assembly and the Movement for the Survival of 
Ogoni People (MOSOP) for example belong to this group. To this group, the FCU 
have not received their fair entitlements from what accounts for well over 80% of 
the revenue of Nigeria derivable from 'their land'. To them therefore, once they 
cannot get what they rightly deserve from what they termed 'their wealth', it would 
be right for them to go "our different ways none violently as a nation."239 
The fourth group has similar ideology and views with the third group; they are 
however different in their modus operandi. While the third group believes in non 
violence in achieving the independence and sovereignty of the Niger Delta from the 
Nigerian state, the fourth group is well armed, more militant and has oftentimes 
adopted an arms struggle to achieve that purpose. To this group belongs the Niger 
Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Niger Delta Vigilante. Recently 
too, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) could be 
added to the list. Their revolutionary ideologies are similar in many respects to 
those of the arms wing of the African National Congress and the Irish Republican 
Army. This group has persistently agitated for self determination of the FCU in the 
form of total independence and sovereignty from the Nigerian State through the use 
of force. The group is in the forefront in the campaign for resource control. Its 
237 Ibid, of IO!h March, 2006. 
238 Ibid. 
239 See lghodaro, "Dokubo Spits Fire," in Vanguard Newspaper of Nov. 20, 2004, 
www. vanguardngr.com/articles/2002/cover/f320 ll2004.htrnl, p. 3. 
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modus operandi has drawn the attention of Nigerian Government at a time when the 
group threatened to blow up oil pipelines and demand the order for the oil 
companies operating in that region to vacate within a deadline set by it. The 
Government was forced to enter into dialogue with the leaders of some of the 
groups to the neglect of some others. This has led other groups that did not initially 
believe in violence to achieve their objectives to think that the only language that 
would probably draw the attention of Nigerian Government to hearken to their 
demands for self determination and resource control is the resort to the use of force. 
It is obvious from the interpretation and the way and manner of the usage of the 
concept of self determination by MASSOB and other interest groups that they both 
lack a clear and proper understanding of the meaning and scope of operation of that 
concept. This therefore, calls for a proper elucidation of the concept. It is hoped that 
in doing this, the above mentioned groups and any other like minded groups or 
individual in Nigeria would take that opportunity to apprise themselves with the 
true meaning and the scope of operation of self determination. This would enable 
them to assess the legality or otherwise of their actions before embarking on them. 
1. The meaning and scope of self determination 
The concept, of 'self determination' is now so widely used that Cassese considers it 
as having attained the status of a "general principle of international law."240 It is 
equally recognised by State practice (though still controversial) as a basic principle 
of international law, to which even the status of ius cogens, has been attributed.241 It 
is also this importance that led the ICJ to describe the principle in the East Timor 
case as an obligation erga omnei42 and in the Western Sahara Opinion it accepted 
it as forming part of customary international law .243 It was against the backdrop of 
this importance that self determination found its way into the corpus of international 
24
° Cassese, A., Self Determination of Peoples: A legal reappraisal, Cambridge, ( 1995), at pp. 171 -
2. See also Doehring, K., 'Self Determination', in B. Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: 
A Commentary Oxford University Press, (1994 ), at p. 70. 
241 Malanczuk, P., Modem Introduction to International Law, (Seventh ed.) London, (1997) p. 327 
242 East Timor Case (Portugal vs. Australia), (1995) ICJ. Reports, 90 
243 (1975) ICJ Reports, p.l2 para. 56. 
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law, first and foremost as an anti colonialist standard, secondly as a ban on foreign 
military occupation and lastly as a requirement that all racial groups be given full 
access to government. 244 However, these lofty aims of self determination have 
changed radically over the years from the original intention of the founders; it has 
now become a weapon used by a number of tribal minorities to unilaterally secede 
or agitate to secede from the parent State. This is exactly the case in Nigeria where 
a desire to control maritime resources is now being pursued under the guise of self 
determination. Whether or not this is possible in international law and even under 
the domestic laws of Nigeria is a matter to be considered. 
2. Sources of right of self determination 
Self determination as a principle can now be found in a number of international 
Conventions and resolutions, among which the following are notable: The principle 
is explicitly mentioned in Articles 1(2) of the UN Charter and implicitly mentioned 
in Articles 55, 73 and 76(b) of the same Charter dealing with colonies and other 
dependent territories. It has also found its way into the ICCPR245 , Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by the 
General Assembly in 1960, 246 International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights247, United Nations General Assembly's Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (hereafter Declaration on 
Principles of International Law), which perhaps appears to be the one that contains 
the most far reaching and important provisions on self determination. It stipulated 
that the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples includes the right 
of all people 'freely to determine, without external interference, their political status 
and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development' and the duty of 
every State 'to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the 
244 Cassese, A., International Law, Oxford University Press (2001), p.l06 
245 Article 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
246 Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. 
241 Article 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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Charter'. 248 Others include the UN Conference on Human Rights which adopted 
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,249 African Charter on Human 
and Peoples Rights250 and the UN General Assembly's Declaration on the Occasion 
of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations. 251 Another international legal 
document that has recognized the right to self determination is the Final Act of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. 252 
The methods of achieving self determination envisaged by the above documents, 
particularly the Declaration on Principles of International Law, include for example, 
establishment by the peoples concerned of a sovereign and independent state, the 
free association or integration with another state and the choice of any other 
political status freely accepted by the people. The choices mentioned above, 
particularly the establishment of a sovereign and independent state, association or 
integration with another state and the emergence into any other political status 
freely determined by a people have been severally interpreted to constitute a right to 
external self determination by the peoples concerned. The above influenced the 
clamour for self determination by the people of Niger Delta and the MASSOB in 
Nigeria. The question therefore is whether or not the above statements could be 
interpreted to mean the existence of a right to external self determination in 
international law. There are those that argued that the statements constitute a right 
to external self determination and those who argued it is not. 
It should be noted however, that the documents mentioned while recognising the 
right of peoples to self determination, majority of them contain qualifications, 
which are supportive of the fact that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently 
limited to prevent threats to an existing State's territorial integrity or the stability of 
relations between sovereign States. For example, the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law provides that States shall refrain from any action aimed at the 
248 General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), 24 October, 1970. 
249 A/Conf. 157/24, 251h June 1993 
250 Article 20 
251 General Assembly Resolution 50/6, 9lh November 1995. 
252 Part VIII, 14 ILM 1292 (1975) (Helsinki Final Act). 
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partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other 
State or country. Added to that, the United Nations General Assembly's Declaration 
of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, by providing that member States 
will: 
.... This shall not be construed as authorising or encouraging any action that 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind ... "253 
Similarly, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
states in part VIII that: 
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their 
right to self determination, acting in conformity with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms 
of international Jaw, including those relating to territorial integrity of 
states?54 
Furthermore, after principle 4 of the concluding document on the follow up Meeting 
to the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe confirmed that the 
people always have the right in full freedom to determine, when and as they wish, 
their internal and external political status, principle 5 on the other hand states that 
the participating States: 
will refrain from any violation of this principle and thus from any action 
aimed by direct or indirect means, in contravention of the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, other obligations under 
international Jaw or the provisions of the Final Act, at violating the territorial 
integrity, political independence or the unity of a State. No actions or 
253 Op. cit., n. 251 
254 Op. cit., n. 252 
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situations in contravention of this principle will be recognised as legal by the 
participating States. 255 
Lastly on this point, the Declaration on Principles of International Law provides 
that: 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorising or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, 
the territorial integrity or political unity of a sovereign and independent 
States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights 
and self determination of peoples ... 256 
The participating States are committed to respecting the equal rights of peoples and 
their right to self-determination only when the peoples concerned conduct 
themselves or act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations, especially with regard to territorial integrity of States. This is a 
clear declaration of opposition to external self-determination in the sense that would 
dismember or obliterate the territorial integrity and political independence of the 
parent State. This presupposes that international law expects that the right to self 
determination should be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing 
sovereign States and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of 
those States and not that those States possessed the right of secession from the 
existing State. 
However, the Declaration on Principles of International Law quoted above, 
contains another parallel statement, which requires States to conduct themselves in 
compliance with the principles of equal rights and self determination. This is similar 
to a paragraph in the United Nations General Assembly's Declaration of the Fiftieth 
Anniversary which requests States to conduct themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of 
255 Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe- Follow -up Meeting, 4th Nov. 1986- 19th 
Jan. 1989; See http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990- 1999/hd/cope90e.htm. 
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Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without any 
distinction of any kind. The clause has been severally interpreted to support the 
existence in international law of a right to external self determination. It is argued 
that a right to external self determination in the form of secession exists in 
international law, when a State has failed to conduct itself in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination and cannot provide a Government 
that is representative enough to accommodate the whole people belonging to the 
territory without any distinction. That a right to external self determination must be 
available to a people when they are blocked from the meaningful exercise of the 
right to self determination internally, they should be entitled, as a last resort, to 
exercise it by secession. 
Apart from the above, the Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Secession of 
Quebec noted that there are certain defined contexts within which the right to the 
self-determination of peoples does allow that right to be exercised "externally", 
which, according to that court would potentially mean secession. The court 
identified those under colonial rule or foreign occupation as falling within the 
category of peoples entitled to external self-determination. According to the court, 
this entitlement is based upon the assumption that both classes make up entities that 
are inherently distinct from the Colonialist Power and the occupant Power and that 
their territorial integrity, all but destroyed by the colonialist or occupying Power, 
should be fully restored. The last category identified by the court is where a people 
are subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation outside colonial 
context.257 This last category finds support in Article 55 of the UN Charter and 
under the Declaration on Friendly Relations mentioned above. A principle of the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations for example states as follows: 
.. Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, the 
realisation of the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples, 
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to 
257 See judgment of 20 Aug., 1998, http://www.uni.ca/ru1e law .html; ILR (Lauterpacht and 
Greenwood), vol. 115, p. 536- 539 
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the United Nations in carrying out the responsibility entrusted to it by the 
Charter regarding implementation of the principle, in order: 
(a) To promote friendly relations and co-operation among States; and 
(b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely 
expressed will of the peoples concerned; 
Bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation constitutes a violation of the principles, as well as a denial of 
fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter of the United Nat ions ... 258 
The question now is, whether the control of maritime resources, which forms the 
basis of the agitation for self-determination by the Niger Delta people fall within the 
category noted above? Secondly, whether the circumstances guaranteeing external 
self-determination could avail MASSOB of a unilateral right of secession from 
Nigeria? The answer to the two questions above is negative for the reasons 
elaborated below. 
3. Why the Niger Delta people may not claim right of external self determination. 
The following reasons are responsible for why control of maritime resources cannot 
be ground for a positive right to external self determination of the Niger Delta 
people: 
(a) The Niger Delta people are not under any colonial bondage, not under any 
foreign occupation and are not under any alien subjugation as determined by the 
Reference re Secession of Quebec. 
(b) Furthermore, the Niger Delta people are not the victims of attacks or abuses on 
their physical existence or integrity, or of massive violation of their fundamental 
human rights, above all they are not an oppressed people. Their fundamental rights 
and their right to participate and aspire to the highest level of governance are all 
guaranteed and protected by the provisions of the Constitution on Fundamental 
Human Rights. 259 In the legislature, citizens of the Niger Delta are represented at 
both the National Assembly and the House of Representatives in accordance with 
258 Op. cit., n. 248. 
259 Sections 14, 15 and the entire provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 
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Sections 48 and 49 of the Nigerian Constitution of 1999. Section 48 for example 
provides that three Senators will be elected from each state, while Section 49 on the 
other hand provides that ... the House of Representatives shall consist of three 
hundred and sixty members representing constituencies of nearly equal population 
as far as possible, provided that no constituency shall fall within more than one state. 
Within the executive, the Vice President of the Republic, Inspector General of 
Police, the Secretary to Federal Government of Nigeria and the chief of Army Staff 
to mention just a few are from the Niger Delta areas. 
(c) It cannot also be said that the various ethnic nationalities in the Niger Delta 
areas have been denied or are being denied the ability to exert internally their rights 
to self-determination. 
(d) Nigeria as a sovereign and independent State can be argued to be conducting 
itself in accordance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory without distinction. This presupposes that the right to 
external self determination will not avail the Niger Delta people on the basis of 
resource control simpliciter. 
(e) One of the main reasons for the agitation for resources control and self 
determination by the Niger Delta people is that the decisions of the Supreme Court 
in Abia case led to a general reduction in the revenue payable to them and in some 
cases to a need to refund revenues earlier collected by some of them. The Federal 
Government through the Dichotomy Act has now out of magnanimity extended the 
share of the FCU to cover revenue derived from resources of the TS and in some 
cases to resources within the Contiguous Zone. Some federating units that were 
supposed to refund moneys earlier collected have been prevented from doing so by 
the enactment of that Act, therefore the basis of the agitation if any has been pre-
empted by that Act. 
269 
(f) The agitation itself may be argued to be contrary to Section 2 ( 1) of the 1999 
Constitution, which provides that, Nigeria is a one indivisible and indissoluble 
Sovereign State to be known by the name Federal Republic of Nigeria. Not only is 
the agitation contrary to international law, it also finds no support in Nigeria's 
domestic laws. This is the crux of the entire argument, as both the Niger Delta 
people, the MAS SOP and even the Y oruba people in the South West of Nigeria 
agree that as the Nigerian State was not brought into existence originally by the 
agreement of the various nationalities that were amalgamated in 1914, and the 
federation superimposed on them in 1951, there is no legally binding obligation that 
could prevent any of them from seceding. This argument may be debunked on the 
basis of the fact that the Constitution itself is a product of the joint actions of the 
various nationalities and may be regarded as binding on all of them. 
With regards to MASSOB, their agitation for self determination is not based on 
control of maritime resources stricto sensu, but on perceived marginalisation of the 
south-east geopolitical zone mainly dominated by the lbos in the scheme of things 
in Nigeria. What constitute the alleged marginalisation has not been specifically 
spelt out in concrete terms by MASSOP, thus the doubts still persist as to how the 
lbos are marginalised. Is it that the lbos are being prevented from asserting their 
internal right of self determination, which in this case connotes, a people's pursuit 
of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of 
Nigerian state, hence their agitation to assert it externally? Or is it that the lbos are 
been marginalised in terms of distribution of Nigeria's wealth or in terms of 
physical development of the federating units constituting the south-east geopolitical 
zone or are being prevented from aspiring to the highest level of governance in 
Nigeria? 
While in terms of numerical strength, homogeneity of language and culture the 
lbos may qualify as a people entitled to the right of self-determination in the eyes of 
international law, it cannot be plausibly said that they are being denied by the 
Federal Government or anybody at all of access to government. The lbos freely 
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make political choices, have the right to vote and be voted for any political office in 
I 
Nigeria and freely without any hindrance from any quarters whatsoever pursue 
economic, social and cultural development within Nigeria and throughout the whole 
world. In terms of representation in government, the lbos are equitably represented 
in the legislative, executive and judicial organs of the Nigerian government. The 
culture of the lbos epitomised by their language and traditional heritage are given 
the prime of place in all institutions in Nigeria. For instance Igbo language is widely 
adopted as one of the three major National languages, spoken in all national 
networks (radio, television etc) and included in the national curriculum taught in 
schools across the country and the cultural heritage which is widely exhibited and 
enjoyed all over the country. 
MASSOB like the Niger Delta groups noted above could equally be said to 
represent only a fragment of the population of the lbos, as a result it can be argued 
not to represent the views and aspirations of the entire Igbo nationality. This calls to 
question the legitimacy of the agitation itself, which in all ramifications does not 
represent the views and the generality of interests of the entire lbos, the majority of 
whom do not share or believe in external self determination or in the modus 
operandi of MASSOB in securing it. It is therefore difficult to envisage how the 
right to external self-determination can be sustained on the basis of our second 
question above. 
If the agitation by MAS SOB is based on the second question, that is marginalisation 
in terms of distribution of wealth and physical development of Igbo land, it is 
doubtful if that alone even if proven could ground a positive right to unilateral 
secession. In the first place, the distribution of Nigeria's wealth among the 
constituent federating units is a constitutional matter undertaking equitably in-
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.260 It has never been tested in 
any court in Nigeria that the authority charged with the responsibility of distributing 
the national wealth of the country has at any time deliberately withheld or reduce 
260Section 162 (2) of Nigeria's 1999 Constitution 
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portions due to the Igbo people for whatever reason. Above all however, the 
Friendly Relations, it could be argued does not envisage self determination in the 
form of external self determination. This fact could be elicited from the provision 
which states that, nothing shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity 
or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self determination of peoples. 
IV. Conclusions 
In this chapter, developments in Nigeria's domestic laws since the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria's decision in Abia case have been examined. It is found that the decision 
led to an unprecedented condemnation by majority of Nigerians and that it is the 
timely intervention of the Federal Government, that prevented some members of the 
FCU from being asked to refund to the coffers of the Government large sums of 
money earlier received by them from the federation's account, the sums which the 
decision in that case has rendered their collection illegal. The intervention it is 
discovered is in the form of setting up of a commission of enquiry to study the 
decision and to recommend to the Federal Government the best way to cushion the 
hardship necessitated by it. 
The enactment of the Dichotomy Act, following recommendation by the 
commission of enquiry is the first legal approach adopted by the Government to 
cushion the hardship. Since this Act has the implication of altering certain 
provisions of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, it can only be legally enacted after an 
amendment pursuant to section 9 of that Constitution had been· carried out. The 
process of examining this aspect of the Dichotomy Act reveals that no constitution 
was amended before the Act was enacted and passed to law. This and many other 
shortcomings of the Act already noted constitute a fatal error, which has further 
generated another round of controversy and a court case. As a result the Dichotomy 
Act though still a valid legal exercise of the Legislature, it cannot be said 
conclusively to have resolved or abated the title dispute over the Nigeria's maritime 
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space and its resources. 
Thus, the title dispute, which had hitherto raged softly between the Federal 
Government and the FCU, suddenly assumed the dimension of violence and 
demand for total resources ownership and control by the FCU. A further 
examination of the demand for resources ownership and control reveals that the 
demand is hung on two principal legal concepts. The first is the constitutional law 
concept of federalism and the second is the international law concept of right of self 
determination. For example, the concept of federalism is examined in relation to 
international legal personality of federating units and in relation to what is termed 
by the FCU 'true federalism'. The federating units can possess international legal 
personality and control maritime territory and resources when the constitution 
expressly confers such powers, it is however difficult to argue that a federating unit 
possesses such powers where no express provisions of the constitution conferring 
such powers upon it. Even in the few countries where the federating units possess 
some elements of international legal personality, there is marked differences in its 
exercise. In some of these States, exercise of such powers is still generally subject 
to the overall consent of the Federal Government before they could be exercised. 
Notwithstanding, international legal personality of a federating unit in most cases 
does not extend to the maritime areas and their resources. The case of the UAE that 
has been examined is an isolated case and even then, it is still· the UAE that 
UNCLOS addresses and not the various Emirates that constitute it. 
There is no such concept as 'true federalism' or a 'false federalism'. Practice of 
States as exhibited by their legislative, judicial, executive and foreign affairs 
practices reveals a marked differences in the practice of federalism. This been the 
case, a return to the type of federalism advocated by the FCU will still not help their 
campaign any better, because, while the practice of the type of federalism 
advocated may warrant control by FCU of the land territory, it may not warrant 
such control over the maritime territory, which is largely governed by international 
law. 
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Lastly, the thesis examines the legality or otherwise of the demands and claims to 
entitlement to right of self determination by the FCU and other similar groups in 
Nigeria. It also examines the criteria of internal and external self determination and 
the preconditions for the exercise of both rights and whether a desire to wrest 
ownership and control of maritime territory and resources could legally be pursued 
or subsumed under the right of self determination. Investigations into the various 
reasons put forward to justify entitlement to the right of self determination reveals a 
glaring lack of understanding on the part of the FCU of the distinction between 
external and internal self determination and the conditions required for the exercise 
of each of the rights. Apart from their desire to wrest ownership and control the 
maritime territory and resources, the FCU and other similar groups have failed to 
show any legal justification for the exercise of external self determination. A desire 
to own and control maritime territory and resources does not fall within known 
legal criteria stipulated by international law for the exercise of right of external self 
determination. 
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Chapter Six 
5. Experience of some federal States 
I. Introduction 
Attempts have been made to examine the dispute over the maritime territory and 
resources of Nigeria. The conclusion was inter alia that, in spite of all the efforts 
the dispute still rages on and is gradually assuming an unprecedented and dangerous 
dimension and that if not properly managed, it may result in the disintegration of 
the country as a united country. It is against this backdrop that this chapter focuses 
on the experience of some selected federal coastal States particularly those that had 
contested at one time or the other ownership and control of the maritime territory 
and resources with their federating units. It is intended to examine how the affected 
federal coastal States have succeeded in resolving similar disputes in their various 
maritime domains, with a view to extracting some lessons for the final and amicable 
resolution of similar dispute in Nigeria. 
In this regard, an in-depth examination will be conducted on the practical 
approaches adopted by the United States, Australia and Canada in resolving or at 
least abating their maritime title disputes. 
II. United States experience 
1. Genesis of the problems 
This development can be seen in three perspectives: The first is the individual rights 
of private persons, the second is the rights of individual federating state and the 
third is the rights of the Federal Government. 
1.1. Individual rights of private persons 
Before colonialism, indigenous system of property rights existed both on land and 
on the adjacent sea areas. By this method, the Indians and other natives exercised 
individual right of property owners over the land and on the adjacent sea areas. 
These rights as noted earlier were subsumed under the British system of alienable 
fee simple by the various land reforms that were carried out against the Indian 
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natives on colonization of the American continent. At this time too the Crown 
registered several grants that were made prior to colonization and made several 
other grants of lands including lands under navigable waters to individuals who 
held titles as proprietors. Individual proprietorship over land and the adjacent sea 
areas is exemplified by the grants made to Martin by the successors to the colonial 
proprietors in Martin vs. Waddell1 and similar ones made in Pollard vs. Hagan? 
1.2. Take over of individuals' rights by the federating states 
The second stage is the stage by which the states began to take over the individuals' 
land and maritime rights. This was the case immediately after the US Supreme 
Court's decisions in Martin vs. Waddell. 3 In that case a grant was made to Martin 
by the state of New Jersey, which after the American Revolution became the 
successor state to the Crown' governmental authority. The defendant- Waddell on 
the other hand derived his title from the successors to the colonial proprietors. In an 
ejection case that followed thereafter, the Supreme Court was invited to determine 
the question whether the beds of navigable water bodies were returned to the Crown 
as part of governmental power or retained by the proprietors as part of the land. It 
was held that the thirteen original states, because of the sovereignty acquired 
through the revolution against the Crown, owned the lands under navigable inland 
waters within their territorial limits, and that each subsequently-admitted state 
acquired similar rights as an inseparable attribute of the equal sovereignty 
guaranteed to it upon admission. Similar decisions were made three years later in 
the case of Pollard vs. Hagan, 4 based on the equal footing doctrine, which the Court 
says subsequently-admitted states enjoyed. Thus, the Supreme Court extended the 
doctrine by laying the foundation of individual states' ownership of the beds of 
certain non-inland waters. 
Armed with the above decisions, the American coastal states took control of not 
1 41 US (16 Pet) 367 (1842) 
2 44 US (3 How) 212 (185) 
3 Supra., n. 1 
4 Supra., n. 2 
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only the internal navigable rivers but also the three mile TS. The states gradually 
took over the former rights of the individual coastal land owners first, through the 
enactment by California of the Exploration and Leasing Act of 1921. By this act 
California wrested from the individual coastal land owners the leasing of coals, 
petroleum, oil shale, gas, phosphate, sodium and other mineral deposits.5 It equally 
asserted proprietary rights in the lands, issued a number of grants of title to 
submerged lands to some of its governmental organs and also to the Federal 
Government, regulated fisheries and applied the state criminal law within the three 
mile TS which it believed it owned.6 California's action was subsequently followed 
by other states through the passing of similar legislation by Texas and Louisiana 
indicating their purported ownership of the offshore areas. 7 
The actions of the states in assuming ownership of the maritime territory was 
actively supported by the Federal Government through the seeking of title from the 
states each time it needed a portion of the maritime territory. It is equally on record 
that the Department of Interior had on several occasions turned down applications 
made to it by producers for license to prospect for oil and gas off the coast of 
California and instead directed that such applications be made to the states.8 Thus, 
the authority of the states, which the two cases mentioned above initially conferred 
on them over the maritime territory off their coasts, was further legitimised by the 
action of the Federal Government. Therefore, for over a century ( 1842 when the 
decision in Martin vs. Waddell was delivered to 1947 when the first California 
decision was delivered), the coastal land owners and subsequently the states 
exercised unfettered authority over the adjacent maritime territory with the active 
acquiescence of the Federal Government. 
5 California Statutes 1921, ch. 303 para. 1, p. 404. 
6 See United States vs. California (supra) 332 US 19,91 L. Ed. 1889 (1947); Kingston, R.I., The law 
of the Sea (Third Annual Conference) (1968), p.90. 
7 Louisiana Act 55 of 1938; 2 Garmel' s Laws of Texas 1461; Bartley's Texas Digest, art. 1631, 
1634. 
8 Reed, M.W., Shore and Sea Boundaries, The United States Government Printing Office, 
Washington, (2000), vol. three, p. 5. A Congressional Committee was provided with 21 such 
decisions of Interior. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, S.J. Res. 20, 82"d Cong., 1 ' 1 
session, p. 562. See also Swarth, G., "Offshore Submerged lands," vol. 6, (1968) Land and Natural 
Resources Division Journal, (US Department of Justice), p. 109, 112 
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1.3 Take over of states' rights by the Federal Government 
The third stage began when disquiet arose within the Federal Government circle as 
to whether the judgment of the Court in the two cases above could be interpreted to 
cover all navigable waters, especially waters beyond high and low-tide lines. As a 
result, judicial, legislative and practical measures were adopted by the United States 
in resolving the title problems. 
2 Judicial approaches to the resolution of the title problems 
Following President Truman's proclamation of September, 1945, in which he 
asserted the claim of the United States to the exclusive right of exploitation of the 
natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the CS appertaining to the United 
States, the Federal Government in October the same year instituted as a test case an 
original action at the Supreme Court of United States against the state of California, 
to determine the dominion over maritime territory and mineral rights under the 
three-mile belt of sea off the Californian coast. The claim of the United States was 
predicated principally upon two grounds, the first of which is its "right and 
responsibility to exercise whatever power and dominion that are necessary to 
protect this country against dangers to the security and tranquility of its people 
incident to the fact that the United States is located immediately adjacent to the 
ocean." Secondly that "proper exercise of these constitutional responsibilities 
requires that it have power, unencumbered by state commitments, always to 
determine what agreements will be made concerning the control and use of the 
marginal sea and land under it." 
On the other hand, the state of California raised three defences, one that, its 
constitution, which she adopted in 1849, included a three-mile offshore belt as part 
of its territory. Secondly, that the boundary was ratified by the Enabling Act that 
admitted California to the Union. Thirdly, California relied heavily on the equal 
footing doctrine enunciated in Martin vs. Waddel/9, Pollard vs. Hagan10 and their 
9 Supra., n. l 
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progeny and argued that the original states had entered the Union with TS and that 
it must have done so too. The Court discountenanced the California arguments and 
upheld those of the United States and decreed that: 
"The United States of America is now, and has been at all times pertinent 
hereto, possessed of paramount rights in and full dominion over, the lands, 
minerals and other things underlying the Pacific Ocean lying seaward of the 
ordinary low-water mark on the coast of California, and outside of inland 
waters, extending sea-ward three nautical miles ... The state of California has 
no title thereto or property interest therein" 11 
The rationale for the decision of the Court is informed first by its understanding that 
the states could not have entered the Union with TS, because according to it, "in 
1776, the year America got her independence from Britain, the idea of a three-mile 
belt over which littoral nation could exercise rights of ownership were but a 
nebulous suggestion. Neither the English charters granted to this nation's settlers, 
nor the treaty of peace with England, nor any other document to which we have 
been referred, showed a purpose to set apart a 3-mile ocean belt for colonial or state 
ownership."12 That "at the time this country won its independence from England 
there was no settled international custom or understanding among nations that each 
nation owned a 3-mile water belt along its borders."13 
It is not totally correct to state that there was no settled international custom 
regarding TS around the periods before and shortly after American independence in 
1776. In 1793 for instance, the American Secretary of State- Jefferson was reputed 
to have made the first United States' official claim to TS. This was followed in 
1794 by an Act of the United States Parliament, which adopted the three mile rule 
for purposes of neutrality during the war of the coalition. 14 Therefore, from that 
period onward to the Supreme Court's decision in Martin vs. Waddell and Pollard 
10 Supra., n. 2 
11 United States vs. California (1947) 332 US 804, 805, 92 L. ed. 382, 383, 68 S. Ct. 20, Order and 
Decree 
12 Ibid, at p. 32. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Neutrality Act of 5th June, 1794 
279 
vs. Hagan and beyond, the idea of three mile TS over which a littoral State 
exercises right of ownership became a common maritime practice in the United 
States. It is therefore difficult to fathom why the same Supreme Court that ruled in 
Martin vs. Waddell in 1842 that the original states acquired title to the maritime 
territory beneath their navigable waters, (generally regarded at that time and beyond 
as including the three-mile belt of TS) and later in Pollard vs. Hagan in 1845 that 
subsequently admitted states enjoyed the same right under equal footing doctrine, 
had suddenly turned to deny the same right in 1947 when the decision in United 
States vs. California was made. 
By the same token, it would seem that the length of time (over one hundred years) 
for which the states have been allowed to exercise the right of ownership over the 
three-mile belt was long enough to found a prescriptive right of ownership in them 
or for the Federal Government to be taken as having acquiesced or slept over its 
rights by its failure to protest the exercise of acts of ownership by its federating 
states but instead actively encouraged and supported states' title. In the Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries case for example, 50 years was held to be long enough for 
Britain to be held to have acquiesced to the straight baselines practice of Norway 
and in the Rann of Kurt case, 25 years was held to be sufficient. 15 It is clear 
however from the pleadings that acquiescence was not specifically pleaded by 
California during the trial. 
The victory recorded in the California case encouraged the Federal Government to 
institute further actions against other American coastal states in what has come to 
be regarded as the Tideland cases. The state of Texas was the next target, thus in 
United States vs. Texas, the Federal Government repeated its earlier claims in the 
California case against Texas. Texas on the other hand presented a uniquely 
different and previously unconsidered legal question for the court to determine. It 
stated that it was neither an English colony nor an American territory prior to its 
admission into the Union and that before it became a member of the union it was a 
15 (1968) ILM vii, 633 
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sovereign independent State, which was proclaimed as such in 1836 and was 
subsequently recognized by the United States and the community of nations. As a 
result of the above, Texas contended that it had sovereignty over marginal sea prior 
to its admission into the Union and that the submerged lands below were among 
those "vacant and un-appropriated lands" that the republic had specifically retained 
at statehood when the Federal Government refused to assume its liabilities. 
The court held however on the basis of "equal footing" and national interest 
principles that even a state previously possessing both dominium (ownership) and 
imperium" ( governmental powers and sovereignty) over its marginal sea as an 
independent sovereign lost that authority upon entry into the union. 16 That, 
"[a]lthough dominium and imperium are normally separable and separate; this is an 
instance where property interests are so subordinated to the rights of sovereignty as 
to follow sovereignty" 17 in favour of the Federal Government. The paramount 
principle relied upon by the court in the above cases was explained further by it in 
its judgment in United States vs. Louisiana case. The court stated in that case that: 
"The marginal sea is a national, not a states' concern. National 
interests, national responsibilities, national concerns are 
involved. The problems of commerce, national defence, 
relations with other powers, war and peace focus there. National 
rights must therefore be paramount in that area."18 
The same reasoning as above was applied in United States vs. Maine19 and in all 
other subsequent submerged land cases decided by the Supreme Court. The 
question is what is national interest? Frankfurter J described in United States vs. 
Texas mentioned above as something less than fee simple title. It could also relate 
to national security, trade and commerce, maritime resources and other interests, 
which the sea is reputed to possess, held in favour of the Federal Government. 
16 339 US, (1950) at p. 719. 
17 Ibid. 
18 339 us 699,704 (1950). 
19 (1975) 420 us 515 77 
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Not only is the above reasoning applicable to all the coastal states in the United 
States, the same reasoning has been held to be applicable also to the Indian 
aboriginal tribes20 and recently, it has been extended by the United States District 
Court to cover a former Trust territory in Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands vs. United States of America. 21 On appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, that court while upholding the District Court decision 
equally followed the Supreme Court decisions in the previous submerged land cases. 
It held that, in upholding the declaratory judgment sought by the United States as 
against sovereignty of Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) over 
the TS, the court noted that the United States possesses "paramount rights in and 
over the waters extending seaward of the ordinary low-water mark on the coast and 
the lands, minerals, and other things of value underlying such waters;" and that the 
CNMI' s "Marine Sovereign Act" including the Submerged Lands Act" are 
preempted by Federal law. The Court went further to explain that the paramount 
doctrine upon which the judgment is based draws its authority from the inherent 
obligations placed on the sovereign governing entity to conduct international affairs 
and control matters of national concern .... that once low-water mark is passed the 
international domain is reached. 22 Thus, the authority of the Federal Government of 
United States over the submerged land areas seaward of the low-water mark 
became firmly stamped and institutionalised. 
The decision of the court in the CNMI case could be understandable to the extent of 
its having been delivered at a time when international law had clearly clarified the 
authority of coastal Sates over their maritime areas and also because of the Section-
By-Section Analysis of the Covenant to Establish the CNMI, which clearly placed 
CNMI under the sovereignty of the United States. It can therefore be argued that the 
Court in arriving at the decision as it did was merely relying on the provisions of 
20 Native Village of Eyak vs. Trawler Diane Marine, Inc., 154 F. 3d 1090, 1092-95. 
21 Civil Action no. 99-0028 ARM of 7t11 August, 2003. See< http://www.Amid.us 
courts.gov/documents/decisions I CV -99-0029-55 pdf> 
22 Ibid; California vs. U.S., 332, U.S. at pp. 35-36 and Native Village ofEyak, (ibid) 
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both the Geneva Convention and UNCLOS, which unambiguously placed 
sovereignty over the TS and sovereign rights and jurisdiction over CS upon the 
State as an entity and not on the individual federating units in federal States. We 
therefore see in the cases of California, Texas and Louisiana the inter-play of 
customary and public laws as opposed to the conventional international law that 
applied in the CNMI case. Thus it could be argued that the cases were decided at 
that time based on the rapidly evolving customary international law on CS. Similar 
argument could be made with respect to the enactment of both the Submerged 
Lands Act, 1953 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which came into being 
pursuant to the Truman's Proclamation of 1945. 
The Supreme Court's judgment as seen in the above cases has recently been 
reaffirmed in State of Alaska vs. United States of America. This is with respect to 
certain pockets and enclaves known as Alexander Archipelago, which are located 
more than three nautical miles off the southeastern coast of Alaska. The court 
refused to award the islands to Alaska because, the waters in question on account 
of their locations more than three nautical miles off the coast did not qualify as 
inland waters (so as to give rise to a presumption of state title to these submerged 
lands) under either of the state's two theories concerning (i) historic inland waters, 
and (ii) juridical bays; and (b) thus, instead qualify as TS, so that the state had no 
valid claim of title to the disputed pockets and enclaves. 23 The islands were 
awarded to the United States because of their locations more than three nautical 
miles off the coast; if they were located within the three nautical miles, they would 
probably have been awarded to the State of Alaska as a consequence of the 
Submerged Land Act, which (a) confirms and establishes the presumption of state 
title to lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective states, 
and (b) establishes the states title to submerged lands beneath a 3-mile belt of the 
territorial sea, which would otherwise be held by the United States.24 
23 US Supreme Court Reports, (2005) 162, L. Ed. 2°d, p. 57-8 
24 Ibid, p. 59 
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2.1 Analysis of judicial practice 
The Supreme Court as seen in the above cases granted United States priority rights 
over the maritime territory. The worrisome aspect is the exclusion of the CNMI 
from the ambit of the. Submerged Lands Act grants. Although the CNMI it may be 
argued, is not a state per se, like the other American states but a mere self governing 
territory under the sovereignty of the United States, it is difficult to fathom or 
explain the rationale of the court in not extending or making the provisions of the 
Submerged Lands Act 1953 to be equally applicable to it as has been done to 
California and other coastal states. This is so because the CNMI entered into a 
political union on February 15th 1975 with the United States, which indicated that 
upon termination of UN Trusteeship Agreement, the CNMI would become a self-
governing commonwealth in political union with, and under the sovereignty of the 
United States of America. One would expect that the newly established relationship 
should put CNMI in equal footing with the other states of United States so that it 
too would be entitled to the grant of three nautical miles of TS. There is force in this 
assertion if consideration is taken of the "Section-By Section Analysis of the 
Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands" of 
February, 1975, prepared by the Marianas Political Status Commission to 
accompany the Covenant, it reads as follows; 
[t]he United States will have sovereignty, that is, ultimate political authority, 
with respect to the Northern Mariana Islands. The United States has 
sovereignty with respect to every state, every territory and the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. United States sovereignty is an essential 
element of a close and enduring political relationship with the United States, 
whether in the form of statehood, in the traditional territorial form, or as a 
commonwealth. 25 
The above clause by placing CNMI under the sovereignty of the US might no doubt 
informed the decision of the court in that case, the argument can still be made that 
even if as a self governing entity under the sovereignty of the United States the 
Submerged Lands Act could not possibly apply to CNMI or that it cannot enjoy 
25 Op. cit., n. 21, p.l2 
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equal footing rights because it is not one of the federating states of the US, this 
alone should not deprive the islands from being granted three miles TS on other 
considerations. Its status as a self governing territory under the sovereignty of the 
US should have been enough to earn her equal treatment like other coastal units. 
The Section-by section Analysis noted above has been declared authoritative by the 
court of Ninth Circuit in Fleming vs. Department of Public Safety?6 
3. The practical measures leading to the final resolution of the dispute 
3.1 Reference to Special Master 
What are of the utmost significance to the subject of this chapter are the pragmatic 
approaches adopted by the United States to resolve the dispute between the Federal 
Government and its coastal federating units. Certain major steps are noteworthy in 
this regard. The first is in the late 1940s, after the Supreme Court ruled in the 
California and Texas cases that the United States and not its federating states was, 
and always had been, the owner of submerged lands underlying its TS, the court 
referred the determination of the precise location of the boundary between state-
owned and federally-owned lands along the coast of each federating state to a 
Special Master appointed by it. The Special Master was also to take evidence and 
make recommendations, setting a precedent which has been followed in numerous 
subsequent cases. 27 The reports of the Special Master especially with regards to 
California identified three pertinent issues for resolution but the US Congress 
intervened before any action was taken on them. 
3.2 Delimitation of areas quitclaimed 
Delimitation as a practical measure was undertaken as will be shown below after 
the quitclaiming made by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953. Therefore, for there to 
be a proper ascertainment of areas appertaining to each state, delimitation exercises 
were carried out between adjacent states to determine the boundary of the areas 
26 837 F. 2d at 408 
27 Reed, M.W., Koester G.T. and Briscoe J., The Reports ofThe Special Masters of the United States 
Supreme Court in the Leading Submerged Land Cases ( 1947- 1987), Landmark Publishing Co., 
California ( 1991) p. xi 
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appertaining to each of them; this action led to another round of court cases, with 
which we are not presently concerned. 
3.3 Enactment of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 
The intervention of the Congress in the title problems took the form of a legislative 
approach and this was done shortly before the Supreme Court could address all the 
exceptions that were raised by the parties to the recommendations by the Special 
Master and before any further action was taken on the reports of the Special Master. 
Thus in May 1953, the United States Congress took a very decisive step consistent 
with its earlier but botched attempt at legislation to resolve the problem by enacting 
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953.28 That Act grants to the states "title to and 
ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the 
respective states." 29 Section 3 thereof is very instructive on this, it provides as 
follows: 
a. It is hereby determined and declared to be in the public interest 
that ( 1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable 
waters within the boundaries of the respective states, and the 
natural resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right 
and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the 
said lands and natural resources all in accordance with applicable 
state law be, and they are hereby, subject to the provisions hereof, 
recognized, confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to 
the respective states in which the land is located, and the 
respective grantees, lessees, or successors in interest thereof. 
b. (1) The United States hereby releases and relinquishes unto said 
States and persons aforesaid, except as otherwise reserved herein, 
all rights, title, and interest of the United States, if any it has, in 
and to all said lands, improvements, and natural resources. 30 
28 67 Stat. 29 (1953) 43 U.S.C.A. § 1301- 15 (1964) 
29 Ibid, para. 3 (a) 
30 Submerged Lands Act 43 [USC § .1311] 
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Section 4 on the other hand defines the seaward boundary of each original state as a 
line three geographical miles distant from its coast line or in the case of the Great 
Lakes, to the international boundary. The section equally extends the grant to cover 
subsequently admitted States, who could now extend their seaward boundaries to 
three geographical miles or to the international boundaries of the United States in 
the Great Lakes or any other body of water traversed by the boundaries. The same 
section recognises and affirms the possibility of some states extending their seaward 
boundaries beyond three geographical miles if such has been provided for by its 
Constitution or law or has been previously approved by the Congress. This last 
requirement generated another round of judicial interpretation between the United 
States and the other Gulf states with the State of Texas31 and Aorida32 respectively 
emerging as the only states in the Gulf of Mexico held to be entitled to the three 
marine leagues. The other Gulf States of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama were 
held to be entitled only to three geographical miles like their counterparts in the 
Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. 
The constitutionality of the provisions of this Act was challenged in the Alabama vs. 
Texas case. The court refused to grant the motion by Alabama and Rhode Island to 
file bills of complaint to challenge the right of certain states to hold properties 
ceded to them by the Federal Government under the Submerged Lands Act. In 
refusing the motion the court relied principally on the provisions of Article IV, 
Section 3, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States, the article that confers 
on the Congress the power to quitclaim areas to the states. 
Furthermore and to accommodate the concerns of the Federal Government, 
especially as it affects commerce, navigation, national defence and international 
affairs, the Submerged Lands Act reserves to the United States all constitutional 
power of regulation and control over areas in which proprietary interests of the 
states are recognised and retain in the United States all rights in submerged lands 
31 363 U.S. at 37,58-64,4 LEd 2d at 1049, 1061, 1062, 1064-65. 
32 363 U.S. 121, 128,4 L. Ed. 2d 1096 at 1101 (1960) 
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beyond those areas and extending seaward to the limit of the CS.33 Apart from the 
natural resources within the areas quitclaimed to the states, the Federal Government 
still retains its traditional and constitutional rights of control over commerce, 
navigation, national defence and international affairs in those areas. 
3.4 Enactment of Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 1953 
The next legislative step taken to redress the dispute was the enactment of the 1964 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 34 which declared that the United States owned 
all submerged lands and resources in the CS seaward of the lands granted to the 
states. This Act clearly distinguishes states' submerged lands from the submerged 
land areas appertaining to the United States. 
4 Comparison with Nigeria's Constitution 
Nigeria's 1999 Constitution, lacks similar provisions as in Article IV, section 3, 
clause 2 of the US Constitution, thus the National Assembly of Nigeria lacks 
similar powers of quitclaiming under the constitution. This grave omission has 
opened up a channel for the criticism of the enactment of the Offshore Dichotomy 
Act, which the Senate enacted without any constitutional basis to extend areas of 
the sea covered by the revenue sharing of the FCU. Thus the Dichotomy Act will 
continue to remain unconstitutional until the necessary procedures have been 
adopted. This also militates against the use by Nigeria of the methods employed by 
the United States in resolving its maritime dispute with the states unless Nigeria 
overhauls or carries out a major amendment to its Constitution to grant the National 
Assembly similar powers. 
III The practice of Australia 
1 Genesis of the problems 
Australia shares similar experience with the United States in that both States were 
former British Colonies and are Federal States. Both States are equally coastal 
33 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1302, 1314 (1964) 
34 67 Stat 462, 43 USC§ 1331 et seq. 
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States sharing similar experiences of dispute over the ownership of the maritime 
territory and its resources they contain between the Federal Government and the 
federating units. Similarly, it can be argued that the two States have taken 
remarkable steps towards final resolution of the dispute. Unlike the United States 
however, dispute over Australia's maritime territories emanated in the first place 
over fisheries as opposed to dispute over ownership of the petroleum resources off 
the coasts of some federating units in United States. 
The dispute as in the United States can be viewed in two perspectives of individual 
state and federal government rights. 
1.1 Individual state rights 
The exercise of fishery rights in the Australian TS by the states derives from the 
provisions of Section 51, subsection (x) of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitutional Act of 1900. That section reserves 'Fisheries in Australian waters 
beyond territorial limits' 35to the Commonwealth thus, impliedly reserving for the 
states the fisheries within territorial limits. By virtue of these provisions Australian 
states exercised control over fisheries within the three-mile TS while the 
Commonwealth exercised its control beyond that limit throughout to the CS. 
1.2 Take over of States' rights by the Federal Government 
The enactment of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act by the Australian Parliament 
in 1973 marked the beginning of attempts by the Federal Government to 
appropriate the rights of the states over fishery within the territorial limits of 
Australia. Section 6 of this Act vests in the Crown in right of the Commonwealth 
the sovereignty over the territorial sea, the airspace, sea-bed and subsoil thereof. 
Section 10 on the other hand vests sovereignty over the internal waters of Australia 
in the Crown in right of the Commonwealth. The Act by its section 14 preserves the 
rights of the states in respect of waters within any bay, gulf, estuary, river, creek, 
inlet, port or harbour, the superincumbent airspace and the subjacent sea-bed and 
35 63 and 64 Viet. C. 12, s. 51 (x); the section of the Constitution referred to is supported by Section 
6, part II of the Australian Seas and Submerged Lands Act, no.l61 of 1973 
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subsoil thereof, which before federation were, and which still remain within the 
sovereignty of a state: the superincumbent air space and subjacent sea-bed and 
subsoil thereof. It equally reserves for the states offshore fishing but this also is 
subject to any subsisting extraterritorial limitations. 
With respect to the continental shelf, Section 11 declared that the sovereign rights 
of Australia as a coastal State in respect of the continental shelf for the purpose of 
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources, are vested in and exercisable by the 
Crown in right of the Commonwealth. By these provisions, the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act has taken away the former rights of the Australian states in 
the TS and arguably the internal waters. It may therefore be argued that the problem 
of ownership of maritime territories in Australia emanated, first from the 
aforementioned provisions of its Constitution, which fails to state in a clear and 
unambiguous language what constitutes 'territorial limits' thus opening up the 
channel for disputation as to what in reality constitutes Australia territorial limits. 
Most importantly, the problem could also be attributed to the need to interpret the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Act of 1973 in the context of Section 51 (xxix) of the 
Australian Constitution. The ambiguity in the language of the constitution also 
served as impetus to the exercise of state powers over fisheries within the three mile 
territorial waters of Australia, which the Australian states regarded as their pre-
colonial boundaries. As a result, Australia adopted judicial and executive or 
practical approaches in resolving the dispute. 
2 Judicial approaches to the problems 
The States challenged the constitutional validity of the Seas and Submerged Lands 
Act, in the case of State of New South Wales and 5 others vs. The Commonwealth of 
Australia. 36 The six states jointly sought declarations that the Act was wholly or 
partly invalid and whether section 51(xxix) of the constitution, which empowers the 
Parliament to legislate on external affairs could be used as the basis for the 
enactment of the law. The states based their claims on the following reasons: 
36 (1976) 50, A.L.J.R. p. 218 
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(a) The states believed that they had prior to federation, and continued to 
have after federation, sovereignty and legislative powers over the TS 
adjacent to their coasts up to three-mile limit, and over the sea-bed, 
subsoil and the superjacent airspace of the TS as well as over the CS. 
(b) They also contended that the vesting of sovereignty in the Crown in 
right of the Commonwealth as seen in Sections 6, 10 and 11 of the Seas 
and Submerged Lands Act, amount to the creation in the Crown of a 
power which could not be constitutionally vested. 
(c) It was also contended that the Act was not a valid exercise by the 
Parliament of the external affairs power conferred by Section 51 (xxix), 
or of the power as to territories under Section 122 of the Constitution. 
The court however held the above sections of the constitution and the Seas and 
Submerged Lands Act to be a valid exercise by the Commonwealth legislature and 
that the validity could also be argued to be derived pursuant to the provisions of the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and also 
on the Continental Shelf Convention of 1958, which grants sovereignty over the TS 
and sovereign right over the CS to the coastal States. On this basis, the Parliament 
was right to enact domestic legislation to claim the rights. The court held further, 
that: 
both prior to and after Federation, the plaintiff states, whether originally as 
colonies or later as states, did not in their own right have sovereignty and 
legislative power over the territorial sea up to three-mile limit, or over the 
sea-bed and subsoil and superjacent air space of the territorial sea up to this 
limit. 37 
The decisions thus consolidate the Commonwealth's title over the adjacent 
maritime territory. 
2.1 Analysis of the judgment 
As seen above, the Commonwealth did not contest the fact that the TS formed part 
37 Ibid at p.219 
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of the territories of the states as alleged prior to federation but instead, it maintained 
that, "if prior to the enactment of the Commonwealth Constitution, the states had 
such sovereignty and legislative power, this passed to the Commonwealth upon the 
commencement of federation, or at the latest on Australia becoming a fully 
independent State."38 This statement to all intents and purposes could be regarded 
as an affirmation by the Commonwealth that the plaintiff states indeed e.xercised 
prior to Federation and independence of Australia sovereignty and legislative 
powers over the TS. This corresponds with our earlier views in chapter two that 
prior to colonialism, the FCU indeed held sovereignty and legislative powers over 
the three-mile TS, but that the same could pass and had indeed passed as a matter of 
state succession in international law to the Federal Government at independence, 
which is the sole authority that could rightfully succeed to such authority. 
Furthermore, the decision may be supported to the extent that it affirms the power 
of the Commonwealth - a sovereign nation as part of its external affairs power to 
enact the Seas and Submerged Lands Act (as amended by the Maritime Legislation 
Amendment Act 1994) and the exclusive right of the Commonwealth over the CS. 
The sovereignty and sovereign rights mentioned in the Geneva Conventions and 
now UNCLOS can only be exercised by sovereign independent States and only they 
could enact domestic legislation to claim the rights. While O'Connell agrees, I 
disagree with the conclusion that low-water-mark marks the limit of the colonies 
and hence that the states either prior to or after Federation did not in their own right 
have sovereignty and legislative power over the littoral sea up to three-mile limit. 
There are four reasons. Firstly, the views are contrary to those expressed by Murphy 
J. in the same case, in which he acknowledges that the "states might as colonies 
prior to Federation have exercised some jurisdiction over the TS and its sea-bed and 
subsoil. .. " Secondly, the views as expressed by the high court were based 
essentially on the authority of R vs. Keyn, which has been earlier argued not to 
represent the correct position of Britain regarding the TS. Thirdly, the decision of 
38 Ibid at p. 219 
292 
the court contradicts its own earlier decision in Bonser vs. La Macchia, 39 where the 
'territorial limit' referred to by section 51(x) of the constitution, was held to refer to 
the TS. The decision equally affirms that the fisheries power of the Commonwealth 
extends from beyond the 'territorial limit'. 
The confusion that the R vs. Keyn generated emanated, from the lack of perception 
on the part of the judges about the true distinction and meanings of the word 
'territory,' 'ownership' and "control." Clearly, the issues are distinguishable one 
from the other and were clearly identified by Stephen J in the Australian case of 
State of New South Wales and Others vs. the Commonwealth of Australia,40 a case 
that was heavily relied upon by the Supreme Court of Nigeria. Stephen J in that 
case, tried hard to explain the meaning of the words. According to him, territory 
may mean "realm" and the body of any county, these been the geographical limits 
of the jurisdiction of the common law courts; or it may refer to territory in the sense 
of Crown ownership. He argued that, the word "territory" was used in the first sense 
only (that is realm and the body of a county) in R vs. Keyn to demarcate the limits 
of curial jurisdiction; R vs. Keyn did not decide that the territory of England, in the 
second sense (ownership), ended at low- water mark. He argued further that the 
later case of Harris vs. Owners of Franconia, 41 which has been regarded as 
accepting R vs. Keyn as an authority for the proposition that the territory of England 
ended at low- water mark, has been misunderstood, that each member of the court 
in Harris' case spoke of territory in a jurisdictional sense, thereby equating 
"territory" with "realm" and the body of any county. This is why the Territorial 
Waters Act of 1878 was specifically enacted to address the issue of jurisdiction 
raised in that case and not any other issue, since that is the issue the case decided 
and not the limits of the English territory in the sense of Crown ownership, which 
was never in contest in that case. 
After he concluded that the British Crown exercised the power of dominion and 
39 (1969) 122 CLR., 177 
40 Supra., n. 37 
41 (1877) 2 C.P.D. 173:46 L.J.C.P. 363 
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imperium over the TS surrounding England and Australia, despite the constructions, 
which have been placed on R vs. Keyn, Stephen J then turned his attention to the 
effect of the grants of responsible government to the colonies on this position. 
According to him, with the grant to the colonies of legislative authority over Crown 
lands went also executive control (citing O'Connor J. in South Australia vs. 
Victoria42), and with executive control came the Crown prerogatives in the nature of 
proprietary rights, over the land mass and over the TS: "sovereignty over the 
colonial land mass carried with it ownership of and dominion over its league 
(territorial) seas ... " 
Peter Goldsworthy submitted that had this important distinction been fully accepted 
and faithfully followed by the court in the New South Wales case, some of the 
arguments both for and against state ownership of the TS would have fallen. He 
tried to draw out the distinction between imperium and dominium by reference to 
the comments of Professor O'Connell that "on this topic there would seem to be a 
fundamental cleavage between common law systems and civil law systems."43 He 
went further by stating: "Sovereignty and property are indistinguishable 
conceptions to the common lawyers, but that the civil lawyers have emancipated the 
concept of sovereignty from the notion of property."44 It is hard to fathom how a 
realization of the distinction between imperium and dominium would have made 
the arguments canvassed by Stephen J. to crumble if both terms were 
indistinguishable to common law countries, which Britain and its colonies indeed 
represent. It is the view of O'Connell that because marginal waters were regarded 
as property and were not distinguished from bays and harbors, the many cases then 
decided by English courts naturally proceeded on the basis of the Crown's 
ownership of the sea and seabed. The state exercises a plenary power called 
imperium (political sovereignty) without necessarily enjoying dominium (title, 
ownership) over the territorial sea. "So some continental courts have held that the 
42 (1911) 12 C.L.R. 667 at 710 
43 O'Connell, D.P., International Law, vol. 1 (2"d ed.) Stevenson and Sons, London (1970), at p. 403 
44 Ibid. at p. 475; Peter G., "Ownership of the Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf of Australia: An 
Analysis of the Sea and Submerged Lands Act Case (State of New South Wales and Others vs. the 
Commonwealth of Australia)," vol. 50, ( 1976), the Australian Law Journal, p. 175 at 180- 181. 
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territorial sea while subject to sovereignty is not within the national 
domain."45Stephen J argued that the failure to recognize the distinction led later 
authority to misinterpret R. vs. Keyn. 
If the Australian High Court had accepted the distinction highlighted above between 
imperium and dominium the views of the majority of the judges that the discharge 
of international responsibilities in respect of the TS and function of protecting the 
nation required that Commonwealth title (dominium) in the TS be recognized, 
would have lost much of their force. Recognition of Commonwealth imperium 
would have been sufficient to secure those functions. Had they understood this 
distinction, they could have granted the power of imperium to the Federal 
Government while the federating units along the coast retain dominium over the TS. 
This is so because, according to Gibbs J in the instant case and Frankfurter J. in 
United States vs. California, the correctness of the argument is not self-evident 
because ownership is one thing and control and power is another: ownership of the 
TS in a state would not hinder the control of that area by the Federal authority. 
While it may not be so much controverted that control of TS be vested in the 
Federal Government and the states the ownership thereof, it will however be 
contrary to the common law practice that dominium and imperium be kept separate. 
3 The practical approach to resolution of the problems 
3.1 The 1967 Agreement 
Australia like the United States adopted certain practical measures, which in what 
may be termed accurate forecast by Prof. Warbrick, "the first step may be the last, 
for it has been the avowed purpose of the representatives of the several authorities 
to achieve an accommodation between them that would make constitutional 
litigation unnecessary".46 This determination in the first place has led to genuine 
dialogue and negotiation by the several authorities in Australia to achieve 
accommodation where necessary which in the final analysis led to the conclusion of 
45 Ibid., at p.475 
46 Warbrick, C., "Shorter Articles, Comments and Notes: Off-shore Petroleum Exploitation in 
Federal Systems: Canadian and Australian Action," vol. 17, (1968), /.C.L.Q. p. 501. 
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the agreement relating to the Exploration for, and Exploitation of, the Petroleum 
Resources, and certain other Resources, of the Continental Shelf of Australia and of 
certain Territories of the Commonwealth and of certain other Submerged Land of 
16th October, 1967.47 A clause in that agreement reads: 
"And whereas the Governments of the Commonwealth and of the States have 
decided, in the national interest, that, without raising questions concerning, 
and without derogating from, their respective constitutional powers, they 
should co-operate for the purpose of ensuring the legal effectiveness of 
authorities to explore for or exploit the petroleum resources of those 
submerged lands. '148 
In line with the preamble therefore, the Commonwealth, the states and the Territory 
agreed to establish a Common Mining Code to operate in the adjacent areas" of the 
Australian off-shore, with no distinction between territorial seabed and CS. Each 
State is to administer the Code in that portion of the adjacent area allocated to it 
under the Agreement. 49 The Agreement reserves for the Commonwealth all its 
constitutional rights with regards to: 
(a) trade and commerce with other countries among the States, including 
navigation and shipping; 
(b) External affairs; 
(c) Taxation, including taxes in the nature of duties of customs and excise; 
(d) Defence; 
(e) Lighthouses, lightships, beacons and buoys; 
(f) Fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits; and 
(g) Postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other like services. 
Under section 12 of the Agreement, the states undertake to take "all reasonable 
steps" to secure compliance with the obligations of Australia under the Continental 
shelf Convention of 1958. The percentage of sharing of the royalty was fixed at 10 
percent of the value of petroleum produced at well-head, which monies are to be 
47 Lumb R.D., "the Off-Shore Petroleum Agreement and Legislation" vol. 41, (1968) Australian 
.Law .Journal 453 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid at p. 509 
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divided in the ratio of 40:60 between the Commonwealth and the states (section 19). 
Further to this, all license fees and override royalties go to the states (section 22). 
The importance of the above arrangement in line with Professor Warbrick's 
observation is that it has made recourse to constitutional litigation to resolve the 
dispute unnecessary and thus may be said to have resolved it in a way, however the 
arrangements have potential implications for international law and may lead to 
some difficulties. Since both parties have decided that they would not raise issues 
concerning their individual constitutional rights, a difficult question of rights was 
thus left unanswered and as will be seen below, such a failure contributed to the 
replacement of the Agreement by a subsequent Australian administration. 
Implementation of the Agreement was not without its own difficulties. It was 
capable of creating conflict between the interests of the Federal Government and 
the interests of the states and the interests of Australia as a State and the interests of 
other States, which no doubt could involve Australia in unnecessary international 
responsibility. 
3.2 Legislative approach 
3.2.1 Enactment of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 (Cth) 
As a further step at resolving the title problems over Australia offshore areas, the 
provisions of the 1967 Agreement were incorporated as an Act of the Australian 
Parliament. 50 The new arrangement under this Act operates in two divisions. First, 
in the offshore areas beyond three nautical miles from the TS baseline, petroleum 
operations are subject to the above mentioned legislation. Within this limit and 
within the coastal waters, complementary State and Territory legislation applies, 
also known as the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act. The Commonwealth 
Petroleum (Submerged Lands) Act 1967 established Joint Authorities for the 
offshore area adjacent to each state and the Northern Territory. 51 Each Joint 
Authority consists of the Australian Government Minister for Resources and the 
relevant state Minister for Mines (later known as the Designated Authority).This is 
50 Petroleum (Submerged Lands), Act (Cth), No. 118 of 1967. 
51 Ibid, section 8 A (1), (2) & (3), (part 1 A). 
297 
made clear by a paragraph in the preamble to the Act, which states; "And whereas it 
has been agreed between the Commonwealth, the states and the Northern Territory 
that, in place of the scheme provided for by an agreement between the 
Commonwealth and the states dated 16 October 1967 -
(a) legislation of the Parliament of the Commonwealth in respect of the 
exploration for and the exploitation of the petroleum resources of submerged 
lands should be limited to the resources of lands beneath waters that are beyond 
the outer limits of the territorial sea adjacent to the states and the Northern 
Territory (being outer limits based, unless and until otherwise agreed, on the 
breadth of that sea being 3 nm), and that the States and the Northern Territory 
should share the administration of that legislation; and 
(b) Legislation of the Parliament of each state should apply in respect of the 
exploration for and the exploitation of the petroleum resources of such part of 
the submerged lands in area adjacent to the state as is on the landward side of 
the waters referred to in paragraph (a); and 
(c) Legislation of the Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory should 
apply in respect of the exploration for and exploitation of the petroleum 
resources of such part of the submerged lands in an area adjacent to the 
Northern Territory as is on the landward side of the waters referred to in 
paragraph (ai2 
Essentially, the provisions grant the Commonwealth legislative powers over 
petroleum resources of the CS, while the states are to participate in the 
administration thereof. The legislation of the states and the Northern Territory are to 
apply exclusively within the three-mile TS and in the internal waters. Thus this Act 
like the Agreement preceding it established Joint Authorities for the offshore areas 
adjacent to each state and the Northern Territory seaward from the limit of three 
miles. Each Joint Authority consists of the Australian Government Minister for 
Resources and the relevant state Minister for Mines (later known as the Designated 
Authority), whose functions are provided for under section 8 c of the above 
52 Ibid. 
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mentioned Act. 
3.2.2 Enactment of the Seas and Submerged Lands Act of 1973 (Cth) 
The agreement and later the Act that was enacted consequent upon it suffered a 
temporary setback in 1972 as a result of the changes which occurred in the political 
terrain of the country. The changes ushered in a new leadership who did not agree 
with the existing arrangement mentioned above. The new leadership was therefore 
determined to implement a stronger commonwealth initiative which would ensure 
the Commonwealth's unfettered sovereignty over the entire internal waters and the 
TS thereof and sovereign rights over the CS. This, he achieved through initiation of 
a law - the Seas and Submerged Lands Act of 1973 (Cth), which as noted earlier 
proclaims the Commonwealth's sovereignty over both the internal waters and the 
TS and sovereign right over the CS. This arrangement and the court action that 
followed thereafter created some difficulties but this did not last long. 
3.2.3 The Offshore Constitutional Settlement of 1979 
In order to cushion the effect and the acrimony which the Submerged Lands Act 
generated, the Liberal government which came to power in 1975 took a dramatic 
step in initiating another procedure which would accommodate the interests of the 
states and the Northern Territory by sharing both the resources of the offshore and 
the responsibility of administering them between the tiers of Australian government. 
This in· effect led to the adoption of the 'Offshore Constitutional Settlement' of 
1979. The federating units, being anxious to avoid a repetition of the experience of 
earlier agreement, individually passed a law through their parliament requesting the 
Commonwealth to incorporate the terms of the settlement in an Act of Australian 
Parliament. 53 Thus, the Commonwealth Legislature responded by enacting 14 
pieces of legislation to accommodate the interests of the states and the Territory in 
the submerged land areas. Relevant to our discussion here is the Coastal Waters 
(State Powers) Act of 1980. Section 5 of that Act provides as follows: The 
53 New South Wales enacted Constitutional Powers (Coastal Waters) Act 1967 with corresponding 
legislation by South Australia, Tasmania, Western Australia. The States of Victoria and Queensland 
enacted theirs. in 1980 
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legislative powers exercisable from time to time under the constitution of each state 
extend to the making of-
(a) all such laws of the state as could be made by virtue of those powers if the 
coastal waters of the state, as extending from time to time, were within the 
limits of the state, including laws applying in or in relation to the sea-bed and 
subsoil beneath, and airspace the above, the coastal waters of the State; 
(b) laws of the state having effect in or in relation to waters within the adjacent area 
in respect of the state but beyond the outer limits of the coastal waters of the 
State, including laws applying in or in relation to the sea-bed and subsoil 
beneath, and the airspace above, the first mentioned waters, being laws with 
respect to-
(i) subterranean mining from land within the limits of the state; or 
(ii) ports, harbour and other shipping facilities, including installations, and 
dredging and other works, relating thereto, and other coastal works; and 
(c) laws of the State with respect to fisheries in Australian waters beyond the 
outer limits of the coastal waters of the state, being laws applying to or in 
relation to those fisheries only to the extent to which those fisheries are, under 
an arrangement to which the Commonwealth and the states are parties, to be 
managed in accordance with the laws of the state. 
The provisions above are important in that they confirm in unambiguous terms the 
authority of a state to legislate first in matters within coastal waters, which 
according to section 4 (2) could be said to be within three mile TS adjacent to a 
state. This same section stipulates that if in future the breadth of the TS is 
determined or declared to be greater than 3nm references in this Act would continue 
to remain the three nautical miles and not including any new TS dimension beyond 
three miles. The importance of this provision could be better appreciated, having 
regard to Article 3 of UNCLOS, which declares the breadth of TS at 12 nautical 
miles. Without the provision above, Australia would have probably engaged in 
other rounds of dispute with the states when on the 13 November 1990, it 
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announced an intention to extend its TS from three to 12 nautical miles.54 
Furthermore, the Act is important in that it extends the legislative powers of the 
states to the maritime territories beyond the coastal waters (referred to in the Act as 
the 'adjacent area') to include activities such as fisheries, shipping facilities, 
installations, works and subterranean mining commenced within the limits of a state. 
The 'adjacent area' being referred to is defined by reference to series of 
geographical coordinates under Schedule 2 of the Petroleum (Submerged Lands) 
Act 1967. 
Another Act relevant to the Offshore Constitutional Settlement is the Coastal 
Waters (State Title) Act 1980 (Cth). Section 4 (1) thereof vests in each state exactly 
the same title granted by a similar Act to its adjacent coastal waters and subjacent 
seabed as if those areas formed part of the territory of the state. It should be noted 
that even though this Act and its counterpart both confer legislative powers on the 
states, they are equally instructive in the matter of resources management. Pursuant 
to this Act the states rather than the Commonwealth have consistently managed the 
TS. The two Acts equally confer administrative responsibilities on the relevant 
federating units and like the previous arrangements, the units under Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement and subject to an arrangement between them and the 
Commonwealth exercise legislative powers beyond the three-mile TS adjacent to 
each of them. 
The validity of the Offshore Constitutional Settlement, especially as it affects rock 
lobster fishery, has been challenged in the High Court in the case of Port 
MacDonnell Professional Fishermen's Association vs. South Australia. 55 In that 
case, the plaintiffs sought a declaration inter alia; (a) that an arrangement between 
the defendants in term of an instrument appearing in the Commonwealth of 
Australia Gazette No. 5104 of 151 June, 1987 and entitled "Arrangement in relation 
54 Evans G. and Duffy, M., "Australia Extends Territorial Sea" vol. 61, (1990) Australian Foreign 
Affairs and Trade p. 816 
55 ( 1989) 168 C.L.R 340 
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to Rock Lobster Fishery between the Commonwealth of Australia and South 
Australia" and a similar one in another Gazette, No. 5406 of 21 December 1988, 
which were expressed to have been made pursuant to the provisions of the Fisheries 
Act 1952 (Cth.) and the Fisheries Act 1982 (South Australia), were beyond the 
power of the state of South Australia and of the Commonwealth; (b) that section 14 
of the Fisheries Act (South Australia) was beyond power and (c) in the alternative, 
that section 14 of the Fisheries Act (South Australia) and the Regulations made 
thereunder in so far as they applied to the Outside Fishery and the Outside Defined 
Fishery (as described in paragraph 4 A and 11 of the amended statement of claim) 
were in-consistent with section 5 A, 8 and 9 of the Fisheries Act (Cth.) and the 
Regulations made thereunder. The court upheld the validity of the joint agreement 
and in doing so also endorsed the relevant portion of the Settlement. The success of 
the above arrangement does not depend entirely, according to Rothwell and Kaye, 
on whether Australia's offshore constitutional legal frame work is founded in the 
'Commonwealth Constitution', nor does it depend totally on the 'role of the high 
court in providing a degree of legal certainty to the position of the Commonwealth' 
but that the success of the arrangement could also be attributed substantially to the 
'political compromises found in Offshore Constitutional Settlement which have had 
contemporary impact. ' 56 The result of all the above according to Rothwell and Kaye 
is that "the management of Australia's offshore areas is a complex web of 
Commonwealth, State and Territorial control, ownership and title."57 
The entire Commonwealth, State and Territory arrangements alluded to are without 
prejudice to the Australia's responsibility under international law. 58 Such as its 
responsibilities with regards to the defence of Australia, formulation of marine 
policy on navigation and shipping, external affairs, postal, telegraphic and 
telephonic. Rothwell and Kaye have identified other areas where the 
Commonwealth may be argued to have priority and or influence over the states. The 
56 Rothwell D.R., and Kaye, S.B., "Australia's Legal Framework for Integrated Oceans and Coastal 
Management", Cooperative Research Centre for Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, Research 
Report, Hobbart, Australia, 26 May, 2001, p.l5. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Section 6, Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act, No. 75 of 1980 
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government of Australia despite the arrangements referred to above still has 
primary responsibility to represent Australia at international forum convened to 
consider the adoption of international environmental and marine instruments. It is 
also the Commonwealth government that has responsibility of either accepting or 
rejecting these international initiatives, and primary responsibility for ensuring that 
the terms of the treaty are fulfilled. 
Under the provisions of the 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment 
(IGAE), Rothwell and Kaye observed that, the Commonwealth has agreed to 
consult with the states prior to ratifying, acceding, approving, or accepting any 
international agreement with environmental significance. They further observed that, 
in addition to the above, the Commonwealth government occasionally includes a 
representative of one of the Australian states as a member of a delegation 
negotiating international environmental conventions.59 The whole arrangements are 
also without prejudice to the Commonwealth's declared sovereignty over the 
territorial sea and sovereign right over both the EEZ and the Continental Shelf. 
Thus the Australian approach to the settlement of its dispute with its component 
units represents another unique approach at settlement of problems of title to 
maritime tt?rritory in federal States. 
In contrast, the Australian approach described above, though it is unique and may 
be suitable for the Australian society, a similar approach would be difficult to 
negotiate and implement in Nigeria for a number of reasons. Firstly, the approach if 
adopted in Nigeria would not satisfy the resources control yearning of the Niger 
Delta members of the FCU and as such it would not abate the current agitation for 
resources control. Secondly, the multiethnic nature and other diversities of the 
Nigerian society and the multiplicity of interests it has generated (particularly in the 
Niger Delta areas of Nigeria where there are about 40 different ethnic nationalities 
who speak about 250 different dialects) over the ownership of the sea and its 
resources would make it very difficult to negotiate and adopt similar approach as 
59 Ibid. 
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Australia. Thirdly, since oil and gas revenue represents the largest sources of 
revenue for Nigeria, the Federal Government, which represents the generality of 
Nigerians, may not be willing to adopt the Australian approach to the resolution of 
its maritime title dispute. This is because of the adverse effects and the in-equity 
that the approach is capable to cause other non coastal and non oil and gas 
producing federating units. For the above reasons therefore, the Australian approach 
may not be suitable for the resolution of the maritime title dispute in Nigeria. 
IV The practice of Canada 
Canada like the two States mentioned above is a Federal coastal State. It is a former 
colony of Britain, thus it shares similar experiences with them of Federal versus 
Provincial dispute over the ownership of its maritime territory. Canada's approach 
to the resolution of the dispute is akin to that adopted by the United States in one 
significant respect. Instead of the Federal Government negotiating with the 
Provinces as Australia did, it preferred like the United States to first refer the matter 
for adjudication by the Court. Like the United States also, the Canadian Supreme 
Court resolved all questions relating to ownership of both the TS and the CS 
referred to it in favour of the Federal Government of Canada. 
1. Judicial approach to the resolution of the problems 
As in the case of United States, Canada brought an action in the Supreme Court in 
Reference Re Ownership of Off-shore Mineral Right to resolve its offshore title 
problems. The case concerns a request for declaration of the question of ownership 
and jurisdiction over off-shore mineral rights, between Canada and British 
Columbia. That is which between Canada and British Columbia owns or should 
own lands, including the mineral and other natural resources, of the sea-bed and 
subsoil seaward from the ordinary low-water mark on the coast of the mainland and 
several islands of British Columbia, outside the harbours, bays, estuaries and other 
similar inland waters to the outer limit of the territorial sea of Canada, as defined in 
the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, 1964 (Canada) C22. Similar question 
was also formulated with respect- to the CS. The Canadian Supreme Court like its 
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United States counterpart awarded ownership and legislative jurisdiction over the 
TS and sovereign right over the CS to Canada. With regards to the CS, the court is 
of the view that two reasons account for British Columbia lacking the right to 
explore and exploit or legislate over the CS. According to the court; 
(i) the continental shelf is outside the boundaries of British Columbia, and 
(ii) Canada is the Sovereign State which will be recognized by international 
law as having the rights stated in the 1958 Geneva Convention, and it is 
Canada that will have to answer the claims of other members of 
international community for breach of the obligations and responsibilities 
impose by that convention.60 
Thus, like the United States and Australia, the Canadian Supreme Court again 
affirmed the Federal Government's title over the off-shore areas. The decision no 
doubt is consistent with international law. 
2. Practical approach taken to resolve the problems 
Following the decision of the Supreme Court, Canadian Provinces were left with no 
other option than to enter into dialogue with the Federal Government with a view to 
seeking a cooperative scheme for the management of the offshore areas. In doing 
this the five Atlantic Provinces decided to adopt a common approach and on July 16, 
1968 they established a Joint Mineral Resources Committee (JMRC) to act on their 
behalf in negotiating with the Federal Government a common and acceptable 
scheme that would ensure their interests and participation in the administration of 
the resources of the maritime territory adjacent to their coasts. It was the Federal 
Government that made the initial move by proposing a scheme which allows it to 
take control of administration of most of the offshore with provincial revenue 
sharing, as well as provincial administration within "mineral resources 
administration lines" close to the provincial coasts. However, this proposal and the 
one that followed thereafter, which proposed a pooling of offshore revenues, were 
unacceptable to the east coast provinces. 
60 (1968) 65, D.L.R. (2"d), pp. 345-346. 
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Following the failure to reach agreement on the initial negotiation, a series of other 
agreements were concluded by the individual province with the Federal 
Government. The refusal of the Federal Government to heed the request by some of 
them to give effect to the boundary agreement reached eventually led to the 
institution of the Reference re the Seabed and Subsoil of the Continental Shelf 
Offshore Newfoundland, 61case. The case was instituted to determine whether the 
dominion of Canada or that of the Province of Newfoundland had the right to 
explore and exploit, and to legislate in relation to exploration and exploitation of the 
mineral and other natural resources of the area of the CS known as the Hibernia 
field, which was adjacent to the coast of Newfoundland and which is located 
approximately 320 Kilometers from Newfoundland coast. The location of the field 
ruled out a determination on TS. The Supreme Court as it did in the 1967 Offshore 
Reference held inter alia that the right to explore and exploit the resources of the 
subsoil of the CS of Newfoundland belonged to the Canadian Federal Government 
and that the Federal Government alone had legislative jurisdiction to make laws in 
relation to hydrocarbon exploration and development. Furthermore, it held that any 
rights which Newfoundland held at the time of confederation would have been 
automatically transferred to Canada when Newfoundland relinquished its 
sovereignty and became a province of Canada. 62 Thus the case provided more legal 
support to the authority of the Federal Government of Canada over the entire 
submerged land areas adjacent to Canada. 
2.1 The 1985 and 1986 Agreements 
After the above case, several other accords were agreed between the Federal 
Government and the provinces on a scheme for joint management and utilization of 
submerged land resources. Notable among the accords are, the Canada -
Newfoundland - Labrador agreement of 1985, which led to a joint legislative action 
that produced the Atlantic Accord Implementation Act of February 11, 1985, C. 26; 
the 1986 Canada - Nova Scotia accord, which equally led to the enactment of a 
61 I.L.R, vol. 86,595 at 625; (1984) l S.C.R. 86 
62 Ibid. 
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joint implementation Act. 63 Thus in 1996, the Federal Government in order to 
harmonise the various agreements reached with the provinces enacted the Oceans 
Act with provisions, spelling out in a broad, clear and unambiguous terms the rights 
of both the Federal and the provincial Governments over the maritime territory of 
Canada, 64 details of which are discussed in paragraph 3 below. 
2.2 Adoption of a collaborative approach 
The above notwithstanding, the Federal Government was well aware that the 
maritime territory with its resources cannot be meaningfully understood, 
realistically and harmoniously managed in a way that would sustain them both for 
the present and also for the future generations without the participation and 
involvement of the major stake holders. The government therefore made it a matter 
of deliberate policy to adopt a collaborative approach toward effective and 
harmonious management of the resources of the maritime territory. Thus most of 
Canada's marine activities were fashioned in a way that ensures collaboration and 
participation of the Aboriginal people, the local communities along the coast, the 
provinces and territories and even governmental and non-governmental agencies. 
This was achieved first and foremost by the formulation of the various accords with 
the provinces and later through the enactment of an Act of Parliament in a way that 
ensures the application of provincial laws, which in most cases apply with 
equanimity with the federal laws in all the zones of the Canadian oceans. 
3. Legislative approach at resolving the problems 
In order to legalise the practical and collaborative approaches, the Canadian 
Parliament enacted the Oceans Act of 1996. This Act ensures that as soon as the 
Federal interests are declared by the Act over a particular maritime zone it is always 
and simultaneously followed by the declaration of the provincial interests. This can 
be seen in the first place by the provisions of section 7 of Ocean Act mentioned 
above, which immediately after declaring that the internal waters and the territorial 
63 See the Canada- Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 
1988, c. 28 
64 S.C. 1996, C. 31 
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sea form part of Canada and by section 8 ( 1 ), which affirms the Federal 
Government's title over the internal waters of Canada it was immediately followed 
by the provisions of Section 9 (1 ). This section grants legislative rights over internal 
waters, the waters not within the provinces and the waters prescribed by regulation 
to the provinces. Subsection (3) thereof stated that the laws of the provinces apply 
in these areas as if the same were within the territory of the provinces. 
Furthermore, section 13 after declaring the EEZ of Canada, section 14 thereof went 
ahead to affirm the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Canada as a federation to 
the exploration and exploitation, conservation and management of the natural 
resources whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and 
of the seabed and its subsoil. This power covers establishment and use of artificial 
islands, installations and structures, marine scientific research and the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment. The same rights and powers as above 
are equally conferred by section 16, 17 and 18 of the Act on Canada with regards to 
the EEZ and the CS respectively. By section 20 therefore, federal laws apply to all 
installations or structures and artificial islands and the safety zones around any 
installation within the CS. 
Section 21 (1) of the Act, enables the laws of the provinces to be applicable in the 
same extent as federal laws apply both with respect to the EEZ and also to the CS. 
By virtue of subsection (4) thereof any sum due under the laws of the province with 
regards to the areas mentioned belongs to Her Majesty in right of the province. 
Similarly and by virtue of Section 22 (1), a court that would have jurisdiction in 
respect of any matter had it arisen in a province is given jurisdiction to try offences 
involving federal law that applies pursuant to this Act to the extent that the matter 
arises in whole or in part in any area of the sea that is not within any province and 
that area of the sea is nearer to the coast of that province than to the coast of any 
other province or that is prescribed by a regulation. By this Act therefore, the 
foundation is laid for the application of both the Provincial and Federal Government 
laws in virtually all maritime zones falling within the national jurisdiction of 
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Canada. 
3.1 The Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act of 1987 
The integrated oceanic management is applicable to virtually all areas of Canadian 
oceanic sectors and activities ranging from conservation and management of the 
marine environment, fishing, exploration and exploitation of oil, gas and other 
mineral resources of the ocean. With respect to the petroleum sector for example, 
the collaborative approach is reflected by Canada and Newfoundland jointly 
adopting oil and gas exploration and exploitation strategy through the enactment of 
an Act of Parliament.65 Section 9 (1) of this Act establishes a board known as the 
Canada - Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board comprising seven members, 
three of whom are to be appointed by the Federal Government, three by the 
Provincial Government and the Chairman of the Board is to be appointed by both 
the Federal Government and the Provincial Government. 66 The Board has the 
authority and responsibility inter alia to make all necessary decisions to permit the 
exploration for, and the development and production of, offshore oil and gas. Other 
Boards have equally been established in other coastal Provinces to carry out similar 
functions as in the Canada- Newfoundland noted above.67 Revenue accruing from 
offshore petroleum activities was initially shared between the Federal Government 
and the Provinces of Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia with each 
Province receiving 20 cents of every offshore revenue dollar and while the 
Government of Canada received 80 cents, including federal corporate income taxes. 
However with the signing of the Atlantic accord with Newfoundland and Labrador 
in 1985 and a similar accord with Nova Scotia on March 2 1982, both provinces are 
to receive the entire revenues from their respective offshore resources until their 
65 Canada- Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1987, C.3 
66 Ibid, section 10 (l) and (2) 
67 In Nova Scotia, the board is known as Canada- Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources 
Accord Implementation Act passed in 1998, which implemented the Canada- Nova Scotia 
Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord of 1986.; 
rttp://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/archives/summary04_print.html. 
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economies grew to the national average level. 68 A wider sharing of offshore revenue 
with all Canadians would take place only and until for example, Newfoundland and 
Labrador have benefited substantially from oil and gas production revenue and have 
reached the proposed "trigger" stage. Going by the provisions of section 3 (1) of 
Offshore Petroleum Royalty Act (Canada) (S.N.S 1987, C. 9), the royalties received 
from the offshore petroleum and gas activities are reserved to Her Majesty in right 
of the affected provinces and each holder of a share in production license. This 
arrangement covers the entire offshore areas defined as the submarine areas lying 
seaward of the low-water mark of the Province and extending, at any location, as 
far as 
(a) any prescribed line, or 
(a) where no line is prescribed at that location, the outer edge of the continental 
margin or a distance of two hundred nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the territorial sea of Canada is measured, whichever is greater. 
In the sector of conservation and management of marine environment, the 
collaborative approach is reflected through the enactment of Canada National 
Marine Conservation Areas Act, S.C. 2002 (C. 18). Thus the last paragraph of the 
preamble to this Act coupled with the provisions of Section 8(4), 10 (1) and 11 (3) 
all envisage involvement of federal and provincial ministers and agencies, affected 
coastal communities, aboriginal organizations, aboriginal governments and bodies 
established under land claims agreements and other persons and organizations in the 
conservation of the marine environment. 
In the fisheries sector the collaborative and integrated approach to oceanic resource 
management is reflected by the refusal of the Canadian courts to grant claims to 
exclusive fisheries made to them by the Native Americans. The rights where 
considered at all, have been restricted in most cases to non-navigable rivers and 
lakes rather than in the sea. Thus in the sea and navigable rivers, the court in R vs. 
68 Clause (d) of Canada- Nova Scotia Agreement on Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Management 
and Revenue Sharing, March 2, 1982; see also a similar proposal made by the government of Canada 
to the government of Newfoundland of September 2 1982. 
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Sparrow69 , NTC Smokehouse Ltd vs. R70 Adams vs. R71 have refused to accept 
exclusive fishery rights in any native but instead, held that the public rights to fish 
and navigate hold sway in such waters. 72 It can therefore be rightly argued that in 
the Oceans of Canada, the fishery rights of all Canadians whether they are 
indigenous or not are protected and guaranteed. 
The Canadian approach has only temporarily but not conclusively resolves the 
dispute between the Federal Government and the Coastal Provinces over the 
ownership of the maritime territory. This argument is reinforced by the rather 
ambiguous methods proposed for the determination of when Newfoundland and 
Labrador and Nova Scotia and other coastal provinces with similar agreements have 
substantially benefited and when all of them have reached a "trigger" or their 
economies growing to national average level. Even when the trigger stage is 
eventually determined, another round of negotiations, which in most cases may be 
cumbersome, has to ensue in order to agree on a percentage of sharing. From the 
foregoing, the collaborative and integrated approach to oceanic resources 
management reflects the method by which Canada has successfully resolved or at 
least abated the title problems over its maritime territory and resources. 
Giving the difficulty involved in negotiating acceptable revenue sharing formula in 
Nigeria, this type of Canadian approach to the problem would be difficult to 
implement. This is because, in Nigeria there are varying interests and tribal 
sentiments and demands that need to be involved and satisfied in the process. In 
addition the Canadian approach does not make a clear cut distinction between the 
Federal Government's interests over the various tnaritime zones and resources 
adjacent to Canada and the interests of the federating units over the same zones; the 
approach will create serious conflict of interests between the Federal Government 
and the FCU if it is introduced to Nigeria. 
69 (1990) I SCR 1075 
70 (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 528 
71 (1996) 138 DLR (4th) 657 
72 SeeR. vs. Lewis (1996) I SCR 921. 
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V Conclusions 
In conclusion, the United States after the initial court cases adopted a quitclaiming 
approach to resolve the title problems over its maritime territory. This approach 
represents a more pragmatic and realistic approach that has substantially put to rest 
the title problems over the maritime territory of the United States. This approach 
would be best to resolve similar title problems in Nigeria if the constitution could 
be amended to give the National Assembly the power to make similar quitclaiming 
to the FCU. 
In the case of Australia, several approaches were initially adopted until the latest, 
which is known as the Off-shore Constitutional Settlement of 1979. This approach 
ensures the accommodation of the interests of the states and the northern territory 
by the sharing of off-shore resources and the responsibility of administering them 
between the Commonwealth and the states and northern territory. The terms of the 
Constitutional Settlement were incorporated in an Act of Parliament. By the several 
Acts, the Australian states and territory now possess legislative powers over the sea 
areas, including the seabed, subsoil and airspace above the coastal waters adjacent 
to each state. They also possess the same powers over mining, ports, harbours and 
other shipping facilities within the limits. The limit being referred to according to 
section 4 (2) of Coastal Waters (States Powers) Act is the three mile TS. The Act 
also extends the legislative powers of the states over fisheries to submerged land 
areas beyond the coastal waters. 
Canada's approach to resolution of its title problems is similar in nature to that 
adopted by Australia. After the initial court cases and the various Accords, Canada 
adopted a collaborative and integrative approach toward effective and harmonious 
management of the resources of the maritime territory between the Federal 
Government and the Provinces. By this method, both the Federal Government and 
the Provinces now possess the same or similar rights and powers over the various 
maritime zones adjacent to Canada. The Canadian approaches could also be 
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relevant in resolving similar title problems in Nigeria if proper constitutional 
foundation could be laid for its adoption. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
In this thesis different legal issues and problems have been raised and examined; it 
is therefore not intended to review them for summarization issue by issue. Instead, 
the focus will be to explore the salient themes of significance to international law. It 
is useful to begin by re-evaluating the following themes: 
(a) Problems based in Nigeria's federal structure 
(b) The relation of National and International law 
(c) Colonialism and Self Determination 
(A) Problems based in Nigeria's federal structure 
States in general have problems of international law in one form or another, but the 
problems of international law in federal States are peculiar because there is more 
than one centre of power. The federal structure reflects the international features of 
politico-legal life. It exists at every level, local, regional, national and international. 
The nomenclature may differ from one federal State to another but most federal 
States are composed of local governments, states or provincial governments and the 
Federal Government. This is exactly the case in Nigeria, with local governments at 
the lowest level of the hierarchy, followed by states and the Federal Government. 
The Federal Government in Nigeria controls virtually all spheres of Nigeria's 
national life, including the economy, resources on land and maritime territories, the 
army and the police. This creates problems for international law, because there is 
competition for supremacy, sovereignty, control of natural resources, international 
legal personality and even sovereign immunity between the federation and its units. 
Nigeria is not an exception in the creation of these international law problems, the 
degree or intensity may vary but the problems are prevalent in most federal States. 
The problems as far as Nigeria is concerned are mostly perceived while some others 
are real. It is therefore important to re-evaluate this aspect so as to provide better 
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and correct dimensions of the Nigerian federal structure and to demonstrate that 
even if re-structured as some experts and intellectuals have advocated this would 
have little or no impact on the issue of ownership and control of maritime territory 
and resources. It is in the light of this genuine overarching observation that this 
aspect focuses on three principal issues of: 
(i) Federal versus state tension regarding maritime territory and resources. 
(ii) Is there true federalism in reality? 
(iii) International legal personality to assume ownership and control of maritime 
territory and resources. 
(i) The Federal/state Tension regarding Maritime Territory and Resources 
The world oceans and seas have immense significance for the security of States, 
navigation, international trade and commerce, exploration and exploitation of 
resources, maritime warfare and marine scientific research. Consequently there is the 
need for the maintenance and observance of the principles of international law. This 
importance underscores the reasons why maintenance and enforcement of rule of law 
over the world oceans and seas has become the cardinal focus and objective of 
international law. International law requires the support and cooperation of States to 
achieve the objectives. Ironically, our examination of the perennial problems of title 
to the maritime territory of Nigeria and its resources and the tension that it has 
generated between the FCU, the Oil and Gas Companies and the Federal Government 
has revealed significant and serious threats to these lofty objectives. The threats are 
being masterminded by some intellectuals and the militant groups, who are bent on 
taking control of the maritime territory and its resources from the Federal 
Government. The tension and its attendant threats to maintenance of order over the 
seas are reflections of a combination of different factors. The imbalance and lopsided 
nature of the structure of the Nigeria's federation and the pattern of distribution of 
power in the state are noteworthy. There is overarching and excessive concentration 
of the federation's political, economic and legal powers in the hands of the Federal 
Government at the centre. This has led to its excessive influence and control over 
virtually all of Nigeria's national life to the displeasure of the federating units. 
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On the basis of the above, the Federal Government controls both the resources on 
land and in the maritime territories of Nigeria and is only required to share the 
revenue with the units on a percentage to be determined by it, but usually in 
accordance with the provisions of the constitution. At the international level, this is 
advantageous because it helps to prevent fragmentation of the international 
obligations of Nigeria between the federation and the various units and thus prevents 
Nigeria from being engaged in unnecessary international responsibility that the action 
or omission of the units could cause. At the domestic level however, this has created a 
lot of tensions because revenue allocation, especially to the FCU that bear the brunt 
of oil and gas exploration and exploitation the most is seen as being too meagre. The 
lopsided nature of the structure of Nigeria's federation has also led to uneven social, 
economic and infrastructural development between the several geo-political zones 
with the Niger Delta being the least developed area among them. This is heightened 
by the fear of the Niger Delta people of domination by other ethnic groups and the 
fate that would befall them in the event of exhaustion of the petroleum and gas in the 
adjacent sea areas, especially as the government is generally seen as not investing or 
making any contingency plans for the future of the Niger Delta people and their 
environment. All these have combined to create tension in the Niger Delta area of 
Nigeria. 
With very strong and vocal coastal units represented by the intellectuals and the 
militant youths fully committed to maximize control over resources of the adjacent 
sea areas, the maritime territory of Nigeria has become characterized by tensions 
between the Federal Government, the various oil and gas companies and the FCU. 
Thus the on-going violent contestation between the parties and the inability of the 
Government to curb and curtail it is seriously inhibiting maintenance of security, law 
and order over the Territorial Sea and other maritime zones of Nigeria. On the one 
hand, the nature of the federal structure is helping to prevent fragmentation of 
Nigeria's international obligations and preventing unnecessary international 
responsibility that the action or omission of the federating units could cause if they 
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were invested with such power. On the other hand Nigeria's inability to curb the 
incessant kidnapping, hostage takings and other vices in the Niger Delta area is 
warranting Nigeria's international responsibility. 
Nigeria has obligation in international law for the security and protection of 
foreigners who are most vulnerable within its territory. International law expects that 
a State fulfills its obligations; as such Nigeria must show overt action of fulfilling its 
international obligations by properly controlling the acts of terrorism on its TS. As 
already demonstrated, Nigeria has adopted and applied several measures, such as the 
establishment of Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission, Niger 
Delta Development Commission. to resolve the problems. Yet, instead of the 
problems to diminish, they are in fact escalating daily. This is largely due to the 
problems of corruption, unfaithful implementation of policies geared toward 
resolution of the environmental and other problems of the region and the lack of 
political will by the Federal Government adequately to address the issue of 
lopsidedness in the distribution of power and the specific grievances of the Niger 
Delta people. The frequency of occurrence of bombings, hostage takings and the 
virulent manner in which the militants now carry out the acts suggest that Nigeria has 
not fulfilled this obligation. These are genuine issues of international law which 
require Nigeria to have a kind of structure that allows it to fulfill its international 
obligations. 
(ii) Is there a True Federalism in Reality? 
The perceived imbalance in the distribution of power has led to the demand for a 
return to the practice of true federalism by Nigeria. However, international law is 
silent on the definition of federalism and does not speak of a true or a false type, 
because it is a matter for political science to determine. The views of writers on 
constitutional law as earlier reflected on the definitions of federalism quoted in 
chapter four also vary. This is a reflection of the correctness of the assertion that there 
are as many definitions of federalism as there are authors on the subject. Nevertheless, 
there is none of these definitions that has specifically declared a particular federalism 
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as the true type and the others as not. All we have are some very general universal 
features. These include one central government, provincial governments and upper 
and lower legislative houses, written constitution, executive governors, and hierarchy 
of courts both at the centre and at the provincial levels. The practice of federal States 
also shows remarkable differences in the distribution of constitutional powers and 
rights between the federation and the units. The distribution of power has corollaries 
for international law, especially in terms of personality, responsibility and sovereign 
immunity. Yet international law neither dictates to federal States how they should 
distribute the rights or practice their federalism; nor does it set a paradigm that they 
must adhere to in its practice. In practice therefore, each federal State formulates its 
own mode of federalism in a way that suits its own peculiarities, political, 
constitutional, cultural, historical and demographic settings. 
There is a common pattern of the federation possessing international personality, 
sovereign immunity and representing the State at the international plane as against the 
units. Similarly visible is the general practice of States, whereby the maritime 
territory and all activities therein are regarded as falling within the federal domain is 
equally visible. Notwithstanding, there is clear manifestation of lack of uniformity in 
the practice of some States, such as Germany, United States and Switzerland that 
accord their federating units some elements of powers relevant to foreign affairs, 
those that do not and in the UAE, where each Emirate controls maritime resources. 
Even in these cases, apart from the UAE, the maritime territory and the obligations 
and responsibilities it entails are still regarded as falling outside the domain of the 
units. In this sense the units are precluded from indulging in unwarranted activities 
that could incur the international responsibilities of the State. In the end, it is 
absolutely unintelligible to speak of a type of federalism as the true type and the other 
as the false type. 
(iii) International Legal Personality to Assume Control of Maritime Territory and 
Resources 
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Legal personality refers to capacity to have and also to maintain and perform 
international rights and duties. It is a capacity that international law generally accords 
independent sovereign States or other international organisations, but which the 
components of some sovereign federal States now claim or agitate to possess equally. 
In some States, the Constitution accords the component units some elements of 
foreign affairs and in some no such powers have been granted. For the constituent 
units of a federation to be recognized as possessing international legal personality, the 
constitution and any other legal instrument must clearly and unambiguously confer 
powers relevant to foreign affairs on them. Even then, the units exercise the powers 
either as agents or in the name of the State. It is important to limit international 
personality to sovereign independent States as this will create certainty in 
international law and relations among States. Limiting international personality to 
sovereign independent States will also help to prevent unwarranted international 
responsibility that the action or omission of the units could bring upon the States. 
In Nigeria, a number of reasons account for why the FCU lack the necessary powers 
to assume ownership and control of the maritime territory of Nigeria and its resources. 
In the first place, international law only deals with sovereign independent States and 
other international organizations, by definition, the FCU and other federating units 
are not a sovereign state and as such cannot assume the international obligations of 
Nigeria. International law as seen in Hong Kong and Macau does create rights for 
units of a territory but this can only happen when the parent State agreed to grant the 
rights to the units on the basis of an international obligation. 
Secondly, their lack of international legal P<?rsonality stems from the fact that rights 
over maritime territory and resources as opposed to right over the land territory arise 
principally from international law. This presupposes that it is only the state that is 
recognized in international law as possessing international legal personality that can 
assume and exercise the rights over the maritime territory and its resources. Even 
though international law is flexible, it is not so flexible as to always give legal 
personality to all the units of a federation. 
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Thirdly, the units' lack of international legal personality also stems from the failure of 
the constitution of Nigeria to confer powers relevant to foreign affairs on them. 
Fourthly, there is no State practice to support the exercise of right of ownership and 
control of maritime territory and resources by federating units in their own right. 
What is evident is that States, such as the United States of America quitclaimed a 
portion of its TS to a number of the federating units, but this was done purely with 
respect only to the resources of the areas quitclaimed. The quitclaiming does not in 
any way erode or adversely affect the sovereignty or any other international law 
rights possessed by the United States over the areas quitclaimed. More importantly 
and as far as the members of the international community are concerned, they deal 
only with the sovereign power in the United States and not the units. This is also 
generally true with all federal States. 
(B) The relation of national and international laws 
Problems of reconciling certain domestic laws and court decisions by the Nigerian 
legislature and judiciary with international law run through this thesis. The problems 
can be classified as substantive and procedural in nature. The substantive problems 
are mostly reflected by the domestic laws either claiming lesser rights than have been 
granted by international law. On the other hand, the procedural problems require 
outright incorporation of any international treaty and convention Nigeria has signed 
and ratified even when the treaty in question does not require incorporation before 
assuming legal force. Processes of incorporation are usually prolonged to the end that 
wide lacunae are created by the undue delay in incorporating treaties and conventions. 
This practice is inconsistent with international law. 
These problems are created by the executive who negotiate and brings Nigeria into 
treaty relationship with other States, the legislature which incorporates treaties and 
conventions so negotiated by the executive into domestic legislation and the judges 
who interpret and apply the laws. Apart from this, the decisions of the court and the 
opinions of the intellectuals have shown significant confusion in the relationship 
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between international and domestic laws. The judges had the opportunity of resolving 
the conflicts and to set the records straight once and for all, but they lost it. Thus, 
there is no harmony between international law and the domestic laws of Nigeria. This 
does not augur well for international law generally. 
The purpose of this segment therefore, is to show how important it is for there to be 
harmony between international law and domestic law and to demonstrate that as far as 
maritime areas are concerned, international law is supreme vis-a-vis the domestic 
laws. 
Thus the re-evaluation of this aspect focuses on three principal issues of: 
(i) The domestic laws claiming lesser rights than granted by international law 
(ii) Domestication of international law under section 12 (1) of the 1999 Nigerian 
constitution 
(iii) The confusion in the Supreme Court's decision inAbia case 
(i) Domestic Laws claiming Lesser Rights than granted by International Law 
Nigeria's rights over the maritime territory and resources are firmly entrenched in 
international law, which grants to coastal States sovereignty over the TS and 
sovereign right and jurisdiction over the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone. Therefore the rights of Nigeria over the maritime areas are not 
strictly dependent upon the domestic laws, but on international law. However, it is a 
practical problem when a State claims lesser rights than are actually granted by 
international law. The problems are these: it is an obligation in international law for 
coastal States to have and maintain TS, but this depends on the extent a State could 
claim. If because of the opposite State a coastal State could not claim the full length 
of 12-miles TS and it claimed a lesser breadth, this cannot be regarded as a breach of 
international law. In the same token, although United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea specifically requested coastal States to claim the EEZ before they could 
have it, failure of a State to claim EEZ means that the concerned State will not have 
EEZ, but this does not constitute any breach of international law. These examples are 
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radically different from when a State by its domestic laws deliberately claims lesser 
rights than granted by international law, such as claiming right of jurisdiction instead 
of sovereignty. This is not saying that because Nigeria has claimed lesser rights than 
granted by international law it can no longer have TS, what is being asserted is that 
because it has claimed lesser rights than granted by international law it will be unable 
to enforce the rights it has failed to claim against the multinational and other 
companies, especially the oil and gas companies operating in Nigeria. Nigeria will. 
also be unable to enforce the rights it has failed to claim against the individual 
citizens and the third States, because the multinational and other companies, the 
individual citizens and the third states will all ask for the law backing up the 
enforcement of the rights against them. 
Furthermore, although UNCLOS is silent about whether or not it is an obligation for 
a coastal State to claim TS, article 16 specifically states that coastal States shall 
publish a chart depicting the baselines delimiting their TS. The question is how a 
State publishes a chart of its TS, if it is not an obligation to claim TS. It is therefore a 
breach of Article 16 for a coastal State to fail to claim TS or claiming lesser rights 
than are granted. 
Looking at the problems created for international law by a State claiming lesser rights 
than granted in a wider perspective of the larger international community it reflects 
three important things. First, it reflects the weakness of international law in not 
providing a central authority for making rules of international law. The law e.g. 
UNCLOS is there and the entitlements of States are there, but there is no central 
authority to regulate what States have claimed by their domestic laws. 
Secondly, although the domestic laws are essential for the assertion of international 
powers, this is not absolutely crucial, because the courts cannot be seen to be silent or 
turned a blind eye on the overt exhibition and exercise of state activities or the 
manifestation of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction based on power by Nigeria 
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over its TS and other maritime zones. These are recognized modes of displaying 
States' title to territory in international law. 
Thirdly, this is also a reflection of the lack of uniformity among States in their 
approaches to adoption, interpretation and application of international law. Therefore, 
the claiming of lesser rights notwithstanding, Nigeria's title is still protected by 
international law and to take it away will cause a major disruption of international law. 
(ii) Domestication of International Law under Nigeria's 1999 Constitution. 
Some international treaties and conventions contain provisions requiring 
domestication in domestic law, but others do not. In Nigeria there is no problem with 
regards to treaties requiring domestication; this is covered by Section 12 (1) of the 
1999 Constitution. That section provides as follows: 
No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law 
except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the 
National Assembly. Thus, international law has to be first domesticated before it can 
be applicable in Nigeria. 
The problem is with treaties and conventions that do not require domestication before 
they could be applied by States - the so called self executing treaties. Such treaties 
only require signing and sometimes ratification to bring them into force. The problem 
is also with section 12 ( 1) above which does not distinguish between treaties 
requiring domestication and those that do not. This provision as it presently stands 
has created procedural difficulties. This means that Nigeria cannot carry out at the 
domestic level any international obligation it has undertaken under a treaty or a 
convention it has signed and ratified, unless such a treaty or convention is first 
enacted in domestic law. On this basis, the following observations are noteworthy. In 
the first place, when international law is enacted in Nigeria's domestic laws as 
required by Section 12 ( 1) of the Constitution, such international law becomes a 
domestic law and thus is subordinated to the constitution. This is the case for example, 
with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981, which on enactment 
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as African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) 
Act, becomes a domestic law in Nigeria. Thus where the provision of international 
law that has been domesticated is in conflict or inconsistent with any of the provisions 
of the constitution, by virtue of Section 1 (3) of the Constitution of 1999, such laws 
shall to the extent of the inconsistency be null and void. This necessarily raises the 
question of conflict between international and domestic laws. The problem is not 
solved by section 19 (d) of the 1999 Constitution which states the foreign objectives 
of Nigeria to include "respect for international law and treaty obligations". Respect 
for international law and treaty obligation could mean deference to international law 
and could also mean obeying the law, but this cannot be clearly elicited from the 
provisions of that section. 
Secondly, the failure of section 12 (1) to distinguish between treaties which do not 
require domestication (self executing treaties) before their application and those that 
require it explains in part the problem encountered in the interpretation and 
application of that section. This means that treaties that do not require domestication 
still have to be first domesticated in Nigeria before they can have the force of law. 
Going by the parliamentary and other procedures that domestication has to go through, 
it takes months if not years for treaties to be domesticated in Nigeria. In the end 
therefore, a number of very important treaties such as MARPOL could not apply in 
Nigeria after many years of their signing and ratification because of delay in enacting 
them into domestic laws. This means that Nigeria's obligations under treaties or 
conventions awaiting enactment into domestic laws would have to be held in 
abeyance pending the enactment of the domestic laws. The result is that Nigeria may 
be inhibited in the performance of the obligations it has already undertaken under a 
particular treaty or convention. It also means that claimants will be unable to back up 
their claims with provisions of international treaties and conventions that have not yet 
been domesticated before a Nigerian domestic court. 
The above problems can be classified into two, the first is the problem of conflict 
between internal and international laws and the second is a procedural problem; they 
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are not without solutions. The conflict between international and the internal laws can 
be resolved by the courts having reference to variety of principles. The court needs to 
take the need to respect the law into consideration. This it could do by taking 
guidance from the provisions of Section 19 (d) of the Constitution by paying 
particular respect to international treaties or conventions not requiring domestication 
and which Nigeria has signed and ratified notwithstanding whether they have been 
domesticated or not. Another thing is that the court needs to take into consideration 
the provisions of Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty, 1969. 
This provision makes it clear that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty it has signed and ratified. The 
provision was applied by the International Court of Justice to the detriment of Nigeria 
in the Cameroun vs. Nigeria case. This should serve as a lesson and guidance to the 
court always to pay particular respect to international treaties and conventions which 
Nigeria has signed and ratified, notwithstanding their domestication. 
For Nigeria to resolve the procedural problems and effectively perform its 
international obligations and free itself from unwarranted international responsibility 
that its action or omission could cause, there is the need totally to overhaul the 
provisions of section 12 (1) of the constitution. This can be done by strictly restricting 
application of section 12 (1) to treaties and conventions requiring incorporation. A 
sub-section should be added to section 12 (1), that is section 12 (2), which makes 
international treaties and conventions not requiring incorporation to be directly 
applicable in Nigeria without the need for their incorporation in domestic law. Seeing 
from the above perspective therefore, the Nigerian laws do not seem to matter; it is 
international law that is supreme. International law is preferred in this instance 
because the problem at issue is an international law problem and not domestic law 
problem. 
(iii) The Confusions in the Supreme Court's decisions in Abia case 
Every arm of the government of a State, beginning from the executive, the legislature 
and the judiciary has an important role to play in the manner in which international 
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law is adopted, implemented and applied in the State. The executive for instance is 
involved in bringing about obligations for the State by making the State a party to a 
particular treaty or convention. The legislature on the other hand is concerned with 
incorporating international law in the domestic laws of the State where incorporation 
is required and thereby giving international law the necessary domestic cloak of legal 
force. In the case of the judiciary, it interprets and applies the laws so made by the 
legislature. How well or bad each of these arms plays its own role determines the 
degree of strength or weakness and the respect that international law enjoys in the 
State. This is exactly the case with the Supreme Court of Nigeria in the Abia case. 
The Abia case is a landmark decision in the history of adjudication in Nigeria. It is a 
domestic case which could hardly be determined without a thorough recourse to 
international law. Unfortunately, the numerous legal blunders, mistakes, 
misapplications of law, concepts and facts, which have been pointed out earlier show 
that the judges in that case did not grapple well with the intertwined strands of 
precedent, history, political philosophy, local and international issues that made up the 
case it was called upon to determine. Its manner of handling the case did enormous 
disservice to Nigeria and international law in particular. It is not the intention here to 
criticize but to see what lessons could be learned by the decision. 
Although the court affirms and very correctly too, that its decision is based on the 
premise of international rights and obligations of Nigeria under international law, 
which endowed Nigeria with those rights over its maritime areas, the various limits 
which the court by its decision placed on the exercise of those rights by Nigeria 
cannot be justified in international law. Let us look at two examples. First, the 
determination that the territories of the FCU and by extension Nigeria's territory ends 
at the low-water mark is confusing. By so deciding, the Supreme Court has failed 
properly to discharge its own responsibility of interpreting and applying the law. 
Though the judiciary may only able to interpret and apply the laws as made by the 
legislature and nothing more, this is a wrong notion. The judiciary, especially the 
Supreme Court, which is the highest court in Nigeria, should be able to go beyond the 
domestic laws when the matter involves international law by specifically looking into 
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the treaties or conventions in order to see what rights or obligations it creates for 
Nigeria and the rights and obligations Nigeria has by the domestic laws claimed. In 
this way, the court would be able to balance its interpretation and application of 
international law correctly. 
Secondly, the determination equating the authority of Nigeria over the TS to that of 
mere jurisdiction and by adjudging that the criminal jurisdiction of Nigeria does not in 
all cases extend to offences committed by foreigners on the TS of Nigeria, the 
Supreme Court has again missed the point. Thus by not interpreting or applying the 
law correctly, the Supreme Court has failed to shed any light on international law. 
By way of general recapitulation, the above problems are a reflection of how the 
political actions or inaction of the Government and the response of the judiciary could 
trigger international responsibility of inconsistency and thus warrant the international 
responsibility of a State in international law. It is also a reflection of the fact that 
international law may be as weak as a State wants it to be. Be that as it may, the 
territory of Nigeria by international law includes, the land territory, the TS, its 
airspace, sea-bed and subsoil, so that Nigeria exercises sovereignty and not mere 
power of jurisdiction over it. 
(C) Colonialism and self determination 
Colonisation as used in this thesis has relevance not only to the concept of self 
determination; it also has relevance to the nature of transfer of power that took place 
at the inception of colonialism between Britain and the various Kingdoms and 
Empires in Nigeria. Colonialism is also relevant to the nature of transfer of 
sovereignty that took place between Britain and the independent Nigeria on the 1st of 
October, 1960. That is, whether the nature of the transfer of power at the inception of 
colonialism and the transfer of sovereignty at independence could be regarded as state 
succession in international law. Whilst, the Australian cases of North South Wales vs. 
Commonwealth and Bonser vs. La Macchia that have been examined succeeded in 
shedding some lights on the accuracy of describing the transfer of sovereignty at 
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independence as state succession international law, the cases have not shed similar 
lights on the accuracy of describing the transfer of power that took place at the 
inception of colonialism. It is therefore the aim of this segment of the conclusions to 
clarify this issue. It is important to clarify the issues as doing so will help in clarifying 
the issue of reversionary interests of the various Kingdoms and Empires over the 
territories that were transferred at the inception of colonialism. 
(i) Transfer of territory between Britain and the Kingdoms and Empires at 
colonization in1861 
The transfer of territory that took place between Britain and the Empires and 
Kingdoms in Nigeria in 1861 should not be described as state succession in 
international law. It was a transfer between a sovereign independent State with a quasi 
sovereign Kingdoms and Empires. For there to be state succession, international law 
requires the transfer of sovereignty to take place between two independent sovereign 
States. This requirement finds justification in the provisions of Article 2(1) (a) of the 
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property, Archives and 
Debts of 1983 (not yet in force). That Article defines state succession as "the 
replacement of one State by another State in the responsibility for the international 
relations of territory". At colonization, there was no state known as Nigeria in 
existence, the transfer of the territories by the various Kingdoms and Empires that 
later became known as Nigeria was done in the first place through discovery by 
Britain. Discovery was later followed by the signing of treaties of cession with the 
rulers of the Kingdoms and Empires. On this basis, the transfer of territory that took 
place between Britain and the Kingdoms and Empires could not be regarded as having 
taken place by the process of state succession, but by the processes of cession, 
consolidation and colonialism. By the processes, the entire territories of the Kingdoms 
and the Empires were taken over by Britain. Since the nature of the transfer that took 
place at independence has been explained to be state succession in international law, it 
necessarily follows that the former territories of the Kingdoms and Empires could 
only revert to the federation of Nigeria and not the Kingdoms and the Empires. 
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(2) Implications of self determination 
Self determination was primarily a political right but has now assumed a human right. 
Like any other human rights, it is a legal right that has to be exercised, but not in a 
legal vacuum. Its exercise has to take cognizance of the political reality that must be 
present before the right can be legally exercised. Neglect of the necessary political 
realities can cause many problems. The way and manner in which 'self determination' 
is being pursued for example in Nigeria shows a remarkable lack of understanding of 
this requirement. The various groups concerned perceive the concept only from the 
narrow angle of external self determination in the form of secession, without 
adverting their minds and thoughts to its other aspect of internal self determination 
and the conditions imposed by international law for its exercise. Accepting the right 
of self determination in this narrow context will lead to major dislocations in 
international law. It will lead to the disintegration of many States and this will cause 
serious boundary problems. Not only that, self determination in the form of forceful 
secession will no doubt warrant the right of resistance by the parent State. Resistance 
could lead to a full blown civil war, in which case states and the United Nations will 
have to contend with the humanitarian problems arising from it. Nigeria is such a 
large country with a tremendous population, such forceful secession in the guise of 
self determination will cause serious consequences not only to the West Africa sub 
region but to the entire African continent and the international community as a whole. 
The maximization of control by the Federal Government over the maritime territory 
and resources is a right inherent both in international and domestic laws and should 
not warrant any form of militancy or anything else to wrest it away. The activities of 
the Niger Delta militants and MASSOB are no doubt an abuse of the right of self 
determination and are clearly at variance with how international law expects the rights 
to be exercised. International law expects that the right of self determination be 
exercised in a way that will not cause dismemberment or disintegration of a sovereign 
State, which is conducting itself in accordance with the principles of international law. 
It holds in the highest esteem, the territorial integrity, political independence, stability 
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and peaceful relations among sovereign States and would abstain from doing anything 
that could jeopardise peaceful coexistence among States not the least encouraging 
disintegration of a sovereign independent State. The right of self determination is 
meant to prevent an abuse of rights of other entities and to create a legal right to 
freedom for those still under one form of domination or the other. Its exercise is 
extremely limited and does not grant recourse to the destruction of integrity of States. 
Thus, except in the very narrow and limited circumstances earlier mentioned, there is 
no general right of external self determination in international law. It goes without 
saying too, that a desire to wrest ownership and control of maritime territory and 
resources from the State, which is vested with those rights by international law is not 
one of the reasons known to international law for the exercise of the right of self 
determination. 
Recommendations 
(1) As a first step towards the resolution of the title problems over its 
maritime territory, Nigeria should as a matter of urgency put all 
former political impediments aside and amend the Territorial Waters 
Act with a provision declaring its sovereignty over the TS, the 
seabed, subsoil and the airspace thereof. Section 44 (3) of the 1999 
Constitution should be similarly amended to reflect Nigeria's 
sovereignty over the TS, the seabed, the subsoil and the airspace 
thereof and the fact that it forms part of the national territory of the 
Nigeria federation. The amendment to the Constitution should also 
include a clear and unambiguous definition of what constitutes both 
the land and the maritime territories of Nigeria. The title "Territorial 
Waters Act" is misleading, since according to International Law 
Commission, territorial waters is used to describe both internal 
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waters only and internal waters and TS combined. 1 Nigeria should 
therefore, amend the title to read Territorial Sea Act. 
(2) Nigeria is to enact urgently a domestic law declaring its sovereign 
right and jurisdiction over the adjacent CS. Although a coastal 
State's rights over the CS may arise automatically, without the need 
to make a formal claim in international law, in a Federal State such 
as Nigeria, making a formal claim will go a long way in preventing 
problems of title such as is seen with regard to the TS. 
(3) Nigeria to organise public enlightenment and awareness campaign to 
sensitise the populace, especially the FCU to the reality that the sea 
areas adjacent to Nigeria and the resources thereof belong to Nigeria 
as the only entity with the necessary legal personality to claim the 
rights granted by international law. 
(4) Nigeria should undertake an amendment to the Exclusive Economic 
Zone Act to indicate that the measurement of the EEZ begins from 
the baselines and not from the external limits of the TS. 
(5) After the various amendments suggested above have been carried out, 
Nigeria in order to resolve effectively the question of title over its 
maritime territory and its resources and the restiveness and criminal 
activities the problem had generated should follow the United States' 
approach described in chapter six by quitclaiming a three nm portion 
of its TS to the FCU, while the Federal Government on behalf of the 
federation continues to exercise acts of sovereignty over the TS, its 
seabed, subsoil and the airspace thereof and sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction over the EEZ and CS and their resources. The FCU is to 
control only the resources within the limits quitclaimed, while at the 
same time paying necessary taxes to the Federal Government. 
(6) Nigeria to undertake the redraw of the country's map to reflect the 
changes caused to the existing map by the ICJ decision in the 
1 Whiteman, M.M., Digest of International Law, 837,vol.. 4, (Department of State Publication 
7825), US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. (1965), vol. 4, p.2 
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Cameroon vs. Nigeria case, which orders the transfer of Bakassi 
Peninsula and other towns and villages to Cameroon. 
(7) Nigeria to establish urgently a Maritime Court to assume 
responsibility over the hearing and determining of admiralty cases, 
which by virtue of Section 251 (1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution fall 
within the purview of the Federal High Court. The jurisdiction of the 
proposed maritime court should invariably extend to cover marine 
pollution cases. 
(8) Establishment of a coastguard to take charge of the security of the 
coastal areas, which at present are highly ineffective. 
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APPENDICES 
A BILL FOR AN ACT TO ABOLISH THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN 
ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE IN THE APPLICATION OF THE 
PRINCIPLE OF DERIVATION FOR THE PURPOSES OF ALLOCATION 
OF REVENUE ACCRUING TO THE FEDERATION ACCOUNT AND FOR 
MATTERS CONNECTED THEREWITH. 
CLAUSE 
Enacted by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria-
SECTION ONE . 
(1) As from the commencement of this Act, the 200 metre water depth isobaths 
contiguous to a State of the Federation shall be deemed to be part of that 
State for the purpose of computing the Revenue accruing to the Federation 
Account from the State pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 or any other enactment. 
(2) Accordingly, for the purpose of the application of the principle of 
derivation, it shall be immaterial whether the revenue accruing to the 
Federation Account from a State is derived from natural resources located 
onshore or offshore. 
SECTION TWO 
This Act may be cited as the Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy in 
the Application of the Principle of Derivation) Act 2004 and shall be deemed to 
have come into force in 2004. 
EXPLANATION MEMORANDUM 
The Bill seeks to Abolish any Dichotomy between Resources Derived Onshore 
and Offshore in the Application of the Principle of Derivation for the purpose of 
Revenue Allocation. 
This bill was passed by the senate on Tuesday, 20th January, 2004. 
Agreement between Great Britain and Germany respecting the Rio del 
Rey, on the West Coast of Mrica signed at Berlin, 14th April, 1893 
No. 237.- AGREEMENT between Great Britain and Germany respecting the 
Rio del Rey, on the West Coast of Africa. Signed at Berlin, 141h April, 1893. 
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The undersigned: 
1. The Honourable P. Le Poer Trench, Her Britannic Majesty's Charged' 
Affaires and First Secretary of Embassy; 
2. Sir Claude MacDonald, Her Britannic Majesty's Commissioner and 
Consul-General of the Oil Rivers Protectorate; 
3. Dr. Kayser, Privy Councillor, Chief of the Colonial Department of the 
Imperial German Foreign Office; 
4. B. von Schuckmann, Imperial Councillor in the Foreign Office; 
After discussion of various questions affecting the fiscal interests of 
Germany and Great Britain on their respective territories in the Gulf of 
Guinea and without prejudice to the conditions laid down in Section 2, 
Article IV, of the Anglo-German Agreement of the 1st July, 1890 (No. 
207), as also the conditions laid down in the Anglo-German 
Agreements of the 20 April/7th May, 1885 (no. 260), and the 27th 
July/2nd August 1886, (no. 263) have come to the following 
Agreement on behalf of their respective Governments: 
ARTICLE ONE 
That the point names in Section 2, Article IV, of the Anglo-German Agreement of 
1st July, 1890 (No. 270), as the head or upper end of the Rio del Rey Creek shall be 
the point at the north-west end of the Island lying to the west of Oron, where the 
two waterways, named Uri.ifian and Ikankan, on the German Admiralty Chart of 
1889-90, meet. 
ARTICLE TWO 
From this upper end of the Rio del Rey to the sea, that is to say, to the promontory 
marked West Huk on the above mentioned chart, the right bank of the Rio del Rey 
waterway shall be the boundary between the Oil Rivers Protectorate and the Colony 
of the Cameroons. 
ARTICLE THREE 
The German Colonial Administration engages not to allow any trade-settlements to 
exist or be erected on the right bank of the Rio del Rey Creek or waterway. In like 
manner the Administration of the Oil Rivers Protectorate engages not to allow any 
trade settlements to exist or to be erected on the western bank of the Backasay 
(Bakassey) Peninsula from the first creek below Archibong's (Arsibon's) village to 
the sea, and eastwards from this bank to the Rio del Rey waterway. 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
We the People of the Federal Republic of Nigeria: 
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Having firmly and solemnly resolved: 
TO LIVE in unity and harmony as one indivisible and indissoluble Sovereign 
Nation under God dedicated to the promotion of inter-African solidarity, world 
peace, international co-operation and understanding: 
AND TO PROVIDE for a Constitution for the purpose of promoting the good 
government and welfare of all persons in our country on the principles of Freedom, 
Equality and Justice, and for the purpose of consolidating the Unity of our people: 
DO HEREBY MAKE, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES the following 
Constitution: 
Chapter One 
General Provisions 
Part one 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 
SECTION ONE 
( 1) This Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on 
all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
(2) The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person 
or group of persons take control of the Government of Nigeria or any part 
thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. 
(3) If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this 
Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of the 
inconsistency be void. 
SECTION TWO 
(1) Nigeria is one indivisible and indissoluble Sovereign State to be known by 
the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
(2) Nigeria shall be a Federation consisting of states and a Federal Capital 
Territory. 
SECTION THREE 
(1) There shall be thirty-six States in Nigeria, that is to say, Abia, Adamawa, 
Akwa-lbom, Anambra, Bauchi, Borno, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo; 
Ekiti, Enugu, Gombe, lmo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, 
Kwara, Lagos, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, 
Taraba, Y obe and Zamfara. 
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(2) Each State of Nigeria named in the first column of Part I of the First 
Schedule to this Constitution shall consist of the area shown opposite thereto 
in the second column of that Schedule. 
(3) The headquarters of the Government of each State shall be known as the 
Capital City of that State as shown in the third .column of the said Part 1 of 
the First Schedule opposite the State named in the first column thereof. 
(4) The Federal Capital Territory, Ahuja, shall be as defined in Part II of the 
First Schedule to this Constitution. 
(5) The provisions of this Constitution in Part 1 of Chapter VIII hereof shall, in 
relation to the Federal Capital Territory, Ahuja, have effect in the manner 
set out hereunder. 
(6) There shall be seven hundred and sixty eight local government areas in 
Nigeria as shown in the second column of Part 1 of the First Schedule to this 
Constitution and six area councils as shown in Part II of that Schedule. 
SECTION NINE 
(1) The National Assembly may, subject to the provisions of this section, alter 
any of the provisions of this Constitution. 
(2) An Act of the National Assembly for the alteration of this Constitution, not 
being an Act to which section 8 of this Constitution applies, shall not be 
passed by either House of the National Assembly unless the proposal is 
supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds majority of all the 
members of that House and approved by resolution of the Houses of 
Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the states. 
(3) An Act of the National Assembly for the purpose of altering the provisions 
of this section, section 8 or chapter IV of this Constitution shall not be 
passed by either House of the National Assembly unless the proposal is 
approved by the votes of not less than four-fifths majority of all the 
members of each House and also approved by resolution of the Houses of 
Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the states. 
( 4) For the purposes of section 8 of this Constitution and of subsections (2) and 
(3) of this section, the number of members of each House of the National 
Assembly shall, notwithstanding any vacancy, be deemed to be the number 
of members specified in sections 48 and 49 of this Constitution. 
SECTION TWELVE 
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(1) No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force 
of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into 
law by the National Assembly. 
(2) The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part 
thereof with respect to matters not included in the Exclusive Legislative List 
for the purpose of implementing a treaty. 
(3) A bill for an Act of the National Assembly passed pursuant to the provisions 
of subsection (2) of this section shall not be presented to the President for 
assent, and shall not be enacted unless it is ratified by a majority of all the 
Houses of Assembly in the Federation 
CHAPTER II 
Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy 
SECTION NINETEEN 
The foreign policy objectives shall be: 
(a) promotion and protection of the national interest; 
(b) promotion of African integration and support for African unity 
(c) promotion of international co-operation for the consolidation of universal peace 
and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination in all its 
manifestations; 
(d) respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of 
settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration and adjudication; and 
(e) promotion of a just world economic order. 
SECTION TWENTY 
The State shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water, air 
and land, forest and wild life of Nigeria 
LEGISLATIVE POWERS 
Part 1 
Exclusive legislative List 
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1 Accounts of the Government of the Federation, and of the offices, courts, 
and authorities thereof, including audit of those accounts. 
2 Arms, ammunition and explosives. 
3 Aviation, including airports, safety of aircraft and carriage of passengers and 
goods by air. 
4 Awards of national titles of honour, decorations and other dignities. 
5 Bankruptcy and insolvency 
6 Banks, banking, bills of exchange and promissory notes. 
7 Borrowing of moneys within or outside Nigeria for the purposes of the 
Federation or any State 
8 Census, including the establishment and maintenance of machinery for the 
continuous and universal registration of births and deaths throughout 
Nigeria 
9 Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens 
10 Commercial and industrial monopolies, combines and trusts. 
11 Construction, alteration and maintenance of such roads as may be declared 
by the National Assembly to be Federal trunk roads. 
12 Control of capital issues 
13 Copyright. 
14 Creation of States. 
15 Currency, coinage and legal tender. 
16 Customs and excise duties 
17 Defence. 
18 Deportation of persons who are not of Nigeria. 
19 Designation of securities in which trust funds may be invested 
20 Diplomatic, consular and trade representation. 
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21 Drugs and poisons. 
22 Election to the offices of President and Vice-President or Governor and 
Deputy Governor and other office to which a person may be elected under 
this Constitution, excluding election to a local government council or any 
office in such council. 
23 Evidence. 
24 Exchange control. 
25 Export duties. 
26 External affairs. 
27 Extraction. 
28 Fingerprints, identification and criminal records. 
29 Fishing and fisheries other than fishing and fisheries in rivers, lakes, water-
ways, ponds and other inland waters within Nigeria. 
30 Immigration into and emigration from Nigeria. 
31 Implementation of treaties relating to matters on this list. 
32 Incorporation, regulation and winding up of bodies corporate, other than co-
operative societies, local government councils and bodies corporate 
established directly by any Law enacted by a House of Assembly of a State 
33 Insurance 
34 Labour, including trade unions, industrial relations; conditions, safety and 
welfare of labour; Industrial disputes; prescribing a national minimum wage 
for the federation or any part thereof; and industrial arbitrations. 
35 Legal proceedings between Governments of State or between the 
Government of the federation and Government of any State or any other 
authority or person 
36 Maritime shipping and navigation, including-
( a) shipping and navigation of tidal waves; 
(b) shipping and navigation on the River Niger and its effluents and on any 
such other inland waterway as may be designated by the National Assembly 
to be an international waterway or to be an inter-state waterway. 
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(c) lighthouses, lightships beacons and other provisions for the safety of 
shipping and navigation; 
(d)such ports as may be declared by the National Assembly to be Federal 
ports (including the constitution and powers of port authorities for Federal 
ports). 
37 Meteorology. 
38 Military (Army, Navy, and Air force) including any other branch of the 
armed forces of the Federation. 
39 Mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and 
natural gas 
40 National parks being such areas in a State as may, with the consent of the 
Government of the State, be designated by the National Assembly as 
national parks, 
41 Nuclear Fuel. 
42 Passports and Visas. 
43 Patents, trade marks or business names, industrial designs and merchandise 
marks 
44 Pensions, gratuities and other- like benefits payable out of the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund or any other public funds of the Federation. 
45 Police and other government security services established by law. 
46 · Posts, telegraphs and telephones 
47 Powers of the National Assembly and the privileges and immunities of its 
members 
48 Prisons 
49 Professional occupations as may be designated by the National Assembly 
50 Public debt of the Federation 
51 Public Holidays 
52 Public relations of the Federation 
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53 Public service of the Federation including the settlement of disputes 
between the Federation and officers of such services 
54 Quarantine 
55 Railways 
56 Regulation of political parties. 
57 Service and execution in the State of the civil and criminal processes, 
judgements, decrees, orders and other decisions of any court of law 
established by the House of Assembly of the State 
58 Stamp duties. 
59 taxation of incomes, profits and capital gains, except as otherwise prescribed 
by the constitution 
60 The establishment and regulation of authorities for the Federation or any 
part thereof-
( a) to promote and enforce the observance of the Fundamental Objectives 
and Directive Principles contained in this constitution 
(b) to identify, collect preserve or generally look after ancient and historical 
monuments and records and archaeological sites and remains declared by 
the National Assembly to be of national importance, 
(c) to administer museums and libraries other than museums and libraries 
established by the Government of the State. 
(d) to regulate tourist traffic; and 
(e) to prescribe minimum standards of education at all levels 
61 the formation, annulment and dissolution of marriages other than marriages 
under Islamic Law and including matrimonial causes relating thereto. 
62 Trade and commerce, and in particular-
(a) trade and commerce between Nigeria and other countries including 
import of commodities into and export of commodities from Nigeria and 
trade and commerce between the States; 
(b) establishment of a purchasing authority with power to acquire for export 
or sale in world markets such agricultural produce as may be designated by 
the National Assembly; 
(c) inspection of produce to be exported from Nigeria and enforcement of 
grades and standards of quality in respect of produce so inspected; 
(d) establishment of a body to prescribe and enforce standards of goods and 
commodities offered for sale; 
(e) control of the prices of goods and commodities designated by the 
National Assembly as essential goods or commodities; and 
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(f) registration of business names 
63 Traffic on Federal trunk roads 
64 water from such sources as may be declared by the National Assembly to be 
sources affecting more than one State 
65 Weights and measures. 
66 Wireless, broadcasting and television other than broadcasting and television 
provided by the Government of the State; allocation of wave-lengths for 
wireless, broadcasting and television transmission 
67 any other matter with respect to which the National Assembly has power to 
make laws in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. 
68 Any matter incidental or supplementary to any matter mentioned elsewhere 
in this list. 
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE ACT 1978 
CHAPTER116 
An Act to delimit the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria being an area 
extending up to 200 nautical miles seawards from the coasts of Nigeria. Within 
this Zone, and subject to universally recognised rights of other States 
(including land-locked States), Nigeria would exercise certain sovereign rights 
especially in relations to the conservation or exploitation of the natural 
resources (mineral, living species etc.) of the seabed, its subsoil and superjacent 
waters and the right to regulate by law the establishment of artificial 
structures and installations and marine scientific research, amongst other 
things. [2nd October 1978] 
SECTION ONE 
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, there is hereby denominated a zone 
to be known as the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Exclusive Zone") which shall be an area extending from the external limits of 
the territorial waters of Nigeria up to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial waters of Nigeria is measured. 
(2) Notwithstanding subsection ( 1) of this section but subject to the provision of any 
treaty or other written agreement between Nigeria and any neighbouring littoral 
State, the delimitation of the Exclusive Zone between Nigeria and any such State 
shall be the median or equidistance line. 
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(3) For the purposes of this section, "the median or equidistant line" means the line 
every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial waters of Nigeria and the State concerned are 
measured. 
SECTION TWO 
(1) Without prejudice the Territorial Waters Act, the Petroleum Act, the Sea 
Fisheries Act, sovereign and exclusive rights with respect to the exploration and 
exploitation of the natural resources of the sea bed, subsoil and superjacent waters 
of the Exclusive Zone shall vest in the Federal Republic of Nigeria and such rights 
shall be exercisable by the Federal Government or by such Minister or agency as 
the Government may from time to time designate in that behalf either generally or 
in any special case. 
(2) Subsection (1) of this section shall be subject to the provision of any treaty to 
which Nigeria is a party with respect to the exploitation of the living resources of 
the Exclusive Zone. 
SECTION THREE 
( 1) For the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the 
natural resources and other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration 
of the Exclusive Zone, the appropriate authority may establish, or permit the 
establishment, operation and use by any other person subject to such condi'tions as 
may be prescribed, in designated areas-
( a) Artificial islands; 
(b) Instillations and structures. 
(2) The appropriate authority may, for the purpose of protecting any installations in 
a designated area by order published in the Federal Gazette, prohibit ship, subject to 
any exceptions provided in the order, from entering without its consent such part of 
that area as may be specified in such order. 
(3) If any ship enters any part of a designated area in contravention of an order 
made under this section, its owner or master shall be liable on conviction to a fine 
of N5,000 or imprisonment for twelve months or to both unless he proves that the 
prohibition inquiry have become, known to the master. 
( 4) In this section, "designated area" means any area of the Exclusive Zone so 
designated by the appropriate authority for the purposes of subsection ( 1) of this 
section. 
SECTION FOUR 
( 1) Any act or omission which-
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(a) Takes place on, under or above an installation in a designated area or any waters 
within 200 metres of such an instillation; and 
(b) Would, if taking place in any part of Nigeria, constitute an offence under the 
enactment in force in that part, shall be treated for the purpose of that law as taking 
place in Nigeria. 
(2) Offences under the subsection (1) of this section shall be triable by the Federal 
High Court whether or not such offence would, if actually committed in Nigeria be 
triable under the applicable enactment by a court other than the Federal High Court. 
(3) The prosecution of any offence under this Act shall be at the instance of the 
Attorney-General of the Federation. 
( 4) In this section, "enactment" means any Act or Law relating to criminal or civil 
law (including torts) and any subsidiary instrument made thereunder including rules 
of court and, in matters other than criminal matters, rules of law applicable to or 
adopted in any part of Nigeria. 
SECTION FIVE 
( 1) Where a body corporate is guilty of an offence under this Act and the offence is 
proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be 
attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other 
similar officer of the body corporate or of any person who was purporting to act in 
any such capacity he, as well as the body corporate shall be guilty of the offence 
and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 
(2) for the purpose of this section, "director" in relation to a body corporate 
established for the purpose of carrying on under national ownership any industry or 
part of an industry or undertaking being a body corporate whose affairs are 
managed by its members, means a member of that body corporate. 
SECTION SIX 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires-
"the appropriate authority" means the Federal Government or any other person or 
authority designated in that behalf by the Federal Government by virtue of section 2 
of this Act; 
"designated area" has the meaning assigned thereto by section 3(4) of this Act; 
"the Exclusive Zone" means the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria as delimited 
by section 1 of this Act; 
"territorial waters of Nigeria" has the meaning assigned thereto by the Territorial 
Waters Act. 
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SECTION SEVEN 
This Act may be cited as the Exclusive Economic Zone Act. 
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (AMENDMENT) DECREE 1998 
The Federal Military Government hereby decrees as follows:-
1. The Exclusive Economic Zone Act is hereby amended in section 2 by-
a) Deleting the existing subsections (2) and (3) 
b) Inserting immediately thereafter the following new subsection (2), 
that is-
"(2) The provisions of subsection ( 1) of this section shall not be 
applicable to the extent that under the provisions of any treaty or other 
written agreement between Nigeria and any neighbouring territorial 
State, the Exclusive Zone is agreed to be less than the distance specified 
in subsection (1) of this section". 
2. This Decree may be cited as the Exclusive Economic Zone (Amendment) 
Decree 1998 
MADE at Ahuja this 25th day of December, 1998. 
General Abdulsalami Alhaji Abubakar, 
Head of State, Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces, 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
Explanatory Note 
(This does not form part of the above Decree but is intended to explain its purport) 
The Decree amends the Exclusive Economic Zone Act to provide that the Exclusive 
Economic Zone of Nigeria shall be a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial waters of Nigeria is measured 
except to the contrary as may be expressly contained in a treaty or other written 
agreement. 
TERRITORIAL WATERS ACT 
CHAPTER428 
An Act to determine the limits of the territorial waters of Nigeria and for other 
matters connected therewith [8th April 1967] 
SECTION ONE 
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( 1) The territorial waters of Nigeria shall for all purposes include every part of the 
open sea within thirty nautical miles of the coast of Nigeria (measured from low 
water mark) or of the seaward limits of inland waters. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing subsection that subsection 
shall in particular apply for the purpose of any power of the Federal Government to 
make with respect to any matter, laws applying to or to any part of the territorial 
waters of Nigeria. 
(1) Accordingly-
a) In the definition of territorial waters contained in the section 18( 1) of 
the Interpretation Act 1964, for the words "twelve nautical miles" 
there shall be substituted the words "thirty nautical miles"; and 
b) References to territorial waters or to the territorial waters of Nigeria 
in all other existing Federal enactments (and in particular the Sea 
Fisheries Act) shall be construed accordingly. 
(2) In subsection (3) of this section, existing "Federal enactment" means-
a) Any Act of the National Assembly passed or made before the 
commencement of this Act or 26th August 1971 (which is the date of 
commencement of the amendment to this Act), including any instrument 
made before 1st October 1960 in so far as it has effect as an Act; or 
b) Any order, rules, regulations, rules of court or byelaws made before the 
commencement of this Act or 26th August 1971 aforesaid in exercise of 
powers conferred by any such Act or instrument. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as altering the. extent of or the area 
covered by any lease, licence , right or permit grant under any enactment or 
instrument before the commencement of this Act or 26th August 1971 (which is the 
date of commencement of the amendment to this Act). 
SECTION TWO 
(1) Any act or omission which-
a) Is committed within the territorial waters of Nigeria, whether by a 
citizen of Nigeria or a foreigner; and 
b) Would, if committed in any part of Nigeria constitute an offence 
under the law in force in that part, 
Shall be an offence under law and the person who committed it may, subject to 
section 3 of this Act, be arrested, tried and punished for it as if he had committed it 
in that part of Nigeria. 
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(1) Subsection (1) of this section-
a) Shall apply whether or not the act or omission in question is committed 
on board or by means of a ship or in, on or by means of a structure 
resting on the sea bed or subsoil; and 
b) Shall, in the case of an act or omission committed by a foreigner on 
board or by means of a foreign ship, apply notwithstanding that the ship 
is a foreign one. 
(2) For the purpose of the issue of a warrant for the arrest of any person who is by 
virtue of this section liable to be tried in some part of Nigeria for an offence, that 
offence may be treated as having been committed in any place in that part. 
(3) Any jurisdiction conferred on any court by this section shall be without 
prejudice to any jurisdiction (and in particular any jurisdiction to try acts of piracy 
as defined by the law of nations) exercisable apart from this section by that or any 
other court. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as derogating from the jurisdiction 
possessed by Nigeria under the law of nations, whether in relation to foreign ships 
or person on board such ships or otherwise. 
( 4) In this section-
"foreigner" means a person who is not a citizen of Nigeria; 
"foreign ship" means a ship of any country other than Nigeria; 
"ship" includes floating craft and floating structures of every description. 
SECTION THREE 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a Nigerian court shall not try a person 
who is not a citizen of Nigeria for any offence committed in the open sea within the 
territorial waters of Nigeria unless before the trial the Attorney-General of the 
Federation has issued a certificate signifying his consent to the trial of that person 
for that offence. 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section-
a) Shall affect any power of arrest, search, entry, seizure or custody 
exercisable with respect to an offence which has been, or is believed 
to have been, committed as aforesaid; 
b) Shall affect any obligation on any person in respect of a recognisable 
or bail bond entered into a consequence of his arrest of any other 
person, for such an offence; 
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c) Shall affect any power of any court to remand (whether on bail or in 
custody) a persons brought before the court in connection with such 
an offence; 
d) Shall affect anything done or omitted in the course of a trial unless in 
the course of the trial objection had already been made that, by 
reason of subsection (1) of this section, the court is not competent to 
proceed with the trial; or 
e) Shall, after the conclusion of a trial, be treated as having affected the 
validity of the trial if no such objection as aforesaid was made in the 
proceedings at any stage before the conclusion of the trial. 
(2) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to the trial of any act of piracy as 
defines by the law of nations 
(3) A document purporting to be a certificate issued for the purpose of subsection 
(1) of this section to be signed by the Attorney-General of the Federation shall be. 
received in evidence and shall, unless the contrary is proved, be taken to be a 
certificate issued by the said Attorney-General. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed as derogating from the provisions of 
any other enactment restricting the prosecution of any proceedings or requiring the 
consent of any authority to the prosecution thereof. 
(5) In this section, "offence" means any act or omission which by virtue of section 2 
of this Act or any other enactment is an offence under the law of Nigeria or any part 
thereof. 
SECTION FOUR 
This Act may be cited as the Territorial Waters Act. 
Territorial Waters (Amendment) Decree, 1998. Decree No. 1 
The Federal Military Government hereby degrees as follows: 
(1) The Territorial Waters Act) in this Decree referred to as the "principal Act") is 
hereby amended as set out in this Decree. 
(2) Section 1 of the principal Act is amended as follows; 
(a) In subsection (1) for the word "thirty" there shall be substituted the word 
"twelve" 
(b) By deleting subsection (3) (a) thereof and inserting a new subsection (3)(a) as 
follows-
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"(3) (a) in the definition of territorial waters contained in section 18(1) of the 
Interpretation Act, for the words "thirty nautical miles" there shall be substituted the 
words "twelve nautical miles". 
1. This Decree may be cited as the Territorial Waters 
(Amendment) Decree 1998. 
Made at Ahuja this 1st day of January 1998. 
General Sani Abacha, Head of State, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
EXPLANATORY NOTE (This note does not form part of the decree but is 
intended to explain its purport) 
This Decree amends the Territorial Waters Act Cap, 428 LFN by changing the 
territorial waters of thirty nautical miles to twelve nautical miles. 
THE SOUTHERN NIGERIA PROTECTORATE ORDER IN COUNCIL, 
1911, NO. 145 
At the Court of Buckingham Palace, the 4th day of February, 1911 
Present 
The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 
Whereas by the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, it is amongst other things, enacted, 
that it shall be lawful for his Majesty the King to hold, exercise, and enjoy any 
jurisdiction which His Majesty has or may at any time hereafter have within a 
foreign country in the same and as ample a manner as if His Majesty had acquired 
that jurisdiction by the session or conquest of territory. 
And whereas by certain Letters patent under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland, bearing date at Westminster the 28th day of February 
1906, it was provided that the Colony of Lagos should, from the date of the coming 
into operation of the said Letters Patent, be known as the Colony of Southern 
Nigeria, and a Legislative Council was appointed for the said Colony, with certain 
powers and authority to legislate for the said Colony, as in the said Letters Patent is 
more fully set forth. 
And whereas by an Order of His Majesty King Edward the Seventh in Council 
bearing the date sixteenth day of February 1906, and known as the Southern Nigeria 
Protectorate Order in Council, 1906, as amended by an order of His said late 
Majesty in Council, bearing date Thirty-first day of May 1910, and known as the 
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Southern Nigeria Protectorate Order in Council, 1910, it was (amongst other things) 
provided that it should be lawful for the Legislative Council for the time being of 
the Colony of Southern Nigeria by any ordinance or ordinances to exercise and 
provide for giving effect to all such powers and jurisdiction as His Majesty might at 
any time before the passing of the above recited Order of the Sixteenth day of 
February 1906, have acquired or might at any time thereafter acquire in any of the 
territories therein described and known as the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. 
And whereas it is expedient to make further and other provision for the peace, order 
and good government for the said territories: 
Now, therefore, His Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of the powers by the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act, 1890, or otherwise in His Majesty vested, is pleased, by and with 
the advice of his Privy Council, to order, and it hereby ordered, as follows:-
ARTICLE ONE 
This Order may be cited as the Southern Nigeria Protectorate Order in Council, 
1911. 
ARTICLE TWO 
This Order shall apply to the territories of Africa which are bounded on the south by 
the Atlantic Ocean, on the west by the line of the frontier between British and 
French territories, on the north and north-east by the British Protectorate of 
Northern Nigeria, and on the east by the frontier between the British and German 
territories. 
ARTICLE THREE 
In this Order, unless the subject or context otherwise requires:-
" His Majesty" includes His Majesty's heirs and successors. 
"Secretary of State" means one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State 
"Treaty" includes any treaty, convention, agreement or arrangement, made by or on 
behalf of Her late Majesty Queen Victoria, of His Late Majesty King Edward the 
Seventh, or of His Majesty with any civilized Power, or with any Native tribe 
people, chief or king and any regulation appended to any such treaty, convention, 
agreement of arrangement. 
"Governor" means the Governor and Commander-In-Chief fore the time being of 
the Colony of Southern Nigeria and includes every person for the time being 
administering the Government of the said Colony. 
ATRICLE FOUR 
The Governor and Commander-In-Chief for the time being of the Colony of 
Southern Nigeria (herein-after called the Governor) shall be the Governor of the 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and he is hereby authorized, empowered and 
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commanded to exercise on His Majesty's behalf all such powers and jurisdiction as 
His Majesty at any time before or after the passing of this Order had or may have 
within the said territories and to that end to take or cause to the taken all such 
measures and to do or cause to be done all such matters and things therein as are 
lawful and as in the interest of His Majesty's service he may think expedient, 
subject to such instructions as he may from time to time receive from His Majesty' 
or through a Secretary of State. 
ARTICLE FIVE 
It shall be lawful for the Legislative Council for the time being of the colony of 
Southern Nigeria by any ordinance or ordinances to exercise and provide for giving 
effect to all such powers and jurisdiction as His Majesty at any time before or after 
the passing of this Order has acquired in the said territories or any of them. 
Provided as follows:-
(1) That nothing in any such ordinance or ordinances contained shall take away or 
affect any rights secured to any natives in the said territories by any treaties or 
agreements made on behalf or with the sanction of Her late Majesty Queen 
Victoria, His late Majesty King Edward the Seventh, or of His Majesty, and all such 
treaties and agreements shall be and remain mutually binding on all parties to the 
same. 
(2) That all laws, ordinances, proclamations, byelaws and regulations of whatsoever 
nature on force at the date of the commencement of this Order within the said 
territories or any of them shall continue in force until repealed or revoked by or in 
pursuance of any law or ordinance passed by the Legislative Council of the Colony 
of Southern Nigeria. 
(3) That every suit, action, complaint, matter or thing which shall be depending in 
any Court within the said territories at the commencement of this Order shall and 
may be proceeded with in such Court in like manner as if this Order had not been 
passed. 
ARTICLE SIX 
The Governor shall have a negative voice in the making or passing of all such 
Ordinances as aforesaid. And the right is hereby reserved to His Majesty to disallow 
any such Ordinances as aforesaid. Such disallowances shall be signified to the 
Governor through one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State and shall take 
affect from the time when the same shall be promulgated by the Governor. 
The right is also hereby reserved to His Majesty, with the advice of His Privy 
Council, from time to time to make all such Laws or Ordinances as may appears to 
Him necessary for the exercise of such powers and jurisdiction as aforesaid as fully 
as if this Order has not been made. 
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ARTICLE EIGHT 
In the making and establishing of all such Ordinances the Governor and the 
Legislative Council shall conform to and observe all rules, regulations and 
directions in that behalf contained on any instructions under His Majesty's Sign 
Manual and Signet, and, until further directed, the Instructions in force for the time 
being as to the passing of Ordinances by the said Legislative Council for the peace, 
order, and good government of the said Colony of Southern Nigeria, shall, so far as 
they may be applicable, be taken and deemed to be in force in respect of Ordinances 
passed by the said Council by virtue of this Order. 
ARTICLE NINE 
In any of the events which he is authorized, by the Letters Patent of the Twenty-
eight day of February 1906 (constituting the office of Governor and Commander-
In-Chief of the Colony of Southern Nigeria) or any other Letters Patent adding to, 
amending, or substituted for the same to appoint a Deputy within any part f the 
Colony of Southern Nigeria, the Governor may appoint any person to be his Deputy 
within any part of the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and in that capacity to 
exercise, during his pleasure, such of the powers vested in the Governor by his 
Order, or by other Order of His Majesty in Council or by any law or Ordinance now 
or hereafter to be in force in the said Protectorate, except the powers of removal, 
suspension and pardon, as the Governor himself or any powers or authorities. 
Every such Deputy shall, in the discharge of his office, conform to and observe all 
such instructions as the Governor shall address to him for his guidance. 
ARTICLE TEN 
The Governor may constitute and appoint all such Judges, Commissioners, Justices 
of the Peace and other necessary officers as may be lawfully constitutes and 
appointed by His Majesty, all of whom unless otherwise provided by law shall hold 
their offices during His Majesty's pleasure. 
ARTICLE ELEVEN 
The Governor may, upon sufficient cause to him appearing, dismiss an public 
officer whose pensionable emoluments do not exceed one hundred pounds a year, 
provided that in every such case the grounds of intended dismissal are definitely 
stated in writing and communicated to the officer, in order that he may have full 
opportunity of exculpating himself, and that the matter is investigated by the 
Governor with the aid of the head for the time being of the Department in which the 
officer is serving. The Governor may, upon sufficient cause to him appearing, 
suspend from the exercise of his office any person holding any office within the 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, whether appointed by the Governor or by virtue of 
any commission or Warrant from His Majesty, or in His Majesty's Name, or by any 
other mode of appointment. Every such suspension shall continue and have effect 
362 
only until His Majesty's pleasure therein shall be signified to the Governor. In 
proceeding to any such suspension, the Governor is strictly to observe the directions 
in that behalf given to him by any Instructions from His Majesty or signified 
through a Secretary of State. 
ARTICLE TWELVE 
When any crime or offence has been committed within the Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria, or for which the offender may be tried therein, the Governor may, as he 
shall see occasion, in His Majesty's Name and on His Majesty's behalf, grant a 
pardon to any accomplice in such crime or offence , who shall give such 
information as shall lead to the conviction of the principal offender, or of any one of 
such offenders if more than one; and further, may grant to any offender convicted in 
any Court, or Protectorate, a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions, or 
any remission of the sentence passed on such offender or any respite of the 
execution of such sentence, for such period as the Governor thinks fit, and may 
remit any fines, penalties or forfeits due or accrued to His Majesty 
ARTICLE TIDRTEEN 
The Seal now or hereafter in use as the Public Seal of the Colony of Southern 
Nigeria shall be and be deemed to be also the public Seal of the Protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria, and shall be used for sealing all the things whatsoever that shall 
pass the said Seal 
ARTICLE FOURTEEN 
This order shall be published in the Gazette of the Colony of Southern Nigeria and 
shall thereupon commence and come into operation; and the Governor shall give 
directions for the publication of this Order at such places and in such manner, and 
for such time or times as he thinks proper for giving due publicity thereto within the 
Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. 
ARTICLE FIFTEEN 
The above recited Orders in Council of the Sixteenth day of February 1906 and the 
Thirty-first day of May 1910, shall from the commencement of this Order, be 
revoked, without prejudice to anything lawfully done thereunder. 
ARTICLE SIXTEEN 
His Majesty may from time to time revoke, alter, add to, or amend this Order. 
And the High Honourable Lewis Harcourt, one of His Majesty's Principal 
Secretaries of State, is to give the necessary directions herein accordingly. 
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